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Landlord and Tenant - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 130 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Barnes v Barratt; CA 1970 - [1970] 2 QB 657
 
Warder v Cooper [1970] 1 All ER 1112
1970


Landlord and Tenant
The locks were changed during the absence of the former licensee, but while his possessions were still in the property. The former tenant had no continuing right to occupy the property. Held: The former licensee had not been wrongfully evicted.
1 Citers


 
Brew Brothers Limited v Snax (Ross) Ltd [1970] QB 612
1970
CA
Sachs LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the extent to which the nature of a building affected the duty to repair under a lease. Sachs LJ said: "It seems to me that the correct approach is to look at the particular building, to look at the state which it is in at the date of the lease, to look at the precise terms of the lease, and then come to a conclusion as to whether, on a fair interpretation of those terms in relation that that state, the requisite work can fairly be termed repair. However large the covenant it must not be looked at in vacuo."
1 Citers



 
 Lake v Bennett; CA 1970 - [1970] QB 663
 
D'Silva v Lister House Development Ltd [1971] Ch 17; [1970] 1 All ER 858
1970

Buckley J
Landlord and Tenant, Legal Professions
Even an unlawful sub-tenancy can have protection under Part II of the 1954 Act. The court described as fallacious the submission that section 74(1) does not extend to or answer the question whether the document has ever been delivered, saying: "The section says that the document is to be deemed to have been duly executed and execution imports not only sealing the document, but also delivering it as an executed document." and "It is . . established by authority that negotiations subject to contract for the grant of a lease remain in a state of negotiation until exchange of lease and counter-part . . Accordingly that letter is a bar to any claim by the Plaintiff that there was a contract by correspondence, for the correspondence must, I think, be taken as correspondence in the course of negotiations which were conducted upon the footing that everything would remain in a state of negotiation until exchange of lease and counterpart. " and "The letters relied on here are letters between solicitors and in the absence of special authority in my judgment, they cannot be relied upon as constituting a contract by correspondence".
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II - Law of Property Act 1925 74(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Shaw v Groom; 1970 - [1970] 2 QB 504
 
Canas Property Co v K L Television Services [1970] 2 All ER 795; [1970] 2 QB 433; [1970] 2 WLR 1133
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
At common law on the breach of a covenant by a lessee, a lessor is entitled to re-enter or determine the lease, and the service of the writ by the lessor on the lessee brought the demise to an end. A lessor who serves a lessee with process for recovery for possession is entitled to mesne profits for the period during which the lessee remains in possession after service.
Lord Denning MR said: "where a tenant has been guilty of a breach which has not been waived, then, in order to effect a forfeiture, the lessor must actually re-enter, or do what is equivalent to re-entry, namely issue and serve a writ for possession on the lessee or assignee, as the case may be . . The lease is determined as from the date on which the writ is served. The rent is payable up to the date of service. Mesne profits are payable after the date of service." and
"If the rent is payable in advance, the writ should claim for the whole quarter's rent due in advance on March 25, 1968: Ellis v. Rowbotham [1900] 1 Q.B. 740; and mesne profits from June 24, 1968, to the date of delivery of possession. If the rent is payable in arrear the writ should claim the last quarter's rent due (for example, on March 25, 1968), and then there should be a claim in words for "rent at the rate of . . from March 25, 1968, to the date of service of the writ and mesne profits at the rate of . . from the date of service of the writ till the date of delivery of possession."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 In re ABC Coupler and Engineering Co Ltd (No 3); ChD 1970 - [1970] 1 WLR 702
 
