Tag Archives: Torts – Other

Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Limited -v- The Corporate Officer of The House of Commons; TCC 28-Oct-1999

The claimant said that the respondent had awarded a contract for works at the House of Commons disregarding its obligations under European law as regards open tendering.

Court: TCC
Date: 28-Oct-1999
Statutes: Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991
Links: Bailii,
References: [1999] EWHC Technology 199, 1996 ORB No 1151, (1999) 67 Con LR 1
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Filed under Construction, European, Torts - Other

Floods of Queensferry Ltd, David Charles Flood -v- Shand Constructions Ltd, Morrison Shand Constructions Ltd, Morrison Construction Ltd; TCC 17-Dec-1999

The claimant alleged that it had entered into a sub-contract relying upon misrepresentations made by the defendant, SCL that it was the main contractor, and that it was still trading. The defendant company operated through associated companies for which it was an agent, but itself was treated as dormant, even though it still put its name to invitations to tender. The claimants had undertaken credit checks before the contract the results of which were adverse.
Held: To be actionable a representation needed to be as to an existing or past fact. The filed accounts were no promise as to the future activity of the company. The claimant could have stopped work at any time, and had not continued after being misled. The company would not have acted differently if the actual position had been made clear. Claim dismissed.

Court: TCC
Date: 17-Dec-1999
Judges: His Honour Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC
Statutes: Misrepresentation Act 1967 2(2)
Links: Bailii,
References: 1994 ORB 826, [1999] EWHC Technology 183
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Filed under Agency, Company, Construction, Torts - Other

In Re L (By His Next Friend GE); Regina -v- Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, Ex Parte L; HL 25-Jun-1998

The applicant was an adult autistic, unable to consent to medical treatment. Treatment was provided at a day centre. He had been detained informally under the Act and against the wishes of his carers, but the Court of Appeal decided he should have been formally detained.
Held: The appeal succeeded. His detention had not been so complete as to constitute the tort of false imprisonment. The appellant had been properly detained using the informal procedure. The medical steps taken were valid under the common law doctrine of necessity. Under the common law doctrine of necessity there was power to detain and restrain patients who lack capacity and where detention was necessary in their own best interests.
Lord Steyn identified the existence of a lacuna: ‘The common law principle of necessity is a useful concept but it contains none of the safeguards of the 1983 Act. It places effective and unqualified control in the hands of the hospital psychiatrists . . neither habeas corpus nor judicial review are sufficient safeguards against misjudgements and professional lapses in the case of compliant incapacitated patients.’

Court: HL
Date: 25-Jun-1998
Judges: Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nolan, Lord Steyn, Lord hope of Craighead
Statutes: Mental Health Act 1983 3
Links: Gazette, Times, House of Lords, Bailii,
References: [1998] UKHL 24, [1998] Fam Law 592, [1999] AC 458, [1998] 3 All ER 289, [1998] 3 WLR 107, [1998] 2 FLR 550, [1998] 2 FCR 501
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Filed under Health, Health Professions, Torts - Other

OHara -v- Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary; HL 21-Nov-1996

