Jacobsohn v Blake and Compton; 13 Jan 1843

References: (1844) 6 Man and G 919, 13 LJ CP 89, [1843] EngR 175, (1844) 6 Man & G 919, (1843) 134 ER 1164
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Tindal CJ, Erskine J, Cresswell J
Custom-house officers took possession of goods landed by the plaintiff for the purpose of examination and detained them upon a misapprehension that they were prohibited and liable to forfeiture. In an action for trespass, the defence was that, there having been no seizure by the officers, the action of trespass could not be maintained. The jury were directed that the goods having been legally in the possession of the defendants, and there having been no seizure by them, the action of trespass could not be maintained. That direction was upheld in the Court of Common Pleas.
Held: In order to entitle the plaintiff to maintain such an action [of trespass] there must have been an actual seizure of the plaintiff’s goods. There was no evidence of any act of trespass. There was no seizure whatever by the defendants. The goods were landed and taken possession of by the defendants in the discharge of their duty, for the purpose of their being examined. There was no evidence of any seizure or of any other act amounting to a trespass. There was no trespass in the first instance, or anything that could be called a seizure. The goods were taken by the plaintiff’s agent to the proper place for examination of them by the defendants in the regular discharge of their duty as custom-house officers. Upon their examination, all that the defendants did was, to detain them, till it could be ascertained whether or not they were liable to forfeiture. This is not an act of trespass.
Tindal CJ said: ‘[T]he defendants merely took possession of the goods, in the execution of their duty as custom-house officers, for the purpose of examination. When the goods were examined certain marks were found upon them, which induced the defendants to think they were prohibited; and they said they must detain them; and then, on a subsequent application on the part of the plaintiff for the delivery of the goods, the answer was that they were detained and would be prosecuted as seizures. It appears, therefore, that the defendants originally detained the goods under a real and honest doubt that they were subject to forfeiture: whether that doubt was well grounded, is not now the question. . . There has been no abuse of authority on their part. The goods remained, during the whole time of the examination, in the same custody in which they were, in the first instance, legally detained.’
Coltman J said: ‘The defendants were custom-house officers acting under an authority given them by law. It was their duty to examine the goods in question, in order to ascertain to what duty they were liable, or whether or not they were subject to forfeiture. If the goods had been afterwards detained by them for a time more than reasonable for the examination, that might have been an abuse of their authority so as to render them liable in another form of action. But it appears to me there is no ground for saying they did more than detain the goods for a reasonable time, in order that the question as to the liability of the goods to forfeiture might be submitted to the proper authorities.’
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