Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Banking - From: 1996 To: 1996

This page lists 46 cases, and was prepared on 03 April 2018.

 
Generale Bank Nederland Nv (Formerly Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland Nv) v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 200
1996

Longmore J
Vicarious Liability, Employment, Banking, Torts - Other
The Export Credit Guarantee Department was not liable to the Bank for the loss which the Bank sustained due to the fraud of one of its customers in which an employee was involved.
1 Citers


 
National and Provincial v William and Humphrey [1996] NI 47
1996

Girvan J
Northern Ireland, Banking
Girvan J said: "If a mortgagor declines to put any material before the court which could lay a basis for the court exercising its powers under s36 the mortgagee would be entitled to his remedy based on his clear contractual rights under the mortgage. It is for a mortgagor to adduce some justification or basis to enable the court to exercise its discretionary power under s36 in his favour. A mortgagor who is in default under his mortgage has no right to demand that the court exercises its discretion in his favour to grant what is in effect a form of relief against the consequences of a breach of contract . . A mortgagor seeking to persuade the court to exercise its powers under s36 should be expected to put before the court his best realistic proposals to avoid the consequences of his breach of the contractual terms of the mortgage . ."
Administration of Justice Act 1973 36
1 Citers


 
Sutherland v Royal Bank of Scotland 1996 GWD6-920
1996


Scotland, Banking

1 Citers



 
 Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society; CA 1996 - [1996] 4 All ER 119
 
Group Josi v Walbrook Insurance Co. [1996] 1 LLR 345
1996
CA
Staughton LJ
Banking
In the absence of fraud by the seller in presenting documents to the confirming bank seeking payment, the court will not restrain a bank from paying a letter of credit which is payable according to its terms, nor a beneficiary from seeking payment.
1 Citers


 
Royal Trust v National Westminster Bank plc [1996] 2 BCLC 682; [1996] BCC 613
1996
CA
Millett LJ
Banking
A charge was given over the benefits of hire purchase and leasing agreements. The terms of the charge entitled the chargee to require payments under the agreements to be paid into a special account, but the chargee never in fact did so and the chargor paid them into its own bank account from which it drew for its own purposes. The issue was whether the funds in that account were subject to a trust in favour of the chargee. It was conceded that the charge itself was a fixed charge. Held: (obiter) This concession was wrongly made.
Millet LJ did not see how it could be possible to separate a debt or other receivable from the proceeds of its realisation. Unless and until the chargee intervened, the chargor had a contractual right to apply the proceeds of the charged assets in the ordinary course of its business. This right was "a badge of a floating charge" and "inconsistent with the existence of a fixed charge".
Millett LJ said: "The proper characterisation of a security as 'fixed' or 'floating' depends upon the freedom of the chargor to deal with the proceeds of the charged assets in the ordinary coure of business free from security. A contractual right in the chargor to collect the proceeds and pay them into its own bank account for use in the ordinary course of business is a badge of a floating charge and is inconsistent with the existence of a fixed charge."
1 Citers



 
 Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society; CA 10-Jan-1996 - Gazette, 10 January 1996; Independent, 04 January 1996; Times, 08 December 1995; [1996] 4 All ER 119
 
Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1995); Regina v B; Regina v F Times, 30 January 1996; Gazette, 14 February 1996; [1996] 1 WLR 970
30 Jan 1996
CACD
Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ
Banking, Crime
The offence of accepting an unauthorised deposit requires both knowledge of the act and an agreement to it. Where "consent" is alleged against him, a defendant has to be proved to know the material facts which constitute the offence by the body corporate and to have agreed to its conduct of the business on the basis of those facts.
Banking Act 1987 3 96(1)
1 Citers



 
 Manchester City Council v McCann and Another; CA 1-Feb-1996 - Times, 01 February 1996
 
United Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others Times, 13 February 1996; [1997] Ch 107; [1996] EWCA Civ 1308; [1996] 3 WLR 372; [1996] 3 All ER 215
2 Feb 1996
CA
Peter Gibson, Leggatt, Phillips LJJ
Land, Banking
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge. Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of an equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds had been akin to part performance, and was therefore equally inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1989 Act. The rule was in essence that the deposit implied that contract had been created: "The deposit by way of security is treated both as prima facie evidence of a contract to mortgage, and as part performance of that contract." Phillips LJ said: "The clear intent of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 is to introduce certainty in relation to contracts for the disposition of interests in land where uncertainty existed before. Section 2(5) contains a list of contracts expressly excluded from the operation of the section. I can see no basis for implying a further exclusion in respect of contracts for the grant of a mortgage which are secured by a deposit of title deeds."
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2 - Statute of Frauds 1677 4 - Law of Property Act 1925 40
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Wahda Bank v Arab Bank Plc Times, 26 February 1996
26 Feb 1996
CA

Banking
Law governing counter-guarantee is the same law which governs the underlying performance bond.

 
Sheppard and Cooper Ltd v TSB Bank Plc and Others Gazette, 27 March 1996; Times, 06 March 1996
6 Mar 1996
CA

Banking, Insolvency
A contract not to appoint the investigators of a company's difficulties subsequently as receivers is to be enforced.

 
Turkiye Is Bankasi as v Bank of China Times, 08 March 1996
8 Mar 1996
QBD

Banking
Party resisting claim under bond to show irrefutable evidence of fraud.

 
Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia Times, 08 April 1996; [1996] QB 752
20 Mar 1996
QBD
Colman J
Contract, Banking
The court looked at a facility agreement opened by a bank in favour of the defendant which provided that in the event of default the defendant should pay interest during the period of default at an aggregate rate equal to the cost to the bank of obtaining the deposits required to fund its participation, an agreed margin and an additional unexplained 1%. The customer said that the 1% fee was a penalty and unenforceable. Held: It was not.
Colman J said: "The defendants contend that, inasmuch as the constituents of the default interest under article 10.03(A) include at (i) 1 per cent, a rate completely unexplained, in addition to the margin (defined in article 1 as 11/2 per cent) and the cost of obtaining dollar deposits to fund the bank's participation, the 1 per cent is a penalty. It is said to be in terrorem the borrower, its sole function being to ensure compliance with the agreements. . "The term provided for a modest increase. It was not a penalty and therefore not invalid.
The court analysed the concept of a penalty as follows (following Dunlop): "whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for breach. That the contractual function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with the loss that might be sustained if breach occurred."
A simple dichotomy between a genuine pre-estimate of damages and a penalty does not always cover all the possibilities.
Although the payment of liquidated damages is "the most prevalent purpose" for which an additional payment on breach might be required under a contract " . . the jurisdiction in relation to penalty clauses is concerned not primarily with the enforcement of inoffensive liquidated damages clauses but rather with protection against the effect of penalty clauses. There would therefore seem to be no reason in principle why a contractual provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach."
He continued: "Where, however, the loan agreement provides that the rate of interest will only increase prospectively from the time of default in payment, a rather different picture emerges. The additional amount payable is ex hypothesi directly proportional to the period of time during which the default in payment continues. Moreover, the borrower in default is not the same credit risk as the prospective borrower with whom the loan agreement was first negotiated. Merely for the pre-existing rate of interest to continue to accrue on the outstanding amount of the debt would not reflect the fact that the borrower no longer has a clean record. Given that money is more expensive for a less good credit risk than for a good credit risk, there would in principle seem to be no reason to deduce that a small rateable increase in interest charged prospectively upon default would have the dominant purpose of deterring default. That is not because there is in any real sense a genuine pre-estimate of loss, but because there is a good commercial reason for deducing that deterrence of breach is not the dominant contractual purpose of the term."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Boote (Inspector of Taxes) v Banco Do Brasil Sa Times, 02 April 1996
2 Apr 1996
ChD

Corporation Tax, Banking
An overseas bank may not carry forward a set-off against profits against later loss by overseas bank on loans through UK.
Finance Act 1976 50(1)
1 Citers