Kammins Ballrooms Co Limited v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Limited [1971] AC 850; [1971] 1 WLR 1751; [1970] 2 All ER 871
1970
HL
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne
Estoppel, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had served his section 26 notice under the 1954 Act, but then began the court proceedings before the minumum two month period had expired. The landlord did not take the point at first, and delivered an answer and negotiated compensation. After the expiry of the maximum period of four months, when it was too late for the tenant to apply, the landlord’s solicitors informed the tenant that it would make a preliminary objection at the hearing that the tenant’s application was invalid. Held: The time limit was procedural or technical, not one of jurisdiction, and as such the landlord could waive the breach. The landlord had done so. The task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction; even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. The question was treated as a question of statutory construction: was it the intention of Parliament to preclude the parties from agreeing that a notice given by one of them to the other should have effect even though the statutory requirements were not satisfied? "And apart from this distinctive feature of this particular statute, where in any Act which merely regulates the rights and obligations of private parties inter se requirements to be complied with by one of those parties are imposed for the sole benefit of the other party it would be inconsistent with their purpose if the party intended to be benefited were not entitled to dispense with the other party’s compliance in circumstances where it as in his own interest to do so . . Upon the purposive approach to statutory construction this is the reason why in a statute of this character a procedural requirement imposed for the benefit or protection of one party alone is construed as subject to the implied exception that it can be 'waived' by the party for whose benefit it is imposed even though the statute states the requirement in unqualified and unequivocal words. In this context 'waived' means that the party has chosen not to rely upon the non-compliance of the other party with the requirement, or has disentitled himself from relying upon it either by agreeing with the other party not to do so or because he has so conducted himself that it would not be fair to allow him to rely upon the non-compliance."
Waiver is far from a precise term of art. It was used in a wider sense of a deliberate decision by a party not to stand on his strict rights, by not taking a technical point as to the validity of a notice.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Citers


 
Manfield and Sons Ltd v Botchin [1970] 2 QB 612
1970


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant wished to occupy a shop, which the landlord wished to develop, but where the landlord awaited clearance of planning difficulties. The tenant was granted a tenancy at will. After occupying the property for more than four years, the tenant asserted security of tenure under the Act. Held: A tenancy at will expressly granted, and with no provisions inconsistent with the nature of a tenancy at will such as for forfeiture, is not protected by the 1954 Act, provided the two parties genuinely agreed it to be such.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954

 
Pugh v Savage [1970] 2 QB 373; [1970] EWCA Civ 9; [1970] 2 WLR 634; [1970] 2 All ER 353; (1970) 21 P & CR 242
14 Jan 1970
CA
Harman, Salmon
Land, Landlord and Tenant
The enjoyment of an easement by a succession of tenants is sufficient to create a right by prescription for the landlord.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Peck v Anicar Properties Ltd; CA 15-Oct-1970 - Times, 15 October 1970; [1971] 1 All ER 517
 
Wolf v Crutchley [1971] 1 WLR 99
23 Oct 1970
ChD
Lord Denning M.R., Phillimore and Cairns L.JJ.
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff came to own two adjoining houses, let on long leases at low rents. She sought to use the legislation to enfranchise one property. The landlord objected saying that the houses had been used as guesthouses, and that a door had been opened up between them. They had come to be rated as one property. Held: The house was structurally independent, and occupied as a dwellinghouse, and the section was complied with. It was not particularly useful to seek to import ideas from the Rent Acts. Three considerations applied, the separate leasehold interests, use as a residence, and being structurally separate.
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 3
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ lip ]

 
 Hounslow London Borough Council v Twickenham Gardens Development Limited; 1971 - [1971] Ch 233
 
Cardshops Limited v Davies and Another [1971] 1 WLR 591
1971
CA
Widgery, Denning LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
When considering the terms of a new lease to be ordered under the Act, the terms of the current tenancy are not necessarily decisive. There may be other circumstances but it is a guide. The terms of the current tenancy are to be considered first in every case. There was no evidence of any special facts affecting the property not common to all retail premises in high-class business areas. The parties are not at liberty to insist on changes simply because they may be beneficial. Every tenant would volunteer to accept increased liabilities as to this or that matter for the purpose of getting, on terms that he thought might ultimately profit him, a lower rent; every landlord might press this or that concession on the tenant because it would enable him to say the open market rent was a higher rent. The right course is to take the terms of the existing lease are a sufficient guide. No special reason is shown for a change and the tenant objects.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 35
1 Citers


