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Barder v Calouri: HL 1987

In divorce proceedings, the husband transferred his interest in the matrimonial home to the wife who had been awarded care and control of the two children of the family. The order was made on 20th February 1985 and on 25th March an appalling tragedy supervened when the wife unlawfully killed the two children and then committed suicide. The husband said that the subsequent events undermined the basis of the order, and that it should be re-opened.
Held: It should.
Lord Brandon said: ‘There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that the consent order dated 20 February 1985 was agreed between the husband and the wife through their respective solicitors, and approved by the registrar, upon a fundamental, though tacit, assumption. The assumption was that for an indefinite period, to be measured in years rather than months or weeks, the wife and the two children of the family would require a suitable home in which to reside. That assumption was totally invalidated by the deaths of the children and the wife within five weeks of the order being made . . My Lords, the result of the two lines of authority to which I have referred appears to me to be this. A court may properly exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time from an order for financial provision or property transfer made after a divorce on the ground of new events, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that new events have occurred since the making of the order which invalidate the basis, or fundamental assumption, upon which the order was made, so that, if leave to appeal out of time were to be given, the appeal would be certain, or very likely, to succeed. The second condition is that the new events should have occurred within a relatively short time of the order having been made. While the length of time cannot be laid down precisely, I should regard it as extremely unlikely that it could be as much as a year, and that in most cases it will be no more than a few months. The third condition is that the application for leave to appeal out of time should be made reasonably promptly in the circumstances of the case. To these three conditions, which can be seen from the authorities as requiring to be satisfied, I would add a fourth, which it does not appear has needed to be considered so far, but which it may be necessary to consider in future cases. That fourth condition is that the grant of leave to appeal out of time should not prejudice third parties who have acquired, in good faith and for valuable consideration, interests in property which is the subject matter of the relevant order.’
Lord Brandon also said: ‘A court may properly exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time from an order for financial provision or property transfer made after a divorce on the ground of new events, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that new events have occurred since the making of the order which invalidates the basis, or fundamental assumption, upon which the order was made, so that, if leave to appeal out of time were to be given, the appeal would be certain, or very likely, to succeed. The second condition is that the new events should have occurred within a relatively short time of the order being made. While the length of time cannot be laid down precisely, I should regard it as extremely unlikely that it could be as much as a year, and that in most cases it will be no more than a few months. The third condition is that the application for leave to appeal out of time should be made reasonably promptly in the circumstances of the case.’

Lord Brandon of Oakbrook
[1988] AC 20, [1987] 2 WLR 1350, [1988] Fam Law 18, [1987] 2 All ER 440
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMyerson v Myerson (No 2) CA 1-Apr-2009
The couple had compromised a very substantial ancillary relief claim on divorce, but the husband now said that the value of the shareholdings from which payment was to be made had collapsed.
Held: His appeal was dismissed. The principles for . .
CitedWestbury v Sampson CA 23-Mar-2001
The claimant was advised to accept a consent order that his wife should pay him a capital sum in the divorce, but by instalments. The wife later successfully applied to have the sum reduced. He sought to claim against his former solicitors for not . .
CitedShaw v Shaw CA 31-Jul-2002
Thorpe LJ said it was difficult to see how a failure to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings could be both substantial and unintentional.
As to Bodey J’s analysis of the power to vary an award of a lump sum in Westbury: ‘I am in . .
CitedBirch v Birch SC 26-Jul-2017
The parties, on divorcing had a greed, under court order that W should obtain the release of H from his covenants under the mortgage of the family home. She had been unable to do so, and sought that order to be varied to allow postponement of her . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.329534

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