swarb.co.uk - law index
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Charity - From: 1970 To: 1979
This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.
Re Snowden [1970] Ch 700
1970
ChD
Cross J
Charity
Two summonses came before the court arising form wills of a Mr Snowden and a Mrs Henderson. Norman Snowden, had made sales adeeming bequests but, in consequence, pecuniary legacies and bequests of shares of residue were greater than contemplated. The pecuniary and residuary legatees were six charities who agreed, if the Attorney-General had no objection, that various sums should be paid to the specific legatees. In Mrs Henderson's case a manuscript but unattested addition to the will was omitted from probate. The proved will gave the residue after payment of various pecuniary legacies was left to charity generally. The administrators sought the approval of the Court, if the Attorney-General consented, to give effect to the manuscript alteration. The A-G argued: "It has been a long established view that the Attorney-General has no power to authorise the application of the funds of a charity for non-charitable purposes. This precise problem has been put to counsel for the Attorney-General for over 40 to 50 years. Each counsel has treated it as clear law. In the present case the point of moral obligation has been raised." Held: The court would not dissent from that view unless satisfied that it was wrong. He was so satisfied: "In the result I am satisfied that the court and the Attorney-General have power to give authority to charity trustees to make ex gratia payments out of funds held on charitable trusts. It is however a power which is not to be exercised lightly or on slender grounds but only in cases where it can fairly be said that if the charity were an individual it would be morally wrong of him to refuse to make the payment." There were four reasons for that conclusion: (1) As charity depends for its continued existence on the recognition by others of moral obligations to give it would be odd if a charity could not likewise give effect to its own moral obligations. (2) Analogous powers exist in other cases, such as the management of the property of mental patients and what is for the benefit of an infant. (3) In sanctioning compromises on behalf of charities the Court does pay regard to moral obligations. (4) The Attorney-General has power to relieve trustees from their strict legal obligations to make full restitution for breaches of trust committed by them. The Court or the Attorney-General may authorise: "a payment...out of charity funds which is motivated simply and solely by the belief of the trustees or other persons administering the funds that the charity is under a moral obligation to make the payment",
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Incorporated Council of Law Reporting For England And Wales v Attorney-General And Others 1969 I No 5934; [1972] Ch 73; [1971] EWCA Civ 13; [1971] 3 WLR 853; [1971] 3 All ER 1029
14 Oct 1971
CA
Russell, Sachs and Buckley LJJ
Charity, Income Tax
The Council sought charitable status for its activities of reporting the law. The Revenue appealed against the decision by Foster J that the Council ought to be registered as a charity. Held: The appeal failed. The company should have charitable status. Although it was selling subscriptions, the trading profits were not distributed to members, and the purposes were charitable.
Russell LJ rejected the argument that the purpose of the company was to provide lawyers with the tools of their trade: "It seems to me that if the publication of reliable reports of decisions of the courts is for the benefit of the community and of general public utility in the charitable sense, it is an inevitable and indeed necessary step in the achievement of that benefit that the members of the legal profession are supplied with the tools of their trade. I do not see how the benefit to the public, assuming it to be a charitable object, could otherwise be achieved."
He continued: " I come now to the question whether, if the main purpose of the council is, as I think it is, to further the sound development and administration of the law in this country, and if, as I think it is, that is a purpose beneficial to the community or of general public utility, that purpose is charitable according to the law of England and Wales.
On this point the law is rooted in the Statute of Elizabeth I, a statute the object of which was the oversight and reform of abuses in the administration of property devoted by donors to purposes which were regarded as worthy of such protection as being charitable. The preamble to the Statute listed certain examples of purposes worthy of such protection. These were from an early stage regarded merely as examples, and have through the centuries been regarded as examples or guideposts for the courts in the differing circumstances of a developing civilisation and economy. Sometimes recourse has been had by the courts to the instances given in the preamble in order to see whether in a given case sufficient analogy may be found with something specifically stated in the preamble, or sufficient analogy with some decided case in which already a previous sufficient analogy has been found. Of this approach perhaps the most obvious example is the provision of crematoria by analogy with the provision of burial grounds by analogy with the upkeep of churchyards by analogy with the repair of churches. On other occasions a decision in favour or against a purpose being charitable has been based in terms upon a more general question whether the purpose is or is not within "the spirit and intendment" of the Statute of Elizabeth I and in particular its preamble. Again (and at an early stage in development) whether the purpose is within "the equity" or within "the mischief" of the Statute. Again whether the purpose is charitable "in the same sense" as purposes within the [purview] of the Statute. I have much sympathy with those who say that these phrases do little of themselves to elucidate any particular problem. "Tell me", they say, "what you define when you speak of spirit, intendment, equity, mischief, the same sense, and I will tell you whether a purpose is charitable according to law. But you never define. All you do is sometimes to say that a purpose is none of these things. I can understand it when you say that the preservation of sea walls is for the safety of lives and property, and therefore by analogy the voluntary provision of lifeboats and fire brigades are charitable. I can even follow you as far as crematoria. But these other generalities teach me nothing."
