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Banking - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 22 cases, and was prepared on 03 April 2018.

 
London Intercontinental Trust Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 241
1980


Banking
A bank acting on a document insufficiently signed according to the strict mandate received, may be protected by a later ratification of the transaction by the customer.

 
In re Gray's Inn Construction Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 711
1980
CA
Buckley, Goff LJJ and Sir David Cairns
Equity, Insolvency, Banking
After the presentation of a petition for the winding up of the company moneys were paid in and out of the company's bank account which was overdrawn. The liquidator issued a summons for a declaration that the amounts credited and/or debited to the account by the bank during the relevant period constituted dispositions of the company's property which were void under s.227 of the Companies Act 1948. The liquidator further sought an order that the bank pay those moneys to the liquidator as constituting dispositions of the property of the company. Held: In the exercise of the court's discretion whether to make a validation order, the overriding principle is that the court must always do its best to ensure that the interests of the unsecured creditors will not be prejudiced. On an application for a validation order in the period between the presentation of the petition and its hearing, the court will need to be satisfied that it is in the interests of the creditors generally that the transaction should be allowed to proceed.
Buckley LJ said: "When a customer's account with his banker is overdrawn he is a debtor to his banker for the amount of the overdraft. When he pays a sum of money into the account, whether in cash or by payments in of a third party's cheque, he discharges his indebtedness to the bank pro tanto. There is clearly in those circumstances, in my judgment, a disposition by the company to the bank of the amount of the cash or of the cheque."
After stating that in the case before the court the company's account with the bank was overdrawn, he said: "Mr Heslop does not dispute that all payments out of the company's account to third parties, not being payments to agents of the company as such are dispositions of the company's property; . . That all such payments out must be dispositions of the company's property is, I think, indisputable . ."
Companies Act 1948 227
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Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Others v Arcepey Shipping Co SA, The Angel Bell [1981] 1 QB 65; [1980] 2 WLR 488; [1980] 1 All ER 480
1980

Robert Goff J
Banking, Litigation Practice
The court considered whether a defendant should be allowed to pay his debts as they fell due despite an asset freezing order. Held: The Mareva jurisdiction should not ”improve the position of claimants”. Rather, it should prevent the injustice of a defendant removing his assets from the jurisdiction which may have otherwise been available to satisfy a judgment.
Robert Goff J said: "the point of the Mareva jurisdiction is to proceed by stealth, to pre-empt any action by the defendant to remove his assets from the jurisdiction. To achieve that result the injunction must be in a wide form because, for example, a transfer by the defendant to a collaborator in the jurisdiction could lead to the transfer of the assets abroad by that collaborator. But it does not follow that, having established the injunction, the court should not thereafter permit a qualification to it to allow a transfer of assets by the defendant if the defendant satisfies the court that he requires the money for a purpose which does not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction . . It does not make commercial sense that a party claiming unliquidated damages should, without himself proceeding to judgment, prevent the defendant from using his assets to satisfy his debts as they fall due and so put him in the position of having to allow his creditors to proceed to judgment with consequent loss of credit and of commercial standing . . All the interveners [the defendant’s creditors who had lent money to the defendant for the purpose of purchasing ships, including the ship in the case at hand] are asking [in their application to vary the injunction so that they could, as equitable mortgagees of the defendant’s ship as well as assignees of the insurance policies of the said ship, be paid the proceeds of these policies as repayment of the debt due under the loan] is that the defendants should be free to repay such a loan if they think fit to do so, not that the loan transaction should be enforced. For a defendant to be free to repay a loan in such circumstances is not inconsistent with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction. He is not in such circumstances seeking to avoid his responsibilities to the plaintiff if the latter should ultimately obtain a judgment; on the contrary, he is seeking in good faith to make payments which he considers he should make in the ordinary course of business. I cannot see that the Mareva jurisdiction should be allowed to prevent such a payment. To allow it to do so would be to stretch it beyond its original purpose so that instead of preventing abuse it would rather prevent businessmen conducting their businesses as they are entitled to do .
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Williams and Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487; [1980] 2 All ER 408; [1980] 3 WLR 138; [1980] UKHL 4
19 Jun 1980
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Salmon and Lord Roskill
Registered Land, Banking
The wife had made a substantial financial contribution to the purchase price of the house which was registered only in her husband’s name, and charged to the bank. The bank sought possession. The wife resisted saying that she had an overriding interest. Held: Her equitable interest was not only a ‘minor interest’ within section 3 (xv) of the Act, but was also protected as an overriding interest because she occupied the land. The House considered the relationship between registered interests on the one hand, and equitable "minor interests" and trusts on the other. Lord Wilberforce said: "The system of land registration, as it exists in England, which long antedates the Land Registration Act 1925, is designed to simplify and to cheapen conveyancing. It is intended to replace the often complicated and voluminous title deeds of property by a single land certificate, on the strength of which land can be dealt with. In place of the lengthy and often technical investigation of title to which a purchaser was committed, all he has to do is consult the register; from any burden not entered on the register, with one exception, overriding interests, he takes free. Above all, the system is designed to free the purchaser from the hazards of notice - real or constructive - which, in the case of unregistered land, involve him in inquiries, often quite elaborate, failing which he might be bound by equities. The Law of Property Act 1925 contains provisions limiting the effect of the doctrine of notice, but it still remains a potential source of danger to purchasers. By contrast, the only provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925 with regard to notice are provisions which enable a purchaser to take the estate free from equitable interests or equities whether he has notice or not. (See, for example, section 3 (xv) "minor interests"). The only kind of notice recognised is by entry on the register.

