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Police - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 33 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Moss v McLachlan [1985] IRLR 76
1985
QBD
Skinner J, Otton J
Police, Torts - Other
Four striking miners were travelling in a convoy of motor vehicles and were stopped by a police cordon at a junction within several miles of four collieries. The inspector in charge believed with reason that a breach of the peace would be committed if they continued to the pits and asked them to turn back. He told them that if they continued they would be obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty and therefore liable to arrest. Many refused to turn back however and, after blocking the road with their vehicles, a group comprising the four striking miners attempted to push their way through the police cordon. They were arrested on the ground that the police feared a breach of the peace at one of the four collieries if the miners had been allowed to proceed. The men were convicted of wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. Held: The appeal was dismissed: "The situation has to be assessed by the senior police officers present. Provided they honestly and reasonably form the opinion that there is a real risk of a breach of the peace in the sense that it is in close proximity both in place and time, then the conditions exist for reasonable preventive action including, if necessary, the measures taken in this case. . . But, says [counsel], the police can only take preventive action if a breach of the peace is imminent and there was no such imminence here." R v Howell] must be read in the light of Piddington v Bates and "We do not think that there is any conflict between the two approaches. The possibility of a breach must be real to justify any preventive action. The imminence or immediacy of the threat to the peace determines what action is reasonable." Later Skinner J added: "For the reasons we have given, on the facts found by the magistrates, a breach of the peace was not only a real possibility but also, because of the proximity of the pits and the availability of cars, imminent, immediate and not remote."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Rigby and another v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 986; [1985] 1 WLR 1242
1985

Taylor J
Police, Negligence
The police were found liable to pay damages for negligence having fired a gas canister into the plaintiffs' premises in order to flush out a dangerous psychopath. There had been a real and substantial fire risk in firing the canister into the building and that risk was only acceptable if there was fire fighting equipment available to put the fire out at an early stage. No equipment had been present at the time and the fire had broken out and spread very quickly. Held: The defence of necessity might be available to police officers when looking at a claim for damage to property.
1 Citers


 
Reynolds v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1985] QB 881
1985

Waller LJ, Slade LJ, Purchas LJ
Police, Torts - Other
A search warrant had been obtained under the 1913 Act. The court considered the existence of a tort of obtaining a search warrant maliciously.
Waller LJ discussed the problem facing police officers when a large volume of material were to be examined: "To do a detailed examination in the house would no doubt have required several police officers to be there for some days causing disturbance to the householder, that might require comparisons to be made with other documents already in the possession of the police. This would require either the documents to be taken to the police station or the other documents to be brought to the house. ..... Searching and taking away papers is an invasion of liberty and any such action must be carefully scrutinised. Where it is done in pursuance of a search warrant or on arrest, the police must consider the way in which they perform the search. If there are only a few papers, no doubt they can be carefully scrutinised on the spot without too much disturbance to the household. If there are many papers, it may be in the best interests of the householder for the police to be broadly selective, i.e. rule out documents which are clearly irrelevant, and take others which they reasonably believe to be of evidential value to examine more closely at the police station. It will of course be of the greatest importance to ensure that documents which prove to be of no evidential value should be returned at the earliest opportunity. In my judgement the question in every such case must be whether the police were acting reasonably or not." and
"The police were not entitled to seize every document that they could lay hands on, at all events without the approval of the first plaintiff. On the other hand, they wer entitled to take documents which they reasonably believed to be forged or would be of evidential value in proceedings for fraud. The officers could obviously take a file which would contain such a document without separating out the individual sheet and it would be a matter for the jury whether what they had taken was reasonable."
Slade LJ: "(1) No matter how convenient this course may seem to be, a police officer acting under a search warrant issued under the Forgery Act 1913 is not entitled, without the consent of the owner, indiscriminately to remove from the premises each and every file, book, bundle or document he can lay his hands on, even if only for the purpose of temporary sorting. Before doing so, he must have regard to the nature and contents of the item in question.
(2) However, provided that he acts reasonably in so doing, he is entitled to remove from the premises files, books, bundles or documents which at the time of removal he reasonably believes contain (i) forged material, or (ii) material which might be of evidential value, as showing that the owner is implicated in some other crime.
(3) Any necessary sorting process in relation to all items removed (e.g., those contained in files and bundles) should be carried out with reasonable expedition and those of them which are not found to fall within either of the two relevant categories should then be returned reasonably promptly to the owner."
Purchas LJ: "This is an area in which the balance between the importance of assisting the police in the detection of crime, and preserving the rights of the individual, must be scrupulously observed. Provided that the police have reasonable grounds in relation to any particular document or file of documents, or other property, for thinking that it might be connected with any crime committed by the first plaintiff, then it would be open to the jury to find that the removal of it was a justified and reasonable action to take in order to make a further and more detailed examination elsewhere. But if the jury were not satisfied that the documents involved in the seizure did command the reasonable suspicion of the police, then, in my view, the jury ought to have found in favour of the plaintiff in respect of trespass to those particular documents."
Forgery Act 1913 16(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Moss v McLachlan [1985] IRLR 76
1985
QBD
Skinner J
Police
There had been violent conflict between members of different unons in the context of the miners' strike. The police had found it difficult to maintain the peace. The appellants were four of about sixty striking miners intent on a mass demonstration at one of several nearby collieries. They were stopped by the police when less than five minutes' journey from the nearest pit, where the police feared a violent episode. The men tried to push on and were arrested. Held: The court accepted a test of "close proximity both in place and time" and a breach of the peace was held to be "imminent and immediate".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Steel v Goacher [1985] RTR 98
1985
QBD

