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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Contract - From: 1800 To: 1849

This page lists 161 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Chandler v Parker and Danks [1800] EngR 3; (1800) 3 Esp 76; (1800) 170 ER 544 (A)
1800


Contract, Children
Where the plaintiff declares on a joint contract, and one defendant pleads infancy, the plaintiff cannot enter a noli prosequi and proceed against the other defendant in that action, but should commence a new action against the adult defendant only.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Astley v Frances Weldon; CCP 27-Jan-1801 - [1801] EngR 108; (1801) 2 Bos and Pul 346; (1801) 126 ER 1318
 
Bilbie v Lumley and Others (1802) 2 East 469; [1802] EngR 245; (1802) 102 ER 448
28 Jun 1802

Lord Ellenborough CJ
Contract
An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid. Held: A contract cannot be set aside on the grounds of a mistake as to the law. Whereas money paid under a mistake of fact is generally recoverable, as a general rule money is not recoverable on the ground that it was paid under a mistake of law.
Lord Ellenborough asked counsel for the plaintiff: "whether he could state any case where if a party paid money to another voluntarily with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case, he could recover it back again on account of his ignorance of the law." In the absence of an answer, judgment was given for the defendant: "Every man must be taken to be cognisant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried. It would be urged in almost every case."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bunn, Executor of Bunn v Guy [1803] EngR 697; (1803) 4 East 190; (1803) 102 ER 803
7 Nov 1803


Legal Professions, Contract
A contract entered into by a practising attorney to relinquish his business and recommend his clients t0 two other attornies for a valuable consideration, and that he would not himself practise in such business within certain limits, and would permit them to make use of his name in their firm for a certain time, but without his interference, &c was holden to be valid in law.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Wain and another v Warlters [1804] KB 10; [1804] EngR 184; (1804) 5 East 10; (1804) 102 ER 972
1804

Grose J, Lord Ellenborough CJ, Lawrence J
Contract
A guarantee contained a promise to pay the debt of another, but made no mention of the consideration given for the guarantee. Lord Ellenborough CJ said: "the clause in question in the Statute of Frauds has the word agreement. And the question is, whether that word is to be understood in the loose incorrect sense in which it may sometimes be used, as synonymous to promise or undertaking, or in its more proper and correct sense, as signifying a mutual contract on consideration between two or more parties? The latter appears to me to be the true construction of the word, to which we are bound to give its proper effect; the more so when it is considered by whom that statute is said to have been drawn the person to be charged for the debt of another is to be charged, in the form of the proceeding against him, upon his special promise, but without a legal consideration to sustain it, that promise would be nudum pactum as to him. The statute never meant to enforce any promise which was before invalid merely because it was put in writing. The obligatory part is indeed the promise, which will account for the word promise being used in the first part of the clause, but still in order to charge the party making it, the statute proceeds to require that the agreement, by which must be understood the agreement in respect of which the promise was made, must be reduced into writing. And indeed it seems necessary for effectuating the object of the statute that the consideration should be set down in writing as well as the promise; for otherwise the consideration might be illegal, or the promise might have been made upon a condition precedent, which the party charged may not afterwards be able to prove, the omission of which would materially vary a promise, by turning that into an absolute promise which was only a conditional one: and then it would rest altogether on the conscience of the witness to assign another consideration in the one case, or to drop the condition in the other, and thus to introduce the very frauds and perjuries which it was the object of the Act to exclude, by requiring that the agreement should be reduced into writing, by which the consideration as well as the promise would be rendered certain. The authorities all show that the word agreement is not satisfied unless there be a consideration, which consideration forming part of the agreement ought therefore to have been shown; and the promise is not binding by the statute unless the consideration which forms part of the agreement be also stated in writing."
Grose J said: "what is required to be in writing therefore, is the agreement (not the promise, as mentioned in the first part of the clause) or some note or memorandum of the agreement. Now the agreement is that which is to show what each party is to do or perform, and by which both parties are to be bound; and this is required to be in writing."
Lawrence J said: "and as the consideration for the promise is part of the agreement, that ought also to be stated in writing."
[ Commonlii ]
 
Crofton v Ormsby (1804) 2 Sch and Lef 604
1804

Lord Redesdale, Lord Chancellor in Ireland
Northern Ireland, Contract
When the purpose of one party to a contract causing delay was to defeat the other party, if the other party then fails to complete, the delaying party cannot insist on performance of the contract: 'The whole laches here consists in the not clothing an equitable estate with a legal title, and that by a party in possession. Now I do not conceive that this is that species of laches, which will prevail against the equitable title; if I should hold it so, it would tend to overset a great deal of property in this country, where parties often continue to hold under an equitable contract for forty or fifty years, without clothing it with the legal title. I conceive, therefore, that possession having gone with the contract, there is no room for the objection. ... But, in the present case, there is nothing but a resting on the equitable estate by a person in possession, without clothing it with a legal title, which I think never was held to be that sort of laches that would prevent relief.'
1 Citers


 
Capp v Topham [1805] EngR 149; (1805) 6 East 392; (1805) 102 ER 1337
17 May 1805


Contract
Commonlii An auctioneer was employed to sell an estate, the lowest price of which was fixed by the owner and written down by him on a piece of paper which was put under a candlestick at the time of sale, with the privity of the auctioneer, but not signed by the owner, nor any notice in writing given to the auctioneer of the price so set down, nor had the auctioneer given the previous notice of the sale to the collector of the duty, as required by the Acts of the 19 G 3 c. 56, and 28 G 3, c. 37: but being asked at the sale whether he had taken the proper precautions to avoid the duty in case there were no sale, he said that it was his mode to fix a price under the candlestick, and if the bidding did not come up to that price, it was no sale or duty : Held, that the duty having attached though there were no sale, for want of taking the precautions required of the owner by the statutes under such circumstances ; and the auctioneer having been sued for the duty on his bond to the Crown, and compelled to pay it, he could not recover it over against the owner, he having warranted that proper precautions had been taken to prevent the duty attaching in the event; though both parties were mistaken in the law.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Rushforth And Another, Assignees of B And W Rushforth v Hadfield And Others [1805] EngR 204; (1805) 6 East 519; (1805) 102 ER 1386
20 Jun 1805


Contract
The lien of a common carrier for his general balance, however it may arise in point of law from an implied agreement to be inferred from a general usage of trade, proved by clear and satisfactory instances sufficiently numerous and general to warrant so extensive a conclusion affecting the custom of the realm, yet is not to be favoured, nor can be supported by a few recent instances of detention of goods by four or five carriers for their general balance. But such a lien may be inferred from evidence of the particular mode of dealing between the respective parties.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Rushforth And Others, Assignees of Rushforth, v Hadfield And Others [1806] EngR 70; (1806) 7 East 224; (1806) 103 ER 86
8 Feb 1806


Contract
A general lien is regarded in law as an exception, rather than the rule, because it advantages one creditor, otherwise unsecured, over the general body of unsecured creditors.
Where no lien exists at common law, it can arise by contract with the particular party, either express or implied: it may be implied either from previos dealings between the same parties upon the footing of such a lien, or even from a usage of the trade so general as that the jury must reasonably presume that the parties knew of and adopted it in their dealing. But where as in the case of a common carrier claiming a lien for his general balance, such a lien is against the policy of the common law and the custom of the realm, which only gives him a lien for the carriage price of the particular goods, there ought to be very trong evidence of a general usage for suh a lien to induce a jury to infer the knowlede and adoption of it by the particular parties in their contract ; and the jury having negatived such a general usage, though proved to have been frequently exercised by the defenants and various other common carriers throghout the north for 10 or years before, and in one instance so far back as 30 years, though not opposed by other evidence, the Court refused to grant a new trial.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ritchie v Atkinson (1808) 10 East 295
1808

Lord Ellenborough
Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Havelock v Geddes (1809) 10 East 555
1809

Lord Ellenborough
Contract, Transport
If the obligation of seaworthiness in a charterparty contract were a condition precedent then the neglect of putting in a single nail after the ship ought to have been made tight, staunch, etc., would be a breach of the condition and a defence to the whole of the plaintiff's demand.
1 Citers



 
 Stilk v Myrick; KBD 16-Dec-1809 - [1809] EWHC KB J58; [1809] EngR 552; (1809) 2 Camp 317; (1809) 170 ER 1168 (B)
 
Davidson v Gwynne [1810] 12 East 381
1810

Lord Ellenborough
Contract
The court considered a claim for a breach of a charterparty. Held: The sailing with the first convoy was not a condition precedent, the object of the contract was the performance of the voyage and that had been performed. It was useless to go over the same subject again "which has so often been discussed of late." Lord Ellenborough said: "The principle laid down in Boone v. Eyre has been recognised in all the subsequent cases that unless the non-performance alleged in the breach of contract goes to the whole root and consideration of it the covenant broken is not to be considered as a condition precedent but as a distinct covenant for breach of which the party may be compensated in damages unless by the breach of the stipulation of the fitness of the vessel the object of the voyage is wholly frustrated."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Aubert v Walsh (1810) 3 Taunt. 277
1810


Contract
The parties had wagered on 15 September 1808 that the war with France would end before 1 July 1810. One party to the wager withdrew in October 1808, and sought recovery of his stake. Held: He was entitled to its return. Lord Mansfield said: "why should not a man say, you and I have agreed so and so, but the agreement is good for nothing; I cannot bind you, and you cannot bind me, therefore I desire, before the event happens, that you will pay me back my money."
1 Citers


 
Scott v Gillmore [1810] EngR 393; (1810) 3 Taunt 226; (1810) 128 ER 90 (A)
6 Jul 1810


Banking, Contract
A bill of exchange, part of the consideration for which is spirituous liquor sold in less quantities than of 20s. value, is totally void, though part of the consideration was money lent -The statute 24 G. 2, c. 40, s. 12, making illegal the sale of spirits in less quantities than to 20s. value, unless paid for, extends to spirits mixed with water.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Phillips v Bateman 104 ER 1124; (1812) 16 East 356
1812


Contract, Banking
A, was faced with a run on a banking house, and promised to support the bank with £30,000. Note holders stopped withdrawing their money, but the bank subsequently stopped paying out. Held: A was not liable to an action by individual holders of bank notes, under the doctrine of privity of contract.


