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Administrative - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 29 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Kent [1970] 2 QB 19
1970
CA

Administrative
A notice of assessment to a levy which was served by the appellant Board failed to provide an address for service of a notice of appeal as required. Held: The decision notice was invalidated by the omission.
Industrial Training Levy (Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry) Order 1967 4(3) - Industrial Training Act 1964 4
1 Citers


 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 1 All ER 1009
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ, Cross LJ
Professional Negligence, Administrative
Mr Sharp was the local land registrar with statutory duty to maintain the local registry, issuing certificates in response to search requests. A clerk who had been seconded by another Council to assist him negligently issued an inaccurate certificate to a prospective purchaser of land, omitting any reference to a claim to reimbursement of compensation which the Ministry had against the seller. The result was to extinguish the right which the Ministry would otherwise have had to pursue its claim against the purchaser. It was conceded that, if the clerk was liable in negligence to the Ministry, then the council was vicariously liable for its clerk. Held: The clerk was liable. The Court rejected the argument that a voluntary assumption of responsibility was the sole criterion for imposing a duty of care for the negligent preparation of a search certificate in the local land charges register.
Lord Denning MR disagreed with the proposition that a duty of care could not fall on someone accepting an assumption of responsibility non-voluntarily: "It has been argued . . that since the council did not voluntarily make the search or prepare the certificate for their clerk's signature they did not voluntarily assume responsibility for the accuracy of the certificate and accordingly owed no duty to the Minister. I do not accept that, in all cases, it necessarily depends upon a voluntary assumption of responsibility." and "The object of the register is to provide security for two classes of people, incumbrancers and purchasers."
Cross LJ saw "no sufficient reason why in an appropriate case the liability should not extend to cases in which the defendant is obliged to make the statement which proves to be false."
he said: ""In 1888 the registrar [i.e. the Chief Land Registrar] was expressly exempted from liability to be sued for acts done in exercise of his powers under the Land Transfer Act, 1875; so Parliament at that date cannot have thought that there was anything inherently objectionable in the fact that members of the public who suffered through innocent mistakes in the registry should have no civil remedies. As he was exempt from liability under the Land Transfer Act, to subject him to liability under the Land Charges Act would, prima facie, be anomalous. The anomaly would, however, be explicable if and so far as the various officers of the Supreme Court who were directed to maintain registers by the Acts scheduled to the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and similar Acts, were themselves liable to be sued, for the provisions for official searches and certificates made applicable to the registrar in 1888 were taken from the provisions in section 2 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882. Further, in 1900, two registers formerly kept by the registrar of judgments were transferred to the land registrar. But if and so far as the court officials were not themselves liable to be sued I find it very difficult to suppose that Parliament intended to subject the land registrar to liability by the Act of 1888. The natural assumption would be that Parliament either considered that no express exemption corresponding to the Land Transfer Act provision was necessary or, more probably, simply forgot to put one in.
So the point which to my mind is crucial is to what extent, if at all, the various "proper officers" were liable to be sued. Douglass v. Yallop, (1759) 2 Burr. 722, to which the Master of the Rolls refers, shows that the senior master of the Court of Common Pleas, who received five shillings for each entry, would have been liable to be sued for any damages suffered by the plaintiff for his failure to register a judgment presented for registration under the Judgments Act, 1838. Of course, by 1888, the registrar of judgments (the senior master of the Queen's Bench Division) received a fixed salary and it might perhaps be argued that his personal liability to be sued for the failure of one of his clerks to register a judgment did not survive the legislation which reorganised the courts. But even if that is not so, what we are concerned with is the obligation to issue certificates of search which was first created by the Conveyancing Act, 1882. That Act was a code applicable to all registers kept, or apparently to be kept, in the Central Office under the Acts scheduled to the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and any other Acts; so that it might apply to functionaries of varying status. I find it difficult to suppose that Parliament in the year 1882 intended by such an Act to make these unidentified officers of the court paid by salary personally liable to ensure the accuracy of the certificates of search issued in respect of registers under their charge."
Salmon LJ held that the local registrar was not liable for breach of an absolute statutory duty, which was what had been alleged. It had been accepted that the local registrar had not been negligent in any way and that he was not vicariously responsible for the negligence of the council's servant who had carried out the search and issued the certificate. He noted indications in favour of civil liability, on the basis of an absolute obligation, saying: "It is clear that section 17(1), (2) and (3) of the Land Charges Act 1925 were enacted particularly for the benefit of chargees, incumbrancers (of whom the Minister is one) and purchasers rather than for the benefit of the general public. Purchasers, chargees and incumbrancers may suffer the most grave financial loss if the search which section 17(2) requires is not properly carried out or the certificate which it requires is inaccurate."
