swarb.co.uk - law index
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Administrative - From: 1980 To: 1984
This page lists 26 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Lovelock v Minister of Transport; 1980 - (1980) 40 PCR 336
Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment; HL 7-Feb-1980 - [1981] AC 75; [1980] 2 All ER 608; [1980] UKHL 1; [1980] 3 WLR 22; (1980) 144 JP 387; (1980) 78 LGR 269
Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwith District Council; CA 1981 - [1981] 2 All ER 204
Regina v Secretary of State for Trade ex parte Perestrello; 1981 - [1981] 1 QB 19
Fernandes v Secretary of State; CA 1981 - [1981] Imm AR 1
CREEDNZ Inc v The Governor General; 1981 - [1981] 1 NZLR 172
Wicks v Firth (Inspector of Taxes); Johnson v Firth; CA 1981 - [1982] 2 WLR 208; [1982] 2 All R 9
Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Brent London Borough Council; QBD 1982 - [1982] 1 QB 593
Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission; CA 1982 - [1982] 1 All ER 498
Ross v Costigan; 1982 - [1982] 41 ALR 319
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans; HL 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 1155; (1982) 3 All ER 141; [1982] UKHL 10
Edwin H Bradley and Sons Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1982) 264 EG 926; 1982 47 P and CR 374
1982
Glidewell J
Planning, Administrative
Reasons given for a decision may be brief, whilst still following Poyser. The fact that a procedure is not in the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial hearing between parties may mean that the requirement to give a party full opportunity to advance his case does not apply in the same way as in such procedures. The reasons given must comply with the test formulated by Megaw J in In re Poyser and Mills' Arbitration, adding that provided the reasons comply with that test, the Secretary of State could not be challenged in that respect.
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Regina v Commissioner of Racial Equality Ex parte Hillingdon London Borough Council; HL 1982 - [1982] AC 779
Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Cromer Ring Mill Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 761; [1982] RVR 113
1982
Forbes J
Administrative, Rating
Forbes J considered a suggestion that the lower tribiunal had taken into account irrelevant matters: "the case wholly supports the formulation in Professor de Smith's book: 'If the influence of irrelevant factors is established, it does not appear to be necessary to prove that they were the sole or even the dominant influence; it seems to be enough to prove that their influence was substantial'"
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Regina v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, Ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board; CA 1982 - [1982] QB 458; [1981] 3 WLR 967; [1981] 3 All ER 826
Manuel and Others v Attorney-General; Noltcho and Others v Attorney-General [1983] Ch 77; [1982] 3 All ER 786
7 May 1982
ChD
Sir Robert Megarry V-C
Constitutional, Administrative
The plaintiffs were Indian Chiefs from Canada. They complained that the 1982 Act which granted independence to Canada, had been passed without their consent, which they said was required. They feared the loss of rights embedded by historical treaties. The Attorney General sought the strike out of the claims. Held: The application for a strike out succeeded. The Act recited that it had been passed at the request of the Canadian Parliament. A British Court could not refuse to obey or question the validity of an Act of Parliament: 'The Canada Act 1982 is an Act of Parliament, and sitting as a judge in an English court, I owe full and dutiful obedience to that Act.' Declaratory relief was not available as against a party not before the court.
Sir Robert Megarry V-C: "A motion to strike out a pleading should not be treated as being the trial of a demurrer or a preliminary point of law, to be determined one way or the other even if the judge is beset by hesitations and doubts. He who moves such a motion must make out a case that is clear beyond doubt. At the same time, one must beware of any assumption that because a case takes a long time to argue, the points at issue must be doubtful. Arguments must be assessed on their quality rather than on their duration, and sometimes the weaker the case the greater the profusion of ingenuity in supporting it." and
"I have grave doubts about the theory of the transfer of sovereignty as affecting the competence of Parliament. In my view, it is a fundamental of the English constitution that Parliament is supreme. As a matter of law the courts of England recognise Parliament as being omnipotent in all save the power to destroy its own omnipotence. Under the authority of Parliament the courts of a territory may be released from their legal duty to obey Parliament, but that does not trench on the acceptance by the English courts of all that Parliament does. Nor must validity in law be confused with practical enforceability."
Canada Act 1982 - Statute of Westminster 1931 - British North America Act 1930 - British North America Act 1867
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Bland v Chief Supplementary Benefit Officer; CA 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 262
Regina v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Hooker 1993 (Unreported)
1983
CA
McCowan LJ
Administrative
The plaintiff sought to challenge the policy of the respondent which prevented the issue of a new National Insurance (NI) number on completion of gender re-assignment surgery. She now appealed against denial of her claim. Held: The policy was lawful.
McCowan LJ said: "since it will not make the slightest practical difference, far from the Secretary of State's decision being an irrational one, I consider it a perfectly rational decision. I would further reject the suggestion that the applicant had a legitimate expectation that a new number would be given to her for psychological purposes when, in fact, its practical effect would be nil."
