Pagett, Regina v: CACD 3 Feb 1983

Jury Directions on Causation

The appellant shot at police officers who were attempting to arrest him for various serious offences. The appellant had with him a 16 year old girl who was pregnant by him. Against her will he used her body to shield him from any retaliation by the officers. The officers returned his fire and as a result the girl was killed. The appellant was charged with her murder. The trial judge left both murder and manslaughter to the jury. The appellant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.
Held: For the judge to direct the jury as to the relevant principles relating to causation and then leave it to the jury to decide whether or not, in the light of those principles, the relevant causal link had been established. In the rare case in which it was necessary to direct the jury’s minds to the question of causation, it was usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim’s death, it being enough that the act contributed significantly to that result.
Robert Goff LJ said: ‘In cases of homicide, it is rarely necessary to give the jury any direction on causation as such. Of course, a necessary ingredient of the crimes of murder and manslaughter is that the accused has by his act caused the victim’s death. But how the victim came by his death is usually not in dispute . . Even where it is necessary to direct the jury’s minds to the question of causation, it is usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim’s death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly to that result . . Occasionally, however, a specific issue of causation may arise. One such case is where, although an act of the accused constitutes a causa sine qua non of (or necessary condition for) the death of the victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim’s death, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. Such intervention, if it has such an effect, has often been described by lawyers as a novus actus interveniens . We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. We are also aware that attempts have been made to translate it into English; though no simple translation has proved satisfactory, really because the Latin term has become a term of art which conveys to lawyers the crucial feature that there has not merely been an intervening act of another person, but that that act was so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the victim’s death, to the exclusion of the act of the accused. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the purposes of this judgment continue to use the Latin term . . in cases where there is an issue whether the act of the victim or of a third party constituted a novus actus interveniens, breaking the causal connection between the act of the accused and the death of the victim, it would be appropriate for the judge to direct the jury, of course in the most simple terms, in accordance with the legal principles which they have to apply.’

Robert Goff LJ, Cantley, Farquharson JJ
[1983] EWCA Crim 1, (1983) 76 Cr App R 279, [1983] Crim LR 394
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGnango, Regina v SC 14-Dec-2011
The prosecutor appealed against a successful appeal by the defendant against his conviction for murder. He and an opponent had engaged in a street battle using guns. His opponent had shot an innocent passer by. The court was now asked as to whether . .

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Crime

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Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.247946