A policy covered the insured against accidental death or injury but excluded injuries happening by exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury. The insured was killed by a train while attempting to cross a railway line in circumstances that made it difficult to understand how he could not have seen or heard the train approaching. The issue between the parties, therefore, was whether he had exposed himself to an obvious risk of injury within the meaning of the policy.
Held: The contract should not be construed in a way that would make it practically illusory and in a case of real ambiguity the court should lean in favour of the insured. However, the court warned against creating doubts or magnifying ambiguities in order to reach a decision in favour of the insured. ‘The words are ‘exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury.’ These words suggest the following questions: Exposure by whom? Obvious when? Obvious to whom? It is to be observed that the words are very general. There is no such word as ‘wilful,’ or ‘reckless,’ or ‘careless’; and to ascertain the true meaning of the exception the whole document must be studied and the object of the parties to it must be steadily borne in mind. The object of the contract is to insure against accidental death and injuries, and the contract must not be construed so as to defeat that object, nor so as to render it practically illusory. A man who crosses an ordinary crowded street is exposed to obvious risk of injury; and, if the words in question are construed literally, the defendants would not be liable in the event of an insured being killed or injured in so crossing, even if he was taking reasonable care of himself. Such a result is so manifestly contrary to the real intention of the parties that a construction which leads to it ought to be rejected. But, if this be true, a literal construction is inadmissible, and some qualification must be put on the words used. In the American cases cited by Mr. Jelf, the language of the policy was different, but the foregoing reasoning was adopted by the Court. The real difficulty is to express the necessary qualification with which the words must be taken. In a case on the line, in a case of real doubt, the policy ought to be construed most strongly against the insurers; they frame the policy and insert the exceptions. But this principle ought only to be applied for the purpose of removing a doubt, not for the purpose of creating a doubt, or magnifying an ambiguity, when the circumstances of the case raise no real difficulty. Without attempting to paraphrase the language so as to meet all cases, it is, we think, plain that two classes of accidents are excluded from the risks insured against, viz. (1) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk is obvious to him at the time he exposes himself to it; (2) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk would be obvious to him at the time, if he were paying reasonable attention to what he was doing. ‘
Judges:
Lindley LJ
Citations:
(1889) 23 QBD 453
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Blackburn Rovers Football and Athletic Club Plc v Avon Insurance Plc, Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, AGF Insurance Ltd IC Insurance Ltd ComC 15-Nov-2004
The claimant football club insured its players through the defendants. A footballer injured himself in training and his career was finished. The insurers rejected the claim, and relied upon exception clauses, saying that the true cause was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Insurance
Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.219695
