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Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd (The ‘Vimeira’): HL 1986

References: [1986] AC 965, [1986] 2 WLR 1051, [1986] 2 All ER 409
Coram: Lord Goff of Chieveley
A claim had been made against charterers by the ship owners, and in turn by the charterers against their sub-charterers. Notice of motion were issued after arbitration awards were not accepted. When heard, costs awards were made, which were now appealed.
Held: The appeals were allowed. The court’s discretion when awarding costs as conferred by section 51(3) was wide. Lord Goff of Chieveley said: ‘thus ensuring that the court has, so far as possible, freedom of action, leaving it to the rule-making authority to control the exercise of discretion (if it thinks it right to do so) by the making of rules of court, and to the appellate courts to establish principles upon which the discretionary power may, within the framework of the statute and the applicable rules of court, be exercised.’ The jurisdiction provided by this Section was not subject to any implied limitation that costs could only be awarded against those who were parties to the litigation. Non-parties could be ordered to pay costs where justice so required. Nevertheless, an order for the payment of costs by a non-party will always be exceptional, and a person or entity who had been ordered to pay such costs would be able to appeal against the order, even though he, she or it was not a party to the original action.
Lord Goff: ‘. . . it is not surprising to find the jurisdiction conferred under section 51(1), like its predecessors, to be expressed in wide terms. The subsection simply provides that ‘the court shall have full power to determine by whom . . . the costs are to be paid.’ Such a provision is consistent with a policy under which jurisdiction to exercise the relevant discretionary power is expressed in wide terms, thus ensuring that the court has, so far as possible, freedom of action, leaving it to the rule-making authority to control the exercise of discretion (if it thinks it right to do so) by the making of rules of court, and to the appellate courts to establish principles upon which the discretionary power may, within the framework of the statute and the applicable rules of court, be exercised. ‘ and
‘In the vast majority of cases, it would no doubt be unjust to make an award of costs against a person who is not a party to the relevant proceedings….. I do not, for my part, foresee any injustice flowing from the abandonment of that implied limitation. Courts of first instance are, I believe, well capable of exercising their discretion under the statute in accordance with reason and justice. I cannot imagine any case arising in which some order for costs is made, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, against some person who has no connection with the proceedings in question. If any problem arises, the Court of Appeal can lay down principles for the guidance of judges of first instance; or the Supreme Court Rules Committee can propose amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court for the purpose of controlling the exercise of the statutory power vested in judges subject to rules of court. ‘
Statutes: Supreme Court Act 1981 51(1)
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Last Update: 19-Jan-16 Ref: 179731

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