The statutory duty was one of due diligence, not an absolute duty and because the claim had been put on the basis of an absolute duty, he held that it failed. As to section 131, he said: "It was, in my view, designed to protect those working in the registry from being plagued by vexatious actions. It accordingly provided that any claim, save a claim in fraud, could be struck out in limine. The indemnity in section 85 was a beneficent provision, possibly in part to compensate for the loss of a cause of action in negligence, and which, in any event, justice demanded. It might well have been introduced into the Land Charges Act, 1925, but only in so far as concerned Her Majesty's Land Registry, for in 1925 Parliament could hardly have been expected to set up a central fund in effect to indemnify local authorities against the mistakes of their own servants. Accordingly, the fact that no provisions corresponding to sections 83, 85 or 131 of the Land Registration Act appear in the Land Charges Act seems to me to be irrelevant to the question we have to decide."
Land Charges Act 1925 17(1) 17(2) 17(3) - Land registration Act 1925 131
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Regina v Registrar General, Ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Winn and Buckley LJJ
Family, Administrative, Ecclesiastical
The Church of Scientology chapel at East Grinstead, Sussex was not a "place of meeting for religious worship" within the meaning of section 2 of the 1855 Act since that would require reverence to a deity. The Church of Scientology's services did not meet that test, and a valid ceremony of marriage could not be conducted there. The question of whether the services performed in the chapel are properly to be regarded as a form of religious worship is inevitably conditioned by whether Scientology is to be regarded as a religion.
Lord Denning asked whether the chapel was a place of meeting for religious worship within the meaning of the Act, saying: "We have had much discussion on the meaning of the word "religion" and of the word "worship", taken separately, but I think we should take the combined phrase, "place of meeting for religious worship" as used in the statute of 1855. It connotes to my mind a place of which the principal use is as a place where people come together as a congregation or assembly to do reverence to God. It need not be the God which the Christians worship. It may be another God, or an unknown God, but it must be reverence to a deity. There may be exceptions. For instance, Buddhist temples are properly described as places of meeting for religious worship. But, apart from exceptional cases of that kind, it seems to me the governing idea behind the words "place of meeting for religious worship" is that it should be a place for the worship of God. I am sure that would be the meaning attached by those who framed this legislation of 1855."
As to how that might apply to the Church of Scientology: "Turning to the creed of the Church of Scientology, I must say that it seems to me to be more a philosophy of the existence of man or of life, rather than a religion. Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being. I do not find any such reverence or veneration in the creed of this church . . When I look through the ceremonies and the affidavits, I am left with the feeling that there is nothing in it of reverence for God or a deity, but simply instruction in a philosophy. There may be belief in a spirit of man, but there is no belief in a spirit of God."
Winn LJ said that he did not feel well qualified to discuss whether Scientology could properly be called a religion, but the evidence did not show to his mind that its adherents observed any form of worship. He explained what he meant by worship: "by no "worship", if I am bound to define my terms, I mean to indicate that they do not humble themselves in reverence and recognition of the dominant power and control of any entity or being outside their own body and life."
Buckley LJ said: "Worship I take to be something which must have some at least of the following characteristics: submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession."
Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 2
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Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] P 83
1 Feb 1970
FD
Ormrod J
Administrative, Family
There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual. Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests. If all three are congruent, that should determine a person's sex for the purpose of marriage. Any operative intervention should be ignored. The biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth, at the latest, and cannot be changed either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex or by medical or surgical means. The marriage was void ab initio.
As to the difference between a declaration under RSC Ord.15, and a decree of nullity, Ormrod J observed: "The importance of this distinction is, of course, that on a decree of nullity, the court has the power to entertain an application for ancillary relief whereas if a declaration order is made, there is not such power." Since ecclesiastical courts did in fact grant declaratory sentences in cases of meretricious marriages, there was no discretion to withhold any decree of nullity. "[o]n the facts as I have found them to be, a matrimonial relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was a legal impossibility at all times and in all circumstances, whereas a marriage which is void on the grounds of bigamy, non-age or failure of third party consents, might, in other circumstances, have been a valid marriage." Sex is an essential determinant of marriage, because: "it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman."
Ormrod J: "It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. The only cases where the term "change of sex" is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation."
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 British Oxygen Co Ltd v Board of Trade; HL 15-Jul-1970 - [1971] AC 610; [1970] UKHL 4; [1970] 3 All ER 165; [1970] 3 WLR 488
 
