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Gill v El Vino Co Ltd: CA 1983

The plaintiffs, who were both women, wanted to stand and drink at the bar in the defendants’ wine bar but the barman refused to serve them and said that, if they sat at a table, the drinks would be brought to them. That was because only men were permitted to stand and drink at the bar.
Held: The plaintiffs were the victims of unlawful discrimination contrary to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Griffiths LJ said: ‘But if a woman wishes to go to El Vino’s, she is not allowed to join the throng before the bar. She must drink either at one of the two tables on the right of the entrance, or she must pass through the throng and drink in the smoking room at the back. There is no doubt whatever that she is refused facilities that are accorded to men, and the only question that remains is: is she being treated less favourably than men? I think that permits of only one answer: of course she is. She is not being allowed to drink where she may want to drink, namely standing up among the many people gathered in front of the bar. There are many reasons why she may want to do so. Her friends may be there. She may not want to break them up and force them to move to some other part of the premises where she is permitted to drink. Or she may wish, if she is a journalist, to join a group in the hope of picking up the gossip of the day. If male journalists are permitted to do it, why shouldn’t she? If she is denied it she is being treated less favourably than her male colleagues.’
Sir Roger Ormrod said: ‘The question posed by section 29(1)(a) of the Act of 1975 is unusually simple compared with most questions posed by statutes. We are enjoined simply to ask whether on this evidence the plaintiffs in this case were ‘treated less favourably’ than a man or men would have been. To my mind, the fact that men have the three options which Griffiths LJ has mentioned makes only one answer to that question possible. Men have these options and the options are valuable to them, and I find it impossible to say, where one sex has an option and the other has not, that there is not a differentiation between them and, prima facie, a differentiation which results in less favourable treatment.’

Judges:

Griffiths LJ, Sir Roger Ormrod

Citations:

[1983] 1 QB 423 I

Statutes:

Sex Discrimination Act 1975

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedChief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills v The Interim Executive Board of Al-Hijrah School CA 13-Oct-2017
Single Sex Schooling failed to prepare for life
The Chief Inspector appealed from a decision that it was discriminatory under the 2010 Act to educate girls and boys in the same school but under a system providing effective complete separation of the sexes.
Held: The action was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Discrimination

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.597256

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