swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Rating - From: 1980 To: 1984
This page lists 8 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
British Railways Board v Hopkins (Valuation Officer) [1981] RA 328
1981
LT
Rating
Different storeys under common occupation as constituting a single hereditament, whether they were contiguous or not.
1 Citers
Westminster City Council v Haymarket Publishing Limited; CA 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 677; [1981] 2 All ER 555
Frost (Inspector of Taxes) v Feltham; 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 452
Provident Mutual Life Assurance Association v Derbyshire City Council [1981] 1 WLR 173
1981
HL
Lord Roskill
Local Government, Rating
The particular individual on whom the task of forming the relevant opinion had been imposed by statute could not possibly perform all the tasks delegated to the relevant financial officer. He had, and needed, a staff to perform his functions, and it was a member of his staff who had formed the relevant opinion. The question was not whether there had been a delegation so that the decision was not that of the treasurer but of the subordinate; the question was whether the treasurer had authorised the subordinate to act as his agent in forming the opinion.
1 Citers
Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Cromer Ring Mill Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 761; [1982] RVR 113
1982
Forbes J
Administrative, Rating
Forbes J considered a suggestion that the lower tribiunal had taken into account irrelevant matters: "the case wholly supports the formulation in Professor de Smith's book: 'If the influence of irrelevant factors is established, it does not appear to be necessary to prove that they were the sole or even the dominant influence; it seems to be enough to prove that their influence was substantial'"
1 Citers
Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v St Katherine by the Tower Limited [1982] RA 261
1982
QBD
McCullogh J
Rating
By section 34(4) of the 1939 Act, no building which required a means of escape from fire under section 34(1) "shall be occupied or let for occupation" until the local authority had issued a certificate that the building had been provided with a means of escape in accordance with approved plans, but buildings belonging to the Port of London Authority were exempted. The Authority first owned Europe House but sold the freehold and leased back one floor for its own occupation from St Katherine's predecessor in title. The Authority stayed in occupation of the 5th floor under its lease from St Katherine until 31 March 1979. When the Authority vacated the premises the owners realised that, if they were to occupy or permit another tenant to occupy the 5th floor, a certificate of compliance with the 1939 Act would be required. Plans were submitted to the Greater London Council and approved. A fire escape was installed, the work was completed and a tenant took occupation.
Tower Hamlets demanded rates of the owners, including the time after Port of London Authority had vacated and before the new tenant occupied the 5th floor. The 1967 Act placed a liability on owners to pay rates on unoccupied properties, but allowed an exemption that for unoccupied properties: "No rates shall be payable . . in respect of a hereditament for, or any part of the 3 months beginning with the day following the end of, any period during which (a) the owner is prohibited by law from occupying the hereditament or allowing it to be occupied."
It was conceded that Europe House was a new building for section 34 of the 1939 Act and, in the absence of a means of escape certificate, there was a prohibition against the occupation of the 5th floor of the building, St Katherine claimed that it was exempted by paragraph 2(a) of Schedule 1 to the 1967 Act from paying the unoccupied rate.
Tower Hamlets argued that the prohibition contemplated by paragraph 2(a) was not a general prohibition arising from the application of section 34(4) but a specific prohibition directed at the property made by a court, local authority or other official or public body. For example, section 34(5) empowered the local authority to issue a prohibition against occupation to a defendant convicted of an offence of contravening the section. No such prohibition had been issued, and provided other examples of statutory prohibition notices that certain public authorities were empowered to serve. It was further argued that the owner of the premises which chooses not to put them into a compliant condition (within the three month period of grace) should not escape liability to pay the occupied rates that would have been due had he made the necessary alterations. Held: Tower Hamlets' appeal failed.
McCullough J rejected the need for a a prohibition notice issued by a public body for the exemption. On the face of it, paragraph 2(a) applied equally to prohibition of occupation without the certificate required by section 34(4), as to occupation prohibited by a notice issued under section 34(5). He considered whether there were countervailing factors which demanded a different construction of paragraph 2(a) or required the court to qualify the meaning of the word "owner". There was force in the argument that it was unlikely to have been the intention of Parliament that a property owner should obtain the benefit of rates exemption by deliberately keeping his property in a condition in which it was incapable of occupation, the argument that Parliament intended the word "owner" to be restricted to one who behaved in a reasonable way was unworkable. Formerly, the owner had been exempted from the payment of rates for an unoccupied property. The 1967 Act removed that exemption in general but, in a limited number of circumstances, maintained it. The purpose of paragraph 2(a) was to restrict the circumstances in which an owner could claim exemption from the payment of rates for an unoccupied property. However, the fact that the plain meaning of the words used in paragraph 2(a) would benefit an owner who chose to delay equipping his building with means of escape in case of fire was insufficient to justify a departure from them. It would be a greater violation of the words used in paragraph 2(a) to hold otherwise.
London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 34 - General Rate Act 1967
1 Citers
Verrall v Hackney London Borough Council; CA 1982 - [1983] RA 331; [1982] 1 QB 445
Broxtowe Borough Council v Birch; CA 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 314
