Vernazza was a vexatious litigant. The Attorney-General obtained an order pursuant to an Act which gave the court power to prohibit such a litigant instituting proceedings without leave. Vernazza appealed. Between the making of the original order and the hearing of the appeal the Act was amended to allow orders to be made prohibiting the institution or continuation of proceedings. On the hearing of the appeal the respondent, the Attorney-General, sought an order that Vernazza be prevented from continuing proceedings as well as instituting them.
Held: The further order was made. The statute book contains many statutes which are not retroactive but alter existing rights and duties – only prospectively, with effect from the date of commencement. Such provisions should not be described as ‘retrospective’.
Statutory provisions dealing with procedural matters will generally be construed so as to apply to proceedings of which the Court was seized at the time the provision came into effect.
Lord Denning said: ‘It is, of course, clear that in the ordinary way the Court of Appeal cannot take into account a statute which has been passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance, because the rights of litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the earlier proceedings . . But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect, or because it deals with matters of procedure only, for then Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending proceedings, and the Court of Appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospective intent as well as a court of first instance, see Quilter v Mapleson . .’
Viscount Simonds said: ‘By the amending Act a new power was given to the court to enable it to deal with proceedings of which it was seised. The object was both to prevent an abuse of its process and to relieve possible victims of vexatious litigation. I would respectfully doubt whether this could in any view be strictly called retrospective legislation, but, if it has this characteristic . . it is of a procedural nature and . . amply covered by . . authority . .
the Court of Appeal, being entitled and bound to apply the law in force at the time of the appeal, was enabled, if it thought fit, to accede to the application of the Attorney-General . . the Court of Appeal could and should have varied the order of the High Court by adding thereto the order that any legal proceedings instituted by the respondent . . before the making of that order ‘shall not be continued . .”
Lord Morris said: ‘it has to be considered what order ought to have been made by the . . Court if the matter had come before them on . . (the date of the rehearing in the Court of Appeal). I entertain little doubt that the . . Court would . . have made an order in the extended terms that the law then authorised. The real substance of the matter . . would have been whether it was shown that Mr Vernazza had habitually . . instituted vexatious legal proceedings. If that were shown, then the extended procedural power of the court which was made available by the Act . . as a remedial and protective measure . . would properly have been employed.’
Judges:
Viscount Simonds, Lord Denning
Citations:
[1960] AC 965, [1960] 1 QB 197, [1960] 3 All ER 97
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Attorney-General v Vernazza, In Re Vernazza CA 1959
The respondent to an application to prevent him issuing proceedings without the court’s consent, had brought actions claiming in one form or another that a consent judgment ought to be set aside and that he was still owed the sum claimed in the . .
Cited by:
Cited – Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent lender of its . .
Appealed to – Attorney-General v Vernazza, In Re Vernazza CA 1959
The respondent to an application to prevent him issuing proceedings without the court’s consent, had brought actions claiming in one form or another that a consent judgment ought to be set aside and that he was still owed the sum claimed in the . .
Cited – HM Attorney General v Pepin Admn 27-May-2004
Civil proceedings order. The defendant had commenced ten sets of proceedings which the court held amounted to serial and repeated litigation of the same points.
Held: The fact that new details had emerged which might throw new light on the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice
Updated: 21 June 2022; Ref: scu.184432