 
 Cook v Jones, Reeve, and Benwell; 11-Feb-1812 - [1812] EngR 114; (1812) 15 East 237; (1812) 104 ER 834
 
Schneider v Heath (1813) 3 Camp 506
1813

Mansfield CJ
Contract
A ship was sold "to be taken with all faults". In fact the vendor knew that she was unseaworthy. The particulars of sale stated that her hull was "nearly as good as when launched". In fact the hull was rotten and the captain took her to a place where he kept her constantly afloat. Held The knowledge of the captain should be imputed to the owner of the ship, and that the contract should be set aside for misrepresentation.
1 Citers


 
Joseph v Knox (1813) 3 Camp 320
1813


Contract, Scotland

1 Citers


 
Brisbane v Dacres (1813) 5 Taunt. 143
1813

Gibbs J, Heath J, Chief Justice, Sir James Mansfield, Chambre J dissenting
Contract, Equity
The commander of a naval vessel, HMS Arethusa, had paid to the Admiral in command a proportion of freight received for the carriage of publicly owned bullion on board the Arethusa in the belief that this was due to the Admiral as a matter of usage. On later discovering that the money was not due because the usage had been discontinued, he sought to recover it from the Admiral's widow and executrix. He challenged the decision in Bilbie v Limley. Held: The court had no role to play in the recovery of money paid by mistake. Chief Justice, Sir James Mansfield said it was not an affront to conscience to allow the money to be retained, because the admiral acted (as all admirals then did) in accordance with what was generally believed to be his accustomed right, and in particular because he might have changed his position on the faith of the payment.
Chambre J (dissenting said the maxim 'ignorantia juris non excusat' applied only in cases of "delinquency".
Gibbs J described the universal opinion among the practitioners in the Court of King's Bench that where money was paid with knowledge of the facts it could not be recovered on the ground of mistake: "We must take this payment to have been made under a demand of right, and I think that where a man demands money of another as a matter of right, and that other, with a full knowledge of the facts upon which the demand is founded, has paid a sum, he never can recover back the sum he has so voluntarily paid. It may be, that upon a further view he may form a different opinion of the law, and it may be, his subsequent opinion may be the correct one. If we were to hold otherwise, I think that many inconveniences may arise; there are many doubtful questions of law: when they arise, the Defendant has an option, either to litigate the question, or to submit to the demand, and pay the money. I think, that by submitting to the demand, he that pays the money gives it to the person to whom he pays it, and makes it his, and closes the transaction between them."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Corlett v Gordon And Another [1813] EngR 700; (1813) 3 Camp 472; (1813) 170 ER 1450 (A)
16 Dec 1813


Contract, Agency, Commercial
Merchants in London receive from a mere stranger residing abroad a bill of lading of certain goods, in a letter requesting them to effeet insurance, they declining to do business for the consignor, but acting bona fide with a view to his interest, indorse the bilil of lading to a friend of his, who receives the goods, and afterwards fails with the proceeds iri his hands Held, that the merchants, by indorsing the bill of ladiug were liable to the consignor for the amount
[ Commonlii ]
 
Schneider v Norris (1814) 2 MandS 286
1814

Lord Ellenborough CJ
Contract
The name of a seller was printed on a bill of parcels but he in turn wrote on the contract the name of the purchaser. Held: The seller had adopted the writing of his own name and a signature within the Statute of Frauds. The essential attributes of a signature are recognition and approval of the contents of the document; it does not necessarily need to be in manuscript form provided that the party adopts the printed name as his own.
Statute of Frauds 1677 4
1 Citers


 
Robinson v Ann Wilson And W Larkins [1814] EngR 748; (1814) 2 Madd 434; (1814) 56 ER 395
19 Dec 1814


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Mortimer v Salkeld [1816] EngR 124; (1816) 4 Camp 42; (1816) 171 ER 14
1816


Contract
Dealing in lottery produces is not within the Stock-jobbing Acts.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Everard v Paterson (1816) 2 Marsh 304; [1816] EngR 521; (1816) 6 Taunt 625; (1816) 128 ER 1178
1816
CEC
Gibbs CJ
Contract
The plaintiff sued on a bond which was conditional on performance of an arbitrators' award "made in writing under their hands". The pleading alleged that the arbitrators had made and published their award in writing; but it did not allege that the award had been made in writing under their hands. Held: This was a defective pleading because the award might have been in writing, but yet not under the hands of the arbitrators. Although Gibbs CJ did not explain the difference between the two expressions, I would infer that he considered that "under the hands" meant that the award had to be signed by the arbitrators.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hudson v Robinson (1816) 4 M and S 475
1816

Lord Ellenborough CJ
Contract
A partner in a firm fraudulently contracted in the names of the partnership to sell goods to the plaintiff. He received the purchase price from the plaintiff and then did not delivery the goods. Held: The plaintiff buyer could recover the purchase price from the fraud as money had and received. Lord Ellenborough CJ said: "It is said that an action for money had and received is not maintainable in this case. But an action for money had and received is maintainable whenever the money of one man has, without consideration, got into the pocket of another. Here the money of the plaintiffs has got into the pocket of the defendant; and the question is whether this has been without any consideration. The consideration was the supposed right of the defendant to dispose of the goods as partnership property, which was the inducement to the plaintiffs to give this bill, under which they have been obliged to pay the money. The defendant had no such right; therefore the absence of any consideration entitles the plaintiffs to maintain this action, and still more so where the money has got into the defendant's pocket through the medium of a fraud."
1 Citers


 
Ranger v The Earl of Chesterfield [1816] EngR 439; (1816) 5 M and S 2; (1816) 105 ER 952 (B)
1 May 1816


Contract
If a bond and warrant of attorney and indenture be made to secure an annuity, the memorial of the bond and warrant of attorney, need not express for whose life the annuity is granted, if it be expressed in the memorial of the indenture, which recites the said bond and warrant of attorney, for whose life the said annuity is granted.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Chase And Others, Assignees of William And Thomas Hurst (Bankrupts), v James And David Westmore [1816] EngR 501; (1816) 5 M and S 180; (1816) 105 ER 1016
21 May 1816


Contract
A workman having bestowed his labour upon a chattel in consideration of a price fixed in amount by his agreement with the owner, may detain the chattel until the price be paid; and this, though the chattel be delivered to the workman in different parcels, and at different times, if the work to be done under the agreement be entire. Semble, that where the parties contract for a particular time or mode of payment, the workman has not a right to set up a claim to the possession inconsistent with the terms of the contract.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dickson v Taylor [1816] ScotJCR 1 - Murray - 141; (1816) 1 Murray 141
1 Nov 1816
SJC

Scotland, Contract
If a collier, under an engagement with one party, enter into an engagement with another party, that party is bound to turn him off as soon as he becomes acquainted with the prior engagement.
[ Bailii ]
 
Selby v Selby [1817] 3 Mer 2
1817

Grant MR
Contract
Signing: "That is signing is, putting his name to [the document] or [doing] some other act intended by him to be equivalent to the actual signature of the name – such as a person unable to write making his mark".
1 Citers


 
Downie v Burgan and Company [1817] ScotJCR 1 - Murray - 219; (1817) 1 Murray 219
24 Feb 1817
SJC

Scotland, Contract
Damages for breach of contract.
[ Bailii ]
 
Morgan and Saunders v Hunter and Company [1817] ScotJCR 1 - Murray - 256; (1817) 1 Murray 256
23 Jun 1817
SJC

Scotland, Contract
An article commissioned, and on receipt returned to be repaired as damaged; found, that when repaired in terms of the letter returning it, any objection to the original construction is precluded.
[ Bailii ]
 
Hepburn v Cowan [1817] ScotJCR 1 - Murray - 261; (1817) 1 Murray 261
14 Jul 1817
SJC

Scotland, Contract
Found that a subscription to a bill was the true and genuine hand writing of the pursuer.
[ Bailii ]
 
Jones v Morgan And Another [1818] EngR 33; (1809, 1811, 1818) 2 Camp 474; (1818) 170 ER 1222
1818


Contract

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Adams v Lindsell; KBD 5-Jun-1818 - (1818) 1 B and Ald 681; [1818] EngR 497; (1818) 106 ER 250
 
Smith v Fromont [1818] EngR 611; (1818) 1 Wils Ch 472; (1818) 37 ER 202 (A)
18 Jul 1818


Litigation Practice, Contract
A. the owner of a stage coach from Bristol to London, sold to B. the profits of it for a part of the road, B. agreeing to supply the coach with horses for that part of the road, and A. for the remainder. B.'s. horses having been taken in execution and advertised for sale, A. provided his own horses to convey the coach along that part of the road comprised in B.'s agreement : and the Court refused a motion for an injunction to restrain him from so doing.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Perfect And Others v Musgrave; 10-Nov-1818 - [1818] EngR 676; (1818) 6 Price 111; (1818) 146 ER 757
 
Prendergast and Another v Devey And Others [1821] EngR 646; (1821) 6 Madd 124; (1821) 56 ER 1039 (B)
6 Dec 1821


Contract
This was a bill by sureties to restrain an action against them upon a surety bond, and to have the bond delivered up, upon the ground that the creditors had given time to the principal debtors without the sureties' consent. Upon the cause coming on in Hilary term last, it was suggested that the merits would be tried at law, upon a demurrer to the plea of the Defendants there (the Plaintiffs in equity), who had, amongst other pleas in bar, pleaded the instrument alleged to be a discharge of their liability, and the cause stood over.
The demurrer at law being allowed, and the plea overruled by the Court of KB, the cause was now put again in the paper.
The facts appearing in the pleading and by further statement agreed upon between the parties at the request of the Court, were these:-
In September 1818 the Plaintiffs, as sureties for two persons of the name of Prendergast, coal merchants, became bound to the Defendants, who supplied the Prendergasts with coals wholesale, in a penalty, conditioned to be void if the Plaintiffs should, within one month after demand on them, pay such balance or sum of money, not exceeding 2500, as should become due to the Defendants upon settlement of accounts between them and the Preridergasts.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Carnegie v Waugh (1823) 1 LJ (OS) KB 89
1823


Contract
The tutors and curators of an infant executed an agreement for a lease with another, for an annual rent to be paid to the infant. Held: The child could sue on the instrument, even though he was not a party to it.