The plaintiff had been arrested on the basis of the 1984 Act. The officer had no particular knowledge of the plaintiff’s involvement, relying on a briefing which led to the arrest.
Held: A reasonable suspicion upon which an arrest was founded need not be based on the arresting officer’s own observations. All that is required is a genuine and reasonably based suspicion in the mind of the officer. The test as to whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion to justify an arrest is partly subjective, in that the arresting officer must have formed a genuine suspicion that the person being arrested was guilty of an offence, and partly objective, in that there must be reasonable grounds for forming such a suspicion. Such grounds can arise from information received from another, even if it subsequently proves to be false, provided that a reasonable man, having regard to all the circumstances, would regard them as reasonable grounds for suspicion.
Lord Hope considered what was the level of suspicion necessary to found a valid arrest under the section, saying: “My Lords, the test which s 12(1) of the 1984 Act has laid down is a simple but practical one. It relates entirely to what is in the mind of the arresting officer when the power is exercised. In part it is a subjective test, because he must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind that the person has been concerned in acts of terrorism. In part also it is an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. But the application of the objective test does not require the court to look beyond what was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the grounds which were in his mind at the time which must be found to be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. All that the objective test requires is that these grounds be examined objectively and that they be judged at the time when the power was exercised.”
Lord Steyn said: “Certain general propositions about the powers of constables under a section such as section 12(1) can now be summarised. (1) In order to have a reasonable suspicion the constable need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case. Ex hypothesi one is considering a preliminary stage of the investigation and information from an informer or a tip-off from a member of the public may be enough: Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam [1970] A.C. 942, 949. (2) Hearsay information may therefore afford a constable a reasonable ground to arrest. Such information may come from other officers: Hussien’s case, ibid. (3) The information which causes the constable to be suspicious of the individual must be in existence to the knowledge of the police officer at the time he makes the arrest. (4) The executive ‘discretion’ to arrest or not as Lord Diplock described it in Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke [1984] A.C. 437, 446, vests in the constable, who is engaged on the decision to arrest or not, and not in his superior officers.” and
“For obvious practical reasons police officers must be able to rely upon each other in taking decisions as to whom to arrest or where to search and in what circumstances. The statutory power does not require that the constable who exercises the power must be in possession of all the information which has led to a decision, perhaps taken by others, that the time has come for it to be exercised. What it does require is that the constable who exercises the power must first have equipped himself with sufficient information so that he has reasonable cause to suspect before the power is exercised.”

Court: HL
Date: 21-Nov-1996
Judges: Lord Hope of Craighead
Statutes: Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 12(1)
Links: Gazette, Times, House of Lords, Bailii,
References: [1996] UKHL 6, [1997] AC 286, [1997] 1 All ER 129, [1997] 2 WLR 1, [1996] NI 8, [1997] Crim LR 432, [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 447
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Filed under Criminal Practice, Police, Torts - Other

Yukong Lines Ltd -v- Rendsburg Investments Corporation and Others (No 2); QBD 23-Sep-1997

Repudiation by charterer: Funds were transferred by a charterer’s ‘alter ego’ to another company controlled by him with intent to defeat owner’s claim – whether ‘alter ego’ acting as undisclosed principal of charterer – whether permissible to pierce corporate veil – whether actionable conspiracy. A company creditor is owed no direct duty by a director putting his assets beyond the jurisdiction anticipating the company’s insolvency. In an unlawful means conspiracy, the unlawful act relied on must be actionable at the suit of the plaintiff: ‘As to an unlawful means conspiracy, Mr. Yamvrias undoubtedly owed a fiduciary duty to Rendsburg. Although he was not formally a director, he was a ‘shadow director’ and controlled the company’s activities.’ and ‘… since Mr Yamvrias had effective control over Rendsburg, he would presumably have been in a position on behalf of the company to get back from himself that which he had caused to be paid for his benefit. It might in an appropriate case be within the scope of the Court’s Mareva jurisdiction to require a company, and its only effective officer, to do just that; but that has not been the subject of argument.’

Court: QBD
Date: 23-Sep-1997
Judges: Justice Toulson
Links: Times,
References: [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 322, [1998] 1 WLR 294, [1998] 4 All ER 82, [1998] 2 BCLC 485, [1998] BCC 870
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Filed under Company, Torts - Other

Webb -v- Chief Constable of Merseyside Police; CA 26-Nov-1999

The Police had confiscated money suspected to be the proceeds of drug trafficking, but no offence was proved. The magistrates had refused to return the money under the 1897 Act. The claimants now sought to reciver it under civil proceedings.
Held: The judge was wrong to have found public policy grounds for refusing to order what he had found to be such proceeds. There was no statutory power to hold the money and it must be returned: ‘There is no statutory power to confiscate the proceeds of drug dealing within the United Kingdom where the person entitled to possession of the money is not convicted of a drug trafficking offence. I recognise that there may be circumstances where for a variety of reasons a prosecution may not take place. But that does not, in my view, justify expropriation by means of a defence to a civil claim for return of money which has been seized from persons who are not convicted.’
The position was essentially the same whether proceedings were taken against the police directly or whether proceedings were taken pursuant to 1897 Act. In each of the cases, the police initially lawfully seized the money, but the statutory power to retain it was exhausted. ‘the court should not, in my view, countenance expropriation by a public authority of money or property belonging to an individual for which there is no statutory authority’ and ‘if goods are in the possession of a person, on the face of it he has the right to that possession. His right to possession may be suspended or temporarily divested if the goods are seized by the police under lawful authority. If the police right to retain the goods comes to an end, the right to possession of the person from whom they are seized revives. In the absence of any evidence that anybody else is the true owner, once the police right of retention comes to an end, the person from whom they were compulsorily taken is entitled to possession.’