Road Traffic, Police
Griffiths LJ discussed the lawfulness of a police officer's stopping of a motorist, and said: "It should, however, be stated that the police officer was acting within the execution of his duty by virtue of his power at common law and not by virtue of any power contained in section 159 of the Road Traffic Act." Having referred to Beard v Wood he continued: "The finding that the police officer was acting lawfully in the execution of his duty at the time he stopped the defendant is sufficient to dispose of the appeal."
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Murphy v Oxford Unreported 15 February 1985
15 Feb 1985
CA

Police, Torts - Other

1 Citers


 
Regina v Chief Constable of Cheshire, Ex parte Berry Unreported, 30 July 1985
30 Jul 1985


Police
There was no positive duty on the police to obtain evidence.

 
Chief Constable of Gwent v Dash [1986] RTR 41
1986

Lloyd LJ, Macpherson J
Road Traffic, Police
In the absence of malpractice, oppression, caprice or opprobrious behaviour, there is no restriction on the stopping of motorists by a police officer in the execution of his duty and subsequent requirement of a breath test if the officer then and there genuinely suspects the ingestion of alcohol.
Lloyd LJ said: "The word 'malpractice', as it has come to be used in this field, seems to me to cover cases where the police have acted from some indirect or improper motive or where the conduct on the part of the police could be described as capricious. The random stopping of cars under section 159 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 for the purpose of detecting crime, or for inquiring whether the driver has had too much to drink, cannot be so described. Nor can it be said that the police were acting from some indirect or improper motive. However much the public may dislike the random stopping of cars, I cannot agree that random stopping by itself involves malpractice, and if Donaldson LJ said otherwise in Such v Ball to which Macpherson J has referred, then, I would very respectfully disagree."
Macpherson J said: "in summary, therefore, the police are, in my judgment, not prohibited from the random stopping of cars within the limits already referred to; but are, of course, prohibited from requiring breath tests at random, which is a very different thing. That distinction must always be borne in mind."
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Thornton [1986] 2 All ER 641
1986


Police
A police officer for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings had been "found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence" following a plea of guilty to an offence of wasting police time, albeit that he was subsequently conditionally discharged by the court before which he had pleaded guilty.
1 Citers


 
Peach v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1986] QB 1064; [1986] 2 WLR 1080; [1986] 2 All ER 129
1986
CA
Fox LJ
Police, Information, Coroners
Statements made to the police about the death of Mr Blair Peach should be disclosed to his mother in her action against the police because, although they were made partly for the purpose of a complaint against the police and so would to that extent, in principle, attract public interest immunity from disclosure, they were made predominantly for the purpose of the investigation by the police of a violent death, to which no such immunity attached.
Fox LJ said: "As I understand the position it is the duty of the chief officer of police to convey to the coroner, for the purposes of a public inquest, all material in its possession touching the cause and circumstances of the death . . As a matter of sensible public administration it seems essential that the Coroner should have the material obtained by the police so that he, the Coroner, can decide what witnesses to call and to investigate the matter generally."
Purchas LJ said: "In my judgment, in the class of documents with which we are now faced there is an overwhelming bias in favour of the public interest being served by the disclosure of those documents and that, therefore, there is no justification for creating a new class of privileged documents which would be the effect of extending the class in respect of which Neilson v. Laugharne [1981] Q.B. 736 remains an authority to the class of documents with which the court is concerned in this appeal."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Fulling; CACD 1987 - [1987] QB 426; [1987] EWCA Crim 4; [1987] 2 All ER 65; [1987] 2 WLR 923; (1987) 151 JP 485; (1987) 85 Cr App Rep 136; [1987] Crim LR 492
 
