swarb.co.uk - law index
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Planning - From: 1970 To: 1979
This page lists 31 cases, and was prepared on 17 February 2015.
Lavender -v- Minister of Housing and Local Government; 1970 -  1 WLR 1231
Manchester Corporation -v- Connolly  Ch 420
Planning, Land, Litigation Practice
The local authority sought to use an injunction to assist in enforcing planning controls. The court had no power to make an interlocutory order for possession. Lord Diplock: "The writ of possession was originally a common law writ (although it is now regulated, as I say, by Ord. 45 r.3) under which it was ordered that the plaintiff recover possession of the land. Like other common law remedies it did not act in personam against the defendant. It authorised the executive power as represented by the sheriff to do certain things, perform certain acts, in this particular case to evict from land persons who are there and deliver possession of the land to the plaintiff. "
Stringer -v- Ministry of Housing and Local Government; 1970 -  1 WLR 1281
Hartley -v- Minister of Housing and Local Government  1 QB 413
Lord Denning MR, Widgery LJ
A petrol station operated with an area to display and sell cars. Sales stopped in 1961 when the owner died. His son was thought too young and inexperienced son to be involved in car sales. Sales were resumed in 1965 when a new owner acquired the site. The court was asked whether that 1965 resumption amounted to an unauthorised change of use. The Minister and the Divisional Court held that it did. The appellant site owner submitted: "The intention is an essential element; and here the evidence supports the view that though the widow, because of her son's youth and inexperience, told him not to sell cars, she would have liked the car sales to continue since the demand was there; so the evidence is that the car sales use was only temporarily suspended until such time as the then owners felt able to resume it." Held: The submission failed.
Lord Denning MR: "The question in all such cases is simply this: Has the cessation of use (followed by a non-use) been merely temporary, or did it amount to an abandonment? If it was merely temporary, the previous use can be resumed without planning permission being obtained. If it amounted to abandonment, it cannot be resumed unless planning permission is obtained. ... Abandonment depends on the circumstances. If the land has remained unused for a considerable time, in such circumstances that a reasonable man might conclude that the previous use had been abandoned, then the tribunal may hold it to have been abandoned."
Widgery LJ: "The substance of the defence of the appellant in this case must be that although it seems there had been no car sales use from 1961 to 1965, yet on a fair and commonsense view of the facts, the proper interpretation of those facts was that the original phase 1 use for car sales had never come to an end. It is in connection with that argument that the question of abandonment arises.
It has been suggested in the courts before, and it seems to me that it is now time to reach a view upon it, that it is perfectly feasible in this context to describe a use as having been abandoned when one means that it has not merely been suspended for a short and determined period, but has ceased with no intention to resume it at any particular time. It is perfectly true, as Mr. Glidewell says, that the word 'abandonment' does not appear in the legislation. We are not concerned with the legislation at this stage but merely with the facts of the matter. I cannot think of a better word to describe a situation in which the land owner has stopped the activities constituting the use not merely for a temporary period, but with no view to their being resumed. If that has happened, then, as a matter of fact, the use has ceased."
Lever (Finance) Ltd -v- City of Westminster; CA 22-Jul-1970 -  EWCA Civ 3;  1 QB 222; (1970) 21 P & CR 778; 68 LGR 757;  3 WLR 732;  3 All ER 496
Kent County Council -v- Kingsway Investments (Kent) Limited; HL 1971 -  AC 72
Hussain -v- Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1971) 221 EG 627
Regina -v- Yeovil Borough Council, ex parte Trustees of Elim Pentecostal Church, Yeovil; QBD 1971 - (1971) 23 P&CR 39;  70 LGR 142
Westminster Bank Limited -v- The Minister for Housing and Local Government, Beverley Borough Council; HL 1971 -  AC 508
Petticoat Lane Rentals Ltd -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; CA 1971 -  2 All ER 793;  1 WLR 1112
Stevens -v- Bromley London Borough Council  1 Ch 400
Salmon LJ, Stamp LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
The court referred to the extent of interest in land required by caravan dwellers to support payment of compensation on the issue of enforcement notice. Held: Salmon LJ: "I agree that the interest referred to in section 45(3)(b) is confined to a legal or equitable interest and does not include an interest in the loose or colloquial sense of someone being interested in the land." Stamp LJ, (dissenting), the caravan dwellers had no legal or equitable interest in the land itself or any part of it.