 
Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia and Another Gazette, 10 July 1996; Times, 08 April 1996; [1998] QB 22; [1996] EWCA Civ 1356
3 Apr 1996
CA
Neill, Peter Gibson, Hobhouse LJJ
Torts - Other, Banking
Appeal by the Defendant from a judgment on an application for summary judgment under RSC Order 14 by the Plaintiffs, Camdex International Ltd judgment was entered for the Plaintiffs in the sum of Kuwaiti Dinars 20,595,557.429. The Plaintiffs pleaded that the Central Bank of Kuwait deposited with the Defendant the sum of Kuwaiti Dinars 15,000,000 for a period of a year at an agreed rate of interest. The deposit was renewed in a number of subsequent years with the interest being accumulated. The Central Bank of Kuwait and the Defendant entered into two further agreements which had the effect of rescheduling part of the Defendant's interest liability and extended the deposit of the principal sum and the balance of the interest for a further year. The Defendant paid a sum of 616,098 Kuwaiti Dinars during 1990 but otherwise failed to pay the sums due under the 1988 agreements. Having pleaded the indebtedness of the Defendant to the Central Bank of Kuwait, the Plaintiffs pleaded that the Central Bank of Kuwait assigned absolutely to the Plaintiffs the debts due under the 1988 agreements and that the Plaintiffs had given written notice of the assignment to the Defendant and that they had accordingly become entitled to the payment of the debt to them. Held: The appeal failed. There was no maintenance in the assignment of debt though litigation was required to recover it. It remains objectionable to traffic in litigation. The assignment had no essence in maintenance and was contemplated by statute, and was effective.
Law of Property Act 1925 136
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Sheppard and Cooper Ltd v TSB Bank Plc and Others (2) Times, 01 May 1996
1 May 1996
ChD

Banking
A banking client company who were in funds, but unwilling to clear a bank loan on proper demand having been made were in default under the loan.


 
 Douglas and others v The Right Honourable Sir Lynden Oscar Pindling; PC 13-May-1996 - Gazette, 30 May 1996; [1996] UKPC 8; [1996] AC 890

 
 National Westminster Bank Plc v Kitch; CA 14-May-1996 - Gazette, 15 May 1996; Times, 14 May 1996; [1996] 1 WLR 1316
 
Bastone and Firminger Ltd v Nasima Enterprises (Nigeria) Ltd and Others [1996] CLC 1902
20 May 1996
ComC
Rix J
Banking
Banking - collecting banker - remitting banker - privity of contract Banking - remitting bank - right to damages - other than indemnity by customer Conflict of laws - RSC Order 11 r.1(1)(f) - 'damage sustained within the jurisdiction' - meaning Amendment of writ - causes of action arising after date of writ - exception - discretion
Rix J took a general view of the court’s discretion to allow the addition (within the limitation period) of causes of action based on assignments subsequent to the writ, but was also able to distinguish Roban Jig on the facts.
1 Citers



