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Charity - From: 1800 To: 1849

This page lists 33 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Moggridge v Thackwell [1803] EngR 572; (1803) 7 Ves Jun 36; (1803) 32 ER 15
12 May 1803


Charity

[ Commonlii ]
 
Morice v The Bishop of Durham [1804] EngR 179; (1804) 9 Ves Jun 399; (1804) 32 ER 656
26 Mar 1804
CA
Sir William Grant MR
Charity, Trusts
Bequest, in trust for such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve, cannot be supported as a charitable Legacy ; and is therefore a Trust for the next of kin.
Ann Cracherade by her Will, dated the 16th of April 1801, and duly executed to pass real estate, after giving several legacies to her next of kin and others, some of which she directed to be paid out of the produce of her real estate, directed to be sold, bequeathed all her personal estate to the Bishop of Durham, his executors, &c., upon trust to pay her debts and legacies, &c.; and to dispose of the u1timate residue to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of ; and she appointed the Bishop her sole executor.
The bill was filed by the next of kin, to have the Will established, except as to the residuary bequest; and that such bequest may be declared void. The Attorney General was made a Defendant . The Bishop by his answer expressly disclaimed any beneficial interest in himself personally.
Held: The objects of benevolence and liberality were not so limited, and that the gift therefore failed. Sir William Grant MR described the effect of the 1601 Act and the use of the word 'charity': "Here its signification is derived chiefly from the Statute of Elizabeth. Those purposes are considered charitable, which that Statute enumerates, or which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment." He continued: "But it is settled, upon authority, which it is too late to controvert, that where a charitable purpose is expressed, however general, the bequest shall not fail on account of uncertainty of the object: but the particular mode of application will be directed by the King in some cases, in others by this Court."
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves Jun 522; [1805] EWHC Ch J80; (1805) 10 Ves 522; (1805) 32 ER 947
1805
HL
Lord Eldon LC, Sir William Grant MR
Trusts, Charity
The court was asked whether a gift of residue to be applied "to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of" was valid as being confined to purposes that were charitable. Held: For a non-charitable trust to be given effect at law, the beneficiaries of the trust must be identifiable.
Lord Eldon referred to the preamble to the 1601 Statute, saying: "where there is a gift to charity, in general, whether it is to be executed by individuals selected by the testator himself or the King as parens patriae is to execute it . . it is the duty of such trustees, on the one hand, and of the Crown, upon the other, to apply the money to charity in the sense, which the determinations have affixed to that word in this court, viz. either such charitable purposes as are expressed in the Statute . . or to purposes having analogy to those. I believe the expression "charitable purposes," as used in this court, has been applied to many acts described in that Statute, and analogous to those, not because they can with propriety be called charitable, but as that denomination is by the Statute given to all the purposes described." and
"As it is a maxim, that the execution of a trust shall be under the control of the Court, it must be of such a nature, that it can be under that control; so that the administration of it can be reviewed by the Court; or, if the trustee dies, the Court itself can execute the trust; a trust therefore, which, in case of maladministration could be reformed; and a due administration directed; and then, unless the subject and the objects can be ascertained, upon principles, familiar in other cases, it must be decided, that the Court can neither reform maladministration, nor direct a due administration."
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Morice v The Bishop of Durham [1805] EngR 97; (1805) 10 Ves Jun 522; (1805) 32 ER 947
20 Mar 1805


Charity, Trusts

Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Morice v The Bishop of Durham [1805] EngR 209; (1805) 11 Ves Jun 57; (1805) 32 ER 1009 (A)
21 Jun 1805


Charity, Trusts

Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Moggridge v Thackwell [1807] EngR 189; (1807) 13 Ves Jun 416; (1807) 33 ER 350 (A)
5 Mar 1807


Charity

[ Commonlii ]
 
Newland v Attorney-General (1809) 3 Mer 684
1809


Charity
Charitable purpose implied
1 Citers


 
The Attorney General v Price [1810] EngR 575; (1810) 17 Ves Jun 371; (1810) 34 ER 143
26 Nov 1810