 
Abrahams v Wilson [1971] 2 QB 88
1971
CA
Widgery LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had allowed his premises to be used for the supply of Class B drugs over many months. Possession was sought under the provision of the Rent Act 1968. Held: His appeal against a possession order succeeded.
Widgery LJ said: “Applying Scrutton LJ's test, the position in regard to the finding of dangerous drugs on the demised premises I think is simply this: If the drugs are on the demised premises merely because the defendant is there and has them in his or her immediate custody, such as a pocket or a handbag, then I would say without hesitation that that does not involve a "using" of the premises in connection with the offence. On the other hand, if the premises are employed as a storage place or hiding place for dangerous drugs, a conviction for possession of such drugs, when the conviction is illuminated by further evidence to show the manner in which the drugs themselves were located, would I think be sufficient to satisfy the section and come within Case 2.”
Rent Act 1968
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Method Developments v Jones; CA 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 168; [1971] 1 All ER 1027

 
 Inland Revenue v Graham's Trustees; HL 1971 - 1971 SC (HL) 1
 
Shell-Mex v Manchester Garages [1971] 1 WLR 612
1971
CA
Buckley LJ, Denning LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The defendant was allowed to go into occupation of the plaintiff's premises solely for the purpose of selling the plaintiff's brands of petrol and the defendants undertook to use every endeavour and due diligence to sell and foster the sale of the plaintiff's products. The plaintiffs also were entitled to considerable rights of access to the premises for the duration of the agreement. The claimant said that no tenancy had been granted. Held: The Rent Acts must not be allowed to alter or influence the construction of an agreement. If the consequence in law of a transaction is the avoidance of the application of the Rent Acts, then that is not a ground on which the transaction can be flawed.
Buckley LJ said: "It may be that this is a device which has been adopted by the plaintiff company to avoid possible consequences of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, which would have affected a transaction being one of landlord and tenant; but, in my judgment, one cannot take that into account in the process of construing such a document to find out what the true nature of the transaction is. One has first to find out what is the true nature of the transaction and then see how the Act operates upon that state of affairs, if it bites at all. One should not approach the problem with a tendency to attempt to find a tenancy because unless there is a tenancy the case will escape the effects of the statute."
Denning LJ said: "Broadly speaking, we have to see whether it is a personal privilege given to a person (in which case it is a licence), or whether it grants an interest in land (in which case it is a tenancy). At one time it used to be thought that exclusive possession was a decisive factor. But that is not so. It depends on broader considerations altogether. Primarily on whether it is personal in its nature or not."
1 Citers



 
 In re 14 Grafton Street London W1; ChD 1971 - [1971] Ch 935
 
Dowty Boulton Paul Ltd v Wolverhampton Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 204
1971

Pennycuick V-C
Litigation Practice, Landlord and Tenant
An order was sought to require the defendant tenants to keep an airfield open as a going concern. Held: The order was refused. Pennycuick V-C said: "It is very well established that the court will not order specific performance of an obligation to carry on a business." and "It is unnecessary in the circumstances to discuss whether damages would be an adequate remedy to the company."
1 Citers


 
Lee-Parker v Izzett (1) [1971] 1 WLR 1688; [1971] 3 All ER 1099
1971
ChD
Goff J
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord's covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence of set-off at law to a claim for unpaid rent. Justice Goff discussed the case of Taylor v Beal: "I do not think this is bound up with technical rules of set off. It is an ancient common law right. I therefore declare that so far as the repairs are within the express or implied covenants of the landlord, the third and fourth defendants are entitled to recoup themselves out of future rents and defend any action for payment thereof. It does not follow however that the full amount expended by the third and fourth defendants on such repairs can properly be treated as payment of rent. It is a question of fact in every case whether and to what extent the expenditure was proper.
For the sake of avoiding misunderstanding I must add that of course the Taylor v Beal right can only be exercised when and so far as the landlord is in breach and any necessary notice must have been given to him."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 In re Midland Railway Co's Agreement, Charles Clay and Sons Ltd v British Railways Board; CA 1971 - [1971] Ch 725
 