Court: CA
Date: 26-Nov-1999
Judges: May, Pill, Hale, LJJ
Statutes: Police (Property) Act 1897 1(1)
Links: Gazette, Bailii,
References: [2000] QB 427, [1999] EWCA Civ 3041, [2000] 2 WLR 546, [2000] 1 All ER 209
Cases Cited:
  • Tinsley -v- Milligan, HL, Applied, (Independent 06-Jul-93, Times 28-Jun-93, [1994] 1 AC 340, Bailii, [1993] UKHL 3, [1993] 3 WLR 126, [1993] 3 All ER 65)

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Filed under Police, Torts - Other

Western Digital Corporation and others -v- British Airways plc; QBD 23-Jul-1999

A claim under the Convention could be brought by the consignor or the consignee, in either case as named on the waybill or by the person to whom delivery was ordered by the consignor. The owner of the goods had no standing to make a claim save to the extent that he was so named.

Court: QBD
Date: 23-Jul-1999
Statutes: Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air Transport 1929
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under Torts - Other, Transport

W -v- Essex County Council and Another; HL 17-Mar-2000

A foster child was placed with a family. The child had a history of abusing other children, but the foster parents, who had other children were not told. The foster child caused psychiatric damage to the carers.
Held: It was wrong to strike out the claim. It was actionable. The psychiatric damage pleaded was not necessarily too remote. That would be a matter for the judge at trial. ‘Whether the nature of the council’s task is such that the court should not recognise an actionable duty of care, in other words that the claim is not justiciable, and whether there is a breach of the duty depend, in the first place, on an investigation of the full facts known to, and the factors influencing the decision of, the defendants.’

Court: HL
Date: 17-Mar-2000
Judges: Lord Slynn of Hadley
Links: Gazette, Times, HL, Bailii,
References: [2000] UKHL 17, [2000] 2 All ER 237, [2000] 2 WLR 601, [2001] 2 AC 592, [2000] 1 FLR 657, [2000] 1 FCR 568, (2000) 53 BMLR 1, [2000] BLGR 281
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Filed under Local Government, Negligence, Torts - Other

W -v- Home Office; CA 19-Feb-1997

W had been held in immigration detention because of a crass administrative mistake about his ability to establish his country of origin.
Held: An immigration officer who was using his statutory powers is not liable for negligent or false imprisonment: ‘The process whereby the decision making body gathers information and comes to its decision cannot be the subject of an action in negligence. It suffices to rely on the absence of the required proximity. In gathering information, and taking it into account the Defendants are acting pursuant to their statutory powers and within that area of their discretion where only deliberate abuse would provide a private remedy. For them to owe a duty of care to immigrants would be inconsistent with the proper performance of their responsibilities as immigration officers. In conducting their inquiries, and making decisions in relation to immigrants, including whether they should be detained pending those inquiries, they are acting in that capacity of public servant to which the considerations outlined above apply.’

Court: CA
Date: 19-Feb-1997
Judges: Lord Woolf MR, Thorpe, Waller LJJ
Links: Times, Bailii,
References: [1997] EWCA Civ 1052,
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Filed under Negligence, Torts - Other

Ward -v- Chief Constable of West Midlands Police; CA 15-Dec-1997

Questions of law must be settled by the judge in civil trials and not left to the jury to decide. Factual issues to be identified clearly.