Minto v Police [1987] 1 NZLR 374
1987

Cooke J
Police, Commonwealth
When considering a police officer's aseessment that a breach of the peace is imminent, the question of immediacy is in part a question of degree and is highly relevant to the reasonableness of the action taken.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Leander v Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433; 9248/81; [1987] ECHR 4
26 Mar 1987
ECHR

Human Rights, Police, Information
Mr Leander had been refused employment at a museum located on a naval base, having been assessed as a security risk on the basis of information stored on a register maintained by State security services that had not been disclosed him. Mr Leander complained that he should have been provided with the information in question, and should have been given the chance to refute it. He submitted that Article 10 conferred a right of access to Government records and a positive obligation upon the State to disclose the contents of its file to him upon request. Held: His submission failed. Article 10 did not "in circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on an individual a right of access to a register containing information on his personal position". Proceedings before an Appeals Board and the possibility of interim injunction proceedings taken together provided the applicants with an effective remedy. Both the storage of private information in a secret police register and its release, coupled with a refusal to allow an opportunity to refute it, were an interference with the right to respect for private life.
"The Court observes that the right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him. Article 10 does not, in circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on the individual a right of access to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the individual.
There has thus been no interference with Mr. Leander's freedom to receive information, as protected by Article 10."
European Convention on Human Rights 13
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire; HL 28-Apr-1987 - [1988] 2 WLR 1049; [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 All ER 238; [1987] UKHL 12
 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 2 WLR 590; [1987] EWCA Civ 5; [1989] QB 26
18 Nov 1987
CA
Purchas, Croom-Johnson, Nourse LJJ
Police
The Authority appealed from refusal of judicial review of a circular issued by the respondent as to the supply of Plastic Baton Rounds and CS gas from central resources only. The authority suggested that the circular amounted to permission for the use of plastic baton rounds for the first time in England and Wales and was ultra vires. Held: The appeal failed. The Divisional Court was mistaken in construing section 41 as not authorising the Home Secretary to supply the equipment from the central store in the way described in paragraph 4 of the circular. All he is proposing to do is to hold the equipment and make it available for supply on request and without charge to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to promote the efficiency of the policing.
"a prerogative of keeping the peace within the realm existed in mediaeval times, probably since the Conquest and, particular statutory provision apart, that it has not been surrendered by the Crown in the process of giving its express or implied assent to the modern system of keeping the peace through the agency of independent police forces. I therefore conclude that, if the necessary power had not been available under section 41 of the 1964 Act, the terms and implementation of paragraph 4 of the Home Office circular would have been within the prerogative powers of the Crown."
Police Act 1964
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] 1 QB 60
1988
CA
Glidewell LJ
Negligence, Police