London and County (A and D) Ltd v Wilfred Sportsman Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 764
1971
CA
Lord Donovan. Russell, Megaw LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
There is no reason of principle why a right of forfeiture arising from a failure to pay rent, cannot be waived in exactly the same way as a right of forfeiture arising from a breach of any other covenant in the Lease.
Russell LJ said: 'The other argument put forward was that there can never be waiver of forfeiture for non-payment of rent by recognition of the continued existence of the Lease because, as has often been said, a right of re-entry for non-payment of rent is a mere security for the payment. I am not aware of any authority for this proposition, and I see no justification in principle for making this distinction between a default in an obligation to pay rent and any other obligation. Of course, rent may be demanded after the forfeiture days are passed, and, indeed, part payment accepted on account without waiving the forfeiture; this does not recognise the continued existence of the Lease beyond the date when that rent was payable. I refer in this connection also to the passage in Shepherd v Berger [1892] 1 QB 597, 599, which appears to me inconsistent with the proposition advanced.'
1 Citers


 
Highway Properties Ltd v Kelly, Douglas and Co [1971] SCR 562; [1971] 17 DLR (3d) 710
1 Feb 1971

Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Laskin JJ
Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
(Supreme Court of Canada) Landlord and tenant—Repudiation by tenant of lease of certain premises and its consequent abandonment of said premises — Possession taken by landlord with contemporaneous assertion of right to full damages according to loss calculable over unexpired term of lease—Remedies of landlord — Measure and range of damages.
Laskin J said: "It is no longer sensible to pretend that a commercial lease, such as the one before the court, is simply a conveyance and not also a contract. It is equally untenable to persist in denying resort to the full armoury of remedies ordinarily available to redress repudiation of covenants, merely because the covenants may be associated with an interest in land."
1 Citers

[ SCC ]
 
Caerphilly Concrete Products Ltd v Owen [1972] 1 WLR 372; [1971] EWCA Civ 1; [1972] 1 All ER 248
5 Nov 1971
CA
Russell LJ, Sachs LJ, Stamp LJ
Landlord and Tenant
A lease contained an agreement by the landlord to grant a lease for a further term of five years 'at the same rent and containing the like covenants and provisos as are herein contained (including an option to renew such lease for the term of five years at the expiration thereof)'. The tenant claimed that as a perpetually renewable lease it was converted by the 1922 Act into a term of 2000 years. Held: There was an express covenant or obligation for perpetual renewal. Russell LJ said: "In the present case the brackets make it abundantly plain that the parties are explaining that 'containing the like covenants and provisos' is a phrase intended to embrace an option. That is to say that the covenants and provisos contained in the first lease, which the first lease requires the second lease to contain, are not to be construed as a reference to those covenants and provisos other than an option to renew, but as a reference to all those covenants including an option to renew." and "If the words . . . are repeated in the second lease without the words in parenthesis the second lease will not be carrying out the requirement of the first lease: it will not be granting an option for a further lease containing 'the like covenants' as defined."
Law of Property Act 1922
1 Citers

[ ]
 
Accountancy Personnel Ltd v Salters' Company [1972] EGD 461
1972
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The landlord opposed the grant of a new tenancy on redevelopment grounds. The judge found that the landlord had not established the requisite intention at the hearing date, but held that the intention would be established six months later. He made a declaration to that effect under section 31 (2) of the Act, which had the effect of terminating the tenant's tenancy on that date. The tenant appealed. By the date of the hearing the landlord's plans had been delayed. Held: The Court of Appeal could take into account the evidence of delay and extended the termination date by a further three months
Landlord and tenant Act 1954 30(1)(f) 31(2)
1 Citers


