Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 5-3; Violation of Art. 5-4; Violation of Art. 6-1; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses partial award – Convention proceedings
‘[T]he [authorities] applied law and practice under which there was a presumption that remand in custody was necessary in cases where the sentence faced went beyond a certain threshold of severity …[While] the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element …. the Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of pre-trial detention . .
That is particularly true in the present case where under the applicable domestic law and practice the characterisation in law of the facts – and thus the sentence faced by the applicant – was determined by the prosecution authorities without judicial control of the question whether or not the evidence supported reasonable suspicion that the accused had committed an offence attracting a sentence of the relevant length . . The only other ground for the applicant’s lengthy detention was the domestic courts’ finding that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting release. However, that finding was not based on an analysis of all pertinent facts. The authorities regarded the applicant’s arguments that he had never been convicted, that he had a family and a stable way of life, and that after the passage of time any possible danger of collusion or absconding had receded, as irrelevant. They did so because by virtue of Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court’s practice the presumption under that provision was only rebuttable in very exceptional circumstances where even a hypothetical possibility of absconding, re-offending or collusion was excluded due to serious illness or other exceptional factors. It was moreover incumbent on the detained person to prove the existence of such exceptional circumstances, failing which he was bound to remain in detention on remand throughout the proceedings . . The Court reiterates that continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty. Any system of mandatory detention on remand is per se incompatible with Article 5 ss 3 of the Convention (see the Letellier v. France judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, ssss 35-53; the Clooth v. Belgium judgment of 12 December 1991, Series A no. 225, ss 44; the Muller v. France judgment of 17 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, ssss 35-45; the above cited Labita judgment, ssss 152 and 162-165; and Jecius v. Lithuania, [no. 34578/97, ECHR 2000?IX] ssss 93 and 94). Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases.’
33977/96, [2001] ECHR 489
Worldlii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 5(3)
Cited by:
Cited – O v Crown Court at Harrow HL 26-Jul-2006
The claimant said that his continued detention after the custody time limits had expired was an infringement of his human rights. He faced continued detention having been refused bail because of his arrest on a grave charge, having a previous . .
Cited – Lumba (WL) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 23-Mar-2011
The claimants had been detained under the 1971 Act, after completing sentences of imprisonment pending their return to their home countries under deportations recommended by the judges at trial, or chosen by the respondent. They challenged as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.164794 br>