The Court will not interfere against the decision of the members of a club professing to act under their rules, unless it can be shewn either that the rules are contrary to natural justice, or that what has been done is contrary to the rules, or that there has been mala fides or malice in arriving at the decision. One of the rules of a club provided that a general meeting might alter any of the standing rules affecting the general interests of the club, provided this was done with certain formalities and by a certain majority.
Held: that a rule providing for the expulsion of members who should be guilty of conduct injurious to the interests of the club was within the regulation, and could be validly passed by a general meeting. One of the rules of a club provided that in case the conduct of any member should, in the opinion of the committee, be injurious to the character and interests of the club, the committee should be empowered to recommend such member to resign, and if he should not comply, the committee should then call a general meeting, and if a majority of two-thirds of the meeting agreed by ballot to the expulsion of such member, he should be expelled.
The Plaintiff, a member of the club, sent a pamphlet which reflected on the conduct of S, a gentleman in a high official position, also a member of the club, to S, at his official address, enclosed in an envelope on the outside of which was printed ‘Dishonourable Conduct of S.’ The committee being of opinion that this action was injurious to the character and interests of the club, called upon the Plaintiff for an explanation, which he refused to give. They then called on him to resign, and as he did not comply with their recommendation, they duly summoned a general meeting, at which a resolution was passed by the requisite majority expelling the Plaintiff from the club. Held (affirming the decision of Jessel, MR), that the Court would not interfere to restrain the committee from excluding the Plaintiff from the club. t Nothing had been done contrary to natural justice. The fact that a decision is unreasonable may be strong evidence of malice, but is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by evidence of bona fides.
Sir George Jessel MR said: ‘I think it is my duty to construe the rules fairly and in the same way as I should any other contract and I have no right to give the words other than their ordinary meaning, or to construe the rules otherwise than in their ordinary sense.’
Sir George Jessel MR
(1881) 17 Ch D 615, [1881] UKLawRpCh 28
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Speechley and Others v Allott and Others CA 10-Mar-2014
The parties disputed the management of a social club. The club owned a bowling green, and bowling members sought to restrain its closure. The appellants now said that the court should not have found at first instance that a meeting had validly . .
Cited – Ridge v Baldwin (No 1) HL 14-Mar-1963
No Condemnation Without Opportunity For Defence
Ridge, a Chief Constable, had been wrongfully dismissed because he was not given the opportunity of presenting his defence. He had been acquitted of the charges brought against him, but the judge at trial had made adverse comments about his . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.551299 br>