 
Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53
1972

Megarry J
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
A lease of business premises contained an option to renew the lease and provided for any such new lease: "to be for a further term of 21 years at a rent to be fixed having regard to the market value of the premises at the time of exercising this option taking into account to the advantage of the tenant any increased value of such premises attributable to structural improvements made by the tenant." Where an option was expressed to be exercisable at a price to be determined according to some stated formula, without any effective machinery being in terms provided for working out that formula, the Court had jurisdiction to determine it. The Court was reluctant to hold void for uncertainty any provision that was intended to have legal effect, and where it was accepted that the option was intended to have business efficacy.
Megarry J said: "No doubt there may be cases in which the draftsman's ineptitude will succeed in defeating the court's efforts to find a meaning for the provision in question; but only if the court is driven to it will it be held that a provision is void for uncertainty".
1 Citers


 
Roberts v Church Commissioners for England [1972] Ch 278
1972
CA
Stamp LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the nature of the habendum in a lease. Stamp LJ said: It is well settled that the habendum in a lease only marks the duration of the tenant’s interest, and that the operation of the lease as a grant takes effect only from time of its delivery . . The expression “the duration of the term” connotes the period in which the term is to continue, and it cannot start until it is created. Until then there is no tenancy and no interest in the tenant."
1 Citers


 
Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Woolgar [1972] 1 QB 48
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
A lessee made a claim to acquire the freehold of his house under the 1967 Act. The making of such a claim prevented the landlord from forfeiting the lease unless lessee had not made his claim in good faith.
Lord Denning MR said: "To my mind, under this statute a claim is made "in good faith" when it is made honestly and with no ulterior motive. It must be made by the tenant honestly in the belief that he has a lawful right to acquire the freehold or an extended lease, and it must be made without any ulterior motive, such as to avoid the just consequences of his own misdeeds or failures."
Leasehold Reform Act 1967
1 Citers



 
 Relvok Properties Ltd v Dixon; CA 1972 - (1972) 224 EG 1401; (1973) 25 P & Cr 1

 
 Total Oil Great Britain Ltd v Thompson Garages (Biggin Hill) Ltd; CA 1972 - [1972] 1 QB 318
 
Binions v Evans [1972] EWCA Civ 6; [1972] 2 All ER 70; [1972] Ch 359; [1972] 2 WLR 729
27 Jan 1972
CA
Lord Denning MR, Megalw LJ, Stephenson LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff had bought a cottage occupied by the elderly defendant under a tenancy agreement with the former owner. After six months he sought possession, saying that it was a tenancy at will. They now appealed a finding that the property was subject to a trust in the defendant's favour. Held: 'Although the words "tenant at will" are used in the agreement, the rest of it contains terms which are quite inconsistent with a tenancy at will as known to the law.' The defendant was not a tenant for life.
1 Cites


 
Binions v Evans [1972] 2 All ER 70; [1972] Ch 359; [1972] EWCA Civ 6; [1972] 2 WLR 729
27 Jan 1972
CA
Lord Denning MR, Megaw, Stephenson LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiffs had bought a cottage subjecty to a tenancy to the defendant. They sought possession saying that she held under a tenancy at will. It was a renancy for her life but described as a tenancy at will. The judge had held that the other terms were quite inconsistent with a tenancy at will. Held: The tenancy was not a tenancy at will. However because no rent was paid, the lease could not be converted under the 1925 Act to one of 99 years.
Law of Property Act 1925 149(6)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Woolgar (No 2) [1972] 1 WLR 1048; [1972] EWCA Civ 4; (1972) 24 P & CR 103; [1972] 3 All ER 610
20 Jun 1972
CA
Buckley LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlords' managing agents learned that the tenant had been convicted of keeping a brothel at the premises and served a section 146 notice intending to forfeit the tenancy. He told his staff and instructed them not to demand or accept rent. But one clerk did demand the rent and subsequently gave a receipt for it. Held: Although the tenant knew, when he paid the rent, that the landlords' intention to forfeit remained unchanged, their right to do so had been waived. Even an acceptance of rent which is expressly "without prejudice" will effect a waiver. The court considered the effects of acts of a landlord at a time when it had the right to elect to forfeit the Lease or affirm it, unequivocally demonstrating the decision to affirm it. It had irrevocably waived the right to forfeit the Lease. If a landlord, knowing of a tenant’s breach of covenant, demands rent (even through a clerical error) he cannot avoid the consequences even by an express reservation of his rights.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding; HL 13-Dec-1972 - [1973] 2 WLR 28; [1973] AC 691
 