Social Security Administration Act 1992 123
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Stevenson v Midlothian District Council; HL 1983 - 1983 SC (HL) 50
Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu; PC 21-Feb-1983 - [1983] 2 AC 629; [1983] UKPC 2; [1983] UKPC 7; [1983] 2 All ER 346; [1983] 2 WLR 735
Attorney-General v Able and Others [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 QB 795; [1984] 1 All ER 277
28 Apr 1983
QBD
Woolf LJ
Crime, Administrative, Criminal Practice, Media
The Attorney General sought a declaration as to whether it would be the crime of aiding and abetting or counselling and procuring suicide, to distribute a booklet published by the respondent which described various effective ways of committing suicide. The stated aim of the booklet was to help readers overcome the fear of dying. Held: The offence would be committed only in the particular circumstances of the booklet being supplied to a particular individual considering suicide and with the intent of assisting or encouraging him. The offence was not committed by the general distribution of the booklet. However the court should also be reluctant to make declarations in advance as to the legality or otherwise of particular acts. That risked usurping the function of the court which considered a particular set of circumstances.
Suicide Act 1961 2(1)
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Regina v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704; [1984] All ER 983; [1983] Imm AR 198; [1983] EWHC 1 (QB)
13 Dec 1983
QBD
Woolf J
Immigration, Prisons, Administrative
An offender had been recommended for deportation following conviction. He had served his sentence and would otherwise have been released on parole. He had no passport and no valid travel documents. He complained that the length of time for which he had then been detained was too long and that the detention had become unlawful, and he sought habeas corpus to secure release. Held: The detention was on the borderline of being unlawful, and unless an order was made within a few days, Mr Singh's application should succeed. A short adjournment was granted on this basis.
The power of the Secretary of State was subject to limitation to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. If it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to remove someone intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In relation to the power of deportation, Woolf J said: "Although the power which is given to the Secretary of State in paragraph 2 to detain individuals is not subject to any express limitation of time, I am quite satisfied that it is subject to limitations. First of all, it can only authorise detention if the individual is being detained . . pending his removal. It cannot be used for any other purpose. Secondly, as the power is given in order to enable the machinery of deportation to be carried out, I regard the power of detention as being impliedly limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose. The period which is reasonable will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. What is more, if there is a situation where it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to operate the machinery provided in the Act for removing persons who are intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it seems to me that it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In addition, I would regard it as implicit that the Secretary of State should exercise all reasonable expedition to ensure that the steps are taken which will be necessary to ensure the removal of the individual within a reasonable time."
Immigration Act 1971 Sch 3 Para 2
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Regina v Hillingdon Health Authority ex parte Goodwin [1984] ICR 800
1984
Woolf J
Administrative
Woolf J said: "Whenever there has to be consultation, there has to be an indication of what there is to be consultation about; and, although an authority must enter into the consultation without a closed mind, it seems to me that there is nothing objectionable in the authority having decided on a course it would seek to adopt, if after consultation it decided that that is the proper course to adopt."
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Wordie Property Co Limited v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345
1984
Lord President Emslie
Administrative, Scotland
To demonstrate an error of law in a decision, the petitioner is required to show that the decision maker had failed to take into account a consideration which was both relevant and material.
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Regina v Secretary of State ex parte Khan; CA 4-Apr-1984 - [1984] 1 WLR 1337; [1984] EWCA Civ 8
Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374; [1985] ICR 14; [1984] 3 All ER 935; [1983] UKHL 6; [1984] 3 WLR 1174; [1985] IRLR 28; [1984] UKHL 9; [1984] UKHL 9, [1985] AC 374
22 Nov 1984
HL
Lord Scarman, Lord Diplock, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Judicial Review, Administrative, Constitutional
The House considered an executive decision made pursuant to powers conferred by a prerogative order. The Minister had ordered employees at GCHQ not to be members of trades unions. Held: The exercise of a prerogative power of a public nature may be, subject to constraints of national security and the like, as susceptible to review as that of a statutory power. The controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of a power by a body is subject to judicial review is not in its source but its subject matter. Challenges to the lawfulness of subordinate legislation or administrative decisions and acts may take under the headings of illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality.
Lord Diplock said: A legitimate expectation may arise from an express promise "given on behalf of a public authority", and "some benefit or advantage which . . [the applicant] had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment." and "To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person (or body of persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him too. It must affect such other person either (a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law; or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision - maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been committed to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that it will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn."
and "Many of the most important prerogative powers concerned with the control of the armed forces and with foreign policy and with matters which are unsuitable for discussion or review in the Law Court . . Such decisions will generally involve the application of Government policy. The reasons for the decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not normally involve questions to which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to provide the right answer, by which I mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible under judicial procedures and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to exclude from the attention of the court competing policy considerations which, if the Executive discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another - a balancing exercise which judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to perform."
Lord Diplock summarised the grounds of judicial review: "By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' . . It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."
Lord Fraser said: "The question is one of evidence. The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case is for the Government and not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the information, and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security. But if the decision is successfully challenged, on the ground that it has been reached by a process which is unfair, then the Government is under an obligation to produce evidence that the decision was in fact based on grounds of national security."
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