 
Adderley v Dixon (1824)
1824


Contract
(Specific Performance)
1 Citers


 
Bromage and Another v Prosser [1824] EngR 822; (1824) 1 Car and P 475; (1824) 171 ER 1280
20 Aug 1824


Contract, Torts - Other
Semble, that malice is necessary to ground an action for words ; and that if words be proved to be spoken bona fide and without malice, no action lies for the speaking of them, though they be false and actionable in themselves; and though injury result to the party from the speaking of them - and, semble, that the defendant may, under the general issue, go into evidence to shew that he spoke the words bona fide and without rnalice
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Welby v Drake [1825] 1 Car and P 557
1825


Contract

1 Citers


 
Bromage And Another v Prosser [1825] EngR 42; (1825) 4 B and C 247; (1825) 107 ER 1051
1825


Contract, Torts - Other
Bayley J distinguished "malice in law", inferred from the defendant's intentional interference with the plaintiff's rights, from "malice in fact" and Malice in common acceptation of the term means ill-will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.'
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bromage And Another v Prosser [1825] EngR 609; (1825) 1 Car and P 673; (1825) 171 ER 1362 (B)
2 Jun 1825


Contract
Thls case having been again argued, by J L Adolphus, for the plaintiffs, and Campbell, for the defendants, the Court now gave Judgment on the motion for a new trial.
Abbot CJ (after stating the nature of the case) -- On the general question, whether on a sale of goods for a specific purpose, a warranty is to be implied that they are resonably fit and proper for that purpose, I continue to be of the same opinion that was expressed by me at the trial, although some of my Brother Judges are as strongly of a contrary opinion We do not, however, feel ourselves called upon to decide that question , for, allowing that a person who sells a commodity fora specific shall be taken, by law, to undertake that it was reasonably fit and proper for that purpose, yet the plaintiffs have not, in this case, declared on that implied warranty, as the declaration states, in general terms, that the defendants undertaok that the copper in question should be good, substantial, and serviceable. Now we are all of opinion, that a warranty to that extent, and in those unqualified terms, could not be implied by law out of the circumstances attending the sale of an article like this, of which the defects were equally unknown to both parties at the time of the sale. The rule must therefore be made absolute.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Studdy v Sanders And Another [1826] EngR 977; (1826) 5 B and C 628; (1826) 108 ER 234
2 Jun 1826


Contract
Where a contract was made between A. and B., whereby A., having a quantity of apples, agreed to sell his cyder to B. at a certain price per hogshead, to be delivered at T. at a future time, and to lend such pipes as he had for the use of the cyder, to be manufactured on his, A.’s premises, and to be paid for before it was removed, and A, in pursuance, delivered a quantity of juice expressed from‘the apples to a servant hired by B. to manufacture the cyder on A.’s premises, and before the cyder was completely manufactured, it was seized by the Excise-officers, because the place where it was deposited had not been entered, and was condemned in the Exchequer as B.’s property, together with the casks, and in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, brought by A. against B., it appeared that the word cyder, at the place where the contract was made, meant the juice of the apples as soon as it was expressed : it was thereupon held, that the contract must be construed to have been for the sale of cyder in that sense of the word, and that the property passed to B. as soon as the apple juice was delivered to his servant. Secondly, that it was B.’s duty to enter t,he premises, and as through his default it became impossible for A. to deliver the goods at T., the failure to do so did not bar his action. Thirdly, that A. might recover in this action the price of the casks lent to the defendant.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Slack v Tolson; 4-Aug-1826 - [1826] EngR 1119; (1826) 1 Russ 553; (1826) 38 ER 213
 
Holliday v Mann And Another [1826] EngR 1321; (1826) 2 Car and P 509; (1826) 172 ER 231 (A)
21 Dec 1826


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Percival v Blake [1826] EngR 1323; (1826) 2 Car and P 514; (1826) 172 ER 233
23 Dec 1826


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Weller v Deakins [1827] EngR 413; (1827) 2 Car and P 618; (1827) 172 ER 281
7 May 1827


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Toosey Administratrix Of Toosey v Williams [1827] EngR 890; (1827) M and M 129; (1827) 173 ER 1105 (C)
22 Dec 1827


Land, Contract
In an action to recover the deposit on the purchase of an estate on the ground of a defect in the vendor’s title, specified on rescinding the contract, no objection can be insisted on at the trial which was not stated as a reason for refusing to complete the contract, if it be of such a nature that it might, if then stated, have been removed.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Atkinson And Others, Assignees Of Sleddon, v Bell And Others [1828] EngR 12; (1828) 8 B and C 277; (1828) 108 ER 1046
1828


Contract
A. having a patent for certain spinning machinery, received an order from B. to have some spinning frames made for him. A. employed C. to make the machines for B., and informed the fatter that he had so done. After the machines had been completed, A. ordered them to be altered. They were afterwards completed according to this new order, and packed up in boxes for B., and C. informed B. that they were ready, but he refused to accept them : Held, that C. could not recover the price from B. in an action for goods bargained and sold, or for work and labour, and materials.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ball v Mallin (1829) 3 Bligh NS 1
1829
HL

Contract, Health
A person must have the necessary mental capacity if he is to execute a voluntary deed. The House upheld a direction to the jury that what was required was that a person "should be capable of understanding what he did by executing the deed in question when its general import was fully explained to him."
1 Citers



 
 Kemble v Farren; 6-Jul-1829 - [1829] EngR 590; (1829) 5 Bing 141; (1829) 130 ER 1234
 
Dunn v Murray [1829] EngR 602; (1829) 9 B and C 780; (1829) 109 ER 290
8 Jul 1829


Contract, Estoppel
Declaration stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, would enter into the employ of the defendant in a certain capacity for a year, at the rate of five guineas per week throughout the year, defendant undertook to employ him for a year, and alleged as a breach that the defendant dismissed the plaintiff from his employ before the end of the year without any reasonable or probable cause.
The declaration contained counts for wages, and for work and labour, &c. The cause, which was commenced before the expiration of the year, was referred to an arbitrator, who awarded to the plaintiff a sum of money equivalent in amount to the wages he would have been entitled to receive from the defendant on the day when the action was commenced. No claim was made before the arbitrator for any compensation in damages for the dismissal, except so far as the special count in the declaration, and the evidence of the employment and the dismissal might amount to such a claim. The plaintiff having afterwards brought an action to recover compensation in damages in consequence of the dismissal from the deferidant’s employ before the end of the year; it was held, that the award of the arbitrator was a bar to such action.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cory v Bretton [1830] 172 ER 783; (1830) 4 Car and P 462
1830


Contract
The provision in a letter that it was "not to be used in prejudice of my rights …." was read as meaning that an apparent acknowledgement of indebtedness in the same letter was "clearly a conditional statement".
1 Citers


 
Marzetti v Williams (1830) 1 B and Ad 415
1830


Contract
A finding of a beach of contract implies that some remedy will be available.
1 Citers



 
 Wilson and M'Lellan v Sinclair; 1830 - (1830) 3 Wilson and Shaw 398
 
Adams v Witherston [1830] EngR 902; (1830) You 117; (1830) 159 ER 929
7 Dec 1830


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dixon v Monkland Canal Company (1831) 5 Wilson and Shaw 445
1831

Lord Brougham LC
Contract
Recovery of money paid in error of law.
1 Citers


 
Young v Timmins (1831) C and J 331
1831


Contract, Employment
The servant had agreed not to work for anyone else bu the employer, but he might have been given no work and he received no remuneration for considerable periods. Held: He had been deprived of a livelihood, and the agreement was in restraint of trade.
1 Citers


 
Hill v Featherstonhaugh (1831) 7 Bing. 569
1831

Tindal CJ
Legal Professions, Contract
Tindal CJ said: 'If an attorney, through inadvertence or inexperience, - for I impute no improper motive to the plaintiff - incurs trouble which is useless to his client, he cannot make it a subject of remuneration . . Could a bricklayer, who had placed a wall in such a position as to be liable to fall, charge his employer for such an erection?' Clearly not."
1 Citers


 
Planche v Colburn and Another [1831] EWHC KB J56; [1831] 172 ER 876; (1831) 8 Bing 14
14 Jun 1831
KBD