Harlow Development Corporation v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd (1973) 226 EG 1960.
1973

Walton J
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
The parties to a lease discussed the terms upon which the landlord would carry out substantial improvement works on the demised property in turn for an increase in rent. The parties had forgotten than the tenant had an option to acquire a long lease at a fixed price, the effect of which would be to remove the landlord's entitlement to future rent.
The landlord sought to rectify. Held: The claim failed because the parties had no intention as regards the option. He also pointed out that there would have been several possibilities if the question had been drawn to the parties' attention at the time of the contract. The objectively ascertainable intention of the parties was that the Bank would retain such rights as it had.
1 Citers



 
 Killick v Second Covent Garden Property Co Ltd; CA 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 658
 
David Blackstone Ltd v Burnetts (West End) Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1487
1973

Swanwick J
Landlord and Tenant
The doctrine of election is the foundation of waiver of forfeiture. The question whether an unqualified demand for rent falling due after the date of the breach giving rise to the forfeiture amounts to an election to waive the forfeiture was considered.
Swanwick J said: "In the present case the matter does arise for decision. My view, both on principle and on such persuasive authority as has been cited to me, is that an unambiguous demand for future rent in advance such as was made here does in law amount to an election and does constitute a waiver if, at the time when it is made, the landlord has sufficient knowledge of the facts to put him to his election. To my perhaps simple mind there is a fundamental inconsistency between contending that a lease has been determined and demanding rent on the basis of its future continuance."
1 Citers


 
Heath v Drown [1973] AC 498
1973
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Kilbrandon, Lord Morris
Landlord and Tenant
The Landlord resisted a new tenancy under the 1954 Act saying that it intended to demolish and redevelop. Held: The lease had provisions which would allow the landlord to do the works required without refusing a renewal. It should be renewed. The 1954 Act is not to be allowed to stand in the way of redevelopment. When construing the Act: “One must first look at the apparent policy of the Act. I think that this was to give security of tenure to business tenants so far as that was thought to be reasonably practicable. Security of tenure was no new idea . . In every case one has to examine the relevant Act to find the limits of the security.” For the purposes of s30(1)(f) the phrase “obtaining possession of the holding” means obtaining legal possession which would yield physical possession rather than simply physical possession of the holding. The House referred to "the inherent improbability, upon a purposive construction of the Act as whole, that Parliament should have intended to deny security of tenure to a tenant because the landlord intended to carry out the work upon the premises which he was entitled to do under the terms of the existing tenancy." and "The “holding” referred to in s. 30 (1)(f) is ex hypothesi one in respect of which there is a subsisting tenancy, since s. 24 (1) extends the current tenancy until the tenant’s application for a new lease has been finally disposed of. ‘Obtaining possession of the holding’ (s.c. by the landlord) must, in my view, mean putting an end to such rights of possession of the holding as are vested in the tenant under the terms of his current tenancy. This is the ordinary meaning of “obtaining possession” in the context of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Moreover, an examination of the Act shows that when the word “possession” is used it means the legal right to possession of the land.” "
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(f)
1 Citers