Court: CA
Date: 15-Dec-1997
Links: Times, Bailii,
References: [1997] EWCA Civ 2972,

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Filed under Litigation Practice, Police, Torts - Other

Three Rivers District Council and Others -v- Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3); CA 10-Dec-1998

The tort of misfeasance in public office is not separated into two distinct limbs. In each case the Plaintiff must show a deliberate and dishonest abuse of his position by a public official aware of the loss that will follow or reckless as to such a result. The court related ‘a rather rigid distinction between the two supposed limbs of the tort’ and observed that there was ‘the need to establish deliberate and dishonest abuse of power in every case.’ and ‘In view of the stringent requirements of the tort of misfeasance in public office, the more appropriate question may be: Is it reasonably arguable that the Bank at any stage made an unlawful and dishonest decision knowing at the time that it would cause loss to the plaintiffs? To that question, in the light of our analysis of the evidence, the answer is plainly ‘No’.’

Court: CA
Date: 10-Dec-1998
Judges: Hirst and Robert Walker LJJ
Links: Times,
References: [2000] 2 WLR 15,
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Filed under Torts - Other

Three Rivers District Council -v- Bank of England; QBD 22-Apr-1996

In an allegation of misfeasance in public office, a complainant who says he has been affected by the alleged misfeasance, has sufficient locus standi to claim. Parliamentary materials are admissible to discover purpose of an Act, and not just in cases of ambiguity. ‘The tort of misfeasance in public office is concerned with a deliberate and dishonest wrongful abuse of the powers given to a public officer. It is not to be equated with torts based on an intention to injure, although . . it has some similarities to them. . . Malice, in the sense of intention to injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of which the plaintiff is a member, and knowledge by the officer both that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of which the plaintiff is a member are alternative, not cumulative, ingredients of the tort. To act with such knowledge is to act in a sufficient sense maliciously.’

Court: QBD
Date: 22-Apr-1996
Judges: Clarke J
Links: Times,
References: [1996] 3 All ER 558, [1996] 3 All ER 634
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Filed under Administrative, Constitutional, Torts - Other

Thompson -v- Commissioner of Police of Metropolis; Hsu -v- Same; CA 20-Feb-1997

CS Damages were to be awarded against the police for unlawful arrest and assault.
Held: The court gave a guideline maximum £50,000 award against police for wrongful arrest and wrongful imprisonment. Comparisons were proper with personal injury cases. It is important to identify and quantify the various elements going to make up an award. Where exemplary damages were appropriate they were unlikely to be less than £5,000: otherwise the case was probably not one which justified an award of exemplary damages at all. Although there could be a penal element in the award of aggravated damages, these were primarily to be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for injury to his proper pride and dignity and the consequences of his being humiliated or where those responsible had acted in a high handed insulting or malicious manner.
In cases where juries were assessing damages in actions for assault, wrongful imprisonment or malicious prosecution arising out police misconduct, section 8(1) has the effect of ‘lowering the barrier against intervention’ in relation to such awards.
Woolfe LJ said: ‘In deciding upon what should be treated as the upper limits for exemplary damages we have selected a figure which is sufficiently substantial to make it clear that there has been conduct of a nature which warrants serious civil punishment and indicates the jury’s vigorous disapproval of what has occurred but at the same time recognises that the plaintiff is the recipient of a windfall in relation to exemplary damages. As punishment is the primary objective in this class of case it is more difficult to tie the amount of exemplary damages to the award of compensatory damages, including aggravated.’ and ‘However, in many cases it could prove a useful check subject to the upper limits we have identified if it is accepted that it will be unusual for the exemplary damages to produce a result of more than three times the basic damages being awarded (as the total of the basic aggravated and exemplary damages) except again where the basic damages are modest.’