"The exception just mentioned consists of "overriding interests" listed in section 70. As to these, all registered land is stated to be deemed to be subject to such of them as may be subsisting in reference to the land, unless the contrary is expressed on the register. The land is so subject regardless of notice actual or constructive. In my opinion therefore, the law as to notice as it may affect purchasers of unregistered land, whether contained in decided cases, or in a statute (the Conveyancing Act 1882, section 3, Law of Property Act, section 199) has no application even by analogy to registered land. Whether a particular right is an overriding interest, and whether it affects a purchaser, is to be decided upon the terms of section 70, and other relevant provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925, and upon nothing else. In relation to rights connected with occupation, it has been said that the purpose and effect of section 70 (1) (g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 was to make applicable to registered land the same rule as previously had been held to apply to unregistered land." The existence of overriding interests within the system of registered conveyancing might be troublesome for purchasers, but "What is involved is a departure from an easy-going practice of dispensing with enquiries as to occupation beyond that of the vendor and accepting the risks of doing so. To substitute for this a practice of more careful enquiry as to the fact of occupation, and if necessary, as to the rights of occupiers can not, in my view of the matter, be considered as unacceptable. I adhere to this, but I do not accept the argument which learned counsel for the appellant sought to draw from it. His submission was that, in applying section 70(1)(g), we should have regard to and limit the application of the paragraph in the light of the doctrine of notice. But this would run counter to the whole purpose of the Act. The purpose, in each system, is the same, namely, to safeguard the rights of persons in occupation, but the method used differs. In the case of unregistered land, the purchaser’s obligation depends upon what he has notice of - notice actual or constructive. In the case of registered land, it is the fact of occupation that matters. If there is actual occupation, and the occupation has rights, the purchaser takes subject to them. If not, he does not. No further element is material."
On the plain meaning of the words “actual occupation”, what is required is “physical presence, not some entitlement at law” these words are ordinary words of plain English, and should, in my opinion, be interpreted as such" and "the word "actual" merely emphasises that what is required is physical presence, not some entitlement in law" and 'undivided shares in land can only take effect in equity, behind a trust for sale upon which the legal owner is to hold the land.”
Land Registration Act 1925 70(1)
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[ Bailii ]
 
Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich [1981] 1 WLR 1265; [1981] 2 All ER 650
1981
CA
Oliver LJ
Banking, Damages, Equity
A combination of defences based on delay was pleaded in a passing off action objecting to the use of a name which the defendants had been using without objection for many years. A permanent injunction was claimed. Held: Oliver LJ said as to the availability of damages in a case of acquiescence to the breach of a contract: "that the test requires a much broader approach which is directed at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment." The court approved a statement in the court below: "Of course, estoppel by conduct has been a field of the law in which there has been considerable expansion over the years and it appears to me that it is essentially the application of a rule by which justice is done where the circumstances of the conduct and behaviour of the party to an action are such that it would be wholly inequitable that he should be entitled to succeed in the proceeding." The court favoured a broad approach to the problem of inequitable or unconscionable conduct by long delay, rather than one turning on historical distinctions between the assertion of equitable rights and the enforcement rights by equitable means
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Intraco Limited v Notis Shipping Corporation [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 256
1981
CA
Donaldson LJ
Contract, Banking
"Demand bonds" are a specialised form of irrevocable instrument, developed by the banking world for its commercial customers. They have been accepted by the courts as the equivalent of irrevocable letters of credit, and have been described as part of "the lifeblood of commerce" Donaldson LJ: "Thrombosis will occur if, unless fraud is involved, the courts intervene and thereby disturb the mercantile practice of treating rights thereunder as being the equivalent of cash in hand."
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Power Curber International Ltd v The National Bank of Kuwait [1981] 1 WLR 1233
1981
CA

Banking
The advising bank on a letter of credit was situated in Florida. The place where the credit was payable was North Carolina, and the place where the issuing bank had its place of business was Kuwait. Held: The contract had its closest and most real connection with North Carolina, being the law of the place where the issuing bank's obligation under the credit fell due.
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Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105
1981

Goulding J
Banking, Equity
Goulding J approved the statement in Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: "the receiving of money which consistently with conscience cannot be retained is, in equity, sufficient to raise a trust in favour of the party for whom or on whose account it was received. This is the governing principle in all such cases. And therefore, whenever any controversy arises, the true question is, not whether money has been received by a party of which he could not have compelled the payment, but whether he can now, with a safe conscience, ex aequo et bono, retain it."
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 Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL; CA 1982 - [1982] 1 AB 558; [1982] 2 WLR 288; [1982] 1 All ER 556
 
Bank of Scotland v Davis 1982 SLT 20
1982
SCS

Banking
A bank's borrower's covenant to pay interest is ordinarily to be taken to continue until the full sum of principal is repaid, after as before judgment. An appeal was allowed from the order of the sheriff in an undefended action for repayment of a loan, the sheriff having ordered payment of interest from the date of judgment at a rate lower than the contractual rate until payment. The court saw no reason why the contractual rate should not apply also after judgment.
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 Standard Chartered Bank Ltd v Walker; CA 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 1410; [1982] 3 All ER 938
 
Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL [1982] 1 All ER 556; [1982] 2 WLR 288; [1982] 1 QB 558
1982
CA
Lord Denning MR, Kerr LJ, Eveleigh LJ
Company, Torts - Other, Banking
The plaintiffs, an oversea company with an office in London had been defrauded here. They sought and obtained Mareva injunctions against defendants and against six clearing banks. The banks sought clarification of their duties. Held: The injunctions were properly granted. An innocent third party such as a bank had a duty to do what it could to comply with a court order, and such an order served on a bank may have the effect of revoking the client's mandate, allowing the bank to refuse to pay on cheques. The necessary mental ingredients for the tort of deceit have a close relationship to the mental ingredients for misfeasance.
Lord Denning MR said: "Even though the order has not then been drawn up - even though it has not then been served on the defendant - it has immediate effect on every asset of the defendant covered by the injunction. Every person who has knowledge of it must do what he reasonably can to preserve the asset. He must not assist in any way in the disposal of it. Otherwise he is guilty of a contempt of court." and
"As soon as the bank is given notice of the Mareva injunction, it must freeze the defendant's bank account. It must not allow any drawings to be made on it, neither by cheques drawn before the injunction nor by those drawn after it. The reason is because, if it allowed any such drawings, it would be obstructing the course of justice - as prescribed by the court which granted the injunction - and it would be guilty of a contempt of court." and
"Carelessness or even recklessness on the part of banks ought not in my opinion to make them liable for contempt unless it can be shown that there was indifference to such a degree that was contumacious . . it seems to me to be undesirable that those who are not immediate parties should be in danger of being held in contempt of court unless they can be shown to have been contumacious."
Eveleigh LJ described the consequences of acts or omissions in breach of an injunction: "(1) The person against whom the order is made will be liable for contempt of court if he acts in breach of the order after having notice of it. (2) A third party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the breach, that is to say if knowing the terms of the injunction he wilfully assists the person to whom it was directed to disobey it. This will be so whether or not the person enjoined has had notice of the injunction.
The first proposition is clear enough. As to the second, however, it was submitted that until the defendant had notice of the injunction nothing done by the bank could amount to contempt of court. Also two opposing views were canvassed (I use this expression as the arguments were not strictly contentious) as to the extent to which mens rea was a necessary ingredient in determining the bank's responsibility to the court.
I will give my reasons for the second proposition and take first the question of prior notice to the defendant. It was argued that the liability of a third party arose because he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. he was an accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which the third party could be an accessory. In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice causing the order of the court to be thwarted." and
As to the argument that a third party was culpable as an accessory: "In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the order of the court to be thwarted."
Kerr LJ “However, once the bank has been served, it will no doubt consider it prudent to take steps to withdraw such facilities from the defendant in so far as it is in its power to do so.”
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Habib Bank Ltd v Gulabhai Naginbas Tailor [1982] EWCA Civ 6; [1982] 3 All ER 561; [1982] 1 WLR 1218
25 May 1982
CA
Oliver LJ
Land, Banking
Appeal against mortgagee possession order. Held: S 36 relief is in practice to be limited to a restricted range of cases - "for, if the mortgagor was already in difficulties with his instalments, the chances of his being able to pay off the whole principal as well in a reasonable time must be considered fairly slim"
Administration of justice Act 1970 36
[ Bailii ]

 
 Catlin v Cyprus Finance Corporation (London) Ltd; 1983 - [1983] QB 759
 
United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168
1983
HL
Lord Diplock
Banking
The House was asked as to the question of fraud which would entitle a banker to refuse to pay under a letter of credit notwithstanding the rule requiring payment when the documents were in order on their face. Held: The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods. That does not permit any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment.
To this general statement of principle as to the contractual obligations of the confirming bank to the seller, there is one established exception, that is, where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue. Although there does not appear among the English authorities any case in which this exception has been applied, it is well established in the American cases of which the leading or "landmark" case is Sztejn v J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation (1941) 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 . . The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, if plain English is to be preferred, "fraud unravels all". The courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud.
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 European Asian Bank AG v Punjab and Sind Bank; CA 1983 - [1983] 1 LL Rep 611
 