 
 Parsons v Trustees of Henry Smith's Charity; CA 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 845

 
 O'Brien v Robinson; HL 19-Feb-1973 - [1973] UKHL 1; [1973] AC 912
 
Scala House and District Property Co Ltd v Forbes [1974] QB 575
1974
CA

Landlord and Tenant
A breach of the covenant either against subletting or against assignment are uniquely not a breach capable of remedy, and the lease was subject to forfeiture.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers


 
Centaploy Ltd v Matlodge Ltd [1974] Ch 1; [1973] 2 All ER 720
1974


Landlord and Tenant
The court declared to be invalid a periodic lease for which only the tenant was said to have the right to terminate.

 
G Orlik (Meat Products) Ltd v Hastings and Thanet Building Society [1974] 29 P&CR 126
1974


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant requested a new lease and the renewal of personal rights attached to the first lease. Held: The court could not countenance renewal of purely personal rights under the 1954 Act. It was said that: "The object of Part II of the Act is to give security of tenure to business tenants by, inter alia, conferring power on the court to order a new tenancy on the property comprised in "the holding", and, however widely expressed, section 35 cannot, in our judgment, consistently with the scheme found in Part II, be construed to enable the court to enlarge the holding, for example, by ordering the grant of an easement over the landlord's land or conferring rights over the landlord's land not hitherto enjoyed."
Lanldord and Tenant Act 1954 35
1 Citers


 
Meah v Sector Properties [1974] 1 All ER 1074
1974


Landlord and Tenant
The landlord served his section 25 notice, amnd the tenant his 26 counter-notice. The tenant did not in fact issue his court application until some two years later. Held: A landlord's waiver of the time limits for beginning court proceedings could only extend until the expiry of the relevant notices. After that point, the lease had terminated and the issue became one of jurisdiction. The court had none.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954

 
In re Downer Enterprises Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1460
1974
ChD
Sir John Pennycuick V-C
Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
The company was the assignee of a lease. The rent appears to have been payable in advance on the usual quarter days. The company went into liquidation in November 1971. At some time before April 1972 the liquidator instructed agents to market the lease and it was assigned to a purchaser in January 1973. Rent had been accruing due since the liquidation. Held: Sir John Pennycuick V-C said: "Given those facts, it seems to me that from the date when he gave instructions to find a purchaser - that is some date in the early spring of 1972 - the liquidator must be treated as having remained in possession of this property with a view to the realisation of the property to the best available advantage, or, in other words, he must be treated as having kept the property in order to sell it or do the best he could with it. It is immaterial, I think, in considering the purpose for which the liquidator retained the property that, having regard to the amount of the rent and the amount which he expected to realise upon a sale of the property, it might have been more advantageous to him and to his trust estate to have realised it at an earlier date.
Given those facts, it seems to me that, applying well established principles, I must hold that Prudential, if it had not been put in funds by Granada, or Schick through Granada, would have been entitled to be paid, as an expense of the liquidation, rent for approximately one year. That would cover the four quarter days at the end of March, June, September and December 1972."
1 Citers


 
Jeune v Queens Cross Properties Ltd [1974] Ch 97
1974


Landlord and Tenant, Equity
The lease contained a covenant by the landlord to carry out repairs. A balcony of his, not within the area let, was at risk of collapsing. Held: Damages alone would be not an adequate remedy. The court ordered specific performance of the landlord's covenant.
1 Citers


 
In re Dulwich College Estate's Application (1974) 231 EG 845
1974


Landlord and Tenant
The Court approved an estate management scheme under s19.
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 19
1 Citers


 
Lord Newborough v Jones [1974] 3 WLR 52; [1974] 3 All ER 17
1974
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The landlord, not finding his tenant at home, served a notice to quit by pushing it under the door of a house occupied by the tenant. The tenant claimed that the notice had disappeared below the linoleum, and had not been found for some considerable time, and that therefore he had not been served. Held: The service was valid. The landlord need serve the notice only, by a means which a reasonable person minded to bring the document to the attention of the person to be served would adopt.
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 92(1)