Charity, Wills and Probate
Devise to A and his heirs; with a direction, that yearly he and his heirs shall for ever divide and distribute according to his and their discretion amongst the testator’s poor kinsmen and kinswomen, and amongst their offspring and issue dwelling within the County of B. £20 by the year. This is in the nature of a charitable bequest ; and, the Will being made in 1581, was sustained; and inquiries directed as to the poor relations dwelling within the county of B.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Attorney-General v Pearson; 1817 - (1817) 3 Mer 353; [1817] EngR 645; (1817) 3 Mer 353; (1817) 36 ER 135
 
Joseph James, And Hannah His Wife v William Allen And Others, and The Attorney-General [1817] EngR 609; (1817) 3 Mer 17; (1817) 36 ER 7; [1817] EWHC Ch J89
30 Jun 1817
ChD

Wills and Probate, Charity
Bequest in trust for such "benevolent" purposes, as the Trustees in their integrity and discretion may unanimously agree on; not to be supported as a charitable legacy; the word "benevolent" not being to be restricted to the sense of "charitable" so as to authorize the Court to say that the application of the property must be confined to such objects as are, strictly speaking, objects of charity. Therefore void for uncertainty, and distributable among the next of kin.
Elijah Waring, by his Will, after devising to his Niece the Plaintiff Hannah James for her life certain farms and lands therein described, and after her decease to her four daughters in fee, and making certain specific bequests of personal property to the said Plaintiff, gave to his Executors (the Defendants W. Allen, and J. Allen, and W. Matthews deceased) £200 each, in consideration of their taking upon themselves the trusts of his will, and then proceeded as follows:
"Lastly, touching all my personal property whatsoever and wheresoever not before disposed of, subject to whatever expences may be incurred relative to the "execution and fulfilment of this my will, I give and bequeath the same to my friends the aforesaid William Allen, Joseph Allen, and William Matthews (whom I constitute and appoint the Executors of this my Will), and to their Executors and Administrators, in trust to be by them applied and disposed of for and to such benevolent purposes as they in their integrity and discretion may unanimously agree on."
The Plaintiffs, by their bill, prayed that the will might be established, except as to the residuary bequest, and that such residuary bequest might be declared void; charging that the disposition was void for uncertainty.
Sir S. Romilly, Trower, and Phillimore, for the Plaintiffs, contended that this case was the same in principle with that of Morice v. The Bishop of Durham "(9 Ves. 399), and referred to Brown v. Yeall (7 Ves. 50, n.).
Hart and Spence, for the Defendants (the surviving Trustees and Executors), attempted to distinguish the cases. "Benevolence" is technically a word of charity; but, when coupled with another (as in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham with the word "liberality"), it loses its technical sense, and is to be judged of by its acceptation in common language. It was on this ground that His Honor decided in the case referred to. But, when the word stands alone, as in the present case, it is to be construed according to its technical meaning.
The Lord Chancellor, in the same case, observed that Brown v. Yeall did not apply; for that was for a particular purpose; here, if a valid devise at all, it is for general purposes.
Lovat, for the Representatives of the deceased Trustee. Mitford, for the Attorney-General.
The Master of the Rolls said: "I certainly did not conceive, that, in the case of Morice v. The Bishop of Durham (9 Ves. 399) it was merely by the addition of the word "liberality" that the trust was rendered uncertain, and therefore incapable of being carried into execution. "Liberality" is, no doubt, distinguishable from "Benevolence," but Benevolence is also distinguishable from "Charity." For although many charitable institutions are very properly called "Benevolent," it is impossible to say, that every object of a man's benevolence is also an object of his charity. Nor do I see how the required concurrence of three persons in the selection of the objects does, by any necessity, exclude the appropriation of the property to purposes very different from any that are specified in the Statute of Queen Elizabeth (stat. 43 Eliz. c. 4), or that have been held to be within the analogies of that statute. In the case before referred to, it was attempted, in the argument on the appeal, to maintain that, although the bequest should be held to be void so far as it was made for purposes of "Liberality," yet it ought to be considered as good, in so far as it was for purposes of " Benevolence "; which last word, it was said, was equivalent to "Charity." The Lord Chancellor does not say, that there could not be a proportional division, where a bequest was in part only for a charitable purpose, as in the Attorney-General v. Doyley (4 Vin. 485; 2 Eq. Ab. 194; 7 Ves. 58, note), but holds generally, that no charitable purpose was sufficiently expressed. In that case, as in this, the whole property might, consistently with the words of the will, have been applied to purposes strictly charitable.
But the question is, what authority would this Court have to say that the property must not be applied to purposes however so benevolent, unless they also come within the technical denomination of charitable purposes? If it might, consistently with the will, be applied to other than strictly charitable purposes, the trust is too indefinite for the Court to execute. I see no substantial difference between this case and the former, and therefore consider the point as already decided, though if it were still open, I should not entertain any doubt on the question."
[ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
James and Another v Allen and others [1817] EWHC Ch J10
30 Jun 1817
ChD

