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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Construction - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.


 
 London Borough of Merton v Leach; 1985 - (1985) 32 BLR 51
 
Minscombe Properties Ltd v Sir Alfred McAlpine and Sons Ltd (1986) 2 Const LJ 303
1986
CA
O'Connor LJ
Construction, Damages
O'Connor LJ applied the test of reasonableness in determining whether the cost of reinstatement of land to its contracted for condition should be recoverable as damages.
1 Citers



 
 Mitsui Construction Co Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong; 1986 - (1986) 33 BLR 14
 
Lloyds Bank plc v Guardian Assurance plc [1986] 35 BLR 34
1986
CA
Sir John Arnold P and Nourse LJ
Nuisance, Construction
The statutory control over building works provided under s.60 is capable of operating quite separately from the private law tort of nuisance.
Control of Pollution Act 1974 60
1 Citers


 
Jones v Stroud District Council [1986] 1 WLR 1141
1986
CA
Neill LJ
Construction, Damages
The plaintiffs were unable to prove that they had paid for repair carried out to their building and rendered necessary by the defendants' negligence. Held: After referring to the general principle that a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages must prove that he has suffered loss: 'but if property belonging to him has been damaged to an extent which is proved and the court is satisfied that the property has been or will be repaired I do not consider that the court is further concerned with the question whether the owner has had to pay for repairs out of his own pocket or whether the funds have come from some other source.'
1 Citers


 
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd v Trollope and Colls Ltd [1986] 33 BLR 77
1986
CA
Lloyd LJ and May LJ
Construction, Limitation, Litigation Practice
The employers sued the builders and architects alleging defects in the air conditioning system. Later, cracking and displacement of the walls was discovered, caused allegedly by not having sulphate resisting cement, and defects in the wall ties. Allegations were made against the contractors and the architects and also structural engineers. The question then arose whether the amendments raised new claims for the purposes of section 35 of the 1980 Act. Held: May LJ said: "I think it is necessary to adopt a broad approach to these cases. At the stage of the issue of the writ or the service of the statement of claim, in the present context one is not, as I think, concerned with the minutiae of the cause of action which will ultimately have to be investigated at the trial. In the Limitation Act context, one asks in quite broad terms whether the relevant factual situation . . first came about, first was suable upon more than the three, six or twelve years previously. In the res judicata context one has to ask whether the issues in the hypothetical second action were realistically before the court in the hypothetical first action. Merely to rely upon the propositions which I have already quoted from Brunsden v Humphrey in the judgment of Bowen LJ, which was referred to in the judgment of Sankey LJ in Conquer v Boot , that it is a well settled rule of law that damages resulting from one and the same cause of action must be assessed and recovered once and for all, (entirely accurate though that is and I would not wish, with respect, to differ at all), nevertheless in the instant context I think that it effectively begs the whole question at the outset."
and "In the present case, if one remembers what a cause of action is (for instance, to refer back to the dictum in Letang), if one looks to the size of this particular building, to its complexities, to other matters of degree, to the statement of claim before the proposed reamendment, to the attitude of the appellants’ solicitors in the correspondence at the material time, to which I have referred, and avoids what I think are unnecessary subtleties, I feel bound to agree with the learned judge where he concluded, having referred to the cases on what is a cause of action, the statement of claim in both its original and amended form related only to the air conditioning. I think that its effect was to narrow the causes of action so that they became confined to breaches of contract concerned with air conditioning and negligence resulting in damages to the air conditioning. In the light of the definitions of a cause of action already referred to, I do not think one can look only to the duty on a party, but one must look also to the nature and extent of the breach relied upon, as well as to the nature and extent of the damage complained of in deciding whether, as a matter of degree, a new cause of action is sought to be relied upon. The mere fact that one is considering what are, as it is said, after all only different defects to the same building, does not necessarily mean in any way that they are constituents of one and the same cause of action.
Thus I conclude that whether there is a new cause of action in any circumstances is a mixed question of law and fact. I am satisfied that the learned judge correctly directed himself on the law on this point, and not only am I unable to say that he applied the law incorrectly to the facts of the case, I think positively that he applied that law correctly to the facts of the case."
and "In my opinion, to issue a writ against a party . . when it is not intended to serve a statement of claim, and where one has no reasonable evidence or grounds on which to serve a statement of claim against that particular party, is an abuse of the process of the court."
Lloyd LJ said: "in each case it will depend on the facts whether the damage gives rise to a separate cause of action, or not" and "there may be separate causes of action in relation to the same building, depending upon the facts of the case."
Limitation Act 1980 35
1 Citers