 
 Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council; CA 20-May-1996 - Times, 20 May 1996; [1997] QB 306
 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council Times, 30 May 1996; [1996] 2 All ER 961; [1996] AC 669; [1996] UKHL 12; [1996] 2 WLR 802; [1996] 5 Bank LR 341
22 May 1996
HL
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff, Lord Woolf
Banking, Local Government, Equity
Simple interest only was payable on a debt payable for an interest rate swap agreement which had been avoided as ultra vires the council's powers. The failure of the swap agreement did not place the authority under any fiduciary duty to the claimants. A finding to that effect would create equitable interests with uncertain consequences for others. Accordingly simple interest only was payable. Parliament had made its intentions clear and it was not for the courts to create new situations in which compound interest would be awarded. "Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property has been obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity." An innocent recipient of property wrongfully obtained does not become a constructive trustee of it until receipt of knowledge of the claim in equity of the true owner.
HL Lord Goff said: "Claims in restitution are founded upon a principle of justice, being designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant: see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548. Long ago, in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, Lord Mansfield C.J. said that the gist of the action for money had and received is that "the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money". It would be strange indeed if the courts lacked jurisdiction in such a case to ensure that justice could be fully achieved by means of an award of compound interest, where it is appropriate to make such an award, despite the fact that the jurisdiction to award such interest is itself said to rest upon the demands of justice. I am glad not to be forced to hold that English law is so inadequate as to be incapable of achieving such a result. In my opinion the jurisdiction should now be made available, as justice requires, in cases of restitution, to ensure that full justice can be done. The seed is there, but the growth has hitherto been confined within a small area. That growth should now be permitted to spread naturally elsewhere within this newly recognised branch of the law. No genetic engineering is required, only that the warm sun of judicial creativity should exercise its benign influence rather than remain hidden behind the dark clouds of legal history."
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: "The argument for a resulting trust was said to be supported by the case of a thief who steals a bag of coins. At law those coins remain traceable only so long as they are kept separate: as soon as they are mixed with other coins or paid into a mixed bank account they cease to be traceable at law. Can it really be the case, it is asked, that in such circumstances the thief cannot be required to disgorge the property which, in equity, represents the stolen coins? Moneys can only be traced in equity if there has been at some stage a breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. if either before the theft there was an equitable proprietary interest (e.g. the coins were stolen trust moneys) or such interest arises under a resulting trust at the time of the theft or the mixing of the moneys. Therefore, it is said, a resulting trust must arise either at the time of the theft or when the moneys are subsequently mixed. Unless this is the law, there will be no right to recover the assets representing the stolen moneys once the moneys have become mixed.
I agree that the stolen moneys are traceable in equity. But the proprietary interest which equity is enforcing in such circumstances arises under a constructive, not a resulting, trust. Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity. Thus, an infant who has obtained property by fraud is bound in equity to restore it: Stocks v. Wilson [1913] 2 K.B. 235, 244; R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill [1914] 3 K.B. 607. Moneys stolen from a bank account can be traced in equity: Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274, 1282C-E: see also McCormick v. Grogan (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 82, 97".
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the differences between institutional and remedial constructive trusts: "Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Goss and others v Laurence George Chilcott As Liquidator of Central Acceptance Limited (In Liquidation) Gazette, 12 June 1996; Times, 06 June 1996; [1996] UKPC 17; [1996] AC 788
23 May 1996
PC
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Cooke of Thorndon
Banking, Commonwealth, Equity
(New Zealand) Mr and Mrs Goss, had been granted a loan by the claimant finance company under a mortgage instrument that had been avoided by the claimant because it had been fraudulently altered by Mr Haddon, an employee of the claimant, without the claimant's authority. Mr Haddon was the brother of Mrs Goss. The advance from the claimant having been made available to Mr and Mrs Goss, it was as agreed between them and Mr Haddon in fact received by Mr Haddon. Mr and Mrs Goss took no security from Mr Haddon. Mr Haddon was unable to repay the advance. Mr and Mrs Goss argued that their inability to recover the money from Mr Haddon constituted a defence of change of position to the claimant's action for restitution of the money paid for a consideration that had totally failed. Held: The loan remained repayable despite the unenforceability of the mortgage instrument under which it was secured. The defence failed because Mr and Mrs Goss knew that the money lent would have to be repaid to the claimant and, in paying it to Mr Haddon, they had taken the risk that the loss would fall on them.
Lord Goff said: "From the beginning, the Defendants were under an obligation to repay the advance once it had been paid to them or to their order; and this obligation was of course unaffected by the fact that they had allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon. The effect of the alteration of the mortgage instrument was that their contractual obligation to repay the money was discharged; but they had nevertheless been enriched by the receipt of the money, and prima facie were liable in restitution to restore it. They had however allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon in circumstances in which, as they well knew, the money would nevertheless have to be repaid to the company. They had, therefore, in allowing the money to be paid to Mr Haddon, deliberately taken the risk that he would be unable to repay the money, in which event they themselves would have to repay it without recourse to him. Since any action by them against Mr Haddon would now be fruitless they are seeking, by invoking the defence of change of position, to shift that loss onto the company. This, in their Lordships' opinion, they cannot do. The fact that they cannot now obtain reimbursement from Mr Haddon does not, in the circumstances of the present case, render it inequitable for them to be required to make restitution to the company in respect of the enrichment which they have received at the company's expense."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc; HL 24-Jun-1996 - Gazette, 04 September 1996; Times, 24 June 1996; [1997] AC 191; [1996] PNLR 455; [1996] 27 EG 125; [1996] 3 WLR 87; [1996] UKHL 10; [1996] 3 All ER 365; [1996] 2 EGLR 93; 80 BLR 1; [1996] 5 Bank LR 211; [1996] CLC 1179; [1996] 50 Con LR 153
 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch Gazette, 04 September 1996; Times, 01 July 1996; [1997] 1 All ER 144
1 Jul 1996
CA
Nourse LJ
Banking, Undue Influence
A Bank was to assume that undue influence existed where they knew that an employee was giving security for his employer's debt to the bank. An unlimited guarantee given by an employee to his employer's bank was set aside as unconscionable. The circumstances in which the doctrine of unconscionable bargains would apply were similar to those of undue influence. "Equity's jurisdiction to relieve against (unconscionable bargains), although more rarely exercised in modern times is at least as venerable as its jurisdiction to relieve against those procured by undue influence." When attending his client to witness such a document, the solicitor must in any event advise her that she is under no obligation to enter into the transaction at all and, if she still wishes to do so, that she is not bound to accept the terms of any document which has been put before her.
1 Citers