I say I have much sympathy for such approach: but it seems to me to be unduly and improperly restrictive. The Statute of Elizabeth I was a statute to reform abuses: in such circumstances and in that age the courts of this country were not inclined to be restricted in their implementation of Parliament's desire for reform to particular examples given by the Statute: and they deliberately kept open their ability to intervene when they thought necessary in cases not specifically mentioned, by applying as the test whether any particular case of abuse of funds or property was within the "mischief" or the "equity" of the Statute.
For myself I believe that this rather vague and undefined approach is the correct one, with analogy, its handmaid, and that when considering Lord Macnaghten's fourth category in Pemsel's case of "other purposes beneficial to the community" (or as phrased by Sir Samuel Romilly (then Mr. Romilly) in argument in Morice v. Bishop of Durham: "objects of general public utility") the courts, in consistently saying that not all such are necessarily charitable in law, are in substance accepting that if a purpose is shown to be so beneficial or of such utility it is prima facie charitable in law, but have left open a line of retreat based on the equity of the Statute in case they are faced with a purpose (e.g. a political purpose) which could not have been within the contemplation of the Statute even if the then legislators had been endowed with the gift of foresight into the circumstances of later centuries.
In a case such as the present, in which in my view the object cannot be thought otherwise than beneficial to the community and of general public utility, I believe the proper question to ask is whether there are any grounds for holding it to be outside the equity of the Statute: and I think the answer to that is here in the negative. I have already touched upon its essential importance to our rule of law. If I look at the somewhat random examples in the preamble to the Statute I find in the repair of bridges, havens, causeways, sea banks and highways examples of matters which if not looked after by private enterprise must be a proper function and responsibility of government, which would afford strong ground for a statutory expression by Parliament of anxiety to prevent misappropriation of funds voluntarily dedicated to such matters. It cannot I think be doubted that if there were not a competent and reliable set of reports of judicial decisions, it would be a proper function and responsibility of government to secure their provision for the due administration of the law. It was argued that the specific topics in the preamble that I have mentioned are all concerned with concrete matters, and that so also is the judicially accepted opinion that the provision of a court house is a charitable purpose. But whether the search be for analogy or for the equity of the Statute this seems to me to be too narrow or refined an approach. I cannot accept that the provision, in order to facilitate the proper administration of the law, of the walls and other physical facilities of a court house is a charitable purpose, but that the dissemination by accurate and selective reporting of knowledge of a most important part of the law to be there administered is not."
Charities Act 1960 4 - Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
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1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Re Lepton's Charity [1972] Ch 276
1972
Charity
1 Cites
1 Citers
Dingle v Turner and Others; HL 16-Feb-1972 - [1972] 2 WLR 523; [1972] UKHL 2; [1972] AC 601
Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General; CA 1973 - [1973] Ch 173
Jones v Attorney General [1974] 1 Ch 148
1974
CA
Charity
The court considered its powers when facing a statutory appeal.
1 Citers
In Re Bushnell (Deceased); Lloyds Bank Ltd and others v Murray and others [1975] 1 WLR 1596; [1975] 1 All ER 721
1975
Goulding J
Charity
The court considered the charitable status of a trust established for the teaching of Socialised Medicine included demonstrating that 'the full advantage of Socialised Medicine can only be enjoyed in a Socialist State'. Held: A charitable purpose must not be propagandist. The public must be presented with neutral information so that they can choose for themselves. Goulding J said: "I am quite unable to avoid the conclusion that the main or dominant or essential object is a political one. The testator never for a moment, as I read his language, desired to educate the public so that they could choose for themselves, starting with neutral information, to support or oppose what he called "socialised medicine". I think he was trying to promote his own theory of education, if you will by propaganda, but I do not attach any importance to that word."