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Harris v Sheffield United Football Club Ltd [1988] QB 77
1988
CA
Balcombe LJ, Neill LJ
Police
The court was asked whether services provided by the police at Sheffield United Football Club for the club's home fixtures were 'special police services' so that if they were provided at the club's request the police could charge for them. Up until 1970 the club had made special arrangements for the attendance of police officers at matches for which payments had been made. Thereafter the police continued to attend at matches both inside and outside the ground, but the club's view was that they were obliged to do so in accordance with their duty to maintain law and order. The club refused to make any payment. The police authority claimed £51,669 for the services of officers inside the ground for a 15 month period between August 1982 and November 1983 on the basis that they were 'special police services'. The club argued that they were not and that the police were doing no more than carrying out their duty. Further, the club denied that over a short period at the end of 1983 they had 'requested' police services for the purposes of the section and counterclaimed a declaration that they were not liable to make any payment for police services unless they requested attendance by officers to fulfil roles other than police duty. Held: Whilst the courts must be astute to condemn illegal acts by the police, "The true rule, in my judgment is as follows. In deciding how to exercise his public duty of enforcing the law, and of keeping the peace, a chief constable has a discretion, which he must exercise even-handedly. Provided he acts within his discretion, the courts will not interfere;. . . . In exercising that discretion a chief constable must clearly have regard to the resources available to him."
Neill LJ: "Bearing these considerations in mind I return to the present case. The club has responsibilities which are owed not only to its employees and the spectators who attend but also to the football authorities to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the game takes place in conditions which do not occasion danger to any person or property. The attendance of the police is necessary to assist the club in the fulfilment of this duty. The matches take place regularly and usually at weekends during about eight months of the year. Though the holding of the matches is of some public importance because of the wide spread support in the local community both for the game and the club, the club is not under any legal duty to hold the matches. The charges which the police authority seek to make, and have made, relate solely to the officers on duty inside the ground and not to those in the street or other public places outside.
There is clear evidence that the chief constable would be unable to provide the necessary amount of protection for Bramall Lane and also to discharge his other responsibilities without making extensive use of officers who would otherwise have been off duty. Substantial sums by a way of overtime have therefore to be paid. The arrangements for the attendance of the officers are made to guard against the possibility, and for some matches the probability, of violence; the officers are not sent to deal with an existing emergency, nor can it be said that any outbreak of violence is immediately imminent.
In my judgment, looking at all these factors I am driven to the conclusion that the provision of police officers to attend regularly at Bramall Lane throughout the football season does constitute the provision of special police services. Nor in my opinion is it to the point that the club has stated that they do not expect the police to carry out any duties other then to maintain law and order. The resources of the police are finite. In my view if the club wishes on a regular basis to make an exceptional claim on police services to deal with potential violence on its premises, then however well intentioned and public spirited it may be in assembling the crowd at Bramall Lane, the services which it receives are "special police services" within the meaning of section 15(1) of the Police Act 1964."
Balcombe LJ said that the chief constable had a discretion which he must exercise even handedly. Provided he acted within his discretion, the courts would not interfere. "In answering the question whether the provision of police within the club's ground was a special service the judge said: "The numbers considered necessary to carry out these services could only be provided by calling on officers who, at the material times, would otherwise have been off duty. The scope and extent of those services and their impact on the chief constable's manpower resources put them beyond what the club, in the circumstances, was entitled to have provided in pursuance of the chief constable's public duty. He was entitled to provide those services because he was able to do so without depriving other people of police protection. In other words, the services provided were within his powers; they were not within the scope of his public duty. I am satisfied that they were special services as I understand that expression to have been used in the Glasbrook case and within the meaning of section 15(1) of the Police Act 1964. It follows that he was entitled to provide them on condition that they were paid for". In my judgment that is a correct statement of the legal position which cannot be faulted."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Samuel [1988] QB 615; [1988] 2 WLR 920; (1987) Cr App R 232
1988
CA
Hodgson J
Criminal Practice, Legal Professions, Police
The defendant had been arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. He asked for a solicitor, but one was refused under section 58 of the 1984 Act. He appealed against his conviction saying that he should have been allowed access to a solicitor. Held: The appeal was allowed. He could not be refused access to a solicitor after charge where, as here, the initial charges had been of burglary, and the inspector refusing access had to justify the refusal of access to any particular solicitor. The right of a suspect to consult and instruct a lawyer "as one of the most important and fundamental rights of a citizen".
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 58(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Simmons [1988] 2 RCS 495
1988

Dickson CJ
Customs and Excise, Police, Human Rights
(Supreme Court of Canada) A contraband search based on reasonable suspicion of the presence of smuggled material is an exception to the usual requirements for searches imposed by section 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Dickson CJ said: "People do not expect to be able to cross international borders free from scrutiny . . Consequently, travellers seeking to cross national boundaries fully expect to be subject to a screening process. This process will typically require the production of proper identification and travel documentation and involve a search process . . "
1 Citers


 
Regina v Longman [1988] 1 WLR 619
1988
QBD
Lord Lane CJ, Boreham and Pill LJJ
Police
Lord Lane CJ expressed reservations as to the construction of this provision: whether the consequence of a breach of section 15 or section 16 or both would render a search of premises under a warrant unlawful and he expressed the tentative view, based on the use of the singular "it", that the unlawfulness referred to the warrant rather than the search, albeit that this would appear to defeat the intention of the framers of the Act.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex Parte Osman; QBD 30-Mar-1988 - [1990] 1 WLR 277

