Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Banking - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 14 cases, and was prepared on 03 April 2018.

 
In re United Railways of the Havana v Regla Warehouses Ltd [1960] Ch 52
1960
CA
Jenkins LJ
Contract, Banking, Insolvency
There had been a financing transaction by way of a lease by a Pennsylvania corporation, as trustee for foreign bondholders, to an English company carrying on business in Cuba, of assets in Cuba. By a Cuban decree the assets were transferred to the Cuban government and the company was put into liquidation in England. The liquidators rejected a proof by the trustees for the payments due under the lease on the ground that the Cuban decree had transferred liability to the Cuban government. The court did not accept that the decree had this effect, but, for argument considered whether it would have been effective to discharge the company's liability. This depended on whether one applied the lex situs of the debt (Cuba) or the proper law of the lease (Pennsylvania). Held: The transaction was a statutory novation; the extinction of the liability of one debtor and its replacement by the liability of another. These two aspects of the transaction were not necessarily governed by the same law and that the question of whether the one debtor was discharged was governed by the proper law of the debt. The court rejected an analogy with the question of whether the benefit of a debt had been transferred to another person. "The contractual right to receive payment of a debt is an item of property, that is to say, a chose in action. It can be transferred by the creditor to a third party, but the validity of the transfer necessarily depends upon the lex situs, because the courts of the country where the debt is have jurisdiction over the title to it. Novation, on the other hand, does not involve the transfer of any property at all, for, as we have already pointed out, it comprises the annulment of one debt and the creation of another. Moreover, in novation a creditor may be vitally prejudiced, whereas it is immaterial to a debtor to whom he pays his debt provided that he gets a good discharge for it."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann [1961] AC 1; [1960] 3 All ER 482
1961
PC
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid, Lord Radcliffe, Lord Tucker and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Commonwealth, Company, Banking, Torts - Other
The respondent Mann practiced as a solicitor in partnership with Richardson. They kept a "trust account" in the partnership name with the Australian and New Zealand Bank in Sydney ("ANZ"). Under the partnership agreement, all assets belonged to Mann, but cheques might be drawn on the partnership bank account by either. Mann gave the necessary authority to ANZ. Richardson used that authority to draw cheques, inserting on each after the printed word "Pay", the words "Bank cheque favour H. Ward" or "Bank cheque H. Ward;". He also filed application forms for bank cheques in favour of H. Ward to a like amount, purporting to sign them on behalf of the firm. He took the documents to ANZ, which in each case debited the firm's account and issued a bank draft of an equal amount in the form "Pay H. Ward or bearer." He took the cheques to the appellant bank, and cashed them over the counter. The bank paid the cheques. He was fraudulent throughout; Ward was not a client of the partnership, nor had any client authorised the payment to him of any money held in the trust account. Mann sued the appellant bank for conversion of the bank cheques, or alternatively to recover the sums received by it from ANZ bank as money had and received to his use. He succeeded before the trial judge, whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. Held: The bank's appeal succeeded. Mann never obtained any title to the cheques, and he could not obtain title by ratifying the conduct of Richardson in obtaining the cheques from ANZ bank, without at the same time ratifying the dealings in the cheques by Ward and the appellant bank. Mann's claim for damages for conversion failed, and that his alternative claim for money had and received also failed. Where a partner in a firm wrongfully draws a cheque on the partnership account, the proceeds of the cheque are legally his.
Viscount Simonds said: "It is important to distinguish between what was Richardson's authority in relation on the one hand to the A.N.Z. bank and on the other to Mann. No question arises in these proceedings between Mann and the A.N.Z. bank. It is clear that Mann could not as between himself and the bank question Richardson's authority to draw cheques on the trust account. The position as between Mann and Richardson was different. Richardson had no authority, express or implied, from Mann either to draw cheques on the trust account or to obtain bank cheques in exchange for them except for the proper purposes of the partnership. If he exceeded those purposes, his act was unauthorised and open to challenge by Mann. It is in these circumstances that the question must be asked whether, as the judge held, the bank cheques were throughout the property of Mann. It is irrelevant to this question what was the relation between Richardson and Ward and whether the latter gave any consideration for the bank cheques that he received and at what stage Mann learned of the fraud that had been practised upon him. The proposition upon which the respondent founds his claim is simple enough: Richardson was his partner and in that capacity was able to draw upon the trust account and so to obtain from the bank its promissory notes: therefore the notes were the property of the partnership and belonged to Mann, and Richardson could not give a better title to a third party than he himself had."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
North Central Wagon Finance Co Ltd v Brailsford [1962] 1 WLR 1288; [1962] 1 All ER 502
1962