Court: CA
Date: 20-Feb-1997
Judges: Woolfe MR, Auld LJ, Sir Brian Neill
Statutes: Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 8(1)
Links: Times, Bailii, Bailii,
References: [1997] EWCA Civ 1042, [1997] 2 All ER 762, [1997] 1 WLR 1519, [1997] EWCA Civ 3083, [1998] 1 QB 498, (1998) 10 Admin LR 363, [1997] 3 WLR 403
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Filed under Damages, Police, Torts - Other

Three Rivers District Council and Others -v- Governor and Company of The Bank of England; HL 8-Jun-2000

The applicants alleged misfeasance against the Bank of England in respect of the regulation of a bank.
Held: The Bank could not be sued in negligence, but the tort of misfeasance required clear evidence of misdeeds. The action was now properly pleaded, and the bank knew the case it had to answer. The issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation to the high standard required, was not a matter for summary assessment, but for the judge at trial. It was not appropriate to strike out the action. The defendant must be a public officer in a wide sense, and exercising power as such.
A claim of misfeasance in public office gives rise to four principal questions: “i) Was the conduct complained of that of public officers, exercising power in that capacity?
ii) Did the officers act knowingly or recklessly beyond their powers?
iii) Did they thereby cause damage to the claimant?
iv) Did they know that the act(s) in question probably would cause such damage or were they reckless in that regard?”
Lord Steyn said: “The case law reveals two different forms of liability for misfeasance in public office. First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts, knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.”

Court: HL
Date: 08-Jun-2000
Judges: Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett
Statutes: First Council Banking Co-ordination Directive (77/780/EEC)
Links: Gazette, Bailii,
References: [2000] UKHL 331, [2000] 2 WLR 1220, [2000] 3 All ER 1, [2003] 2 AC 1
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Filed under Administrative, European, Litigation Practice, Torts - Other

Regina -v- Colohan; CACD 17-May-2001

The defendant appealed against his convictions for harassment. He said that since he suffered from schizophrenia, the test for whether his actions had been reasonable should be relaxed.
Held: The test of whether actions constituted harassment under the Act was an objective one – would a reasonable person think it amounted to harassment? Accordingly the mental condition of the defendant was irrelevant. The mental illness of a defendant was no defence. There was no need to apply to the hypothetical reasonable person the characteristics of the defendant.
Kennedy LJ said:
‘Mr. Butterfield’s principal short submission on behalf of the appellant is that in order to apply this test the hypothetical reasonable person referred to in section 1(2) must be endowed with the relevant characteristics of the accused and in particular with any recognisable mental disorder to which he is subject. In the present case the consequence of the submission, if correct, is that the appellant is to be judged by the standards of the hypothetical reasonable schizophrenic.
Mr. Butterfield’s associated secondary submission is that the jury ought to have been directed that it was open to them when considering the defence provided by subsection (1)(3)(c) to say that the appellant’s conduct was, in the particular circumstances of his illness, a reasonable one. Any construction other than that, say Mr. Butterfield, is simply unfair to an accused with a recognizable mental illness.
The question raised by these submissions is one of the proper construction of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As the first word of that title suggests, this is an Act whose purpose is significantly protective and preventative. The long title is ‘An Act to make provision for protecting persons from harassment and similar conduct.’
As well as making a course of conduct amounting to harassment an offence, the Act by section 3 provides civil remedies by way of damages for a breach of section 1 and by way of injunction to restrain an apprehended breach of it. Further, section 5 enables a criminal court, before whom a defendant has been convicted under section 2, to make a restraining order prohibiting him from doing anything specified. Such a restraining order is to be made for the purpose of protecting from harassment not only the victim of the offence but also any other person specified. As is well-known the Act was passed with the phenomenon of ‘stalking’ particularly, although not exclusively, in mind. The conduct at which the Act is aimed, and from which it seeks to provide protection, is particularly likely to be conduct pursued by those of obsessive or otherwise unusual psychological make-up and very frequently by those suffering from an identifiable mental illness. Schizophrenia is only one such condition which is obviously very likely to give rise to conduct of this sort.
We are satisfied that to give the Act the construction for which Mr. Butterfield contends would be to remove from its protection a very large number of victims and indeed to run the risk of significantly thwarting the purpose of the Act. If such a construction is correct it would prevent the conduct in question from being a breach of section 1 and thus exclude not only suitable punishment for the perpetrator, but also damages, and, more especially, an injunction or restraining order for the protection of the victim. We do not believe that Parliament can have meant the provisions in question to have the meaning fro which Mr. Butterfield contends. Moreover, as it seems to us, if Mr. Butterfield’s submissions were correct then subsection 1(2) would have been inserted unnecessarily into the Act.
We agree accordingly with the learned judge that except in so far as it requires the jury to consider the information actually in the possession of this defendant section 1(2) requires the jury to answer the question whether he ought to have known that what he was doing amounts to harassment by the objective test of what a reasonable person would think. Its words, we are satisfied, are abundantly clear.
As to section 1(3)(c) that, we are satisfied, poses even more clearly an objective test, namely whether the conduct is in the judgment of the jury reasonable. There is no warrant for attaching the word ‘reasonable’ or via the words ‘particular circumstances’ the standards or characteristics of the defendant himself.

