Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Limited: CA 29 Jul 1983

The plaintiff alleged abuse of the discretion conferred on the club by the rules. His trainer’s licence had been suspended. He said that it was contrary to an implied term of an agreement between the trainer and the racing club that any action taken would be reasonable and fair and made on reasonable grounds. The plaintiff claimed a declaration of invalidity of the decision. The question before the court, was whether the special procedures which Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court applied to applications for judicial review should have been followed.
Held: The power of the Stewards of the respondent racing club to impose penalties for breach of the Rules on owners of greyhounds, derives from a contract between the NGRC and owners and all those who took part in greyhound racing in stadia licensed by the NGRC. The status of the stewards was that of a domestic tribunal. By Rule 2 every owner and holder of a licence is deemed to have read the Rules and to submit himself to them.
The National Greyhound Racing Club was not amenable to judicial review. It was a matter of private law which could be dealt with by originating summons
Lawton LJ said: ‘A stewards’ inquiry under the defendants’ Rules of Racing concerned only those who voluntarily submitted themselves to the stewards’ jurisdiction. There was no public element in the jurisdiction itself. Its exercise, however, could have consequences from which the public benefited, as, for example by the stamping out of malpractices, and from which individuals might have their rights restricted by, for example, being prevented from employing a trainer whose licence had been suspended. Consequences affecting the public generally can flow from the decisions of many domestic tribunals . . the courts have always refused to use the orders of certiorari to review the decisions of domestic tribunals.’ and ‘In my judgment, such powers as the stewards had to suspend the plaintiff’s licence were derived from a contract between him and the defendants. This was so for all who took part in greyhound racing in stadia licensed by the defendants. A stewards’ enquiry under the defendants’ Rules of Racing concerned only those who voluntarily submitted themselves to the stewards’ jurisdiction. There was no public element in the jurisdiction itself.’
Fox LJ said: ‘Accordingly, in my view, the authority of the stewards to suspend the license of the plaintiff derives wholly from a contract between him and the defendants. I see nothing to suggest that the defendants have rights or duties relating to members of the public as such. What the defendants do in relation to the control of greyhound racing may affect the public, or a section of it, but the defendants’ powers in relation to the matters with which this case is concerned are contractual.’
Slade LJ said: ‘the rules of racing of the NGRC and its decision to suspend the plaintiff in purported compliance with those rules have not been made in the field of public law. Furthermore, its authority to perform judicial or quasi judicial functions in respect of persons holding licenses from it is not derived from statute or statutory instruments or from the Crown. It is derived solely from contract. Rule 2 of the NGRC’s Rules of Racing provides that every person who is the holder of a license shall be deemed to have read the rules and to submit himself to them and to the jurisdiction of the NGRC. The relief, by way of declaration and injunction, sought by the plaintiff in his originating summons is correspondingly based primarily and explicitly on alleged breach of contract.’

Lawton, Fox, Slade LLJ
[1983] 1 WLR 1302, [1983] EWCA Civ 6, [1983] 3 All ER 300
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedFlaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd CA 14-Sep-2005
The club regulated greyhound racing. The claimant had complained that its disciplinary proceedings had been conducted unfairly. He said that a panel member had an interest as veterinary surgeon in the proceedings at the stadium at which the alleged . .
CitedRegina v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan CA 4-Dec-1992
No Judicial Review of Decisions of Private Body
Despite the wide range of its powers, the disciplinary committee of the Jockey Club remains a domestic tribunal. Judicial review is not available to a member. Tne relationship is in contract between the club and its member. Sir Thomas Bingham MR: . .
CitedMullins, Regina (on the Application of) v The Jockey Club Admn 17-Oct-2005
The claimant’s horse had been found after a race to have morphine in his system. It was not thought that the claimant was at fault, but the horse was disqualifed. He sought judicial review of the decision.
Held: The decision was a disciplinary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Judicial Review

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.220132