Cairns J
Banking
The onus of proof of establishing the application of the exception in the section lay with the company claiming it.
Moneylenders Act 1900 6(d)
1 Citers


 
Frasers (Glasgow) Bank Ltd v Inland Revenue [1963] UKHL TC_40_698
20 Feb 1963
HL

Banking
The Appellant Company carried on a bona fide banking business on a restricted scale. It operated primarily to facilitate transactions within a group of companies controlled by its own chairman, managing director and controlling shareholder, F, but there were also a number of deposit and current accounts opened by persons who were not members of the group. It did not utilise the normal clearing-house facilities and met cheques drawn on it either by cash or by drawing a further cheque on a clearing-house bank, N Ltd., who were, in effect, its bankers.
[ Bailii ]
 
Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575; [1963] UKHL 4; [1963] 1 Lloyds Rep 485; [1963] 3 WLR 101
28 May 1963
HL
Lord Morris, Lord Devlin, Lord Reid, Lord Hodson
Professional Negligence, Banking
The appellants were advertising agents. They were liable themselves for advertising space taken for a client, and had sought a financial reference from the defendant bankers to the client. The reference was negligent, but the bankers denied any assumption of a duty of care to a third party when purely economic losses were at issue. Held: Irrespective of any contract, if someone who is possessed of a special skill undertakes to apply that skill for the assistance of another person, who relies upon such skill, then a duty of care will arise. In certain circumstances a professional adviser might be liable even in the absence of a contractual or fiduciary relationship between himself and the person who had suffered some economic loss. Lord Devlin considered the sort of relationship which gave rise to a responsibility towards those who act upon information or advice and so created a duty of care towards the person so acting, saying "I do not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility imposed by law upon certain types of persons or in certain sorts of situations. It is a responsibility that is voluntarily accepted or undertaken, either generally where a general relationship, such as that of solicitor and client or banker and customer, is created, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction." and "If irrespective of contract, a doctor negligently advises a patient that he can safely pursue his occupation and he cannot and the patient's health suffers and he loses his livelihood, the patient has a remedy. But if the doctor negligently advises him that he cannot safely pursue his occupation when in fact he can and he loses his livelihood, there is said to be no remedy. Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: then the patient can recover all. I am bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of law out of the need to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the law, simply out of a refusal to make sense. The line is not drawn on any intelligible principle. It just happens to be the line which those who have been driven from the extreme assertion that negligent statements in the absence of contractual or fiduciary duty give no cause of action have in the course of their retreat so far reached."
and, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: "it should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by means of or by the instrumentality of words can make no difference. Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that they could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise."
Lord Devlin held that the categories of special relationships which might give rise to a duty of care in word as well as in deed are not limited to contractual relationships or to relationships of fiduciary duty, "but include also relationships which in the words of Lord Shaw in Nocton v Lord Ashburton are 'equivalent to contract' that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract." and
"I have had the advantage of reading all the opinions prepared by your Lordships and of studying the terms which your Lordships have framed by way of definition of the sort of relationship which gives rise to a responsibility towards those who act upon information or advice and so creates a duty of care towards them. I do not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility imposed by law upon certain types of persons or in certain sorts of situations. It is a responsibility that is voluntarily accepted or undertaken, either generally where a general relationship, such as that of solicitor and client or banker and customer, is created, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ UBC ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 1 QB 783; [1965] 3 WLR 817; [1965] 2 All ER 992
1965
QBD
Mocatta J
Banking
For a company to be taken to carry on the business of banking money it must be able to show that it took money on current accounts.
1 Citers


