The defendants sought leave to appeal against their sentences, saying that the time served calculations had not included time spent subject to curfew and otherwise.
Held: ‘if a prisoner is serving a sentence for another offence at the time on which he is remanded for the offence for which he is to be sentenced, the application of the Remand in Custody Rules is mandatory; the court has neither the power nor the discretion under s.240(3) to allow that period to count as time on remand.
The effect of s.240(6) is that where a court gives a direction for less than the number of days for which the prisoner was remanded in custody or gives no direction under s.240(3) (with the result that no days count), it must make clear that it has complied with the mandatory provisions of s.240(4)(a) as to the time being served with respect to another sentence of imprisonment and give its reasons for not making a direction under s240(3). The intention of Parliament was clear – a court could not count the time spent serving another sentence, but had to give reasons as to why otherwise the full period of time on remand did not count. In effect there was to be no diminution in the punishment for the earlier offence, but time awaiting trial should normally count in full.
Thus understood, it is clear that there is no separate order under s.240(4); the only order a court can make is an order under s.240(3). S.240(4)(a) merely restricts the discretion of the court; s.240(4)(b) makes it clear that if an order is not made under s.240(3) reasons must be given. The only Order is an order under s.240(3).’
Sir John Thomas LCJ, MacKay, Sweeney JJ
[2013] EWCA Crim 1994
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 240
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Norman and Others, Regina v CACD 20-Jul-2006
The defendant said that the judge in setting his sentence had failed correctly to identify the time he had spent in custody awaiting trial, and which would act as time served.
Held: The defendants were entitled to a direction. If the time for . .
Cited – Gordon, Regina v; Regina v Taylor etc CACD 8-Feb-2007
The court considered the interaction of sections 240 of the 2003 Act, and 67 of the 1967 Act as applied to time spent on remand.
Held: The court laying down the sentence should address this issue, and declare whether all time or otherwise . .
Cited – Johnson (RT) v Regina; Nnaji v Regina CACD 17-Mar-2009
The court considered the difficulties arising in trying under section 240 to calculate the credit to be given for time spent in custody awaiting trial, and put forward a suggested formulation. . .
Cited – Hoggard, Regina v CACD 20-Jun-2013
The court gave its reasons for allowing an appeal by the defendant as to the time to be held to go towards service of his sentence of imprisonment after had had spent time before sentence subject to curfew.
The sentence, imposed on 13 December . .
Cited – Hicks, Regina (on The Application of) v Crown Court At Snaresbrook and Another CACD 27-Nov-2012
. .
Cited – Boutell, Regina v CACD 19-Aug-2010
. .
Cited – Regina v Irving; Regina v Squires CACD 4-Feb-2010
Both defendants appealed against sentence saying that the court had not given proper allowance on sentencing for the time that had spent awaiting trial under curfew and electronically tagged.
Held: The appeals succeeded. Greater effort should . .
Cited by:
Cited – Thorsby and Others v Regina CACD 20-Jan-2015
These several applications raised a single ground of appeal namely that the sentencing court failed to give credit under section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended, for one half of the time spent by the offender on qualifying curfew . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Sentencing
Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.517611