Contract
The plaintiff had contracted with defendants to write a work for "The Juvenile Library;" and he was held to be entitled to recover on their discontinuing the publication; yet the time for the completion of the contract, that is for the work being published in "The Juvenile Library," had not arrived, for that would not be till a reasonable time after the author had completed the work.
[ Bailii ]
 
Nash v Duncomb And Griffin [1831] EngR 777; (1831) 1 M and Rob 104; (1831) 174 ER 36 (A)
5 Jul 1831


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Wetherell v Jones (1832) 3BandAD 221; (1832) 1 LJ KB 139
1832


Contract
The plaintiff sold spirits, misstating the strength to reduce the tax. Held: A failure only to comply with regulations, which would result in a penalty, did not render void a sale of goods, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the contract price.
1 Citers


 
Reading v Menham [1832] EngR 923; (1832) 1 M and Rob 234; (1832) 174 ER 80 (B)
18 Dec 1832


Contract
The hirer of a carriage by the year under a written agreement, binding the carriage maker "to keep the same in perfect repair without say further charges whatever,” is not liable for repairs made necessary by accident, and not by the wilful default of the hirer.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Judson v Etheridge [1833] EngR 144; (1833) 1 Cr and M 743; (1833) 149 ER 598
1833


Contract
A contract for the feeding and stabling of a horse does not allow a lien for unpaid fees because it does not improve the horse.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Chambers v Waters [1833] EngR 42; (1833) Coop T Br 91; (1833) 47 ER 33
1833


Land, Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Price v Easton (1833) 4 B and Ad 433; [1833] EngR 334; (1833) 4 B and Ad 433; (1833) 110 ER 518
1833


Contract
At common law, only the parties to the contract themselves can obtain rights and incur reciprocal obligations.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Keppell v Bailey [1834] EWHC Ch J77; (1834) 2 My and K 517; [1834] 39 ER 1042; [1834] EngR 193; (1834) Coop T Br 298; (1834) 47 ER 106; [1834] EngR 448; (1834) 39 ER 1042
29 Jan 1834
ChD
Lord Brougham LC
Contract, Company
The court was asked whether the owner of land can burthen it in the hands of future owners by the creation of novel rights. Held: Lord Brougham said: "It must not be supposed that incidents of a novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy and caprice of any owner. It is clearly inconvenient both to the science of the law and the public weal that such a latitude should be given. There can be no harm in allowing the fullest latitude to men in binding themselves . . to answer in damages for breach of their obligations . . but great detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property."
As to the subject of covenants, he said: 'The covenant (that is, such as will run with the land) must be of such a nature as 'to inhere in the land,' to use the language of some cases; or 'it must concern the demised premises, and the mode of occupying them,' as it is laid down in others: 'it must be quodammodo annexed and appurtenant to them,' as one authority has it; or, as another says, 'it must both concern the thing demised, and tend to support it, and support the reversioner's estate.' Now, the privilege or right in question does not inhere in the land, does not concern the premises conveyed or the mode of occupying them: it is not appurtenant to them. A covenant, therefore, that such a right should be enjoyed, would not run with the land. Upon the same principle, it appears to us that such a right, unconnected with the enjoyment or occupation of the land, cannot be annexed as an incident to it: nor can a way appendant to a house or land be granted away, or made in gross; for, no one can have such a way but he who has the land to which it is appendant: Bro. Abr. Graunt, pl. 130 (citing, M. 5 H. 7, fo. 7, pl. 15). If a way be granted in gross, it is personal only, and cannot be assigned. So, common in gross sans nombre may he granted, but cannot be granted over: per Treby, C. J., in Weekly v. Wildman, 1 Lord Raym. 407. It is not in the power of a vendor to create any rights not connected with the use or enjoyment of the land, and annex them to it: nor can the owner of land render it subject to a new species of burthen, so as to bind it in the hands of an assignee."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Commonlii ] - [ Commonlii ]
 
Flight v Booth [1834] 1 Bing NC 370; [1834] 1 Scott 190; [1834] 131 ER 1160; [1834] EngR 1087
24 Nov 1834

Tindal CJ
Land, Contract
The auction particulars stated that the land was subject to covenants restricting use of the property for certain offensive purposes. After successfully bidding it was shown to be subject to other substantial restrictions against non-ofensive trades also. Held: The purchaser was entitled to rescind the contract and recover his deposit. Even though a misdescription may be unintended, where it is a material and substantial point, and a court could infer that the purchaser would not have bid for the property, the purchaser is not restricted to recovering compensation but may choose to rescind.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Alexander v Gardner [1835] 1 Bing NC 671
1835


Contract


 
The Lady Durham (1835) 3 Hagg 196
1835


Contract
“The man by his contract has a lien on the vessel: he may proceed in rem ... The court has every disposition to help this class of man”.

 
Andrews v Smith (1835) 2 CM and R 627
1835

Parke B, Lord Abinger CB
Contract
Hill was employed to work on a property, the defendant being retained by the building owner as surveyor to receive and pay over to Hill monies due to him. When Hill required materials for his work, these were supplied by the plaintiff on the defendant's promise to pay the plaintiff for them out of the monies which he received to pay Hill. Although Hill himself agreed with this arrangement, the defendant nevertheless failed to pay the plaintiff out of the monies available. When the plaintiff then sued him for breach of the agreement the defendant sought to invoke s.4. The plaintiff's argument was: "This is not a promise to answer for the debt or default of another, within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. It is not a promise to be answerable out of the defendant's own funds, but to pay out of the funds of another, on receiving his directions for that purpose. … Such a contract is direct, and not collateral, and therefore binding without being in writing." Parke B:"Even if there was an original debt from Hill the case is no more than a prospective assignment of a particular fund, with an attornment [an acknowledgment], so to speak, of the defendant to that assignment." The defendant's counsel continued: "The general rule is, that the undertaking is collateral, wherever there is an original debt" to which Parke B replied: "That is the general rule, but with exceptions …" Held: "Lord Abinger, C.B. On reading the declaration, the first thing that struck me was, that no debt necessarily appeared on the face of it to be due from Hill at all; it is quite consistent with all that is stated on the record, that he was never liable to the plaintiff. That alone is an answer to the objection raised by the defendant. But further, if the defendant contracted, not to pay Hill's debt out of his own funds, but only faithfully to apply Hill's funds for that purpose, when they should come to his hands, that contract would not be within the operation of the statute. Parke, B. I am of the same opinion. There is nothing on the face of the declaration to imply a contract by the plaintiff with Hill. If that be so, it is clear the defendant's contract was an original, not a collateral one, and so not within the statute. But even if that were otherwise, this is nothing more than a prospective assignment of funds which were to come to the defendant's hands for Hill, and an attornment, as it were, by the defendant to that assignment: and the authorities show that, in such case, the contract is not within the statute. On this ground also the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the court. Alderson and Gurney, Bs., concurred.

 
Waters And Another, Executors Of Waters, Deceased, v Tompkins [1835] EngR 334; (1835) 2 CrM and R 723; (1835) 150 ER 306 (B)
1835


Contract, Limitation
The meaning of part payment, to take a case out of the Statute of Limitations, is payment of a smaller on account of a greater sum of money, due from the party making the payment to the party to whom it is made. The appropriation of such part payment of principal, or of payment of interest, to a particular debt, may be shewn by any medium of proof, and does not require an express declaration of the debtor, at the time of the payment, to establish it : it may therefore be proved by previous or subsequent declarations of the debtor; although the fact of the payment must be proved by independent evidence.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Laythoarp v Bryant [1835] EngR 383; (1835) 1 Bing NC 421; (1835) 131 ER 1179
16 Jan 1835


Contract, Landlord and Tenant
Plaintiff put up to sale by auction a lease of premises, which he occupied as assignee of the lease, stipulation not to produce any title prior to the lease. In an action against a purchaser for not completing his purchase, in which action Plaintiff declared he was possessed of the lease, Held, the Defendant having rejected the abstract, that Plaintiff was bound to prove the execution of the lease by calling the attesting witness, and that it was not sufficient to prove the assignment to Plaintiff.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Passenger v Brookes [1835] EngR 638; (1835) 1 Bing NC 587; (1835) 131 ER 1243 (A)
24 Apr 1835


Contract
A defence on the ground of want of consideration for an agreement cannot be proved under the plea of non assumpsit.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Alexander v Vane (1836) 1 MandW 511
1836

Lord Abinger CB, Baron Parke
Contract
The Plaintiff had given an oral guarantee to P that the Defendant would pay for certain goods ordered by him from P: if the Defendant did not pay P for the goods, he (the Plaintiff) would do so. The Defendant did not pay the full amount due and the Plaintiff did so in his place. He then sued the Defendant for the amount so paid. The Defendant resisted the claim saying that the Plaintiff could not have been made to pay, because the guarantee, not being in or evidenced in writing, was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Held: The Defendant was liable notwithstanding this argument. Lord Abinger CB said: "the promise was, that, if the Defendant did not pay, the Plaintiff would; there was therefore an agreement, that, if the money was paid for the Defendant, it might be recovered from him."
1 Citers


 
James and Others, Assignees of Arthur Emerson, A Bankrupt, v Griffin And Another [1836] EngR 118; (1836) 1 M and W 20; (1836) 150 ER 329
1836