 
Graham Charles Botham and others v TSB Bank Plc [1996] EWCA Civ 549
30 Jul 1996
CA
Sir Richard Scott VC, Roch LJ, Henry LJ
Land, Banking
A flat had been repossessed by the bank. The parties disputed whether items were fixtures and charged with the land or not. Held: The judge had correctly analysed and applied the law of fixtures and fittings. The appeal failed save to a limited extent. "The tests, in the case of an item which has been attached to the building in some way other than simply by its own weight, seem to be the purpose of the item and the purpose of the link between the item and the building. If the item viewed objectively, is, intended to be permanent and to afford a lasting improvement to the building, the thing will have become a fixture. If the attachment is temporary and is no more than is necessary for the item to be used and enjoyed, then it will remain a chattel. Some indicators can be identified. For example, if the item is ornamental and the attachment is simply to enable the item to be displayed and enjoyed as an adornment that will often indicate that this item is a chattel. Obvious examples are pictures. But this will not be the result in every case; for example ornamental tiles on the walls of kitchens and bathrooms. The ability to remove an item or its attachment from the building without damaging the fabric of the building is another indicator. The same item may in some areas be a chattel and in others a fixture. For example a cooker will, if free standing and connected to the building only by an electric flex, be a chattel But it may be otherwise if the cooker is a split level cooker with the hob set into a work surface and the oven forming part of one of the cabinets in the kitchen. " As to fitted carpets attached by grippers, they were not fixtures, and nor were white goods in the kitchen. Though part of a decoraive scheme of they wre not sufficiently attached.
Sir Richard Scott VC: There is, I think, some danger in applying too literally tests formulated for the purpose of decisions regarding machinery in factories to cases regarding articles in residences. There is a danger, also, in applying too literally tests formulated for the purpose of decisions regarding articles of ornamental value only to cases regarding articles whose prime function is utilitarian.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Banco Exterior Internacional SA (Formerly Banco Exterior - UK a Limited Liability Company Incorporated Under the Laws of Spain) v Thomas and Barry the Executors of Patricia Dempsey; CA 31-Jul-1996 - [1996] EWCA Civ 558; [1997] 1 WLR 221
 
Oakdale (Richmond) Limited v National Westminster Bank Plc Times, 20 August 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 568
6 Aug 1996
CA

Company, Banking, European
The plaintiff sought to have the bank's form of debenture deemed anti-competitive under the treaty and void. Held: The bank's security finished when the sums due were repaid. It was not a clog on the equity of redemption. A provision against the freedom to give a second charge was appropriate because the charge was a continuing one securing an overdraft. A second charge would take priority over subsequent advances under the debenture. It was also necessary for the bank to take control of the collection of book debts to avoid that part of the charge being a floating charge. The provisions were reasonable and not anti-competitive. The arguments had no prospect of success and leave to appeal was refused.
EC Treaty 85 86
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Nationwide Building Society v Rogers [1996] EWCA Civ 572
8 Aug 1996
CA

Land, Banking

[ Bailii ]

