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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Administrative - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 28 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Rex v The London County Council [1931] 2 KB 215
1931
CA
Scrutton LJ
Administrative
Scrutton LJ said: "The writ of certiorari is a very old and high prerogative writ drawn up for the purpose of enabling the Court of King's Bench to control the action of inferior Courts and to make it certain that they shall not exceed their jurisdiction; and therefore the writ of certiorari is intended to bring into the High Court the decision of the inferior tribunal, in order that the High Court may be certified whether the decision is within the jurisdiction of the inferior Court. There has been a great deal of discussion and a large number of cases extending the meaning of 'Court'. It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense in which this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari; and I do not discuss the nature of the writ, because very elaborate discussions of it will be found in the recent cases of Rex v. Electricity Commissioners and Rex v. Minister of Health."
1 Citers


 
Eshugbayi Eleko v Office Administering the Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662; [1931] UKPC 37; [1931] All ER 44
24 Mar 1931
HL
Lord Atkin
Administrative, Commonwealth
The claimant sought a writ of habeas corpus. Held: Lord Atkin said that in a habeas corpus case, "no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice. And it is the tradition of British justice that judges should not shrink from deciding such issues in the face of the executive."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Ellen Street Estates Limited v Minister for Health; CA 1934 - [1934] 1 KB 590; [1934] All ER Rep 385
 
Reilly v The King [1934] AC 176
1934
HL
Lord Atkin
Administrative
The government has power to abolish a public service post, and it is an "elementary proposition that if further performance of a contract becomes impossible by legislation having that effect the contract is discharged".
1 Citers


 
Rex v Stafford Justices, ex parte Stafford Corp [1940] 2 KB 33; (1940) 109 LJKB 584
1940
CA
Lord Greene MR
Land, Administrative
Houses had been built across the site of a footpath which had not been properly diverted. An order to demolish the houses was refused because of the delay and prejudice. Held: Lord Green MR said of the exercise of discretion involved: "Now, in my opinion, the order for the issue of the writ of certiorari is, except in cases where it goes as of course, strictly in all cases a matter of discretion. It is perfectly true to say that if no special circumstances exist, then a person aggrieved by that is entitled ex debito justitiae to his order. That merely means this, in my judgment, that the Court in such circumstances will exercise its discretion by granting the relief. In all discretionary remedies it is well known and settled that in certain circumstances - I will not say in all of them, but in a great many of them- the Court, although nominally it has a discretion, it is to act according to the ordinary principles upon which judicial discretion is exercised, must exercise that discretion in a particular way, and if a Judge at a trial refuses to do so, then the Court of Appeal will set the mater right. But when once it is established that in deciding whether or not a particular remedy shall be granted the Court is entitled to inquire into the conduct of the applicant, and the circumstances of the case, in order to ascertain whether it is proper or not proper to grant the remedy sought, the case must in my judgment be one of discretion."
Before such a discretion can be exercised "there must be something in the circumstances of the case which make it right to refuse the relief sought"


 
 Barnard v Gorman; HL 1941 - [1941] AC 378

 
 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works; CA 1943 - [1943] 2 All ER 560
 
Watt (or Thomas) v Thomas [1947] AC 484; 1947 SC (HL) 45
1947
HL
MacMillan L, Lord Thankerton, Viscount Simon
Administrative, Litigation Practice, Family
The House considered when it was appropriate for an appellate court in Scotland to set aside the judgment at first instance.
Lord Thankerton said: "(1) Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion. (2) The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence. (3) The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court."
. . And: "So far as the case stands on paper it not infrequently happens that a decision either way may seem equally open. When this is so, and it may be said of the present case, then the decision of the trial judge, who has enjoyed the advantages not available to the appellate court, becomes of profound importance and ought not to be disturbed. This is not an abrogation of the powers of a court of appeal on questions of fact. The judgment of the trial judge on the facts may be demonstrated on the printed evidence to be affected by material inconsistencies and inaccuracies, or he may be shown to have failed to appreciate the weight or bearing of circumstances admitted or proved, or otherwise to have gone plainly wrong.
. .If the case on the printed evidence leaves the facts in balance, as it may be fairly said to do, then the rule enunciated in this House applies and brings the balance down on the side of the trial judge."
Lord Thankerton sad: "It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question. It will hardly be disputed that consistorial cases form a class in which it is generally most important to see and hear the witnesses, and particularly the spouses themselves;"
Viscount Simon said: "If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this is really a question of law), the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight."
Viscount Simon said: "an appellate Court has, of course, jurisdiction to review the record of the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand; but this jurisdiction has to be exercised with caution. If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this is really a question of law) the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate Court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to Courts of Appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Fletcher v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1947] 2 All ER 496
1947


