swarb.co.uk - law index
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Administrative - From: 1900 To: 1929
This page lists 15 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Rayner v Stepney Corporation [1911] 2 Ch 312
1911
Administrative
1 Citers
Solomon v Solomon; 1912 - (1912) 29 WN(NSW) 68
The King v Mitchell; 1913 - [1913] 1 KB 561
Scott v Scott; HL 5-May-1913 - [1912] P 241; [1913] AC 417; 29 TLR 520; [1911-13] All ER 1; [1913] UKHL 2
Local Government Board v Arlidge; HL 1914 - [1915] AC 120; [1914-15] All ER 1; 30 TLR 672
Ex parte Stott [1916] 1 KB 7
1916
Administrative, Litigation Practice
An order of certiorari should be made only at the request of somebody with a sufficient interest in the mater.
Rex v Port of London Authority Ex parte Kynoch Ltd [1919] 1 KB 176
1919
CA
Bankes LJ
Administrative
Bankes LJ said: "There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal in the honest exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, and, without refusing to hear an applicant, intimates to him what its policy is, and that after hearing him it will in accordance with its policy decide against him, unless there is something exceptional in his case. I think counsel for the applicants would admit that, if the policy has been adopted for reasons which the tribunal may legitimately entertain, no objection could be taken to such a course. On the other hand there are cases where a tribunal has passed a rule, or come to a determination, not to hear any application of a particular character by whomsoever made. There is a wide distinction to be drawn between these two classes."
1 Citers
Rex v Port of London Authority [1919] 1 QB 184
1919
Lord Justice Bankes
Administrative
A tribunal may, in the honest exercise of its discretion, adopt a policy, and announce it to those concerned, so long as it is ready to listen to reasons why, in an exceptional case, that policy should not be applied.
1 Citers
Rex v Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex parte Venicoff [1920] 3 KB 72; [1920] All ER 157
1920
Earl of Reading CJ
Immigration, Administrative
The Aliens Order of 1919 empowered the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against an alien if he deemed it to be conducive to the public good. The Home Secretary had expressed no concluded view that the critical allegations, namely taking women to a foreign country for the purpose of exploiting them and deriving money from their prostitution, were true. It was contended that the Home Secretary could not lawfully make the order without holding an enquiry. Held: The Home Secretary is not bound to hear representations on behalf of a proposed deportee, even though, in practice he may do so. It was not for the court to pronounce whether the making of the order was or was not for the public good and further that: "in dealing with a regulation such as that with which we are now concerned the value of the order would be considerably impaired if it could be made only after holding an inquiry, because it might very well be that the person against whom it was intended to make a deportation order would, the moment he had notice of that intention, take care not to present himself and would take steps to evade apprehension. I therefore come to the conclusion that the Home Secretary is not a judicial officer for this purpose, but an executive officer bound to act for the public good, and it is left to his judgment whether upon the facts before him it is desirable that he should make a deportation order."
1 Citers
England v Inglis [1920] 2 KB 636
1920
Salter J, Roche J
Administrative
An interest in the avoidance of an obligation is as much a material interest as an interest in making a gain. Salter J said: "As was pointed out by Lindley LJ in Nutton v Wilson [(1889) 22 QBD 744, 748] the object of sections of this kind is 'to prevent the conflict between interest and duty that might otherwise inevitably arise.' An 'interest' within the meaning of the section must, I agree, be something more than a sentimental interest, such as arises from the natural love and affection of a man for his son; it must be a pecuniary or, at least, a material interest; but I do not see on what principle it must necessarily be a pecuniary advantage, because, if a public man is likely to suffer pecuniary loss by his interest in any particular contract, his judgment is as likely to be deflected as where he is obtaining a pecuniary advantage from it."
1 Citers
Rex v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128
1922
HL
Lord Sumner
Administrative
Lord Sumner said: "Long before Jervis's Acts statutes had been passed which created an inferior court, and declared its decisions to be 'final' and 'without appeal', and again and again the Court of the King's Bench had held that the language of this kind did not restrict or take away the right of the court to bring the proceedings before itself by certiorari. There is no need to regard this as a conflict between the court and Parliament; on the contrary, the latter, by continuing to use the same language in subsequent enactments, accepted this interpretation which is now clearly established and is applicable to Canadian legislation, both Dominion and Provincial, when regulating the rights of certiorari and of appeal in similar terms. The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, was intended to produce and did produce its result by a simple change in procedure without unduly ousting the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior court." An error on the face of a judgment could not be said to make the decision a nullity. The error "however grave, is a wrong exercise of the jurisdiction which he has, and not a usurpation of a jurisdiction which he has not"
1 Citers
Rex v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co (1920) Ltd; 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 171
Auckland Harbour Board v The King; PC 1924 - [1924] AC 318
Roberts v Hopwood; HL 1925 - [1925] AC 578; [1925] All ER 24
Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. Ltd v The Corporation of Southport [1926] AC 355
1926
Lord Birkenhead
Administrative, Utilities
The appellants, having bound themselves not to exercise their discretion in the raising of electricity prices, were held not to have incompetently fettered their discretion, bearing in mind the commercial purposes for which the discretion was conferred and the commercial reasons for which the price fixing agreement had been entered to. Lord Birkenhead said that there is: "a well-established principle of law, that if a person or public body is entrusted by the legislature with certain powers and duties expressly or impliedly for public purposes, those persons or bodies cannot divest themselves of these powers and duties. They cannot enter into any contract or take any action incompatible with the due exercise of their powers or the discharge of their duties."
1 Citers