Adams v Adams [1971] P 188
1971

Sir Jocelyn Simon P
Administrative
Despite the lack of modern English authority applying the doctrine, it was still part of the English common law, that the acts of a de facto officer were validated. The de facto officer must have some basis for his assumption of office, variously expressed as ‘colourable title’ or ‘colourable authority’. The President declined to recognise a divorce decree granted in Rhodesia by a Judge who had been appointed under the Constitution adopted in 1965 after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The case did not fall within the de facto doctrine ‘even so widely stated’ as in State v Carroll because the circumstances of his appointment which made it invalid in the eyes of English law were very well known, indeed notorious. The President could find no trace of its ever being applied during a rebellion to accord recognition to the judicial or official acts or under a usurping power.
1 Citers


 
Attorney General v Chaudry [1971] 1 WLR 1614
1971
CA
Lord Denning MR
Litigation Practice, Administrative
The court has jurisdiction to grant a civil law remedy by way of injunction in order to enforce the public law, except in cases where statute had expressly or by necessary implication removed the jurisdiction. Whenever Parliament has enacted a law and given a particular remedy for the breach of it, such remedy being in an inferior court, nevertheless the High Court always has reserve power to enforce the law so enacted by way of an injunction or declaration or other suitable remedy. The High Court has jurisdiction to ensure obedience to the law whenever it is just and convenient so to do.
1 Citers


 
Szechter (orse Karsov) v Szechter [1971] P 286; [1971] 1 WLR 171
1971

Sir Jocelyn Simon P, Karminski J
Family, Administrative
The parties, who had been given leave to stay in the United Kingdom for only a limited period, had acquired a domicile of choice in England by residing here with the intention of making this country their permanent home. It was immaterial that their intentions were liable to be frustrated by the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department as to permission for their continued residence here.
As to the necessary element of consent to a marriage. Sir Jocelyn Simon P said: "It is, in my view, insufficient to invalidate an otherwise good marraige that a party has entered into it in order to escape from a disagreeable situation, such as penury or social degradation. In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock. I think that in the instant ease that test is satisfied."
Karminski J said: "In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock."
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 Wiseman v Borneman; HL 1971 - [1971] AC 297; [1971] 3 All ER 275

 
 Coleen Properties Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government; CA 26-Jan-1971 - [1971] 1 All ER 1049; (1971) 1 WLR 433; [1971] EWCA Civ 11
 