Planning, Administrative
A local authority being consulted about the government's proposed designation of Stevenage as a "new town" would be likely to be able to respond satisfactorily to a presentation of less specificity than would members of the public, particularly perhaps the economically disadvantaged.
1 Citers



 
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation; CA 10-Nov-1947 - [1947] 2 All ER 680; [1948] 1 KB 223; 1947 WL 10584; (1948) 92 SJ 26; [1948] LJR 190; [1948] 45 LGR 635; (1948) 112 JP 55; 63 TLR 623; [1947] EWCA Civ 1
 
Blackpool Corporation v Locker [1948] 1 KB 349; [1948] 1 All ER 85
1948
CA
Scott LJ
Administrative, Agency
The effect of the delegation of a power is that the power in question is exercisable by the delegate and no longer by the pricipal delegator.
Scott LJ discussed the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse: The maxim that ignorance of the law does not excuse any subject represents the working hypothesis on which the rule of law rests in British democracy. That maxim applies in legal theory just as much to written as to unwritten law, i.e., to statute law as much as to common law or equity. But the very justification for that basic maxim is that the whole of our law, written or unwritten, is accessible to the public - in the sense, of course, that, at any rate, its legal advisers have access to it, at any moment, as of right" . . 'John Citizen' should not be "in complete ignorance of what rights over him and his property have been secretly conferred by the minister" as otherwise "For practical purposes, the rule of law . . breaks down because the aggrieved subject's remedy is gravely impaired"."
1 Citers



 
 Tamlin v Hannaford; CA 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 18
 
Taylor (formerly Kraupl) v National Assistance Board [1957] 1 All ER 183; [1957] 2 WLR 193; [1956] P 470
1951
CA
Lord Denning
Administrative
Lord Denning spoke as to the power of a court to issue a declaration, "The remedy is not excluded by the fact that the determination of the board is by statute made 'final'. Parliament gives the impress of finality to the decisions of the board only on the condition that they are reached in accordance with the law."
A right to receive maintenance under an order of the court is not a legal thing in action and for that reason is incapable of assignment:
1 Citers


 
Foster v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 606
1951


Commonwealth, Administrative
(Australia) The idea of "disclosure" to a person who already knew or was deemed to know the fact at issue iss conceptually impossible.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 KB 1
1951

Devlin J
Administrative, Landlord and Tenant
A rent tribunal could not give itself jurisdiction over an unfurnished letting. Devlin J said: "While they will not allow every empty threat to their jurisdiction to deter them from their proper business of fixing reasonable rents, they will likewise appreciate that they are not by their nature equipped for the trial of matters which in the ordinary civil court would be determined after pleading and discovery had been given and evidence on oath tested by cross-examination, and possibly, also after trial by jury. The tribunal cannot be required to determine summarily such an issue if it involves a point of substance and if one or other of the parties is willing to have it determined in the ordinary civil courts."
1 Citers


 
Nakkuda Ali v M F De S Jayaratne [1951] AC 66
1951
PC
Lord Radcliffe
Commonwealth, Administrative
(Ceylon) The section provided that "where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer" the Controller could exercise power to cancel the dealer’s licence given to him by the relevant Regulations in force in Ceylon. Held. The words must be construed to mean that there must in fact exist reasonable grounds, known to the Controller, before he could validly exercise the power.
Liversidge v Anderson should be regarded as an authority for the meaning of that phrase in the particular regulation considered alone. Lord Radcliffe said "Their Lordships therefore treat the words in regulation 62 . . as imposing a condition that there must in fact exist such reasonable grounds, known to the Controller, before he can validly exercise the power of cancellation." and "It is not difficult to think of circumstances in which the Controller might in the ordinary sense of the words, have reasonable grounds of belief without having ever confronted the licence holder with the information which is the source of his belief. It is a long step in the argument to say that because a man is enjoined that he must not take action unless he has reasonable ground for believing something he can only arrive at that belief by a course of conduct analogous to the judicial process . . In truth when he cancels a licence he is not determining a question; he is taking executive action to withdraw a privilege because he believes, and has reasonable grounds to believe that the holder is unfit to retain it."amlet
Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations 1945 62
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Clarence Henry Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 The Times LR 373
26 Jun 1951
KBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Somervell and Jenkins LJJ, Kilberry, Lynskey and Devlin JJ
Administrative, Police
Mr Willcock was stopped for speeding. PC Muckle asked him to show his national registration identity card. Mr Willcock refused. PC Muckle served a notice requiring its production which Mr Willcock ignored. He was prosecuted. He argued that the emergency which had led to the Act had passed. He was convicted by the magistrates, but the magistrates imposed only an absolute discharge. He appealed. Held: There had been a declaration that the war had come to an end but no Order in Council revoking the Act. Only one emergency was meant - the imminent outbreak of war. The policeman had really wanted the defendant's vehicle registration number, but was still acting under standing orders requiring them to ask every person stopped to produce the identity card. Lord Goddard "That sort of thing tends to make motorists not law-abiding; it tends to cause resentment." The Act was being used for a purpose for which it was not passed. A court of seven judges had been convened to decide whether the Act remained in force. It did. It required a specific Order in Council to revoke it. '. . . The court wishes to express its emphatic approval of the way in which they [the magistrates] dealt with this case by granting the defendant an absolute discharge. Because the police may have powers, it does not follow that they ought to exercise them on all occasions or as a matter of routine . . . To demand production of the national registration identity card from all and sundry . . . is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes; it was never passed for the purposes for which it is now apparently being used. To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in war-time when the war 'is a thing of the past . . . tends to turn law-abiding citizens into law-breakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs.
Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that exists between the police and the public, and such action tends to make people resentful of the acts of the police, and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of assisting them.'
Devlin J: 'I think that it would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the impression that the continuance of the state of emergency had become a sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging legislation initiated in different circumstances and for different purposes.'
National Registration Act 1939 12(4)