 
Scottish Special Housing Association v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 995; [1986] 2 All ER 957
1986
HL

Construction
The court acknowledged the practice in construction contracts making an express link between the liability imposed on the contractor, the specific aspect of such liability which iwas excluded and the existence of insurance (intended to benefit both contractor and employer) in respect of that excluded liability.
1 Citers


 
Imodco Ltd v Wimpey Major Projects Ltd (1987) 40 BLR 1
1987
CA
Glidewell LJ
Construction, Damages
Glidewell LJ stated that the cost of work to put pipes in the position contracted for would be recoverable if there was an intention to carry out the work and if it was reasonable so to do.
1 Citers


 
Loh Wai Lian v Sea Housing Corporation [1987] UKPC 4
3 Mar 1987
PC

Land, Construction
Malaysia
[ Bailii ]
 
D and F Estates v Church Commissioners for England [1988] 2 All ER 992; [1987] CLY 3582; [1987] 1 FTLR 405
1988
CA

Construction, Torts - Other
The main contractor on the site subcontracted the interior plastering. Fifteen years later, the plasterwork collapsed causing injury. The plasterer had not used the plaster specified. Held: Appeal allowed. A contractor may have contractual or statutory duty to supervise, but not necessarily in tort. A main contractor will not have responsibility in tort for failure to supervise the acts of a sub-contractor where it would be unreasonable to expect him to provide supervision.
1 Citers


 
D and F Estates v Church Commissioners for England [1988] UKHL 4; [1989] AC 177
14 Jul 1988
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Templeman, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Negligence, Construction
The House considered the liability of main contractors on a construction site for the negligence of it sub-contractors.
Lord Bridge said: "It is trite law that the employer of an independent contractor is, in general, not liable for the negligence or other torts committed by the contractor in the course of the execution of the work. To this general rule there are certain well-established exceptions or apparent exceptions. Without enumerating them it is sufficient to say that it was accepted by Mr. Fernyhough on behalf of the present appellants that the instant case could not be accommodated within any of the recognised and established categories by which the exceptions are classified. But it has been rightly said that the so-called exceptions
'are not true exceptions (at least so far as the theoretical nature of the employer's liability is concerned) for they are dependent upon a finding that the employer is, himself, in breach of some duty which he personally owes to the plaintiff. The liability is thus not truly a vicarious liability and is to be distinguished from the vicarious liability of a master for his servant:" see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 15th ed.'"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280; [1988] 3 WLR 939; [1988] 3 All ER 737; [1988] UKHL 7
3 Nov 1988
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Griffiths, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Goff of Chieveley
Evidence, Litigation Practice, Construction
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the agreement so that it could pursue its own action. The council said that the document was covered by the without prejudice rule. Held: When looking at without prejudice negotiations to decide on admissibility, it would be wrong to isolate admissions before admitting the rest. That would not allow the parties to speak freely about all issues in the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise and, for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise, admitting certain facts. The rule applies "to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement whether oral or in writing from being given in evidence."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v Aqua-Lift (1989) CLR 66; (1989) 26 Const LR 66; (1989) 45 BLR 27
1989
CA
Nourse LJ, Slade LJ
Construction, Arbitration
The court considered whether claims arising from misrepresentation or breach of a collateral contrat were claims arising 'under' the contract so as to be governed by the disputes provisions in it. Held: The disputes did not arise 'under the contract as such. Slade LJ said that the phrase "under a contract" was not wide enough to include disputes which did not concern obligations created by or incorporated in the contract. Nourse LJ agreed.
Nourse LJ: "The preposition "under" presupposes that the noun which it governs already has some existence. It operates in time as well as in space. I think that it means 'as a result of' and with reference to'. The disputes as to express or implied terms in the composite Peterborough contract arise both as a result of and with reference to that contract and are therefore within clause 14 of the heads of agreement. The disputes as to negligent misstatement, misrepresentation under the misrepresentation Act 1967 and collateral warranty or contract, while they may in a loose sense be said to arise with reference to the contract, cannot be said to arise as a result of it. They all relate to matters which either preceded the contract or were at best contemporaneous with it. Those disputes are therefore outside clause 14 and I agree with Slade LJ that the material words are not wide enough to include disputes which do not concern obligations created by or incorporated in the contract."
Slade LJ held the phrase "disputes arising under a contract" to be not wide enough to include disputes which do not concern obligations created by or incorporated in that contract.
1 Citers


 
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