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Contempt of Court - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 22 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Regina v Havant Justices ex parte Palmer (1985) 149 JP
1985
QBD
May LJ, Nolan J
Contempt of Court
Palmer was a witness to proceedings before a Magistrates' Court. Whilst he and the defendant were waiting in the foyer outside the court for the magistrates to consider their decision Palmer threatened the defendant. He was charged with and convicted of a contempt, then sought to appeal. The crown court declined jurisdiction. He then sought judicial review. Held: On the facts, what had happened was not a contempt since it did not amount to an insult. However, section 12(5) was confined to appeals against sentence only and not to appeals against conviction.
May LJ said: "In those circumstances, as again will be readily apparent, it becomes unnecessary for this court to express any final opinion on the decision of the learned circuit Judge at Portsmouth that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal by the applicant against the magistrates' decision. However, well appreciating that any views which I now express may well hereafter be said to be obiter, having had the benefit of extensive argument on the point and also because it is perhaps a more important one than the one with which I have already dealt, I do propose to express a view upon it.
Mr Foskett [counsel for Palmer] drew our attention to what at first sight appears to be the somewhat unhappy wording of s. 12(5) of the 1981 Act, particularly the phrase "in relation to a sentence on conviction or finding of guilty of an offence". At first reading, one might be forgiven for expecting either the word "to" or "a" before the words "finding of guilty of an offence", but neither is there and for my part I think that it is not for the reason put forward in his submissions by Mr Foskett. By s. 59 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 it was provided that the words "conviction" and "sentence" were to cease to be used in relation to children and young persons dealt with summarily and any reference in any enactment passed before or after the commencement of that Act should in the case of a child or a young person be construed as including a reference to that person being found guilty of an offence, a finding of guilty, or an order made upon such a finding. A child or young person, therefore, is not to be convicted; he or she is to be found guilty of an offence. It is for this reason, Mr Foskett submits, that one finds the word "conviction" and the phrase "finding of guilty of an offence" side by side in subs. (5). For my part, I accept that submission and that then leads one to the proper construction of that subsection.
The relevant section of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 in the instant case of those referred to in s. 12(5) of the 1981 Act is s. 108, which provides for a right of appeal to the Crown Court for a person convicted by magistrates – if he pleaded guilty, against sentence; if he did not, against the conviction or sentence. But s. 12(5) of the 1981 Act merely refers to an "order" under s. 12 and applies s. 108 of the Act of the previous year to that order only as it applies "in relation to a sentence on conviction or finding of guilty of an offence." Thus, in my opinion, the jurisdiction of a Crown court in this context is limited to hearing an appeal against the penalty imposed by magistrates for the contempt which they have found to have been committed: there is no jurisdiction in a Crown Court to hear an appeal by a person against the actual finding of contempt by justices under s. 12(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
Thus, in my judgment, in the instant case the learned circuit Judge was wholly right to decline jurisdiction in so far as the appeal against the finding of contempt was concerned, although had he been minded to and had the applicant been prepared to proceed on that limited basis, he did, in my judgment, have jurisdiction in respect of penalty."
Contempt of Court Act 1981 12 - Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 108
1 Citers


 
Bush v Green [1985] 1 WLR 1143
1985


Contempt of Court
Acts of contempt of court in proceedings before a county court which was neither in the face of the court, nor directly in breach of a judgment or order could only be punished by the QBD.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Moran [1985] 81 Cr App R 51
1985


Contempt of Court
The court noted the need for a court to 'take stock' before sentencing for contempt of court.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Arundel Justices, Ex parte Westminster Press Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 708
1985


Contempt of Court, Media
The basic rule is that anything said in open court may be reported. Withholding the name from the public during the proceedings will provide the basis for the making of an order under section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
Contempt of Court Act 1981 11
1 Citers


 
Attorney-General v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 83; [1987] QB 1
1986
CA
John Donaldson MR, Parker LJJ
Media, Contempt of Court
When considering a complaint of contempt of court against a newspaper, it should be recognised that any criminal trial, by its very nature, causes all involved in it to become progressively more inward looking, with the capacity to study the evidence given and the submissions made in the courtroom, to the exclusion of other sources of information. The words 'substantial risk' of prejudice mean 'not insubstantial'. The test of ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious prejudice’ are separate but overlapping.
Contempt of Court Act 1981
1 Citers



 
 Linnett v Coles; QBD 1986 - [1987] QB 555; [1986] 3 WLR 843
 
Maxwell v Pressdram Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 298; [1987] 1 All ER 656
1987
CA
Kerr LJ, Parker LJ
Defamation, Vicarious Liability, Damages, Contempt of Court, Media
The court was asked whether disclosure should be ordered in the context of the statutory privilege which was created by s.10 of the 1981 Act. The publisher defendant had deposed that it would justify the material. At trial, however, the defence of justification was abandoned and the judge said he would make a (strong) comment adverse to the defendant in the course of his charge of the jury, but he held that the witness need not reveal the source of his material. Held: The appeal failed. A plea of negligence is insufficient to found a claim for exemplary damages. Some conscious wrongdoing is necessary.
Parker LJ made the point that "it is not sufficient merely to say that the information which is sought (to be obtained) is information which is relevant to the determination of an issue before the court. Were that so, it would always be possible to obtain an order for disclosure . "
Contempt of Court Act 1981 10
1 Citers