 
 A Ltd v B Bank; CA 15-Aug-1996 - Times, 15 August 1996
 
Mercedes Benz Finance Ltd v Clydesdale Times, 16 September 1996; 1996 SCLR 1005
16 Sep 1996
OHCS
Lord Penrose
Banking, Scotland
The creditor finance company complained that the customer had paid money into its account with the bank, in order to discharge its obligations by direct debit payments, but that the bank had refused to make the payments. The claimant argued that the direct debit mandate was a mandate in rem suam, and was not dependant upon a credit balance to be maintained. Held: The respective rights as between a banker and his customer are not affected by direct debit instructions. The instruction to pay remained that of the account holder. The creditor was in the same position as was the payee on a cheque, namely that it was a prerequisitie of an assignative effect that the account should crry sufficient funds. Though there were no relevant averments of trust or of a fiduciary relationship, the bank's knowledgeof the specific reason for the lodgment of the funds to meet a specific obligation might be enough to require proof to be heard on the claim for unjust enrichment.
1 Cites



 
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International Sa (In Liquidation) (No 8); CA 2-Oct-1996 - Gazette, 02 October 1996; [1996] Ch 245
 
Ali Abdel Ghani ATA and Another v American Express Bank Ltd Unreported, 07 October 1996
7 Oct 1996
ComC
Rix J
Banking, Damages
ComC Banking - bank - acting as counter-party - discretion to trade - failure to exercise discretion - damages - causation - assumptions to be made - common-sense
1 Citers


 
Gold Coin Joailliers SA (a body incorporated With Unlimited Liability Under the Laws of Switzerland) v United Bank of Kuwait Times, 04 November 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 753
17 Oct 1996
CA

Banking
A banker giving a financial status reference by telephone does not guarantee the identity of the person for whom the reference is being given.
[ Bailii ]
 
International Marine Services Inc v National Bank of Fujairah and Another [1996] EWCA Civ 768
18 Oct 1996
CA

Banking

[ Bailii ]
 
Bristol Meci Australasia Pty Limited v Ericsson Business Networks Ab [1996] EWCA Civ 807
25 Oct 1996
CA

Banking

[ Bailii ]
 
Barclays Bank Plc v Birkett [1996] EWCA Civ 826
30 Oct 1996
CA

Banking
Renewed application for leave to appeal - possession order.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Jarrett v Barclays Bank Plc, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc and Jones v First National Bank Plc and Peacock v First National Bank Plc; CA 31-Oct-1996 - Times, 18 November 1996; Gazette, 12 February 1997; [1996] EWCA Civ 847
 
Barclays Bank Plc v Thompson [1996] EWCA Civ 893; [1997] 4 All ER 816
7 Nov 1996
CA
Simon Brown LJ
Banking, Undue Influence
Knowledge acquired by solicitors whilst tendering independent advice to a signatory did not come to them as agents for the lenders because at that time their professional duty was owed to the signatory alone.[ Simon Brown LJ said: "The starting point for consideration of these rival arguments must be the trilogy of recent Court of Appeal decisions which clearly establish a bank's entitlement to rely upon a solicitor's certificate that proper advice has been given to the signatory of a relevant instrument even though that solicitor acts principally for the very person against whose undue influence the signatory must be guarded . . Was it reasonable to expect a solicitor, in explaining the nature and effect of the document, to give appropriate advice? In my view it was. It is an ordinary incident of a solicitor's duty to explain the obvious potential pitfalls of legal transactions to those about to take part in them."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Banner Lane Realisations Limited (In Liquidation) v Berisford Plc and Another [1996] EWCA Civ 953
14 Nov 1996
CA

Company, Banking

[ Bailii ]
 
Audrey Joan Conroy v James Francis Kenny and Anr [1996] EWCA Civ 979
18 Nov 1996
CA

Banking, Consumer

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Lloyds Bank Plc v Croad; Crutcher; Miller; Miller and Ramstate Limited; CA 28-Nov-1996 - [1996] EWCA Civ 1056

 
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) v Malik and Malik; CA 5-Dec-1996 - [1996] EWCA Civ 1108
 
Mole Valley District Council v Nationwide Building Society [1996] EWCA Civ 1158
10 Dec 1996
CA

Banking

[ Bailii ]
 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd v Gulf Bank Ksc [1996] EWCA Civ 1281
20 Dec 1996
CA

Contract, Banking

[ Bailii ]
 
Tradex Hellas SA v Republic of Albania ARB/94/2
24 Dec 1996
ICSID

International, Banking

[ ICSID ]
 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.