Regina v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association [1972] 2 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 589; [1972] 2 WLR 1262
1972
CA
Lord Denning, Lord Roskill and Sir Gordon Willmer
Administrative
A number of taxi cab owners challenged a decision of the Council to increase the numbers of hackney cabs operating in the city. At a public meeting with the council prior to the decision, the chairman had given a public undertaking that the numbers of hackney cabs would not be increased until the proposed legislation, which included provisions for controlling private hire vehicles, had been enacted by Parliament. Held: (Majority) On account of this public representation, the applicants were "justifiably aggrieved" by the council's subsequent unfair conduct. Lord Denning obiter: Even in the absence of such a public undertaking, the applicants would have had a right to be consulted: "It is perhaps putting it a little high to say that they [Liverpool Corporation] are exercising judicial functions. They may be said to be exercising an administrative function. But even so, in our modern approach, they must act fairly: and the Court will see that they do so.
To apply that principle here; suppose the corporation proposed to reduce the number of taxicabs from 300 to 200, it would be their duty to hear the taxicab owners' association: because their members would be greatly affected. They would certainly be persons aggrieved. Likewise suppose the corporation propose to increase the number of taxicabs from 300 to 350 or 400 or more it is the duty of the corporation to hear those affected before coming to a decision adverse to their interests." Lord Roskill and Sir Gordon Willmer emphasised the unequivocal public undertaking given by the Respondents. Roskill L.J.: "It has been said that the council and its relevant committee and sub-committee were never under any duty to hear any representations from the Applicants. That may or may not be correct. In the light of what has happened, I do not think it necessary to express any opinion upon that question...It seems to me to allow the council to resile from that undertaking without notice to and representations from the Applicants is to condone unfairness in a case where the duty was to act fairly." Sir Gordon Willmer: "It seems to me that in these very special circumstances, having regard to the history of how this matter had been dealt with in the past, and having regard especially to the giving of the undertaking, the Applicants are justified in regarding themselves as "aggrieved" by what I can only describe as unfair treatment on the part of Liverpool Corporation." An explicit representation had been made and relied upon. A legitimate expectation had been created.
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 Kingston London Borough Council v Environment Secretary; 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 1549

 
 Regina v Race Relations Board, Ex parte Selvarajan; CA 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1686; [1976] 1 All ER 12
 
F Hoffmann La Roche and Co A G v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295; [1974] 2 All ER 1128; [1974] 3 WLR 104
1975
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce
Administrative, Litigation Practice, Constitutional
The Secretary of State sought an interlocutory injunction under the Act to restrain the appellant from charging prices in excess of those fixed by a statutory instrument he had made. The appellant argued that the statutory instrument was ultra vires, because it had been based upon a report by the Monopolies Commission, which the appellant maintained, had been produced without due regard to principles of natural justice. The Secretary of State objected to giving a cross undertaking in damages. Held: The Secretary of State was not required to give such an undertaking. Lord Reid said that normally a claimant "cannot be compelled to give an undertaking but if he will not give it he will not get the injunction."
The fact that an individual has suffered loss because of an invalid administrative act does not in itself entitle him to be indemnified.
Lord Diplock said: "The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to damages." and "The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Non-performance of it is contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempts, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant's benefit. It retains a discretion not to enforce the undertaking if it considers that the conduct of the defendant in relation to the obtaining or continuing of the injunction or the enforcement of the undertaking makes it inequitable to do so, but if the undertaking is enforced the measure of the damages payable under it is not discretionary. It is assessed on an inquiry into damages at which principles to be applied are fixed and clear. The assessment is made upon the same basis as that upon which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction."
. . "In constitutional law a clear distinction can be drawn between an Act of Parliament and subordinate legislation, even though the latter is contained in an order made by statutory instrument approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. Despite this indication that the majority of members of both Houses of the contemporary Parliament regard the order as being for the common weal, I entertain no doubt that the courts have jurisdiction to declare it to be invalid if they are satisfied that in making it the Minister who did so acted outwith the legislative powers conferred upon him by the previous Act of Parliament under which the order is ultra vires by reason of its contents (patent defects) or by reason of defects in the procedure followed prior to its being made (latent defects)."
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry Control) Act 1948 11(2) - Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965
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Conteh v Onslow Fane and another Times, 26 June 1975; Bar Library Transcript No. 291 of 1975
26 Jun 1975
CA

Contract, Administrative
Mr Conteh, a boxer, was accused of misconduct in breaking his contracts with his former manager and former promoter, and the High Court proceedings had been brought by him for declarations that these contracts were not binding on him. It was conceded by the Board that any finding that the contracts were binding on Mr Conteh would be provisional, and that a subsequent High Court judgment to a different effect would prevail.
1 Citers



 
 Congreve v Secretary of State for the Home Office; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 QB 629; [1976] 1 All ER 697; [1977] 2 WLR 291