 
 Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey; CA 10-Jun-1988 - [1988] NLJR 180; Times, 15 June 1988; [1996] LG Rev Rep 241; [1996] LGR 241
 
DH Edmonds Ltd v East Sussex Police Authority Times, 15 July 1988
6 Jul 1988
CA
Kerr, Balcombe LJJ, Sir Roualeyn Cumming-Bruce
Police, Damages
The plaintiffs Brighton jewellers sought compensation from the police authority for a raid on their premises by three or four men. Kenneth Jones J at first instance held that the incident did not involve a tumultuous assembly and accordingly the claim against the defendant police authority failed. On appeal it was conceded on behalf of the plaintiffs that the 1886 Act imposed an additional requirement that the assembly be tumultuous. It was submitted however that it would suffice if the assembly in question caused bystanders to behave tumultuously in the sense of making a lot of noise, and that Lyell J had been wrong in Dwyer when stating that "tumultuous" connoted an assembly of some considerable size. Held: Kerr LJ rejected the first contention, regarding it as self-evident that whatever conduct or effect is involved in the adverb "tumultuously" must relate to the persons who are assembled together, both "riotously" and "tumultuously". On the second point, Kerr LJ said that as a matter of first impression the connotation of "multitude" or "crowd" or "mob", or of a large number of people, had been introduced into the meaning of "tumultuous" and "tumult". He continued: "Moreover, these aspects were considered with great care, and after a full citation of all the authorities, by Mr Justice Lyell in the most recent of the cases to which we were referred, JW Dwyer Limited –v- Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1967] 2 QB 970, [1967] 3 WLR 731. Mr Justice Kenneth Jones followed that case and I would do exactly the same, because it is an admirable judgment on this very section" and
"I would accept the analysis of the phrase "riotously and tumultuously" assembled together" of Mr Justice Lyell in Dwyer's case. Looked at in that way, there is no error in concluding that "tumultuously adds something more than mere noise to the minimum assembly of three people required to constitute a riot.
The other point which Mr Poulton took was that Mr Justice Lyell's suggestion that what matters is whether or not the police should have been alerted was satisfied in the present case, since there was a great deal of noise. He said that this should have attracted the attention of the police. I do not accept that. It is certainly not the kind of picture which Mr Justice Lyell had in mind when he gave his impression of a "riotous and tumultuous assembly". After all, this was not a case of a crowd which had assembled and which should have attracted the attention of the police by its very presence. On the contrary. These robbers drew up in a van quietly and then stormed out, no doubt making a good deal of noise, but in the minimum time possible. And they then vanished as quickly as they could. The whole nature of the raid was one of furtiveness at the beginning, and then surprise and speed of departure thereafter. In my view that is far from a "riotous and tumultuous assembly".
Balcombe J added: "I would also like to express my complete agreement with the judgment of Mr Justice Lyell in Dwyer's case."
Riot (Damages) Act 1886 2
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Practice Direction (Ward: Witness at Trial) (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 989
18 Jul 1988
FD
Sir Stephen Brown P
Children, Police
"The registrar's direction of 11 November 1987, Practice Direction (Ward: Witness at Trial) [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1739, set out the procedure to be followed to obtain leave for the police to interview a child who is a ward of court. It provided that all applications for leave should be made to a judge on summons on notice to all parties.
That procedure is hereby modified to the extent that where a party may become the subject of a criminal investigation and it is considered necessary for the ward to be able to be interviewed without that party knowing that the police are making inquiries, the application for leave may be made ex parte to a judge without notice to that party. Notice should, however, where practicable be given to the guardian ad litem.
There will be other occasions where the police need to deal with complaints, or alleged offences, concerning wards where it is appropriate, if not essential, for action to be taken straight away without the prior leave of the wardship court. Typical examples may be: (a) serious offences against the ward such as rape, where the medical examination and the collection of forensic evidence ought to be carried out promptly, (b) where the ward is suspected by the police of having committed a criminal act and the police wish to interview him in respect of that matter, (c) where the police wish to interview the ward as a potential witness. This list is not exhaustive. There will inevitably be other instances where immediate action is appropriate.
The President and judges of the Family Division are of the opinion that, where any such instances are encountered, the police should notify the parent or foster parent with whom the ward is living or other "appropriate adult" within the Home Office Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, so that that adult has the opportunity of being present when the police interview the child. Additionally, if practicable the guardian ad litem (if one has been appointed) should be notified and invited to attend the police interview or to nominate a third party to attend on his behalf. A record of the interview or a copy of any statement made by the ward should be supplied to the guardian ad litem. Where the ward has been interviewed without the guardian's knowledge he should be informed at the earliest opportunity and (if it be the case) that the police wish to conduct further interviews. The wardship court should be appraised of the situation at the earliest possible opportunity thereafter by the guardian ad litem, the parent, foster-parent (through the local authority) or other responsible adult."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Windsor v United Kingdom 13081/87; [1988] ECHR 29
14 Dec 1988
ECHR

