The Secretary of State was not entitled to a Mareva injunction preventing the disposal of assets against a parent pending the issue of a child support assessment. The court refused a freezing order:- (Morritt LJ) ‘The Child Support Act introduced a wholly new framework for the assessment and collection of the sums required for the maintenance of children by their parents. There is no provision for the enforcement of any maintenance assessment except by the Secretary of State and his methods of enforcement are limited in the way I have mentioned. In my judgment the detailed provisions contained in the Act of 1991 which I have described show clearly that Parliament intended that all questions concerning the enforcement of maintenance assessments should be determined exclusively by the Secretary of State, the Magistrates’ Court or the County Court. The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is, in my view, necessarily excluded.’
Evans LJ: ‘The following observations may be made on these statutory provisions. (1) The Act of 1991 together with regulations made under it provide a detailed and apparently comprehensive code for the collection of payments due under maintenance assessments and the enforcement of liability orders made on the application of the Secretary of State. (2) The only method provided for enforced collection before a liability order is made is a deduction from earnings order made by the Secretary of State himself under section 31. (3) Although section 1(3) provides for a duty which arises when the maintenance assessment is made, this duty is not expressed as a civil debt. Mr Crampin accepts that the duty could not be directly enforced by action in any civil court, or by any means other than as provided in the Act. (4) There is no provision for precautionary or Mareva-style relief.’
Morritt LJ: ‘As I have indicated the Secretary of State claims in respect of the statutory right correlative with the obligation expressed in section 1(3) of the Act of 1991. But that obligation and right is not a civil debt in any ordinary sense. First, the obligation may only be enforced by the Secretary of State and not by any other person who may be stated to be the payee in the maintenance assessment. Secondly, the Secretary of State’s powers of enforcement do not enable him to sue for the arrears in the ordinary way. In the first instance his choice lies between a deduction of earnings order directed to the employer or an application to justices for a liability order. In my judgment, neither of those rights is such as would entitle this court, consistently with the decision in The Veracruz I [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 353 to grant Mareva relief.
The Child Support Act 1991 introduced a wholly new framework for the assessment and collection of the sums required for the maintenance of children by their parents. There is no provision for the enforcement of any maintenance assessment except by the Secretary of State and his methods of enforcement are limited in the way I have mentioned. It seems to me that it would be inconsistent with the Act as a whole in general and with section 33 in particular if the Secretary of State were to be at liberty to apply for Mareva injunctions in the High Court. If the conditions in section 33(1) are satisfied then Parliament has clearly laid down that the Secretary of State should proceed first in the magistrates’ court and then in the county court. If those conditions are not satisfied then Parliament has clearly ordained that the Secretary of State should not be entitled to enforce the maintenance assessment by court process at all.
No doubt clear words or a necessary implication are required to exclude the jurisdiction of the court. The suggested exclusion in this case is of the High Court’s ordinary civil jurisdiction which includes the power to grant injunctions. In my judgment, the detailed provisions contained in the Act of 1991 which I have described show clearly that Parliament intended that all questions concerning the enforcement of maintenance assessments should be determined exclusively by the Secretary of State, the magistrates’ court or the county court. The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is, in my view, necessarily excluded. I agree with Evans LJ that the judge was right and that this application should be dismissed.’
Simon Brown LJ: ‘For my part I believe that the argument fails at both stages albeit for what in the last analysis may be thought essentially the selfsame reason. Put shortly my conclusions are, first, that Mareva relief is only obtainable where there is already available to the applicant a cause of action properly so called, viz. a right to litigate or arbitrate an existing monetary claim, and, secondly, that the Act of 1991 affords to the Secretary of State no such cause of action, and indeed no rights at all save only those expressly conferred upon him by section 4(2) to arrange in certain circumstances either for the ‘collection’ of maintenance payable under an assessment or for the ‘enforcement’ of the obligation to pay such maintenance, in each instance as thereafter expressly provided for in sections 29 et seq. of the Act of 1991.’
Judges:
Morritt LJ, Evans LJ, Simon Brown LJ
Citations:
Ind Summary 14-Aug-1995, Times 11-Aug-1995, [1995] 1 WLR 1528
Statutes:
Supreme Court Act 1981 37, Child Support Act 1991
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Kehoe CA 5-Mar-2004
The claimant had applied to the Child Support Agncy for maintenance. They failed utterly to obtain payment, and she complained now that she was denied the opportunity by the 1991 Act to take court proceedings herself.
Held: The denial of . .
Cited – Kehoe, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions HL 14-Jul-2005
The applicant contended that the 1991 Act infringed her human rights in denying her access to court to obtain maintenance for her children.
Held: The applicant had no substantive right to take part in the enforcement process in domestic law . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Child Support
Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.79908