 
Re Bishop, Dec'd [1965] Ch 450
1965


Banking
An investment bought in the name of one from monies in the joint account will prima facie belong to the person in whose name the investment has been bought.
1 Citers


 
Burnett v Westminster Bank Ltd [1966] 1 QB 742; [1965] 3 All ER 81
1965
ChD
Mocatta J
Banking, Contract
The plaintiff had a cheque account at the Borough Branch and drew a cheque on the cheque forms which had been provided. He crossed out the word `Borough' and put in `Bromley'. He altered the address and he initialled the cheque. Later he decided to stop payment on the cheque, telephoning the Bromley Branch and informing them of this decision. The cheque had passed through the computer system which could not read the alterations made by the plaintiff. The cheque itself was forwarded to the Borough Branch at which the employees were unaware of the stop-payment instructions. At the end of the suspense period, the amount of the cheque was debited to the plaintiff's account at the Borough Branch. Held: The bank was unsuccessful in its contention that a new practice utilising the introduction of magnetic ink characters seeking to restrict cheques to the particular account for which they had been prepared, had been consensually agreed to by the customer. Notice of a change in condition oin cheque book covers was ineffective. A stop instruction from a bank's customer applies to all accounts at the same branch if a specific account is not specified.
The bank is the debtor of the customer, whether the customer has a current or deposit account.

 
United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 1 All ER 968
24 Feb 1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Harman, Diplock LJJ
Banking
The defendant was MD of a company which borrowed from the plaintiff. The company drew five bills as security, and the defendant endorsed them. When the company failed, the plaintiff gave notice of dishonour and sued the defendant as indorsee. The defence was that the plaintiff had been acting as an unregistered moneylender, and that the debt was void. The plaintiff claimed the benefit of the exception in section 6(d) of the 1900 Act. Held. Once it was shown that the plaintiff lent money in the course of business, it was for them to show that they acted as a bank. The plaintiff failed to show that it was a bank, but did establish that it had a reputation as such, and that was sufficient. The defendant's appeal failed.
Moneylenders Act 1900 6(d)
1 Cites

[ Vanuatu ]
 
Rolls Razor Ltd v Cox [1967] 1 QB 552
1967
CA
Winn LJ
Banking
Winn LJ said: "the relationship of banker and customer upon a current account implies from its very nature an intention on the part of both parties that debits and credits arising between them shall be brought into a running account on which by reason of the customary method of keeping such account, there will at any given moment be an outstanding debit or credit balance."
1 Citers



 
 United Dominions Trust Limited v Ennis; CA 1968 - [1968] 1 QB 54
 
Cityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd v Dabrah [1968] Ch 166
1968