Human Rights, Police
The claimant complained that whilst arrested, he had been denied access to a lawyer.
European Convention on Human Rights
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kitching; 1989 - [1990] COD 149; [1990] CLR 394; Times, 17 November 1989
 
Chapman v Director of Public Prosecutions [1989] 89 Cr App R 190
1989
CA
Bingham LJ
Police, Torts - Other
The section required a constable to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an arrestable offence had been committed before he could arrest without warrant. Held: Bingham LJ said: "It is not of course to be expected that a police constable in the heat of an emergency, or while in hot pursuit of a suspected criminal, should always have in mind specific statutory provisions, or that he should mentally identify specific offences with technicality or precision. He must, in my judgment, reasonably suspect the existence of facts amounting to an arrestable offence of a kind which he has in mind. Unless he can do that he cannot comply with section 28(3) of the Act by informing the suspect of grounds which justify the arrest."
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 24(6)
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset, ex parte Robinson; 1989 - [1989] 1 WLR 793
 
Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228; [1989] 1 All ER 1025; [1989] 2 WLR 624
1989
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Police, Negligence, Torts - Other
Police officers brought an action in negligence against a Chief Constable on the ground that disciplinary proceedings against them had been negligently conducted. They claimed that the investigating officers had negligently failed to conduct the investigations properly or expeditiously and they sued for loss of overtime payments which they would otherwise have received during their periods of suspension. Held: The claim failed. It would be contrary to public policy to prejudice the fearless and efficient discharge by police officers of their vitally important public duty of investigating crime by requiring them to act under the shadow of a potential action for damages for negligence by the suspect.
Lord Bridge dealing with the question of whether the police owe a duty of care to a suspect in carrying out a criminal investigation observed that: "One must therefore ask the question whether foreseeable injury to the suspect may be caused on the hypothesis either that he has never been charged or, if charged, that he has been acquitted at trial or on appeal, or that his conviction has been quashed on an application for judicial review. It is, I accept, foreseeable that in these situations the suspect may be put to expense, or may conceivably suffer some other economic loss, which might have been avoided had a more careful investigation established his innocence at some earlier stage. However, any suggestion that there should be liability in negligence in such circumstances runs up against the formidable obstacles in the way of liability in negligence for purely economic loss. Where no action for malicious prosecution would lie, it would be strange indeed if an acquitted defendant could recover damages for negligent investigation. Finally, all other considerations apart, it would plainly be contrary to public policy, in my opinion, to prejudice the fearless and efficient discharge by police officers of their vitally important public duty of investigating crime by requiring them to act under the shadow of a potential action for damages for negligence by the suspect. If no duty of care is owed by a police officer investigating a suspected crime to a civilian suspect, it is difficult to see any conceivable reason why a police officer who is subject to investigation under the Regulations of 1977 should be in any better position." and "…it is not reasonably foreseeable that the negligent conduct of a criminal investigation would cause injury to the health of the suspect, whether in the form of depressive illness or otherwise."
The availability of the tort of misfeasance in public office is one reason justifying the non-actionability of a claim in negligence where there is an act of maladministration: "where no action for malicious prosecution would lie, it would be strange indeed if an acquitted defendant could recover damages for negligent investigation."'

