The claimant had been dismissed as chief executive. He had made a claim in the Employment Tribunal for unfair dismissal, but reserved the right to make further claims. The defendant argued that he was not estopped from pursuing those claims.
Held: Mummery LJ said: ‘In my judgment, this was clearly a case of merger of Mr Fraser’s cause of action for wrongful dismissal in the final judgment of the tribunal on the claim for wrongful dismissal as between the same parties as in the High Court proceedings. Merger was not prevented from taking place by the express statement in the ET1 that Mr Fraser expressly reserved his rights to bring High Court proceedings for the excess. The merger arose from the fact that the cause of action had been the subject of a final judgment of the tribunal. Once it had merged Mr Fraser no longer had any cause of action which he could pursue in the High Court, even for the excess over andpound;25,000. The claim for the excess is not a separate cause of action. The cause of action for wrongful dismissal could not be split into two causes of action, one for damages up to andpound;25,000 and another for the balance. A claim in the High Court for the balance of the loss determined in the tribunal would have to be based on a single indivisible cause of action for wrongful dismissal.’
Moore-Bick LJ said: ‘The Employment Tribunal has a statutory jurisdiction to determine claims for wrongful dismissal and, although its jurisdiction to grant relief is subject to a financial limit, its judgment may be enforced in accordance with its terms through the County Court procedure. The judgment creates a new and independent obligation which is in substance of the same character as a judgment of the court. Since, as the authorities show, a judgment of the Employment Tribunal gives rise to cause of action estoppel, I think it must follow that the doctrine of merger as described by Diplock L.J. in Thoday v Thoday and Lord Goff in The ‘Indian Grace’ also applies in cases where the claimant is successful and obtains judgment on his claim. Accordingly, I can see no escape from the conclusion that when judgment has been entered in favour of the claimant the cause of action merges in the judgment and is extinguished. The result in this case is that once the tribunal’s judgment had been entered on the register Mr. Fraser no longer had any cause of action for wrongful dismissal and his reservation of the right to pursue an action in the High Court was wholly ineffective.’
Judges:
Lord Justice Moore-Bick Lord Justice Mummery
Citations:
[2006] EWCA Civ 738, [2007] 1 All ER 383, [2006] IRLR 687, [2006] ICR 1395
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Thoday v Thoday CA 1964
The court discussed the difference between issue estoppel, and action estoppel: ‘The particular type of estoppel relied upon by the husband is estoppel per rem judicatam. This is a generic term which in modern law includes two species. The first . .
Cited by:
Cited – Campbell v Leeds United Association Football Misc 3-Apr-2009
The claimant sought damages for psychiatric injury suffered when working for the defendant who replied that the matter had already been litigated in her claims in the Employment Tribunal, and that a cause of action estoppel applied.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Employment, Estoppel
Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.242543