Banking, Undue Influence
The mortgage secured a debt of £2,900 owing by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. The mortgagor covenanted to pay the mortgagee £4,553 by monthly instalments over a six year period. The return to the mortgagee was in the form of a premium rather than a specified interest rate. The mortgage also provided that the full premium should become payable upon the mortgagor's default. The premium was effectively 57% of the amount of the loan, and had the effect of making the interest rate upon default an amount of 38%. Held: The court can talke into account such issues as the identity of the mortgagor when looking at any assertion of undue influence. A necessitous borrower may be overborne by a more powerful lender in circumstances giving rise to unconscionability on the part of the lender. Whilst there was no rule in equity precluding a lender from stipulating for a collateral advantage that was fair and reasonable, the charging of a premium of this order had the effect of destroying the borrower's equity in the security, and that such a collateral advantage was in the circumstances unconscionable.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Marfani and Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 956; [1968] 2 All ER 573
1968
CA
Diplock LJ
Banking, Torts - Other
A rogue opened a new bank account under a false name with the help of an incorrect reference from a valued customer. Held: When an account is fraudulently opened with the bank in the name of another person by someone pretending to be that person, the person opening the account is the customer.
The court explained the tort of conversion, with special reference to bills of exchange. Liability is strict for misappropriation of goods.
Diplock LJ: "It is, however, in my view, clear that the intention of the subsection and its statutory predecessors is to substitute for the absolute duty owed at common law by a banker to the true owner of a cheque not to take any steps in the ordinary course of business leading up to an including the receipt of payment of the cheque, and the crediting of the amount of the cheque to the account of his customer, in usurpation of the true owner's title thereto a qualified duty to take reasonable care to refrain from taking any such step which he foresees is, or ought reasonably to have foreseen was, likely to cause loss or damage to the true owner.
The only respect in which this substituted statutory duty differs from a common law cause of action in negligence is that, since it takes the form of a qualified immunity from a strict liability at common law, the onus of showing that he did take such reasonable care lies upon the defendant banker. Granted good faith in the banker (the other condition of the immunity), the usual matter with respect to which the banker must take reasonable care is to satisfy himself that his own customer's title to the cheque delivered to him for collection is not defective, i.e., that no other person is the true owner of it. Where the customer is in possession of the cheque at the time of delivery for collection and appears upon the face of it to be the "holder", i.e., the payee or indorsee or the bearer, the banker is, in my view, entitled to assume that the customer is the owner of the cheque unless there are facts which are, or ought to be, known to him which would cause a reasonable banker to suspect that the customer was not the true owner.
What facts ought to be known to the banker, i.e., what inquiries he should make, and what facts are sufficient to cause him reasonably to suspect that the customer is not the true owner, must depend upon current banking practice, and change as that practice changes. Cases decided 30 years ago, when the use by the general public of banking facilities was much less widespread, may not be a reliable guide to what the duty of a careful banker in relation to inquiries, and as to facts which should give rise to suspicion, is today.
What the court has to do is to look at all the circumstances at the time of the acts complained of and to ask itself: were those circumstances such as would cause a reasonable banker possessed of such information about his customer as a reasonable banker would possess, to suspect that his customer was not the true owner of the cheque?
In all actions of the kind with which we are here concerned, the banker's customer has in fact turned out to be a fraudulent rogue, and attention is naturally concentrated upon the duty of care which was owed by the banker to the person who has in fact turned out to be the true owner of the cheque. We are always able to be wise after the event, but the banker's duty fell to be performed before it, and the duty which he owed to the true owner ought not to be considered in isolation. At the relevant time, the true owner was entitled to take into consideration the interests of his customer, who, be it remembered, would in all probability turn out to be honest, as most men are, and his own business interests, and to weigh those against the risk of loss or damage to the true owner of the cheque in the unlikely event that he should turn out not to be the customer himself."