Wills and Probate, Charity
The testator left a bequest in trust for such 'benevolent purposes' as the trustees might unanimously agree upon. Held: The word 'benevolent' when coupled with another was not sufficient to restrict the trusts to charitable purposes and it failed.
[ Bailii ]
 
Attorney-General v Lepine (1818) 2 Swanst 181
1818

Lord Eldon L-C
Charity
The testator left part of his residuary estate for the benefit of a school for the poor in the parish of Dollar in Scotland. Held: The English court declined jurisdiction. "I have always understood that, where a charity is to be administered in Scotland, this Court should not take into its own hands the administration." He directed that the money should be paid to trustees and administered under the supervision of the Scottish courts.
1 Citers


 
Emery v Hill (1826) 1 Russ 112
1826


Charity, Jurisdiction
The Court was asked to make an order with respect to a bequest to the treasurer of a society established in Scotland for the propagation of Christian knowledge. Held: The English court had no jurisdiction over a Scottish charity.
1 Citers


 
The Trustees Of The British Museum v White [1826] EngR 1073; (1826) 2 Sim and St 594; (1826) 57 ER 473
8 Jul 1826


Charity
William White, deceased, devised a freehold estate to trustees, in trust to sell it, and pay the proceeds, together with his residuary personal estate, to the Trustees of the British Museum, to be by them employed for the benefit of that institution. The question was, whether this devise was void under the 9th Geo, 2d, c. 361.
It was argued that the British Museum is not a charitable Institution. It was founded by the munificence of the State for the benefit of the public. Every gift for the use of the publie is not, necessarily, a charity. There must be something in the nature of relief to constitute a charity. Gifts to support a public bridge, and for the repair of sea-banks, have, on that principle, been held to be charitable gifts.
So schools for learning have been held to be charitable institutions ; not so schools of art (Duke, 128). Now this is a school of art. Besides, the museum is national property ; and, for that reason, it was held in Thelluseon v Woodford (4 Ves. 227), that the devise to the King, for the use of the Sinking Fund, was good. Held: Despite these arguments, the gift was for charitable purposes, though the gift then failed onder the 1736 Act.
Mortmain Act 1736 - Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Trustees Of The British Museum v White [1828] EngR 426; (1828) 3 Car and P 289; (1828) 172 ER 424
20 Feb 1828


Charity

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
White v Trustees Of The British Museum [1829] EngR 254; (1829) 6 Bing 309; (1829) 130 ER 1299
1829


Charity

1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney-General v Merchant Tailors' Company [1832] EngR 926; (1832) 1 My and K 189; (1832) 39 ER 652
21 Dec 1832


Charity
In a suit against a corporation, to establish eight charitable trusts, of which seven were for the benefit of poor members of the corporation exclusively, and the eighth was subject to a fixed paymerit to another coporation ; it was held that this latter corporation was a necessary party as the suit was then framed, and as such an addition of parties might render the suit multifarious, leave was given to amend the information by striking out the matter relating to the charity last mentioned.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Jordon's Charity [1832] EngR 927; (1832) 5 Sim 571; (1832) 58 ER 453 (B)
22 Dec 1832