Town and Country Planning Act 1962 45(3)(b)
Burdle -v- Secretary of State for the Environment  1 WLR 1207;  23 All ER 240
22 Jun 1972
Lord Widgery CJ, Willis, Bridge JJ
The appellants had purchased land which had been used as a dwelling with a lean-to annex which had been used as a scrap yard, selling off car parts. The appellant had reconstructed the annex with a shop front, and began to use it more substantially for the sale of car parts. The planning authority served an enforcement notice asserting a change of use and breach of planning control. On appeal both the appellant and respondent presented the site as a whole. The appeal failed, but the respondent had argued that the notice could apply only to the annex, falling within the definition on its own of a shop, and that therefore the enforcement referred to the annex alone. The appellant said that by considering only the annex, he had lost the ability to argue that as regards the site as a whole, there had been no material cange of use. Held: The Secretary of State's decision did not identify the reasoning used to reach his decision, and the matter must be remitted. Whilst the word shop would not naturally apply to the whole site, the accident of the language used by the planning authority could not determine what made up the planning unit. A good guide to what made up a planning unit was to consider the site as a whole until and unless some smaller unit could be identified from its physical and functional identity.
Bridge J: It 'may equally be apt to consider the entire unit of occupation even though the occupier carries on a variety of activities and it is not possible to say hat one isincidental or ancillary to another' and 'however, it may frequently occur that within a single unit of occupation two or more physically separate and distinct areas are occupied for substantially different and unrelated purposes. In such a case each area used for a different main purpose (together with its incidental and ancillary activities) ought to be considered as a separate planning unit.'
Town and Country Planning Act 1962 180
Thomas David (Porthcawl) Ltd and others -v- Penybont Rural District Council and others  3 All ER 1092
5 Oct 1972
Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies, Stephenson LJJ
The appellant complained that an enforcement notice had been served as to an entire plot of land when the activities complained of, sand and gravel extraction, had occurred on only two smaller parts. Held: The site should be looked at as a whole. The appellant had a licence from the land owner to extract materials from the remaining site, had claimed the right to make such extractions, and had already extended their operations during the appeal process. The abolition of the four year rule for change of use enforcement did not apply to mining.
Pilkington -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; QBD 1973 -  1 WLR 1527; (1973) 25 P & CR 508
Kingston London Borough Council -v- Environment Secretary  1 WLR 1549
Lord Widgery CJ
Planning was granted for the rebuilding of a railway station on condition that the land allocated for parking should be made available for such purposes at all times and used for no other purpose. The station was duly rebuilt but the car park was not provided. The local planning authority served an enforcement notice requiring compliance with the condition. Held: The words of the statute clearly on their face entitle the local planning authority to impose conditions which affect land not the subject of the application itself and which go to the restriction of the past user or removal of existing work. Although they are wide it has been recognised for a long time that they are subject to certain restrictions. The two principal restrictions which the court had placed on those words are first that a condition is invalid as being contrary to law unless it is reasonably related to the development in the planning permission which has been granted: it must not be used for an ulterior purpose, and second a condition which is so clearly unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed it may be regarded as ultra vires and contrary to law and treated as such in proceedings in this court
Aston -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; 9-Apr-1973 - Unreported, 09 April 1973
Turner -v- Secretary of State of the Environment; 1974 - (1974) 28 P & CR 123
Regina -v- Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex parte Royco Homes Ltd; 1974 -  QB 720;  2 All ER 643;  2 WLR 805
Hope -v- Secretary of State for the Environment (1975) 31 P & CR 120
AI and P (Stratford) Ltd -v- Tower Hamlets London Borough Council; 1975 -  237 Estates Gazette 416
Howard -v- Secretary of State; CA 1975 -  QB 235
Sovmots Investments Ltd -v- Secretary of State for the Environment  QB 411
Conveyancing Act 1881 6
Clyde & Co -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; CA 1977 -  1 WLR 926
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler; CA 1977 -  1 QB 122
Hoveringham Gravels -v- Chiltern District Council; CA 1977 -  76 LGR 533
Newbury District Council -v- Secretary of State for the Environment and others (1977) 35 P&CR 170
Mr Justice Robert Goff
Mr Justice Robert Goff: “The subsection provides that no enforcement notice shall be served in respect of such a development. It does not provide, as it easily could have done if such had been the intention, that no enforcement notice should be served on the Crown in respect of such development. It follows that, if a private citizen should subsequently acquire any such land from the Crown, he would not have to apply for planning permission in respect of development within the subsection. He too would be protected from the service of an enforcement notice by the terms of the subsection which are quite explicit.”
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 87(1)
Penwith District Council -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; QBD 1977 -  JPL 371;  34 P & CR 269
Seddon Properties Ltd -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; 1978 - (1978) 42 P&CR 26
Brighton Borough Council -v- Secretary of State for Environment (1978) 39 P & CR 46
Winchester City Council -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; 1978 - (1978) 36 P & CR 455
Suffolk County Council -v- Mason; HL 1979 -  AC 705;  2 All ER 369
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