As to the practice of bankers: "The only evidence of the practice of bankers was given by the manager and the securities clerk of the branch in question of the defendant bank. No evidence that the general practice of other bankers differed from that adopted by the defendant bank was called by the plaintiff company, although they knew well in advance of the trial, as a result of searching interrogatories, exactly what steps the defendant bank had taken, and what inquiries they had made. It seems a reasonable inference that what the defendants did in the present case was in accordance with current banking practice. Nield J accepted that it was, and Mr Lloyd has not sought to argue the contrary. What he contends is that this court is entitled to examine that practice and to form its own opinion as to whether it does comply with the standard of care which a prudent banker should adopt. That is quite right, but I venture to think that this court should be hesitant before condemning as negligent a practice generally adopted by those engaged in banking business."
Cheques Act 1957 4
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Fielding and Platt Ltd v Selim Najjar (1969) 113 Sol Jo 160; [1969] 1 WLR 357; [1969] 2 All ER 150
17 Jan 1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Davies, Widgery LJJ
Contract, Banking
The plaintiff company had contracted to make and export to the defendant an aluminium extrusion press. The defendant re-assured the plaintiff that it would be lawful for him to import the plant, but asked that the plant be described falsely on the invoice as 'parts for rolling mill'. Payment was made by promissory notes. After the first two promissory notes had not been met, the plaintiff ceased production, and sued on the notes and succeeded summarily. The defendant appealed. Held: The plaintiff was entitled to payment under the first note, because it had performed its obligations under the contract, and there was no failure of consideration. However there was no such completed consideration for the second promissory note, and the defendant should be allowed to defend.
The request to mis-invoice the goods, if illegal, was severable, and did not undermine the contract as a whole. To succeed in their defence of illegality, the defendant had to show that the plaintiff was aware that performance by importing the plant would be illegal, and had agreed to go ahead notwithstanding that illegality. That had not been demonstrated in this case.
An innocent party who is ignorant of the facts or circumstances that would make performance of a contract illegal may be allowed to recover money paid by him under the illegal contract.
Only in exceptional circumstances should a court deprive a claimant of judgment on a claim based on a promissory note.
Lord Denning MR said: "The plaintiffs, Fielding and Platt Ltd are manufacturers of machinery. Their business is in Gloucester. In the middle of 1965 they entered into a contract with a Lebanese company called SCIALE Aluminium of Lebanon. They agreed to make and sell to the Lebanese company an aluminium extrusion press for a total sum of £235,000. The plant and equipment was to be delivered free on board at a British port. The time for delivery was 10 1/2 months from 19 June 1965. Payment was to be made by six promissory notes given by the defendant, the managing director of the Lebanese company, Mr Selim Najjar, personally; and he deposited shares, of his own, as security for the due payment of the promissory notes. The promissory notes were payable at intervals during the progress of the work. The first four were payable whilst the plaintiffs were making the machinery in England. Thus the first note was payable on 4 October 1965, for £23,500; the second on 4 December 1965, for £47,000, the third on 4 February 1966, for £47,000; and the fourth on 4 April 1966, for another £47,000. The fifth note was payable on 4 June 1966, for £47,000, which was just about the time when the machinery was to be delivered to the port. The sixth note, the final one, for £23,500, was payable on 4 August 1966.
On 4 October 1965, the first promissory note, for £23,500, fell due. It was not paid. The defendant apologised for not paying it. He asked for a few days' grace. He said that had been agreed. So be it. He was given a few days-indeed more than a few days. Still he did not pay. When the note was a fortnight overdue he wrote on 18 October 1965: "It is my estimate that by the middle of next month all will be arranged and I will be able to proceed with the payments." He realised that his non-payment might result in delays on the English side, for he added: "Please remember that any delays on your part due to delayed payments will be acceptable." When the note was more than three weeks overdue, the plaintiffs decided to suspend work on the contract. On 27 October 1965, they cabled to the Lebanese company:
"We have today suspended all work on your contract with us and this includes notification to all our material suppliers that they must do no further work on this contract. We have been forced to take this action to comply with the requirements of our authorities. Our current financial commitment to material and equipment suppliers plus design and stock material and labour charges, is extremely heavy. We trust you appreciate that this is your liability. As a result of suspending all work you will appreciate that our delivery date will be considerably extended and the amount of the delay will depend on the time taken for you to resolve your difficulties."
The defendant never paid the first promissory note or any of the others. He never paid anything. In consequence, the plaintiffs suspended work on the contract, and it remained suspended. No further work was done on it. There were negotiations for a revival of the contract, but they came to nothing.