Contract, Insolvency
Where goods, consigned to A in London, and deliverable in the river, were by his direction, he being then insolvent, landed on a wharf at which he had been in the habit of landing goods, A having no premises adjoining the river, but having a warehouse in the city ; and the goods were stopped in transitu in the hands of the wharfinger : Held, in action of trover for the goods by the assignees of A (who became bankrupt a few days afterwards) against the wharfingers, that the proper question to be left to the jury was, whether the wharfingers received the goods as A's agents to take possession of them for his own benefit as owner, or as agents only to forward them to him, or to keep them for the seller. Held, also, that directions given by A to an agent whom he sent to order the landing of the goods, in which he expressed his intention not to receive them as owner, were admissible in evidence, although they were not communicated to the wharfingers or to the seller.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Lyde v Barnard; CExC 1836 - [1836] 1 M and W 101; [1836] EngR 146; (1836) 150 ER 363
 
Cope v Rowlands (1836) 2 M and W 149
1836

Parke B
Contract
The court considered te situation of entry into a contract by a person under a statutory prohibition. Parke B said: "It is perfectly settled that where the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, be it express or implied, is expressly or by implication forbidden by the common or statute law, no court will lend its assistance to give it effect."
1 Citers


 
Hutton v Warren [1836] EWHC Exch J61; (1836) 1 MandW 466; (1836) 150 ER 517
9 Jan 1836
Exc
Parke B
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
The landlord gave his farmer tenant six months notice to quit, but insisted that he continue to cultivate the land. The tenant sought compensation for his seeds and for his labour during the notice period. The written lease said nothing on these issues. Held: The tenant succeeded. Parke B said: "extrinsic evidence of custom and usage is admissible to annex incidents to written contracts, in matters with respect to which they are silent. "and applying that rule: "by the custom of the country, a tenant was bound to farm according to a certain course of husbandry for the whole of his tenancy, and at quitting was entitled to a fair allowance for seed and labour on the arable land; and was obliged to leave the manure, if the landlord would purchase it."
[ Bailii ]
 
Shackell v Rosier [1836] EngR 613; (1836) 2 Bing NC 635; (1836) 132 ER 245
22 Apr 1836

Tindall CJ
Torts - Other, Contract
In consideration that Plaintiff had published a libel at Defendant's request, and had at the like request consented to defend an action brought against Plaintiff for such publication, Defendant promised to indemnify Plaintiff from the costs of the action : Held, that the promise was void.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hart v Alexander (1837) 2 M and W 483
1837


Contract
The test for novation is whether there has been an acceptance which can be inferred from the acts and conduct of the customer.
1 Citers


 
James And Others, Assignees Of Arthur Emerson, A Bankrupt v Griffin And Hillhouse [1837] EngR 140; (1837) 2 M and W 623; (1837) 150 ER 906
1837


Contract, Insolvency

[ Commonlii ]
 
Eckstein and Another v Reynolds [1837] EngR 770; (1837) 7 Ad and E 80; (1837) 112 ER 401
30 May 1837


Contract
Defendant's agent told plaintiff that he had called to tender £8 in settlement of defendant's account ; plaintiff answered that he would take nothing leas than the bill, which defendant's agent produced at the time, amourttirig to £19. Held, that the question whether this tender was conditional or unconditional, was proper to be Ieft to the jury.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Prendergast v Compton [1837] EngR 1165; (1837) 8 Car and P 454; (1837) 173 ER 572
21 Dec 1837


Transport, Contract
Conduct unbecoming a gentleman, in the strict sense of the word, will, it seems, justify a captain of a ship in excluding a passeuger from the cuddy table whom he has engaged by contract to provide for there, but it is difficult to say in what degree want of polish would, in point of law, warrant such exclusion but it is clear that if a passenger use threats of persoual violence towards the captain, the captain may exclude him from the table, and require him to take his meals in his own private apartment. If the husband be excluded from the cuddy table, and the wife, not from compulsion, but from a wish to be with her husband, take her meals with him in private, this will not amount to a breach of contract on the part of the captain so far as regards the wife.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Scarfe v Morgan [1838] EngR 253; (1838) 4 M and W 270; (1838) 150 ER 1430
1838

Parke B
Contract
A keeper of livery stables does not have a right to exercise a lien for his charges because he is obliged to give possession of the horse to the bailor whenever requested.
Parke B. expressed the view that particular liens "being consistent with the principles of natural equity, are favoured by the law, which is construed liberally in such cases."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Holme And Another v Guppy And Another [1838] EngR 133; (1838) 3 M and W 387; (1838) 150 ER 1195
1838


Contract, Damages
The plaintiffs, on the 19th April, 1836, entered into a written contract to build, for the sum of 1700l., a brewery for the defenclants, so far as regarded the carpenters’ work, within the space of four months and a half next ensuing the date (if the agreement : and in default of completirig the same within the time therein-before limited, to forfeit to the defendants 40l. per week for each week that the completion of the work should be delayed beyond the 31st August, the amount to be deducted from the said sum of 1700l, as liquidated damages. The plaintiffs did not begin the work for four weeks after the date of the agreement, in consequence of the defendants not being able to give them possession they were afterwards delayed one week by the default of their own workmen, and four weeks by the default of the masons, & c, employed by the defendants; and the work was not completed till five weeks after the time limited :--Held, that the defendants were not entititled to deduct from the 1700l. any sum in respect of the delay, either for the one or the four weeks.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Beckham v Knight And Drake [1838] EngR 382; (1838) 4 Bing NC 243; (1838) 132 ER 781 (B)
24 Jan 1838


Contract
K and S having entered into a written engagement to employ Plaintiff in their trade for seven years. Held: The Plaintiff could not sue D, a dormant partner with K. and S., but not party to the agreement.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Calvert v The London Dock Company; CA 13-Feb-1838 - [1838] EngR 449; (1838-1838) 2 Keen 638; (1838) 48 ER 774

 
 Attwood v Small and Others; HL 1-Mar-1838 - [1838] UKHL J14; 7 ER 684; [1838] UKHL J60
 
Attwood v Small etc [1838] EngR 515; (1835-40) 6 Cl and Fin 232; (1838) 7 ER 684
22 Mar 1838


Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Small v Attwood [1838] EngR 690; (1838) 3 Y and C Ex 105; (1838) 160 ER 633
1 Jun 1838


Contract
The purchasers of certain mines having paid part of their purchase money, and having been let into possession, agreed to pay the residue of the purchase money by instalments, and in the meantime to pay to the vendor half-yearly interest on what should remain due. Having paid one half-year's interest, but no portion of the remaining purchase money, they filed their bill to set aside the contract.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Glennie v Imri [1839] EngR 658; (1839) 3 Y and C Ex 436; (1839) 160 ER 773
3 May 1839


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Saunderson v Piper (1839) 5 Bing NC 425; [1839] EngR 726; (1839) 5 Bing NC 561; (1839) 132 ER 1215
27 May 1839


Contract
Where there is an inconsistency in a contract between written words expressing a number and the same number expressed in figures, the written number will usually prevail.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Eastwood v Kenyon; 1840 - [1840] EngR 80; (1840) 11 Ad and E 438; (1840) 113 ER 482
 
Vyse v Wakefield [1840] EngR 276; (1840) 6 M and W 442; (1840) 151 ER 485
1840

Lord Abinger CB
Insurance, Contract
The declaration stated, that, by indenture, the defendant covenanted that he would, at any time or times thereafter, appear at an office or offices for the insurance of lives within London, or the bills of mortality, and answer such questions as might be asked respecting his age, and, in order to enable the plaintiff to ensure his life, and would riot afterward do or permit to be done any act whereby such insurance should be avoided or prejudiced. It then alleged, that the defendant, in part performance of his covenant, did, at the plaintiff's request, appear at the office of the Rock Life Insurance Company, and did answer certain questions asked of him ; and that the plaintiff insured the defendant's life with that Company, by a policy containing a proviso, that if the defendant went beyond the limits of Europe, the policy should be null and void : - Breach, that the defendant went beyond the limits of Europe, to wit, to the province of Canada, in North America :- Held, on special demurrer, that the declaration was bad, for not averririg that the defendant had notice that the policy was effective.
Lord Abinger CB said: "The rule to be collected from the cases seems to be this, that where a party stipulates to do a certain thing in a certain specific event which may become known to him, or with which he can make himself acquainted, he is not entitled to any notice, unless he stipulates for it; but when it is to do a thing which lies within the peculiar knowledge of the opposite party, this notice ought to be given."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attwood v Small [1840] EngR 125; (1840) 1 Man and G 279; (1840) 133 ER 340
1840


Contract

1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Vyse v Wakefield [1840] EngR 277; (1840) 7 M and W 126; (1840) 151 ER 706 (A)
1840
CExC

Insurance, Contract
A writ of error having been brought an the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in this case (6 M. and W 442), it now came on for argument. The Court, however, on reading the record, were unanimously of opinion, that an averment of notice to the defendant that the policy had been affected was necessary to make the declaration good, arid that the judgment must he affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Lohmann v Rougemont And Another [1840] EngR 357; (1840) 6 Bing NC 253; (1840) 133 ER 100
24 Jan 1840


Contract
Defendants, merchants in London, received orders from G. at St. Petersburgh for a quantity of Havannah sugars : that order was revoked, and another given for Brazil sugars, for the amount of which Defendants were to draw on Plaintiff, G.'s agent at Hamburgh, by a bill at three months : Plaintiff accepted the bill ; wrote to G for instructions because Defendants had been accredited for Havannah sugars and not Brazil ; and then to Defendants to say that he had accepted the bill under their guaranty for the present, as he had not received the accreditive : G. then wrote to Plaintiff, giving him credit for the Brazil sugar, and requesting him to release Defendants from their guaranty : G. failed before the acceptance became due : Held, that Plaintiff was liable to Defendants on this acceptance, notwithstanding Defendants, after G.'s failure, wrote to Plaintiff,--" We have received from G. the assurance that he has arranged with you the needful for the protection of the draft: we reserve to ourselves any advantage from the insurance of the goods ; if you have written to G. that you have not honored the draft, we cannot consider your acceptance as valid in any other way than on account of G."
[ Commonlii ]
 