 
Waddle v Wallsend Shipping Co Ltd [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 105
1952

Devlin J
Administrative
The court considered the relationship between the findings of an inquiry and later judicial proceedings: "… I think that the competent authorities might consider whether the useful purposes that wreck inquiries serve would not be increased if the report was made available to any court which had to determine the cause of the loss. It is not necessary that the findings of fact in the report should be treated as binding. The opinion of the commissioner based on the facts he finds has at least as high a value as that of an expert based on the facts which he assumes to be proved; and it has the advantage of being quite independent of either side."
1 Citers



 
 The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (SS) Limited v Singapore Harbour Board; PC 10-Jun-1952 - [1952] UKPC 17; 50 LGR 619; [1952] 1 TLR 1625; [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1; [1952] AC 452; [1952] 2 All ER 219

 
 Regina v National Insurance Commissioners, ex parte Timmis; QBD 1954 - [1954] 2 All ER 292

 
 Glasgow Corporation v Central Land Board; HL 12-Dec-1955 - [1955] UKHL 7; 1956 SLT 41; [1956] JPL 442; 1956 SC (HL) 1

 
 Lawson v Registrar General; 1956 - (1956) 105 LJ 204

 
 Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley; CA 1956 - [1956] 1 QB 702; [1956] 1 All ER 341

 
 Smith (Kathleen Rose) v East Elloe Rural District Council; HL 26-Mar-1956 - [1956] AC 736; [1956] 1 All ER 855; [1956] UKHL 2

 
 Regina v Medical Appeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore; Re Gilmore's Application; CA 25-Feb-1957 - [1957] 1 QB 574; [1957] 1 All ER 796; [1957] EWCA Civ 1; [1957] 2 WLR 498
 
Regina v Medical Appeal Tribunal (North Midland Region), Ex parte Hubble [1958] 2 QB 228; [1958] 2 All ER 374
1958

Diplock J
Benefits, Administrative
The claimant sought to receive money out of insurance funds fed by contributions from all employers, insured persons and the Exchequer. The procedure for determining whether the claimant is entitled to a disability benefit was said to be more like an inquest than an action.
Diplock J said: "A claim by an insured person to benefit under the Act is not truly analogous to a lis inter partes. A claim to benefit is a claim to receive money out of the insurance funds . . Any such claim requires investigation to determine whether any, and if so, what amount of benefit is payable out of the fund. In such an investigation, the minister or the insurance officer is not a party adverse to the claimant. If analogy be sought in the other branches of the law, it is to be found in an inquest rather than in an action."
1 Citers


 
Pyx Granite Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1960] AC 260; [1959] 3 All ER 1
1959
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Goddard
Planning, Administrative, Constitutional
There is a strong presumption that Parliament will not legislate to prevent individuals affected by legal measures promulgated by executive public bodies having a fair opportunity to challenge these measures and to vindicate their rights in court proceedings doing so. Viscount Simonds said: "It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights in not to be excluded except by clear words. That is a 'fundamental rule' from which I would not for my part sanction any departure."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Rands v Oldroyd [1959] 1 QB 209
1959


Litigation Practice, Administrative
The ejusdem generis rule is, at best, a very secondary guide to the meaning of a statute. The all-important matter is to consider the purpose of the statute. A statute preventing a civil servant contracting for his employers with a company in which he had an interest, should be interpreted strictly.
1 Citers


 
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