Stopping there, it is quite plain to me that the defendant was liable to pay the first of the promissory notes. We have repeatedly said in this court that a bill of exchange or a promissory note is to be treated as cash. It is to be honoured unless there is some good reason to the contrary. It is suggested that, on the first note, there was a failure of consideration. That suggestion is quite unfounded. The plaintiffs were getting on with their part of the contract. They were, they say, ordering goods from their suppliers and getting on with the work. At any rate, there is no evidence to the contrary; and, unless they were themselves in default, they were clearly entitled to payment of the first note. The position as to the second note is different. Before it fell due, the defendant said: "I cannot pay"; and the plaintiffs replied: "We, therefore, suspend work." Seeing that the plaintiffs had suspended work, they could not claim payment in full, but at most damages. They could not sue on each note as it fell due-each of the six-when they had suspended all work on the contract. So there is an available defence on the second note. But not on the first note.
This brings me to the second point. In answer to the claim in both notes, the defendant raises a defence of illegality. He says that it was his intention to break the laws of the Lebanon and that the plaintiffs were parties to it. In order to import the extrusion press into the Lebanon, he had to get an import licence from the Lebanon authorities. He had already got a licence to import a two million pound rolling mill, but he had not got a licence to bring in an extrusion press. His intention was to import it without a licence, and he says that the plaintiffs agreed to help him to do so. The plaintiffs agreed, he says, to put in a false invoice. He says: "I asked you to invoice the press as part of a rolling mill, and you agreed to it, and, therefore, you cannot recover anything." That defence does not commend itself to me. Here is a man who prays in aid his own illegality-he admits he was trying to evade the laws of his own country-and he seeks to implicate the plaintiffs in it.
In order for this to be any kind of defence, he must show first of all that the contract contained a term that the plaintiffs were to give a false invoice; so that it could not lawfully be performed. For if it would be lawfully performed (by giving a correct invoice) the plaintiffs can certainly sue on it. I do not think there was any such term. During the negotiations the Lebanese company did ask the plaintiffs to invoice the press as "parts for rolling mill". But this request did not, as I read the correspondence, become a term of the contract. The contract was concluded on 13 July 1965. And the only subsequent reference was contained later in the confirmation which the plaintiffs sent to the Lebanese company. There was a long detailed description of the goods covering many pages and then, in brackets, were the words ("to be invoiced as 'parts for rolling mill'"). That was a mere notification by the Lebanese company of the way they wanted an invoice made out. It was not a term of the contract itself. The plaintiffs would therefore quite justifiably refuse to give such invoice, and insist on the contract being lawfully performed.
In the second place, even if it were a term, the defendant would have to show that the plaintiffs were implicated in this illegality, that is that they had knowledge of it and were actively participating in it, see Foster v Driscoll, Lindsay v Attfield, Lindsay v Driscoll ([1929] 1 KB 470 at p 518; [1928] All ER Rep 130 at pp 146, 147) per Sankey LJ. I can see no evidence worthy of the name to suggest that the plaintiffs knew of this illegality. The only evidence is contained in a cable about the import licence. On 16 June 19658 the plaintiffs stated that they were agreeable to the proposed contract "subject to evidence of satisfactory importing licence arrangements". The Lebanese company replied:
"Concerning our import licence, we have a regular import licence for a total amount of two million sterling, for a complete aluminium plant. This licence is more than what we require for an extrusion press, and since we don't want to lose our right for the remaining amount, we want the material to be invoiced as 'parts for rolling mill'. This of course is for local consumption. We discussed these details with your representative here, and will make sure that you do the correct thing when the time comes. Please bear in mind that few items (just any thing) of the total order should be in Beirut the first week of October the latest, because our licence is valid until October 24, 1965, and before that date something should have arrived."
I do not think that cable was enough to give the plaintiffs knowledge of the illegality. It only shows that the Lebanese company thought it convenient, for local consumption, to have the machines invoiced as parts for a rolling mill, instead of the more accurate description of an aluminium extrusion press.
I cannot help remarking that the defendant seems to have a special fondness for false invoices. At a later stage he suggested that the plaintiffs should give an invoice for only half the cost, instead of the whole; so as to save customs duties. He also suggested that the plaintiffs should write a false letter (which he drafted) to show the Lebanese customs authorities. The plaintiffs very properly did not agree to those suggestions. And when the matter finally came to a head, the plaintiffs firmly said: "We must invoice the goods correctly." I know there is a suggestion in the affidavit of the defendant that the plaintiffs were implicated, but, in the face of the documents, I see no substance in this suggestion.