Beckham v Knight And Drake [1840] EngR 758; (1840) 1 Man and G 738; (1840) 133 ER 530
28 Jun 1840
CEC

Employment, Contract
By a contract between the plaintiff and A and B, it was agreed that the plaintiff should serve A and B as foreman in their business for seven years, if A and B, or either of them, should so long live. - The plaintiff having subsequently discovered that, at the time of making the contract, C was a dormant partner with A and B, declared upon the contract as an agreement to serve A, B, and C, or the survivor of them, for the period therein named. Held: That the contract was misdescribed. - Semble, that if it had been properly declared upon C would have been liable under the agreement.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hyde v Wrench [1840] EWHC Ch J90; (1840) 49 ER 132; [1840] EngR 1054; (1840) 3 Beav 334
8 Dec 1840
ChD
Langdale MR
Land, Contract
The defendant offered to sell his land to the plaintiff for £1000. The plaintiff counter-offered £950, which was rejected. The plaintiff then said that he accepted the original offer. Held: Lord Langdale MR said: "there exists no valid binding contract between the parties for the purchase of the property. The Defendant offered to sell it for £1000, and if that had been at once unconditionally accepted, there would undoubtedly have been a perfect binding contract; instead of that, the Plaintiff made an offer of his own, to purchase the property for £950, and he thereby rejected the offer previously made by the Defendant. I think that it was not afterwards competent for him to revive the proposal of the Defendant, by tendering an acceptance of it; and that, therefore, there exists no obligation of any sort between the parties."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Commonlii ]
 
Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M and W 858
1841

Parke B
Contract
The court considered a claim for a set off. Parke B: 'Such cases are confined to those concerned with goods sold and delivered with a warranty, goods agreed to be supplied according to a contract and actions for work and labour done.'
1 Citers


 
Skeate v Beale [1841] EngR 142; (1841) 11 Ad and E 983; (1841) 113 ER 688
1841


Contract
The tenant resisted a claim for the balance due under a contract, saying that the landlord in persuading him to agree to a rate of payment had subjected him to duress in threatening a distress. Held. The plea of duress failed.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Kelly v Solari; CexC 1841 - (1841) 9 M and W 54

 
 Laird v Pim and Another; 18-Jan-1841 - [1841] EngR 237; (1841) 7 M and W 474; (1841) 151 ER 852
 
James M French v John T W French [1841] EngR 564; (1841) 2 Man and G 644; (1841) 133 ER 903
29 Apr 1841


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Beckham v Drake, Knight, And Surgey [1841] EngR 923; (1841) 8 M and W 846; (1841) 151 ER 1283
10 Jul 1841


Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Beckham v Drake, Knight, And Surgey [1841] EngR 1096; (1841) 9 M and W 79; (1841) 152 ER 35
19 Nov 1841


Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Clifford v Turrell [1841] EngR 1212; (1841) 1 Y and CCC 138; (1841) 62 ER 826
11 Dec 1841

Knight-Bruce VC
Land, Equity, Contract
The court considered the availability of specific performance to a seller of land. Knight Bruce VC said: "A case is stated in which, setting the Statute of Frauds out of the question, a bill might have been maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, to compel him to execute the assignment. That, therefore, is a reason to compel the performance of the terms upon which the plaintiff agreed to execute the assignment."
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the existence of consideration in addition to that referred to in a deed: "It is clear, even in cases where the Statute of Frauds does not apply, that the rules of law may exclude parol evidence where a written instrument stands in competition with it; but it has long been settled that it is not within any rule of this nature to adduce evidence of a consideration additional to what is stated in the written instrument . . the rule is that where there is one consideration stated in the deed, you may prove any other consideration which existed, not in contradiction to the instrument; and it is not in contradiction to the instrument to prove a larger consideration than that which is stated".
[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney-General v Drummond [1842] 1 Dr and War 353
1842

Lord St. Leonards
Contract
Lord St. Leonards: " Tell me what you have done under such a deed and I will tell you what that deed means."
1 Citers


 
Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 CI and Fin 355; [1842] EngR 950; (1839,1842) 9 Cl and Fin 355; (1842) 8 ER 450
1842

Parke B
Contract, Charity
Parke B said: "In the first place, there is no doubt that not only where the language of the instrument is such as the Court does not understand, it is competent to receive evidence of the proper meaning of that language, as when it is written in a foreign tongue; but it is also competent, where technical words or peculiar terms, or indeed any expressions are used, which at the time the instrument was written had acquired an appropriate meaning, either generally or by local usage, or amongst particular classes . This description of evidence is admissible, in order to enable the Court to understand the meaning of the words contained in the instrument itself, by themselves, and without reference to the extrinsic facts on which the instrument is intended to operate. For the purpose of applying the instrument to the facts, and determining what passes by it, and who take an interest under it, a second description of evidence is admissible, viz. every material fact that will enable the Court to identify the person or tiling mentioned in the instrument, and to place the Court, whose province it is to declare the meaning of the words of the instrument, as near as may be in the situation of the parties to it."
and " From the context of the instrument, and from these two descriptions of evidence, with such circumstances as by law the Court, without evidence, may of itself notice, it is its duty to construe and apply the words of that instrument; and no extrinsic evidence of the intention of the party to the deed, from his declarations, whether at the time of his executing the instrument, or before or after that time, is admissible; the duty of the Court being to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not of what was intended to have been written."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Thomas v Thomas; 5-Feb-1842 - [1842] EngR 260; (1842) 2 QB 851; (1842) 114 ER 330

 
 Roscorla v Thomas; KBD 30-May-1842 - [1842] EWHC KB J74; (1842) 114 ER 496
 
Churchill v Susanna Bertrand, Administratrix, &C Of Pateman [1842] EngR 804; (1842) 3 QB 568; (1842) 114 ER 625
23 Jun 1842


Contract
Intestate granted an annuity to plaintiff. After his death, his administratix caused the annuity to be vacated for a defect in the memorial Plaintff to recover the balance of consideration money, brought indebitatus assumpsit against the admiriistratrix for money had and received by the intestate to plaintiff's use, stating promises by intestate and by defendant. Held that, although a right to recover the consideration money became vested in plaintiff on the refusal to continue the annuity, such right did not go back, by relation, to the time when that money was originally paid : and therefore counts in the above forms were not applicable.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Wentworth v Outhwaite And Others [1842] EngR 873; (1842) 10 M and W 436; (1842) 152 ER 541
7 Jul 1842


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cutts v Thodey [1842] EngR 1129; (1842) 13 Sim 206; (1842) 60 ER 80
3 Dec 1842


Land, Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Henniker v Wigg (1843) 4 QB 792; [1843] 1 Dav and Mer 160; [1843] 7 Jur 1058; [1843] 114 ER 1095
1843


Contract
A bond was given, and payments made under it. One party sought to say that the payments must be applied as against the first items secured or in full satisfaction. Held: The rule that payments made were to be applied against the first debts could be set aside by the actions of the parties showing a contrary intention, particularly where the bond was intended as a continuing security.

 
Chapman v Morton (1843) 11 M and W 534
1843


Contract


 
Hemp v Garland, Administrator and Co [1843] EngR 33; (1843) 4 QB 519; (1843) 114 ER 994; 12 LJQB 134; 3 Gal and Dav 402
1843

Lord Denman CJ
Limitation, Contract
The Defendant gave a warrant of attorney to secure a debt payable by instalments, the plaintiff to be at liberty, in case of any default, to have judgment and execution for the whole, as if all the periods for payment had expired. Held that, in an action of assumpsit on the implied promise to pay according to the terms of the defeazance, defendant might shew, urider a plea of the Statute of Limitations, that the first default was made more than six years before action; and that this was a complete defence, not only as to instalments due more than six years ago, but also as to those due within that period.
The court found that "the cause of action accrued upon the first default for all that then remained owing of the whole debt."
Lord Denman CJ continued: "(t)here was no other contract for forbearance or giving time than that which is expressed in or to be implied from the terms of the warrant of attorney."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bowker v Burdekin (1843) 11 MandW 128
1843

Parke B
Land, Contract
Parke B considered how a court identified whether a document had been delivered in escrow: "you are to look at all the facts attending the execution, to all that took place at the time, and to the result of the transaction; and therefore, though it is in form an absolute delivery, if it can reasonably be inferred that it was delivered not to take effect as a deed till a certain condition was performed, it will nevertheless operate as an escrow."
1 Citers


 
Drake And Others v Beckham [1843] EngR 325; (1843) 11 M and W 315; (1843) 152 ER 823
6 Feb 1843


Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Phillips v Viscount Canterbury [1843] EngR 704; (1843) 11 M and W 619; (1843) 152 ER 953
27 May 1843


Contract
A sheriff who has seized goods under a fi fa, and disposed of them by appraisement and bill of sale, is not entitled to deduct the expenses of the appraisement and sale ; the scale of fees framed under 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 55, applying to "sales by auction" only.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Pritchard v Hitchcock; 6-Jun-1843 - (1843) 6 Man and G 151; [1843] EngR 760 (B)
 
Davidson, Public Officer, &Amp;C v Cooper And Brassington [1843] EngR 819 (B); (1843) 11 M and W 778
14 Jun 1843


Contract

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cutts v Thodey [1844] EngR 13; (1844-1845) 1 Coll 223; (1844) 63 ER 393
1844


Land, Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Elizabeth Henderson v Bethel Henderson [1844] EngR 18; (1844) 6 QB 288; (1844) 115 ER 111
1844