Court: CACD
Date: 17-May-2001
Judges: Kennedy LJ VP, Curtis, Hughes JJ
Statutes: Protection from Harassment Act 1997 1(2), 1(3)(c)
Links: Times, Bailii,
References:
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Filed under Crime, Torts - Other

Regina -v- Chief Constable for Warwickshire and Others Ex Parte Fitzpatrick and Others; QBD 1-Oct-1997

Judicial Review is not the appropriate way to challenge the excessive nature of a search warrant issues by magistrates. A private law remedy is better. Jowitt J said: ‘Judicial review is not a fact finding exercise and it is an extremely unsatisfactory tool by which to determine, in any but the clearest of cases, whether there has been a seizure of material not permitted by a search warrant. In my judgment a person who complains of excessive seizure in breach of section 16(8) should not, save in such cases, seek his remedy by way of judicial review but should rely on his private law remedy when he will have a tribunal which will be able to hear evidence and make findings of fact unfettered by Wednesbury principles. In an appropriate case the court in a private law action is able to grant interlocutory relief on a speedy basis on well recognised principles so that in all but the clearest cases of a breach of section 16(8) judicial review has only disadvantages and no advantages when compared with the private law remedy.’

Court: QBD
Date: 01-Oct-1997
Judges: Rose LJ, Jowitt LJ
Statutes: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 16(8)
Links: Times, Bailii,
References: [1997] EWHC Admin 820, [1999] 1 WLR 564, [1998] 1 All ER 65, [1998] Crim LR 290
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Filed under Judicial Review, Police, Torts - Other

Regina -v- Sanghera; CA 26-Oct-2000

The search of a victim’s premises which continued after evidence had come to light suggesting the victim might be a suspect was in breach of the codes of practice where it continued without the consent of the occupier. Evidence which was derived from that continued search was unlawful. Nevertheless, it was fair to admit the evidence since the defendant was not challenging the facts as to what was found and would have still been able to offer any explanation of the search results.

Court: CA
Date: 26-Oct-2000
Statutes: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78, Codes of Practice PACE 1984
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under Criminal Practice, Police, Torts - Other

Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department; QBD 7-Sep-2000

A finding that the applicant was an illegal immigrant had been subject to an application for judicial review on the basis that there had been insufficient evidence of an intent to deceive. The review had been refused because of the applicant’s delay. The applicant later sought to claim habeas corpus.
Held: This application was in effect merely a repetition of the earlier rejected application, and was an abuse of process. Although the review application had been refused for delay, the court had considered and rejected the merits of the application.

Court: QBD
Date: 07-Sep-2000
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under Immigration, Torts - Other

Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others, Ex Parte Russell; QBD 31-Aug-2000

An order by a prison governor that a prisoner must submit to a random drug test depended for its lawfulness upon the selection being genuinely random. The order to submit and the order to attend for the test could not be separated. Although in fact the repeated selection of the prisoner, whilst genuinely random, had not been under circumstances where the method and implications of selection had been properly explained. Accordingly the order to attend was unlawful, and the court declined to exercise any discretion to allow the punishment to stand.

Court: QBD
Date: 31-Aug-2000
Statutes: Prisons Act 19525 16A, Prison Rules 1999 (1999 No 728) 46A, Prison (Amendment) Rules 2000 (2000 No 1794)
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under Prisons, Torts - Other

Pritchard -v- Ministry of Defence; QBD 27-Jan-1995

Wrongful continuation of army service may be false imprisonment; since compulsion is available to the army authorities.

Court: QBD
Date: 27-Jan-1995
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under Torts - Other