 
 HTV Ltd v Price Commission; CA 1976 - [1976] ICR 170

 
 Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd; 1976 - [1976] 1 QB 752; [1976] 3 All E R 484

 
 Regina v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Ex parte Salamat Bibi; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 979; [1976] 3 All ER 843

 
 Regina v The Secretary of State for the Environment, ex Parte Ostler; CA 16-Mar-1976 - [1976] EWCA Civ 6; [1977] 1 QB 122
 
Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] 1 QB 643; [1976] EWCA Civ 10; [1977] 2 All ER 182; [1977] 2 WLR 234
15 Dec 1976
CA
Roskill LJ, Lord Denning MR, Lawton LJ
Administrative, Constitutional
Policy guidance issued by the respondent was unlawful because it was contrary to the statutory objectives laid down for the Civil Aviation Authority by section 3 of the 1971 Act. The court discussed the status of guidance issued by the respondent: "guidance is assistance in reaching a decision proffered to him who has to make the decision, but guidance does not compel any particular decision."
Lord Denning said that the exercise of a discretionary prerogative power "can be examined by the courts just as any other discretionary power which is vested in the executive."
. . And "The prerogative is a discretionary power exercisable by the executive government for the public good, in certain spheres of governmental activity for which the law has made no provision, such as the war prerogative (of requisitioning property for the defence of the realm), or the treaty prerogative (of making treaties with foreign powers). The law does not interfere with the proper exercise of the discretion by the executive in those situations: but it can set limits by defining the bounds of the activity: and it can intervene if the discretion is exercised improperly or mistakenly. That is a fundamental principle of our constitution.
Civil Aviation Act 1971 3
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[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler [1977] 1 QB 122
1977
CA

Administrative, Planning
The six week period during which a challenge must be made to a compulsory purchase is not capable of extension under the rules of court. The legislative intention is that questions as to the invalidity may be raised on the specified grounds in the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, but that otherwise the jurisdiction of the court is excluded in the interests of certainty.


 
 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 QB 529; [1976] 3 All ER 437; [1976] 1 WLR 868
 
Kaplan v United Kingdom (1980) 4 EHRR 64; 7598/76
14 Dec 1978
ECHR

Human Rights, Administrative
(Admissibility) The Secretary of State had, after preliminary procedures, served notices on an insurance company disallowing it from writing any new business, because its managing director the applicant, had been found not to be a fit and proper person to be a controller of the company. He had misstated the value of the company's assets. The director claimed that the matters in issue should, under Article 6(1) of the Convention, have been decided by a court, and not by the Secretary of State. The respondent said that the action was inadmissible, the applicant not yet having exhausted his court remedies. Held: The application was admissible. The jurisdiction of the courts cannot be removed altogether or limited beyond a certain point, but administrative decisions do not generally attract the full judicial model type of review: "an interpretation of Article 6(1) under which it was held to provide a right to a full appeal on the merits of every administrative decision . . would therefore lead to a result which was inconsistent with the existing and longstanding legal position in most of the Contracting States.
To avoid that consequence, the principle that has evolved in the Strasbourg Court is that decision-making in administrative cases according to the strict judicial model is not required in all cases. This has been achieved in several ways, and the path to a settled position is still being trod." and
"it is a feature of the administrative law of all the contracting states that in numerous different fields public authorities are empowered by law to take various forms of action impinging on the private rights of citizens."
"It is plain from the text of Article 6(1) that it does not directly protect the individual's 'civil rights' as such against acts or decisions which modify, annul or otherwise interfere with them. In many circumstances the private rights of an individual are liable to be affected not only by the lawful acts of public authorities but also by those of other individuals or entities exercising counter-vailing private rights of their own, and indeed by circumstances of a purely factual nature such as the effluxion of time. The mere fact that an individual's private rights are adversely affected by the acts of another party, whether a public authority or not, does not therefore involve a violation of Article 6(1).
. . The Commission has held that where Article 6(1) applies to an administrative process, it may be sufficient that a court procedure is available at some stage after the initial administration decision. It has left open the question whether Article 6(1) would apply both to the administrative and the judicial part of restitution proceedings in the Federal Republic of Germany, or whether it covers only the proceedings in court. It recalls that it is also held that proceedings concerning the registration of patients fall outside the scope of Article 6(1) on the ground that this is an 'essentially administrative' matter.
154. In the Commission's view the essential role of Article 6(1) in this sphere is to lay down guarantees concerning the mode in which claims or disputes concerning legal rights and obligations (of a 'civil' character) are to be resolved. A distinction must be drawn between the acts of a body which is engaged in the resolution of such a claim or dispute and the acts of an administrative or other body purporting merely to exercise or apply a legal power vested in it and not to resolve a legal claim or dispute. Article 6(1) would not, in the Commission's opinion apply, to the acts of the latter even if they do affect 'civil rights'. It could not be considered as being engaged in a process of 'determination' of civil rights and obligations. Its function would not be to decide ('décidera') on a claim, dispute or 'contestation'. Its acts may, on the other hand, give rise to a claim, dispute or 'contestation' and Article 6 may come into play in that way.
155. As to the present case, the Commission notes that the Secretary of State was not engaged in the resolution of a dispute between parties concerning civil rights. He proposed to take action affecting (as the Commission has found) the company's private rights. He considered the objections put forward and then acted. He took action in the exercise of his legal powers which affected 'civil rights' but was not engaged in the 'determination' of a dispute or a 'contestation' concerning civil rights and obligations. In the Commission's opinion, the procedures leading to the finding of unfitness against the applicant and the imposition of restrictions on IGA did not therefore themselves have to comply with Article 6(1). The fact that the relevant decisions were not taken by a tribunal after a fair and public hearing does not therefore involve a breach of this provision."
European Convention on Human Rights 6.1 - Insurance Companies Act 1974
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[ LIP ]
 