Contract

1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Mallan v May (1844) 13 M and W 511
1844

Pollock CB
Contract
The court considered the possible consequences of interpretation of a contract: "We must apply the ordinary rules of construction to this instrument; and though, by so doing, we may, in some instances, probably in this, defeat the real intention of the parties, such a course tends to establish a greater degree of certainty in the administration of the law."
1 Citers


 
Brown v Boorman, Boorman, and Wild [1844] EngR 65; (1844) 11 Cl and Fin 1; (1844) 8 ER 1003
3 Jun 1844
HL

Contract
The declaration alleged that A employed B as a broker, to sell and deliver oil, on the terms contained in such contracts of sale as should be made with perisons who should become purchasers thereof, for reasonable commission to B: That B accepted the employment, and sold oil to C on the terms of payment on delivery: That it thereupon became the duty of B not to deliver the oil without payment: That B delivered the oil to C, but did not obtain payment, whereby the plaintiff was damnified. Held that this declaration set forth a good cause of action: that the duty of B arose out of the contract: and that, after verdict, judgment could not be arrested.
Wherever there is a contract, and something is to be done in the course of the emiployment which is the subject of that contract, if there is a breach of duty in the course of that employment, the party injured may recover either in tort or in contract.
[ Commonlii ] - [ Uniset ]
 
Davidson, Public Officer, &Amp;C v Cooper And Another [1844] EngR 748; (1844) 13 M and W 343; (1844) 153 ER 142
6 Jul 1844


Contract

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Powney v Blomberg [1844] EngR 772; (1844) 14 Sim 179; (1844) 60 ER 325
11 Jul 1844


Contract, Banking
A. executed B bond and mortgage to B. to secure £2,000 lent to him by B., with interest at 5%.
B having sold out a sum of stock to enable her to make the loan, the dividends of which exceeded the interest of the £2000 at £5 per cent., A. afterwards agreed, in consideration of her Ietting the £2000 continue secured at interest as aforesaid, to transfer to her, when requested so to do, the amount of the stock sold out, or, at her option, to pay to her a sum of money sufficient to repurchase it, and, in the meantime, to pay to her the amount of the dividends of it, intstead of the interest of the £2000.
Held, that the agreement was additional to and not substitutional for the bond and mortgage, and was, therefore, usurious.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Lane v Ironmonger [1844] EngR 933; (1844) 13 M and W 368; (1844) 153 ER 152
9 Nov 1844


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Salmon v Smith [1845] EngR 228; (1845) 1 Wms Saund 202; (1845) 85 ER 205
1845


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl and F 109
1845

Lord Campbell
Contract
Although a would-be surety is, in general, expected to acquaint himself with the risk he is undertaking, the creditor is under an obligation to disclose to the intending surety "anything which might not naturally be expected to take place between the parties who are concerned in the transaction, that is, whether there be a contract between the debtor and the creditor, to the effect that his position shall be different from that which the surety might naturally expect."
1 Citers


 
Moore v Jervis (1845) 2 Coll 60; (1845) 63 ER 637
1845


Contract
The debtor had placed a policy of assurance with the creditor by way of security. In the course of trade between them, a right of set-off occurred between them, and he sought to exchange the policy given as security for another policy for an unconnected reason. The policy was returned. Held: The debtor had not lost his right of set off.

 
Chadwick v Clarke (1845) 1 CB 700
1845
CCC
Coltman J, Tindal CJ
Contract
The plaintiff and defendant were directors of an insurance company. The board resolved to rent a house from Mr Chadwick for one year. A memorandum of agreement was prepared and agreed, but it was never signed. The memorandum recorded an agreement to let the house to the directors personally. Mr Chadwick then sued for one year's use and occupation and sought to rely on the memorandum. Mr Clarke objected that it was inadmissible, because it had not been stamped. The objection succeeded, and Mr Chadwick was non-suited. Held: The Court of Common Pleas upheld the objection. A provision in the Stamp Act which required the stamping of: "any agreement, or any minute or memorandum of an agreement, made in England, under hand only, or made in Scotland, without any clause of registration." Coltman J: "One argument that has been urged on the part of the plaintiff is that no document can require a stamp unless it be signed, the words of the stamp act imposing a duty upon "any agreement, or any memorandum of an agreement, made in England, under hand only." It appears to me, however, that that is not the meaning of the statute, but that the legislature, in using that expression, merely intended to denote instruments under hand only – that is, not under seal, - in opposition to instruments under seal. The words that follow, "or made in Scotland, without any clause of registration" shew this to be the true construction – an instrument with a clause of registration, in that country, having the same force as an instrument under seal with us."
1 Citers


 
Parker v Smith [1845] EngR 366; (1845) 1 Coll 608; (1845) 63 ER 564
17 Jan 1845


Landlord and Tenant, Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hall And Wager v Poyser [1845] EngR 363; (1845) 13 M and W 600; (1845) 153 ER 251
17 Jan 1845


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Smith v Moore And Another [1845] EngR 639 (B); (1845) 1 CB 438
16 Apr 1845


Police, Contract
The defendants, by public advertisement, offered a reward of 20l. to any person who would give such information as should lead to the apprehension and conviction of the party or parties who had broken into, robbed, and set fire to their premises. One B, whom the plaintiff had taken into custody on suspicion of being concerned in the offence, offered to make certain disclosures if furnished with something to eat and drink. The plaintiff communicated this offer to a sub-inspector of police, who took B to a public-house, and gave him refreshment, whereupon B made a voluntary confession, which resulted in his conviction and transportation for the crime in question :-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the reward.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Dunlop And Others v Grote And Booker [1845] EngR 1196 (B); (1845) 2 Car and K 153
23 Aug 1845


Contract
The plaintiffs declared on a contract by the defendants to purchase certain iron of the plaintiff alleging a promise by the defendants, "that, if the delivery of the said iron should riot be required by the defendants on or before the 30th day of April, 1845, the said iron was to be paid for by the defendants on the day and year last aforesaid" , and averring that the plaintiffs had always been ready and willing to deliver the said iron in terms of the contract, that the 30th of April was past before the commencement of the suit, but that the defendants had not paid for the iron :-Held, first, that, under the averment of readiness and willingness to deliver the iron, the plaintiffs were not bound to shew that any specific iron had been appropriated by them for that purpose, and, secondly, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the above contract the full price of the iron, and not merely the damages which they had sustained by the defendants' breach of contract.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Rigby And Another v The Great Western Railway Company [1845] EngR 1316 (B); (1845) 14 M and W 811
1 Dec 1845


Litigation Practice, Contract

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Keir v Leeman [1846] 9 QB 371
1846

Tyndal CJ
Contract
Tyndal CJ said: "Indeed it is very remarkable what very little authority there is to be found . . for the principle that any compromise of a misdemeanour or indeed of any public offence can be otherwise than illegal and any promise founded on such a consideration otherwise than void. If the matter were res integra we should have no doubt on this point. We have no doubt that in all offences which involve damages to an injured party for which he may maintain an action it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit."
1 Citers


 
Freeman v Taylor [1846] 8 Bingham 124
1846

Tindal CJ
Contract, Transport
The charterer claimed a deviation by the owner. The jury found the deviation of such a nature and description as to deprive the freighter of the benefit of the contract. Held: The verdict was upheld.
1 Citers


 
Alder And Another, Assignees Of John Birkhill, A Bankrupt v Keighley [1846] EngR 340; (1846) 15 M and W 117; (1846) 153 ER 785
28 Jan 1846


Contract

[ Commonlii ]
 
Smart And Another v Sandars And Others [1846] EngR 865; (1846) 3 CB 380; (1846) 136 ER 152
6 Jul 1846


Contract, Agency
The mere relation of principal and factor confers, ordinarily, an authourity to sell at such times and for such prices as the factor may, in the exercise of his discretion, think best for his employer: but, if he receive the goods subject to any special instructions, he is bound to obey them. The authority, whether general or special, is revocable. Quaere, whether the factor's authority to sell can be revoked after he has made advances upon the credit of the goods consigned to him, his authority then being coupled with an interest? In assumpsit, the declaration stated that the plaintiffs had consigned wheat to the defendants, who were corn factors, for sale on account of the plaintiffs ; that the defendants then promised the plaintiffs to obey and observe the lawful orders and directions of the plaintiffs to be given by them to the defendants in regard to the sale and disposal of the wheat, and that, although the plaintiffs ordered the defendants not to sell below a certain price, and although the same was a lawful order and direction in that behalf, yet the defendants, not regarding their promise, sold at a less price. Plea, that, after the delivery of the wheat to the defendants, they became and were under advances to the plaintiffs in respect thereof ; that they gave the plaintiffs notice that they required to be repaid such advances, and that in default they should sell the wheat and repay themselves; and that, although a reasonable time had elapsed, the plaintiffs did not repay them such advances ; whereupon the defendants, for the purpose of reimbursing themselves, sold the wheat for the best prices that could then be obtained for the same, &c. Held, that the plea was bad in substance, there being nothing in the transaction disclosed upon the record, from which it could be inferred that it was part of the contract that at any time the wheat should be forfeited, or the defendant's authority to sell enlarged, so as to enable them to sell for repayment of advances, without reference to its being for the interest of the principals to sell at that particular time, and for that price.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Molton v Camroux (1848) 2 Exch 487
1848
CE