There is another point: even if there was a term that these goods should be invoiced falsely in order to deceive the Lebanese authorities, I do not think it would render the whole contract void. That term would be void for illegality. But it can clearly be severed from the rest of the contract. It can be rejected, leaving the rest of the contract good and enforceable. The plaintiffs would be entitled, despite the illegal term, to deliver the goods FOB English port, and send a true and accurate invoice to the Lebanese buyer. The Lebanese buyer could not refuse the goods by saying "I stipulated for a false invoice". He could not rely on his own iniquity so as to refuse payment.
In my opinion, therefore, the defence of illegality is clearly bad. I would allow judgment to be entered on the first note and for the interest thereon; and give leave to defend as to the second."
Davies LJ said: "I agree with the result reached by Lord Denning MR and I do not propose to add anything."
Widgery LJ said: "I also agree. I find each of the main issues in this case one of some difficulty and I am much indebted to counsel for the defendant for his argument; but in the end I have concluded that they are sufficiently determined to justify judgment under RSC, Ord 14 in respect of the amount of the earlier promissory note. So far as the allegation of illegality is concerned, there are I think two independent and sufficient answers to it. First, in order to succeed on this question, the defendant must show that the plaintiffs were aware of the illegal purpose in the falsification of the invoice and that they agreed actively to participate in that purpose so that goods could be illegally imported into the Lebanon which would not otherwise be allowed to enter. The only basis on which it is said that the plaintiffs at any material time had knowledge of that illegal purpose is the telex message of 18 June from the Lebanese company, to which Lord Denning MR has referred. If I may just repeat again the essential words, they were replying to an enquiry from the plaintiffs as to their import licence, and they stated:
“We have a regular import licence for a total amount of two million sterling, and for a complete aluminium plant. This licence is more than what we require for an extrusion press and since we don't want to lose our right for the remaining amount, we want the material to be invoiced as' parts for rolling mill'. This, of course, is for local consumption . . “
When that was first read to us, for my part I found it quite incomprehensible, and it is not until one gets further in the correspondence that the real point of it becomes clear. The plaintiffs, of course, had to judge the legality or illegality of what was proposed, without the benefit of the correspondence which developed months later as to the terms of that telex message. I can see no reason whatever to suppose that the plaintiffs should see more in that message than that the invoice was to indicate that the goods were part of a larger matter, which in itself would not involve any illegality that I can see. It is only later that one appreciates that the character of the goods may be of some relevance, and if the plaintiffs did agree to invoice the goods as part of a larger whole, I cannot for my part see that that would involve them in any illegality sufficient to excuse the defendant from liability in this case. Alternatively, as Lord Denning MR has said, I am of the opinion that there was no term in this contract requiring the plaintiffs to invoice the goods as part of a rolling mill. The chief contractual document is a formal and lengthy quotation which the plaintiffs submitted to the defendant setting out details of the machine to be supplied; and on 13 July the Lebanese company accepted that quotation in these words:
“please consider this letter as an official order based on your quotation of July 5, 1965 and our different telexes to which you have given your agreement.”
At that point there was nothing in the contractual documents to imply an obligation on the plaintiffs to invoice the goods as part of a rolling mill. Counsel for the defendant has referred to the telexes mentioned in that letter, but there was no agreement by the plaintiffs to any telex involving a special form of invoicing. When the plaintiffs received that acceptance of their offer, they sent a formal and detailed confirmation; and it is to be observed that under the terms of their agreement no contract was to be binding on them until that confirmation had been given. In my judgment, that was no more than a confirmation of that which was already agreed, and it would be quite unreal to regard it as a counter-offer containing a new term whereby the goods were to be invoiced as part of a rolling mill.
On the second issue, namely, the failure of consideration, for which the notes were given, my opinion is that these notes were given by the defendant in consideration of the plaintiffs entering into the agreement with the Lebanese company and carrying out that agreement. It is arguable that if counsel for the defendant can sustain his contention that the plaintiffs repudiated the contract in November and that that repudiation was accepted by the Lebanese company, then perhaps it can be shown that liability on bills maturing after the date of the repudiation had itself been determined; but, like Lord Denning MR I can see no possible ground on which it can be said that the consideration for the first bill, which would mature in October 1965, at a time when the plaintiffs were in no way in default, can have been rendered wholly ineffective by virtue of that which followed.
I also would accordingly allow the appeal to the extent that judgment should be entered only in respect of the amount of the first bill and interest thereon."
1 Cites


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.