The availability of the tort of misfeasance in public office was one reason justifying the non-actionability of a claim in negligence for an act of maladministration: "I do not regard this as an occasion where it is necessary to explore, still less to define, the precise limits of the tort of misfeasance in public office. It suffices for present purposes to say that it must at least involve an act done in the exercise or purported exercise by the public officer of some power or authority with which he is clothed by virtue of the office he holds and which is done in bad faith or (possibly) without reasonable cause. The decision to suspend the plaintiff Park under regulation 24 was taken by the deputy Chief Constable. If this had been done maliciously in the sense indicated, this would certainly be capable of constituting the tort of misfeasance in public office. But it was conceded that no malice is alleged against the deputy Chief Constable and that malice on the part of Grant cannot be imputed to him. The pleaded case must therefore stand or fall according as to whether it identifies any act done by Grant in the exercise or purported exercise of a power or authority vested in him as investigating officer which was infected by the malice pleaded against him. I can find no such act identified by the pleading.
No formal application to amend the pleading was made in the course of the argument, but at a late stage a document was placed before your Lordships indicating a pleading of additional particulars under paragraphs 22 and 24 which the plaintiff might seek leave to add by way of amendment if those two paragraphs in the statement of claim were allowed to stand. The particulars which it is suggested might be added under paragraph 24 would read:
“From an early stage (the date whereof the plaintiff cannot further particularise until after discovery and/or interrogatories herein) Grant knew or believed that there were no proper grounds for suspending the plaintiff yet procured the imposition of and/or the continuation of the suspension by continuing the investigation and giving misleading and/or incomplete reports concerning the same.”
It is evident that if a police officer investigating suspected criminal or disciplinary offences makes a false report to his superior officer which is defamatory of the suspect and that report is made maliciously so as to lose its status of qualified privilege, the suspect has a cause of action in tort against the author of the report. But the tort is defamation not misfeasance in public office, since the mere making of a report is not a relevant exercise of power or authority by the investigating officer. I express no opinion as to whether in those circumstances the Chief Constable would be vicariously liable under section 48(1) of the Act of 1964. However that may be, the suggested additional particulars under paragraph 24 of the statement of claim would do nothing to validate the pleading of misfeasance in public office and obviously fall far short of disclosing a reasonable cause of action in defamation.” "
1 Citers


 
In re A (A Minor) (Wardship: Police Caution) [1989] Fam 103
28 Jun 1989
FD
Cazalet J
Children, Police
The Court considered the role of the wardship court where the police wished to caution a ward of court. The question fell into two parts. In relation to the first, Cazalet J said this: "The decision as to whether to caution in lieu of prosecuting is a matter which is wholly within the discretion of the appropriate prosecuting authority. The question has been raised as to whether, when the juvenile concerned is a ward of court, the court has any power to intervene or play some part in such decision-making process."
Having referred to In re K (Minors) (Wardship: Criminal Proceedings) [1988] Fam 1, he continued: "In my view, similar considerations apply in the present circumstances, and it is for the prosecuting authority and that authority alone to decide whether to caution in lieu of prosecuting in a particular case. The court has no power to intervene in this decision-making process."
1 Citers



 
 Abbassy v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis; CA 28-Jul-1989 - [1990] 1 WLR 385; [1989] EWCA Civ 7; [1990] 1 All ER 193; (1989) 90 Cr App R 250
 
Re B (A Minor) [1990] FCR 469
15 Dec 1989
FD
Ewbank J
Children, Police
Ewbank J considered the case of a ward of court, aged 17.5 years who had been arrested by the police on suspicion of burglary and said: "After he was arrested he was interviewed by the police who did not know that he was a ward of court. They became aware that he was a ward of court at his trial, and the police accordingly brought the matter to the attention of the wardship court on the basis of the Practice Direction of 18 July 1988 . .
It is suggested that the wording of . . paragraph [(b)] implies that, if there is no urgency about the interviews, leave ought to be sought; and if prior leave has not been obtained, subsequent approval should be sought. I am told that these matters are going to be the subject of an application to the President in due course . .
The statutory provision in relation to interviews with children in police detention are contained in s 57 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This provides that where a child or young person is in police detention various steps must be taken. These provisions apply to children under 17 and do not apply to children over 17. The ward was 17.5, and accordingly under the statutory provision it was not necessary to inform anyone of the arrest or detention of the child.
In the circumstances, in a case of a child over 17 who is a ward of court, in my judgment, it is accordingly not necessary for prior leave to be sought or for subsequent approval to be sought of any steps taken by the police in respect of the arrest or detention of the child. I accordingly make no order on the application in this case."
1 Citers



 
 Kirkham v Anderton, The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester police; CA 20-Dec-1989 - [1989] 2 QB 283; [1990] 3 All ER 246; [1989] EWCA Civ 3
 
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