Contract
A person of unsound mind bought an annuity from a life assurance society. The society granted the annuities in the ordinary course of its business. The contracts were challenged. Held: The court referred to the argument that a plea of insanity would not prevail unless the other contracting party knew of it, and said: "We are not disposed to lay down so general a proposition, as that all executed contracts bona. fide entered into must be taken as valid, though one of the parties be of unsound mind; we think, however, that we may safely conclude, that when a person, apparently of sound mind, and not known to be otherwise, enters into a contract for the purchase of property which is fair and bona fide, and which is executed and completed, and the property, the subject-matter of the contract, has been paid for and fully enjoyed, and cannot be restored so as to put the parties in statu quo, such contract cannot afterwards be set aside, either by the alleged lunatic, or those who represent him."
1 Citers


 
Moon v Durden (1848) 2 Ex 22; [1848] EngR 285; (1848) 2 Exch 22; (1848) 154 ER 389
1848


Contract
In a case of a contract to pay money upon the event of a wager which an Act subsequently declares to be one in respect of which the assured shall not have an insurable interest. If the event has happened before the Act is passed, so that at the moment when the Act comes into operation a debt exists, an investigation whether the transaction is struck at by the Act involves an investigation whether the Act is retrospective.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Graham v Pollock (1848) 10 D 646
1848
IHCS
Lord Mackenzie, Lord Fullerton, Lord Jeffrey
Contract, Scotland
There was no dispute that a dog race had been won by a dog named Violet, and that Violet had been entered in the race by one of the parties. The issue was whether that party had entered Violet for his own benefit, having borrowed Violet for the purpose, and was therefore entitled to the prize; or whether he had entered Violet as the agent of Violet's owner, who was therefore the person truly entitled to the prize. Held: No question of sponsio ludicra. The issue as to which party was entitled to the prize depended on the nature of the contract between them, whether loan or agency, and since that was a question which was separate from the race itself, no question of sponsio ludicra was involved. It was a question not of racing or hunting, but of contract of mandate or loan. The whole sporting question is settled - the prize is awarded to Violet - and the question is, what individual has an interest by law and contract in what Violet has won?
1 Citers


 
Howie v Anderson (1848) 10 D 355
1848


Contract
The court considered the approach of the Scots courts to anticipatory breach of contract, or renunciation.
1 Citers


 
Humble v Hunter (1848) 12 QB 310
1848


Contract

1 Citers



 
 Dunlop v Higgins; HL 1848 - (1848) 6 Bell's App 195
 
Walker v Giles (1848) 6 CB 662; [1848] EngR 20; (1848) 136 ER 1407
1848

Wilde CJ
Contract
The court sought to reconcile conflicting parts of a deed.
Wilde CJ said: "And as the different parts of the deed are inconsistent with each other, the question is, to which part effect ought to be given. There is no doubt, that, applying the approved rules of construction to this instrument, effect ought to be given to that part which is calculated to carry into effect the real intention, and that part which would defeat it should be rejected."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Molton v Camroux (1848) 4 Exch 17
2 Jan 1848
CEC

Contract
The buyer of annuities from a company was of unsound mind. The company had acted in its normal course of business. Held: The court asked "whether the mere fact of unsoundness of mind, which was not apparent, is sufficient to vacate a fair contract executed by the grantee, by payment of the consideration money, and intended bona fide to be executed by the grantor, by payment of the annuity." and answered: "the modern cases show, that when that state of mind was unknown to the other contracting party, and no advantage was taken of the lunatic, the defence cannot prevail, especially where the contract is not merely executory, but executed in whole or in part, and the parties cannot be restored altogether to their original position."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Tolhurst v Notley [1848] EngR 139; (1848) 11 QB 406; (1848) 116 ER 529
18 Jan 1848


Contract
In assumpsit on a promissory note, by indorsee against maker, defendant pleaded that the payee, before, at and ever since the time of indorsement, was indebted to him in a sum equalling the money due on the note, and damages ; and, while so indebted, and after maturity in order to deprive defendant of his set-off, in fraud of defendant and in collusion with plaintiff, indorsed to plaintiff without consideration, in order to enable him to sue for the use and benefit of the payee : and that plaintiff commenced and maintains the action as agent for the payee, for his use and benefit, according to the fraud and collusion. And defendant offered to set off, to the payee and plaintiff, the damages sustained by the nonpayment of the note, against the payee's debt to defendant. Replication : de injuria. Special demurrer to the replication held frivolous, inasmuch as fraud was averred in the plea; and it was immaterial to the goodliness of the replication whether, without such averment, the plea disclosed a defence.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Robinson v Harman [1848] 1 Exch Rep 850; (1843-60) All ER 383; [1848] EngR 135; (1848) 1 Exch 850; (1848) 154 ER 363
18 Jan 1848

Baron Parke
Damages, Contract
Damages for breach of contract should compensate the victim of the breach for the loss of his contractual bargain. Baron Parke said: 'The next question is: What damages is the plaintiff entitled to recover? The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it to be placed in the same situation, with regard to damages as if the contract had been performed."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Smart and another v Sandars and Others (1848) 5 CB 895; [1848] EngR 499; (1848) 136 ER 1132
12 May 1848
CCP
Wilde CJ
Contract, Agency
A factor to whom goods have been consigned generally for sale, and who has subsequently made advances to his principal on the credit of the goods, has no right to sell them, contrary to the orders of his principal, on the latter neglecting, on request, to repay the advances, although such, sale would be a sound exercise of discretion on his part ; his authority to sell not becoming, by reason of the unpaid advances, irrevocable, as an authority coupled with an interest.
Wilde CJ said: "where an agreement is entered into on a sufficient consideration, whereby an authority is given for the purpose of securing some benefit to the donee of the authority, such an authority is irrevocable. This is what is usually meant by an authority coupled with an interest, and which is commonly said to be irrevocable. But we think this doctrine applies only to cases where the authority is given for the purpose of being a security, or, as Lord Kenyon expresses it, as a part of the security; not to cases where the authority is given independently, and the interest of the donee of the authority arises afterwards, and incidentally only."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Freeman And Another, Assignees of William Broadbent v Cooke (1848) 2 Exch 554; 6 Dow and L 187; [1843-60] All ER Rep 185; [1848] EngR 687; (1848) 154 ER 652
1 Jul 1848


Contract, Estoppel
Where a party creates a belief in another's mind, and causes the other to act upon that belief, he will not in subsequent court proceedings be heard to deny that belief: "a party who negigently of culpably stands by and allows another to contract on the faith of a fact which he can contradict, cannot afterwards dispoute that fact in an action against the party who he has himself assisted in deceiving."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Moore v Garwood (1849) 4 Ex 681
1849
CEC
Patteson J
Contract
The plaintiff sued to recover a deposit which he had paid in 1845, at the height of the great Victorian railway boom, for shares in a proposed railway company. The scheme was afterwards abandoned and the company never incorporated. Whether he was entitled to his money back depended partly upon the terms of the prospectus and some letters and partly upon what had been said at a meeting of the promoters and subscribers when it first appeared that the formation of the company was likely to be delayed. The court directed the jury that: "the nature of the contract into which the parties had entered was rather a question of fact than of law, because it did not consist of one distinct contract between the parties, but of a series of acts and things done, from which the jury were to determine what was the real intention and meaning of the parties when they entered into the mutual relation in which they stood." Held: . The main point in the case was: "whether it was a question of law for the judge, - whether he ought to have taken upon himself to say what the contract was; or, on the other hand, whether that was a question for the jury. Now there was a good deal of evidence, independent of these letters and of other documents. There was the conduct of the parties, which was relied upon, and which appeared from the statements of the witnesses in the progress of the trial. We therefore think that, looking at all the circumstances of the case, the Lord Chief Baron could hardly have put the case in better terms to the jury. . . . If the contract had depended solely upon the written documents, the [contrary] argument might have prevailed; but as it does not, we think the question was properly submitted to the jury."
1 Citers


 
Ripley v McLure (1849) 4 Exch 345
1849


Contract
The parties entered into an executory contract to sell and purchase a cargo of tea upon its arrival. The cargo arrived, but before it did so, the defendant had discharged the plaintiff from performance, and refused to perform the agreement. Held: The plaintiff had not been bound to provide a response to the defendant's purported discharge of the contract. The defendant's refusal before the cargo arrived to complete the contract was not itself a breach, but was evidence of a continuing intention to break the contract, and operated as a waiver of the condition precedent and that in turn put the defendant in breach.

 
Forth v Simpson [1849] EngR 641; (1849) 13 QB 680; (1849) 116 ER 1423
23 May 1849


Contract
A racehorse trainer cannot exercise a lien over a racehorse for his fees if the contract reserves to the owner (expressly or by implication) the right to decide the places at which and the jockeys by whom it is to be raced.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Beckham v Drake [1849] EngR 843; (1849) 2 HLC 579; (1849) 2 HL Cas 579; (1849) 9 ER 1213
11 Jul 1849
HL
Lord Mansfield, Erle CJ
Contract, Insolvency
An action was brought on a contract for hiring and service, where the plaintiff was to serve for seven years, and the defendant to pay weekly wages during that time; and the breach was a dismissal during the seven years. The plaintiff, after this breach, and before the commencement of the action, became bankrupt; and the question was, whether this cause of action passed from the plaintiff to his assignees. Held: Lord Mansfield said: "The general principle is, that all rights of the bankrupt which can be exercised beneficially for the creditors do so pass, and the right to recover damages may pass though they are unliquidated . . This principle is subject to exception. The right of action does not pass where the damages are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his body, mind or character, and without immediate reference to his rights of property. Thus it has been laid down that the assignees cannot sue for breach of promise of marriage, for criminal conversation, seduction, defamation, battery, injury to the person by negligence, as by not carrying safely, not curing, not saving from imprisonment by process of law …"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
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