Part way into a trial, one of the judges in a case applied for a position with a company. She discovered that a director of that company was due to give evidence. She brought the circumstances to the attention of the remaining court and parties. She was informed that there was no vacancy, and agreed to undertake not to apply again for a period of two years after the trial. She refused to recuse herself.
Held: The Human Rights test was the presence of a cause for apparent bias. Where she would have no further immediate contact with the firm, there was no such bias. The occasion for any suspicion of bias had been removed.
Lightman J described the issue: ‘There is no suggestion in this case of actual bias on the part of Dr Rowlatt. The essential issue underlying the Applications is whether the actions of Dr Rowlatt in relation to her application for a job at Frontier Economics (‘Frontier’) gives rise to a real danger of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. It is common ground that: (1) the relevant circumstances by reference to which the issue is to be determined are the circumstances as they exist today when the Applications are being determined; (2) (as is now quite clear) Dr Rowlatt today has no prospect of any employment by Frontier, whatever prospect she may have entertained before or after the 7th November Fax; and (3) Mr Biro’s evidence is central to the DG’s case. As we understand the concerns expressed by Mr Cran on behalf of the Respondents, they are threefold: (1) that Dr Rowlatt by making the application to Frontier in the course of the proceedings showed a partiality which cannot be removed or undone; . . . (2) that Dr Rowlatt will feel a sense of resentment against the Respondents for preventing her from obtaining a job with Frontier; . . . (3) that Dr Rowlatt will feel a sense of gratitude to Frontier for writing the Frontier Letter which ‘got her off the hook’ by publicly bringing to an end any prospect of employment and thereby improving the prospects that the Applications would fail. . . .Dr Rowlatt gave her provisional view in the fax dated the 13th November 2000 that she ought not to recuse herself. She reconsidered her position after full argument had been addressed to the Court and that remains her final view. In the circumstances the Court must itself decide (in effect if not in form) whether she is wrong, for the Court must independently decide the question whether she should recuse herself as the preliminary to deciding whether the Court should accede to the application that the Court should recuse itself.’
Lightman J
Gazette 11-Jan-2001
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods RPC 14-Apr-1999
Before granting leave to review the exemption of a class of goods from the resale price maintenance prohibition, there must be established prima facie evidence of a material change in circumstances, which might have led the earlier court to a . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2); Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain and Proprietary Articles Trade Association CA 21-Dec-2000
The claimants alleged that a connection between a member of the Restrictive Practices Court, who was to hear a complaint and another company, disclosed bias against them. She had not recused herself.
Held: When asking whether material . .
See also – In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 4) CA 26-Jul-2001
The parties had expended very considerable sums preparing for a hearing. The hearing became abortive when it was questioned whether a member of the court had given the appearance of bias. The parties sought payment of their wasted costs from the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Natural Justice
Leading Case
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.82056