Neste Oy v Lloyd's Bank Plc [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 658
1983
ChD
Bingham J
Insolvency, Agency, Banking
A shipping agent (PSL), a client of the defendant, had become insolvent. The defendant sought to combine the accounts. PSL settled on behalf of their shipowner clients bills payable to harbour authorities, pilots, fuel merchants, and other providers of goods and services. The shipowners sometimes put them in funds in advance and sometimes reimbursed them in arrears. The plaintiff shipowners claimed that the unspent balance of six payments made by them to a general account of PSL were held for them in trust. Their primary case was that the payments were subject to an implied trust to pay the money to the suppliers. This arose either by virtue of the agency relationship or as a special purpose (or Quistclose) trust. Held: The argument was rejected. However, there was a constructive trust of the sixth payment, which had been received after the directors of PSL had concluded that their company was insolvent.
Bingham J approved as "in accord with the general principles of equity as applied in England": "the receiving of money which consistently with conscience cannot be retained is, in equity, sufficient to raise a trust in favour of the party for whom or on whose account it was received. This is the governing principle in all such cases. And therefore, whenever any controversy arises, the true question is, not whether money has been received by a party of which he could not have compelled the payment, but whether he can now, with a safe conscience, ex aequo et bono, retain it." from Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 2nd ed.
He applied this to the facts of the case saying: "Given the situation of PSL when the last payment was received, any reasonable and honest directors of that company (or the actual directors had they known of it) would, I feel sure, have arranged for the repayment of that sum to the plaintiff's without hesitation or delay. It would have seemed little short of sharp practice for PSL to take any benefit from the payment, and it would have seemed contrary to any ordinary notion of fairness that the general body of creditors should profit from the accident of a payment made at a time when there was bound to be a total failure of consideration. Of course it is true that insolvency always causes loss and perfect fairness is unattainable. The bank, and other creditors, have their legitimate claims. It nonetheless seems to me that at the time of its receipt PSL could not in good conscience retain this payment and that accordingly a constructive trust is to be inferred."
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Re Armagh Shoes Ltd [1984] BCLC 405
1984


Banking

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Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 WLR 392; [1984] 1 Lloyds Rep 251
1984