Charity

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney-General v The Ironmongers' Company [1834] EngR 1042; (1833-1834) 2 My and K 576; (1834) 39 ER 1064
18 Nov 1834


Charity
A testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees, positively forbidding them to diminish the capital thereof, or that the interest and profit arising be applied to any other use or uses than thereinafter directed ; and he proceeded to direct one moiety of the income to be applied to a charitable purpose which failed; and the other moiety to be applied to other specified charitable purposes. Held, upon appeal, that the Court had jurisdiction to apply cypres the income of the moiety devoted to the charitable purpose which failed.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Mayor of Lyon v East India Co (1836) 1 Moore's PC 175
1836

Lord Brougham
Charity, Jurisdiction
Lord Brougham said: "The objection, in the ordinary case, to administering a foreign charity under the superintendence of the Court, is this: those who are engaged in the actual execution of it, are beyond the Court's control, and those who are within the jurisdiction are answerable to the Court for the acts of persons as to whom they can derive no aid from the Court. Such an office will not easily be undertaken by any one; and its duties cannot be satisfactorily performed; at least the party must rely more on the local, that is, the foreign, authorities for help, than on the Court to which he is accountable."
1 Citers


 
The Attorney-General v Aspinall [1836] EngR 885; (1836) 1 Keen 513; (1836) 48 ER 404
4 Jul 1836

Lord Cottenham
Local Government, Charity
Municipal corporations hold their property for public charitable purposes.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney-General v Ironmongers' Company [1837] EngR 790; (1837) CP Coop 283; (1837) 47 ER 506
3 Jun 1837


Charity
Scheme for application of a charity fund left for loans to young freemen of a company and of the interest.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney-General v The Ironmongers' Company Betton's Charity [1840] EngR 425; (1840) 2 Beav 313; (1840) 48 ER 1201
14 Feb 1840

Lord Langdale MR
Charity, Constitutional
Bequest of residue to a company, to apply the interest of a moiety "unto the redemption of British slaves in Turkey or Barbary," one-fourth to charity schools in London and its suburbs; and in consideration of the care and pains of the company, the remaining one-fourth towards necessitated decayed freemen of the company. There were no such British slaves to redeem, and a reference was made to the Master to approve of a scheme for the application of the fund thus unapplied, having regard to all the charitable bequests in the will. Held, that the application of the fund to the education of the British emancipated apprenticed negroes was iiot a cy-pres application ; secondly, that the gift to the freemen of the company was a charitable bequest ; and, thirdly, there being no direct objects to which the income could be applied, regard being had to the bequest touching British captives, that the application of the fund to the second and third purposes was as near as could be to the intention of the testator, having regard to all the charitable bequests in the will.
Lord Langdale MR said that: " He did not recognise the relator as distinct from the Attorney-General. That the suit was the suit of the Attorney-General, though at the relation of another person upon whom he relied and who was answerable for costs; and that he could only recognise the counsel for the relator as the counsel for the Attorney-General, and could hear them only by his permission ; that the suit was so entirely under the control of the Attorney-General that he might desire the Court to " dismiss the information, and that if he stated that he did not sanction any proceeding, it would be instantly stopped ".
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Attorney General v South Sea Co (1841) 4 Beav 453
1841


Charity
Subject to the terms upon which the land had been conveyed to them, charitable corporations and charity trustees had the power to sell, lease or mortgage charity land. But any such transaction might be set aside in equity unless it was shown to be beneficial to the charity. The onus to establish that it was beneficial to the charity was on the purchaser.
1 Citers


 
The Attorney-General v Dulwich College [1841] EngR 957; (1840-1841) 4 Beav 255; (1841) 49 ER 337
29 Jul 1841