Oxfam v Birmingham City District Council [1976] AC 126
1976
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Rating, Charity
The appellant charity had the relief of poverty as its main object, a recognised "charitable purpose". It operated gift shops used for sorting and selling donated articles of clothing as well as selling products made in the developing world. All of the profits of such shops were devoted to the charity's purposes. Held: The appeal failed. The premises were not being "used for charitable purposes". Not every lawful activity of a charity is necessarily charitable. The "charitable purposes" of a charity are its objects.
Lord Cross of Chelsea said that a court must: "[draw] the line so as to exclude from relief user for the purpose of getting in, raising or earning money for the charity, as opposed to user for purposes directly related to the achievement of the objects of the charity".
Lord Reid said that Oxfam, therefore, was entitled to rating relief in respect of premises which it occupies and which are not being used for the actual relief of poverty of distress, if the use which it makes of them is "wholly ancillary to" or "directly facilitates" the carrying out of its charitable object - the relief of poverty or distress. The nub of the problem was: "For my part, I agree with counsel on both sides that one cannot well draw a distinction between using premises to get in money by managing existing trust property and using them to raise fresh money."
1 Citers
Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen [1978] 1 WLR 664
1978
ChD
Walton J
Charity
The Football Association set up a trust to promote football and other sports in schools and universities. The parties disputed whether a valid charitable trust had been created. Held: The trust was not valid as one for the advancement of education, and nor did it satisfy section 1 of the Act of 1958. Walton J discussed the words "social welfare" in subsection (1): "In my view, however, these words in themselves indicate that there is some sort of deprivation - not, of course, by any means necessarily of money - which falls to be alleviated; and I think that this is made even clearer by the terms of subsection (2)(a). The facilities must be provided with the object of improving the conditions of life for persons for whom the facilities are primarily intended. In other words, they must be to some extent and in some way deprived persons."
Recreational Charities Act 1958 1
1 Citers
Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen [1979] 1 WLR 130
1979
CA
Stamp, Orr, Bridge LJJ
Charity
The Football Association had set up a trust to promote football in universities and schools, claiming this was charitable under the 1958 Act. Held: The trust was not charitable whether as being for the advancement of education, or in the fourth head of charity, or under the Recreational Charities Act 1958.
Bridge LJ (dissenting) said: "I turn therefore to consider whether the object defined by clause 3(a) is charitable under the express terms of section 1 of the Recreational Charities Act 1958. Are the facilities for recreation contemplated in this clause to be 'provided in the interests of social welfare' under section 1(1)? If this phrase stood without further statutory elaboration, I should not hesitate to decide that sporting facilities for persons undergoing any formal process of education are provided in the interests of social welfare. Save in the sense that the interest of social welfare can only be served by the meeting of some social need, I cannot accept the judge's view that the interests of social welfare can only be served in relation to some 'deprived' class. The judge found this view reinforced by the requirement of subsection (2)(a) of section 1 that the facilities must be provided 'with the object of improving the conditions of life for the persons for whom the facilities are primarily intended;' Here again I can see no reason to conclude that only the deprived can have their conditions of life improved. Hyde Park improves the conditions of life for residents in Mayfair and Belgravia as much as for those in Pimlico or the Portobello Road, and the village hall may improve the conditions of life for the squire and his family as well as for the cottagers. The persons for whom the facilities here are primarily intended are pupils of schools and universities, as defined in the trust deed, and these facilities are in my judgment unquestionably to be provided with the object of improving their conditions of life. Accordingly the ultimate question on which the application of the statute to this trust depends, is whether the requirements of section l(2)(b)(i) are satisfied on the ground that such pupils as a class have need of facilities for games or sports which will promote their physical education and development by reason either of their youth or of their social and economic circumstances, or both. The overwhelming majority of pupils within the definition are young persons and the tiny minority of mature students can be ignored as de minimis. There cannot surely be any doubt that young persons as part of their education do need facilities for organised games and sports both by reason of their youth and by reason of their social and economic circumstances. They cannot provide such facilities for themselves but are dependent on what is provided for them."
Recreational Charities Act 1958 1
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