Sir John Donaldson MR
Banking, Insurance
The court emphasised "the great and fundamentally important separation" between bankers and re-insurers.
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UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation [1984] QB 713; [1984] 1 WLR 508; [1984] CLY 1579
1984
CA
Ackner LJ
Banking, Company, Limitation, Torts - Other
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant's assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that the signature was not that of the bank, and that even if it was, the action would be statute barred. Held: The court refused to strike out the claim. A company itself made a representation, if it produced a document which was signed by an authorised officer or agent acting within the scope of his actual authority. This applied to bind the defendant bank. The nature of a syndicated loan was a fiduciary arrangement, and the obligations on a lead bank were continuing for limitation purposes, time did not run, and the obligation was not time barred. The issue would be settled at trial when it was established when the defendant could be said to have come to know of the alleged deceit.
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Alcom Ltd v Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580; [1984] 2 WLR 750; [1984] 2 Lloyds Rep 24; [1984] 2 All ER 6
1984
HL
Lord Diplock, Lords Fraser of Tullybelton, Keith of Kinkel, Roskill and Templeman
International, Banking
A bank account used to cover the day-to-day expenses of an Embassy, clearly served sovereign purposes and therefore was immune from enforcement measures. The Act of 1978 must be read against the background of customary international law current in 1978. It is highly unlikely that Parliament intended to require United Kingdom courts to act contrary to international law unless the clear language of the statute compels such a conclusion.
Lord Diplock said: "The Act, as its short title indicates, deals primarily with relations between sovereign states, though its provisions are capable of extension by Order in Council to relations between the United Kingdom and the constituent territories of federal states. Accordingly its provisions fall to be construed against the background of those principles of public international law as are generally recognised by the family of nations." and "The State Immunity Act 1978, whose long title states as its first purpose to make new provision with respect to proceedings in the United Kingdom by or against other states, purports in Part I to deal comprehensively with the jurisdiction of courts of law in the United Kingdom both (1) to adjudicate upon claims against foreign states ("adjudicative jurisdiction"); and (2) to enforce by legal process ("enforcement jurisdiction") judgments pronounced and orders made in the exercise of their adjudicative jurisdiction . . the Act . . draws a clear distinction between the adjudicative jurisdiction and the enforcement jurisdiction of courts of law in the United Kingdom. Sections 2 to 11 deal with adjudicative jurisdiction. Sections 12 to 14 deal with procedure and of these, sections 13(2) to (6) and 14(3) and (4) deal in particular with enforcement jurisdiction."
In the case of a bank account, the onus is on the judgment creditor to show that the use or intended use of the account is, apart from minimal exceptions, for commercial purposes within the meaning of the Act.
"The crucial question of construction for your Lordships is whether a debt which has these legal characteristics falls within the description contained in section 13(4) of 'property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes.' To speak of a debt as 'being used or intended for use' for any purposes by the creditor to whom the debt is owed involves employing ordinary English words in what is not their natural sense, even if the phrase 'commercial purposes' is given the ordinary meaning of jure gestionis in contrast to jure imperii that is generally attributed to it in the context of rights to sovereign immunity in public international law; though it might be permissible to apply the phrase intelligibly to the credit balance in a bank account that was earmarked by the state for exclusive use for transactions into which it entered jure gestionis. What is clear beyond all question is that if the expression 'commercial purposes' in section 13(4) bore what would be its ordinary and natural meaning in the context in which it there appears, a debt representing the balance standing to the credit of a diplomatic mission in a current bank account used for meeting the day-to-day expenses of running the mission would fall outside the subsection.
'Commercial purposes,' however, is given by section 17(1) the extended meaning which takes one back to the comprehensive definition of 'commercial transaction' in section 3(3). Paragraph (a) of this tripartite definition refers to any contract for the supply of goods or services, without making any exception for contracts in either of these two classes that are entered into for purposes of enabling a foreign state to do things in the exercise of its sovereign authority either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. This is to be contrasted with the other paragraph of the definition that is relevant to the instant case, paragraph (c), which on the face of it would be comprehensive enough to include all transactions into which a state might enter, were it not that it does specifically preserve immunity from adjudicative jurisdiction for transactions or activities into which a state enters or in which it engages in the exercise of sovereign authority, other than those transactions that are specifically referred to either in paragraph (a) or in paragraph (b), with the latter of which the instant appeal is not concerned . . My Lords, the decisive question for your Lordships is whether in the context of the other provisions of the Act to which I have referred, and against the background of its subject matter, public international law, the words 'property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes,' appearing as an exception to a general immunity to the enforcement jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts accorded by section 13(2) to the property of a foreign state, are apt to describe the debt represented by the balance standing to the credit of a current account kept with a commercial banker for the purpose of meeting the expenditure incurred in the day-to-day running of the diplomatic mission of a foreign state.
Such expenditure will, no doubt, include some moneys due under contracts for the supply of goods or services to the mission, to meet which the mission will draw upon its current bank account; but the account will also be drawn upon to meet many other items of expenditure which fall outside even the extended definition of 'commercial purposes' for which section 17(1) and section 3(3) provide. The debt owed by the bank to the foreign sovereign state and represented by the credit balance in the current account kept by the diplomatic mission of that state as a possible subject matter of the enforcement jurisdiction of the court is, however, one and indivisible; it is not susceptible of anticipatory dissection into the various uses to which moneys drawn upon it might have been put in the future if it had not been subjected to attachment by garnishee proceedings. Unless it can be shown by the judgment creditor who is seeking to attach the credit balance by garnishee proceedings that the bank account was earmarked by the foreign state solely (save for de minimis exceptions) for being drawn upon to settle liabilities incurred in commercial transactions, as for example by issuing documentary credits in payment of the price of goods sold to the state, it cannot, in my view, be sensibly brought within the crucial words of the exception for which section 13(4) provides."
State Immunity Act 1978
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In re Multi Guarantee Company Ltd (No 2) Unreported, 31 July 1984
31 Jul 1984
ChD
Harman J
Insurance, Banking
The court considered whether funds in an account operated in accordance with the rules were held on trust. Having considered the nature of a trust account, the court held: "In my judgment, it is quite impossible to read these rules as creating trusts and requiring the application of ordinary trust principles to these accounts".
Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and Business Requirements) Rules Approval Order 1979
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