Charity
By letters patent, E. A. was empowered to found a charity, consisting of a master and a specified number of other members, who were thereby created a corporation, with power to take certain lands. E. A. was empowered to make ordinances for the Government thereof, and for the better ordering of the estates, E. A. established the charity, and conveyed the lands to the use of the master and other members, of the numbers specified by the letters patent, and to no other intent and purpose whatsoever. He afterwards made orclinances, whereby, amongst other things, he added to the number of members specified by the letters patent ; and appropriated to them a portion of the revenues of the charity property, Held, that E. A. had not the power of creating additional members, or of declaring any trust of the property in their favour.
An information, alleging an abuse in the internal regulations of a charity dismissed, on the ground that they were the proper subject for the interference of the special visitor.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Mitford v Reynolds; 1842 - (1842) 1 Ph 185
 
Pettingall v Pettingall (1842) LJ Ch 176
1842


Charity, Trusts
The testator left funds in trust to provide for maintenance of his horses and dogs for as long as they should live. Held: The gift was valid.

 
Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 CI and Fin 355; [1842] EngR 950; (1839,1842) 9 Cl and Fin 355; (1842) 8 ER 450
1842

Parke B
Contract, Charity
Parke B said: "In the first place, there is no doubt that not only where the language of the instrument is such as the Court does not understand, it is competent to receive evidence of the proper meaning of that language, as when it is written in a foreign tongue; but it is also competent, where technical words or peculiar terms, or indeed any expressions are used, which at the time the instrument was written had acquired an appropriate meaning, either generally or by local usage, or amongst particular classes . This description of evidence is admissible, in order to enable the Court to understand the meaning of the words contained in the instrument itself, by themselves, and without reference to the extrinsic facts on which the instrument is intended to operate. For the purpose of applying the instrument to the facts, and determining what passes by it, and who take an interest under it, a second description of evidence is admissible, viz. every material fact that will enable the Court to identify the person or tiling mentioned in the instrument, and to place the Court, whose province it is to declare the meaning of the words of the instrument, as near as may be in the situation of the parties to it."
and " From the context of the instrument, and from these two descriptions of evidence, with such circumstances as by law the Court, without evidence, may of itself notice, it is its duty to construe and apply the words of that instrument; and no extrinsic evidence of the intention of the party to the deed, from his declarations, whether at the time of his executing the instrument, or before or after that time, is admissible; the duty of the Court being to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not of what was intended to have been written."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Kendall v Granger [1842] EngR 856; (1842) 5 Beav 300; (1842) 49 ER 593
2 Jul 1842
CA
Lord Langdale MR
Charity
Bequest of personalty to trustees, to be "applied for the relief of domestic distress, assisting indigent but deserving individuals, or encouraging undertakings of general utility." Held, void as a charitable bequest.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Ironmongers' Company v Her Majesty's Attorney-General, At The Relation Of Daniel Humphreys Howlett [1844] EngR 626; (1844) 10 Cl and Fin 908; (1844) 8 ER 983
4 Jun 1844


Charity

[ Commonlii ]
 
Nightingale v Goulbourn (1848) 2 Ph 594; (1847) 5 Hare 484
1847


Charity, Wills and Probate
A testamentary gift to the Chancellor of the Exchequer was expressly impressed with a trust for Great Britain.
1 Citers


 
The Attorney-General v The Ironmongers' Company [1847] EngR 161 (B); (1847) 10 Beav 194
26 Jan 1847


Costs, Charity
A charity scheme was directed. The relator, without the sanction of the Master, advertised and incurred expense in obtaining information. The Court refused to allow the ordinary costs, but, on the ground of its having proved useful to the charity, allowed the money out of pocket bona fide expended.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Re: Shrewsbury Grammar School (1849) 1 Mac and G 324
1849


Charity
Trustees of the school had accumulated income in excess of what was required to achieve the objects of the charitable trust, and asked the court how to apply them. Having upheld the contention that what was described as Sir S. Romilly's Act conferred sufficient jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the Lord Chancellor continued: "...it is of constant occurrence that the court is asked to inquire whether an Act of Parliament shall be applied for. If it is in regard to such a matter as this court has no jurisdiction to alter, or which is already provided for by Act of Parliament, it is obvious it requires the authority of Parliament in such cases to enable the trustees to depart from that which is their prescribed duty, according to the rule existing."
1 Citers


 
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