swarb.co.uk - law index
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Consumer - From: 1960 To: 1969
This page lists 4 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.
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 Fisher v Bell; QBD 10-Nov-1960 - [1961] 1 QB 394
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Financings Ltd v Baldock [1963] 2 QBD 104; [1963] 1 All ER 443; [1963] 2 WLR 359
1963
CA
Lord denning MR, Diplock LJ
Contract, Consumer
The hirer took delivery of a vehicle under an HP contract. he plaintiff exercised a contractual right to terminate the hiring and take possession of the vehicle when the defendant failed to pay the first two monthly instalments. Held: Where an owner determines a hire purchase agreement in exercise of a right so to do given him by the agreement, in the absence of repudiation he can recover damages for any breaches up to the date of termination but not thereafter, and a "minimum payment" clause which purports to oblige the hirer to pay larger sums than this is unenforceable as a penalty.
Lord Denning MR said: "Undoubtedly the cases in the past give rise to some conflict, and therefore I will try to state the matter on principle. It seems to me that when an agreement of hiring is terminated by virtue of a power contained in it, and the owner retakes the vehicle, he can recover damages for any breach up to the date of termination but not for any breach thereafter, for the simple reason that there are no breaches thereafter". And "Seeing that they can no longer rely with any confidence on the 'minimum payment' clause, the owners have reverted recently to a claim for damages under the general law. But they can only do so, it seems to me, subject to the general principle which I have already stated, namely, that when they terminate the hiring and retake the vehicle, they can only get damages for any breaches up to the date of termination but not thereafter".
Diplock L.J said: "In the present contract clause 8 itself merely defines a number of events, the occurrence of any one of which gives the owners an option to bring the contract to an end. Clause 11 purports to confer upon the owners other rights upon exercising their option to bring the contract to an end, but this clause is void as a penalty clause, at any rate in so far as it purports to confer rights upon the owners in the events which in fact gave rise to their right to bring the contract to an end, namely the hirer's breach of contract in failing to pay two instalments of hire. The owners are, therefore, in my opinion, forced to rely upon their ordinary remedies for those breaches of contract which had accrued at the date when the contract was determined, viz., April 7, 1960.
I have already expressed my opinion that on that date the only causes of action which had accrued to the owners were for the two instalments due on February 25 and March 22, I960, then in arrear. There had on April 7, 1960, been no repudiation by the hirer of his contract and no fresh breach by him which went to the root of the contract so as to evince his intention no longer to be bound by it. The owners' remedy is accordingly limited to recovery of the two instalments, together with interest thereon at the agreed rate of 10 per cent per annum from the dates they respectively fell due".
1 Citers
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Goodfellow v Johnson [1966] 1 QB 83
1966
Lord Parker CJ, Widgery J
Licensing, Crime, Consumer
The defendant was the manager and licensee of a public house owned by a brewery. When the premises were visited by a sampling officer the gin supplied by the barmaid was adulterated. She was the servant of the brewery, and the magistrates dismissed the allegation that the defendant had contravened the section which provided "If a person sells to the prejudice of the purchaser any food . . which is not . . of the substance . . demanded by the purchaser he shall . . be guilty of an offence."
Lord Parker CJ said that the statutory provision created an absolute offence which was not correct "The forbidden act is the selling to the prejudice of the purchaser, and it has long been held that a person who has done the forbidden thing through somebody else like a servant or agent is himself liable. Further, as long ago as 1891 it was held in Hotchin v Hindmarsh that the forbidden act in a provision such as this is not the parting with the title by the owner but is the physical handling and handing over of the goods by way of sale: in other words the shop assistant, or in this case the barmaid, is liable, and accordingly in view of the general principle to which I have already referred any person on whose behalf that act of handling and handing over is done is also liable." Widgery J "Rather it is a fact that licensed houses are, by the necessity of the licensing legislation, organised on that footing, and here the act of selling complained of was an act … which could only have been done in that house by the defendant licensee. In those circumstances it seems to me inevitable to conclude that Mrs Wright's act of selling was in law the act of the licensee and he should be responsible for it."
Food and Drugs Act 1955 2 - Licensing Act 1953 120(1)
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 United Dominions Trust Limited v Ennis; CA 1968 - [1968] 1 QB 54
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