 
Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing plc [1988] Ch 333; [1987] 3 All ER 276; [1987] 3 WLR 942
1987
CA
Lloyd LJ, Lord Donaldson MR
Media, Contempt of Court
The court explained the common law basis of the law of contempt of court. Lloyd LJ said: "Since the test of contempt is not a breach of the order but interference with the administration of justice, it follows that at common law a contempt may be committed if no specific order has been made by the court affecting anyone other than those involved in the proceedings. At common law, if the court makes an order regulating its own procedure and the purpose of the order is plainly to protect the administration of justice, then anyone who subverts that order will be guilty of contempt".
There was no room for a state of mind which fell short of intention. Lloyd LJ said: " . . that intent may exist, even though there is no desire to interfere with the course of justice. Nor need it be the sole intent. It may be inferred, even though there is no overt proof. The more obvious the interference with the course of justice, the more readily will the requisite intent be inferred."
Sir Donaldson said of an application for contempt against a third party that: "I should like to emphasise with all the power at my command that this case is not primarily about national security or official secrets. It is about the right of private citizens and public authorities to seek and obtain the protection of the courts for confidential information which they claim to be their property"
Lord Donaldson MR set out the intent required to be shown: ". . the power of the court to commit for contempt where the conduct complained of is specifically intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. Such an intent need not be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct. Nor need it be the sole intention of the contemnor. An intent is to be distinguished from motive or desire . ."
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General v News Group Newspapers Ltd; CA 1987 - [1987] QB 1; [1986] 2 All ER 833
 
Harmsworth v Harmsworth [1987] 3 All ER 816
1987


Contempt of Court
The court said that said that it would only be in an exceptional case that the procedural rules regarding committal applications could be waived.
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd; QBD 1988 - [1988] 2 WLR 805
 
X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648
1988

Rose J
Information, Health Professions, Contempt of Court
Complaint was made that defendant newspapers were to publish confidential medical records of patients suffering Aids. An injunction was sought to prevent use of records given to a journalist by a hospital employee. The records related to doctors in general practice. The newspaper said it intended to do so in a way which would not allow identification of the doctors. Held: The injunction was granted. The fact of the confidence in the records meant that the claimant did not have to establish any further prospective damage. Detriment had been established immediately the records were handed over, since this would discourage other patients approaching AIDS clinics. One of the doctors had already been harassed by the newspaper. Once the information had been acquired in breach of contract, it was for the defendants to show good reason for its publication. They had not discharged that burden. Allowing the paper to pick and choose what it published would make a mockery of the section, and the story published during the continuation of the roceedings ahd clearly been in contempt of court. The court emphasised the importance of confidentiality for medical health records.
Contempt of Court Act 1981 10
1 Citers


 
Re L (A Minor) (Wardship: Freedom of Publication) [1988] 1 All ER 418
1988
FD
Booth J
Children, Media, Contempt of Court
The mere fact that a child is known to be a ward of court is not sufficient to make any publication identifying the child a contempt of court.
Contempt of Court Act 1981 12
1 Citers


 
Pospischal v Phillips Times, 20 January 1988
20 Jan 1988
CA
Taylor LJ
Contempt of Court
Where property was sold, and assets dissipated in breach of a Mareva injunction, an immediate prison sentence was necessary to both protect the plaintiff and punish the defendant. However, the court substituted a sentence of six weeks' imprisonment for the ten weeks imposed by the judge because the defendant was able to raise a loan and the money could be placed in the names of solicitors which would enable the Mareva injunction to be discharged.
1 Citers