Regina v Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England ex parte Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1979] 2 All ER 881; [1979] QB 287
1979
CA
Lord Denning MR
Administrative, Local Government
The court considered the meaning of 'maladministration' in the section. Held: Lord Denning MR said: "It will cover ‘bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on.’ It ‘would be a long and interesting list’ clearly open-ended, covering the manner in which a decision is reached or discretion is exercised; but excluding the merits of the decision itself or of the discretion itself. It follows that ‘discretionary decision, properly exercised which the complainant dislikes but cannot fault the manner in which it was taken, is excluded,’ . . In other words if there is no ‘maladministration’, the ombudsman may not question any decision taken by the authorities. He must not go into the merits of it or intimate any view as to whether it was right or wrong."
Parliament was "at pains" to ensure that the Ombudsman should not conduct an investigation "which might trespass in any way on the jurisdiction of the courts of law or of any tribunals."
Local Government Act 1974 26
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Watt v Lord Advocate 1979 SC 120
1979

Lord President Emslie
Scotland, Administrative
Lord President Emslie said: "it seems clear that, however much this is to be regretted, the Court Session has never had power to correct an intra vires error of law made by a statutory tribunal or authority exercising statutory jurisdiction. As Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff said in Lord Advocate v Police Commissioners of Perth (1869) 8 M 244 at p 245 – 'In the ordinary case it would now, I think, be held that where statutory powers are given, and a statutory jurisdiction is set up, all other jurisdictions are excluded' There is no indication in any subsequent authority that this view has been doubted or even questioned and I entirely agree with the Lord Ordinary for the reasons which he gives that the fact that the Court of Session may have exercised a comprehensive corrective jurisdiction over determinations of parochial aid in the 18th and early 19th Centuries does not in any way support the existence of a jurisdiction in this court to correct errors by a statutory tribunal in the due performance of its statutory duties."
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 Calvin v Carr; PC 15-Jan-1979 - [1979] UKPC 1; [1979] 2 All ER 440; [1980] AC 574; [1979] 2 WLR 755

 
 London and Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen District Council; HL 8-Nov-1979 - [1980] SC (HL) 1; [1980] 1 WLR 182; [1979] UKHL 7

 
 Regina v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Rossminster Ltd; HL 13-Dec-1979 - [1980] AC 952; [1979] UKHL 5; [1980] 1 All ER 80
 
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