During the pendency of an appeal against an order restraining a vexatious litigant from commencing proceedings, an Act was passed adding to the court’s power to restrain vexatious litigants from commencing proceedings a power to restrain them from pursuing existing proceedings. The Act was held to be procedural on the basis that it did not deprive the litigant of a right to bring proper proceedings and even if it had been regarded as substantive. In deciding whether any given proceedings are vexatious the court is entitled to look at the whole history of the matter and is not confined to such questions as whether an individual pleading discloses a cause of action. The effect of the new Act was retrospective since to hold otherwise would only lead to renewed proceedings.
Judges:
Lord Denning
Citations:
[1959] 2 All ER 200
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed to – Attorney-General v Vernazza, In Re Vernazza CA 1959
The respondent to an application to prevent him issuing proceedings without the court’s consent, had brought actions claiming in one form or another that a consent judgment ought to be set aside and that he was still owed the sum claimed in the . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – Attorney-General v Vernazza, In Re Vernazza CA 1959
The respondent to an application to prevent him issuing proceedings without the court’s consent, had brought actions claiming in one form or another that a consent judgment ought to be set aside and that he was still owed the sum claimed in the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice
Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.190156