 
Logicrose Ltd v Southend United Football Club Ltd Times, 05 March 1988; [1988] 1 WLR 1256
5 Feb 1988
CA
Millet LJ
Litigation Practice, Contempt of Court
An application was made to strike out the action in the middle of the substantive hearing on the ground that the responsible director of the plaintiffs had "deliberately suppressed [a crucial document] and, for a time, successfully concealed its existence from the Court." Held: The Court's processes had not been defeated and the proceedings should be allowed to proceed.
Millet LJ said: "That is a very serious allegation indeed if true it would deserve the serious consequences for which the defendants ask, but it must be clearly proved . . it does not have to be proved in accordance with the criminal standard of proof. Deliberate disobedience of a peremptory order for discovery is no doubt a contempt and, if proved in accordance with the criminal standard of proof, may, in theory at least, be visited with a fine or imprisonment. But to debar the offender from all further part in the proceedings and to give judgment against him accordingly is not an appropriate response by the Court to contempt. It may, however, be an appropriate response to a failure to comply with the rules relating to discovery, even in the absence of a specific order of the Court, and so in the absence of any contempt, not because that conduct is deserving of punishment but because the failure has rendered it impossible to conduct a fair trial and would make any judgement in favour of the offender unsafe. In my view a litigant is not to be deprived of his right to proper trial as a penalty for his contempt or his defiance of the Court, but only if his conduct has amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court which would render any further proceedings unsatisfactory and prevent the Court from doing justice. Before the Court takes that serious step it needs to satisfied that there is a real risk of this happening." and "The deliberate and successful suppression of a material document is a serious abuse of the process of the Court and may well merit the exclusion of the offender from all other participation in the trial. The reason is that it makes the fair trial of the action impossible to achieve and any judgment in favour of the offender unsafe. But if the threat of such exclusion produces the missing document, then the object of order 24 rule 16 is achieved. "
Millet LJ: "It is well established that a principal who discovers that his agent in a transaction has obtained or arranged to obtain a bribe or secret commission from the other party to the transaction is entitled, in addition to other remedies which may be open to him to rescind the transaction ab initio or, if it is too late to rescind, to bring it to an end for the future."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Brewer v Brewer; CA 1989 - [1989] 2 FLR 251
 
in Re Lonrho Plc [1990] 2 AC 154; [1989] 3 WLR 535; [1989] 2 All ER 1100
1989
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Contempt of Court
A jury trial procedure for contempt would never be appropriate: "If the trial is to be by jury, the possibility of prejudice by advance publicity directed to an issue which the jury will have to decide is obvious. The possibility that a professional judge will be influenced by anything he has read about the issues in a case which he has to try is very much more remote. He will not consciously allow himself to take account of anything other than the evidence and arguments presented to him in court."
Lord Bridge of Harwich discussed the 1981 Act: "the Act of 1981, on any point on which any doubt arises as to its construction, may be presumed to have been intended to avoid future conflict between the law of contempt of court in the United Kingdom and the obligations of the United Kingdom under the European Convention . . The only safe course, we think, is to apply the test imposed by the statutory language according to its ordinary meaning, without any preconception derived from Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 as to what kind of publication is likely to impede or prejudice the course of justice. The question whether a particular publication, in relation to particular legal proceedings which are active, creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in those proceedings will be seriously impeded or prejudiced is ultimately one of fact. Whether the course of justice in particular proceedings will be impeded or prejudiced by a publication must depend primarily on whether the publication will bring influence to bear which is likely to divert the proceedings in some way from the course which they would otherwise have followed. The influence may affect the conduct of witnesses, the parties or the court. Before proceedings have come to trial and before the facts have been found, it is easy to see how critical public discussion of the issues and criticism of the conduct of the parties, particularly if a party is held up to public obloquy, may impede or prejudice the course of the proceedings by influencing the conduct of witnesses or parties in relation to the proceedings. If the trial is to be by jury, the possibility of prejudice by advance publicity directed to an issue which the jury will have to decide is obvious."
Contempt of Court Act 1981
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Midland Marts v Hobday; ChD 1989 - [1989] 1 WLR 1143

 
 Lightfoot v Lightfoot; CA 1989 - [1989] 1 FLR 414

 
 Regina v Griffin; 1989 - (1989) 88 Cr App R 63
 
Hewitt and Harman v United Kingdom 12175/86
9 May 1989
ECHR
Frowein J P
Human Rights, Contempt of Court
The claimants, officers of the National Council for Civil Liberties, complained that their telephone calls had beem intercepted by the Secret Services.
[ Bailii ]
 
Leary v Britiah Broadcasting Corporatin Unreported, 29 September 1989
29 Sep 1989
CA
Lord Donaldson MR, Ralph Gibson LJ
Media, Contempt of Court
Lord Donaldson MR considered an application for an injunction to prevent a publication which it was said would create a contempt of court, and said: "I am very concerned that no one should think that on a speculative basis you can go to the courts and call upon the publisher of printed material or television or radio material to come forward and tell the court exactly what it is proposed to do, and invite the court to act as a censor. That is not the function of the court. It is different, of course, if there is solid evidence as to what the content of the publication will be and that evidence leads the court to conclude that prima facie there will be a contempt of court. Then it would no doubt be right that the defendant should be invited, but not compelled, to tell the court what in fact he intends to publish, because of course if he does not and there is a prima facie case that there will be contempt he will find himself faced with an injunction. But that is not the same thing as setting the courts up as a censorship body to which people must submit material on pain of being prohibited from publishing it."
Ralph Gibson LJ said: "The primary defence of the administration of justice from unlawful interference by [publications] is the heavy sanction of prosecution if a contempt of court is committed."
1 Citers


 
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