 
 Parsons v Trustees of Henry Smith's Charity; Parson v Gage; HL 1974 - [1974] 1 WLR 435
 
Lewis v MTC Cars Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1499
1974
ChD
Templeman J
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord served notice in a form which contained two alternatives, but he failed to strike out one. He added a statement as to why he opposed a new tenancy. Held. The notice was effective.
Templeman J said: "No one reading that notice can be in the slightest doubt; the landlord accidently failed to strike out the first sentence and intended to oppose an application to the court for the reasons set forth in the notice. Indeed Mr Colyer, who appeared for the defendants, did not contend that there was any doubt or ambiguity, but said that the notice did not comply with the Act, because it did not contain the positive statement required by the Act . . In the present case it would be perverse to turn a blind eye to the clear intention of the landlord as expressed in the notice, with the result that the notice does, in my judgment, on its true construction, state that which section 25(6) requires to be stated."
Russell LJ said: "It is quite plain that if you find one person in occupation paying sums by way of rent quarterly or half-yearly to another person, ordinarily speaking it is a right conclusion that there is a relationship between them of contractual landlord and tenant; but, of course, the circumstances may show that there is no justification for such an inference."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 25(6)
1 Citers



 
 Heslop v Burns; CA 1974 - [1974] 1 WLR 1241; [1974] 3 All ER 406
 
CH Bailey Ltd v Memorial Enterprises Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 728
1974
CA
Lord Denning MR, Sir Eric Sachs
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the construction of a rent review clause in a lease. Lord Denning MR said: "So I think these rent review clauses are to be construed according to their natural meaning. The clause in the present case says that the increased rent, when ascertained, "shall be substituted from such date", that is from September 21 1969. It was, it is true, not ascertained until March 23 1973; but once ascertained it is substituted from September 21 1969. It must be paid from that date. I know this means that it operates retrospectively. But that is the plain intention of the clause. And effect must be given to it." and
"It is time to get away from the medieval concept of rent. That appears from a passage in Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. VII (1900), p 262 . . . in modern law, rent is not conceived of as a thing, but rather as a payment which a tenant is bound by his contract to make to his landlord for the use of the land.
The time and manner of the payment is to be ascertained according to the true construction of the contract, and not by reference to out-dated relies of medieval law."
Sir Eric Sachs said: "Whatever the position last century, the word 'rent' today can often simply refer to any contractual sum to which a landlord becomes entitled for the use of his land."
1 Citers


 
Whiteminster Estates Ltd v Hodges Menswear Ltd [1974] EGD 324
1974

Pennycuick V-C
Landlord and Tenant
The landlords carried on business as men's outfitters. They also owned the shop next door which had been let as a café. The tenant applied for consent to assign the lease to another men's outfitter, and the landlord refused on the ground that the proposed assignee would be a direct competitor. Held: The landlord's fear of an adverse effect on their trade was one that could reasonably be held: "Once it was accepted, as now it must be, that a landlord was entitled to take into account his own interests as well as his interests as a landlord, that was really an end of the matter. It was sufficient that the landlord could reasonably anticipate that the opening of the new shop would prejudice his trade."
1 Citers


 
Re Hennessey [1975] 1 Ch 252
1975

Sir Anthony Plowman V-C
Landlord and Tenant
A long lease at a premium and a low rent comprised three rooms at the top of a building. Clause 7 provided that the landlord should be entitled to buy the residue of the lease for £2,500 if either the tenant gave notice to the landlord that he wished to vacate the premises or the landlord gave notice to the tenant that he wished to sell the building with vacant possession. It was contended that the proviso to s.17 applied to an agreement to surrender in the future as it applied to a present surrender. Held: The request was dismissed. Joseph was analogous and any other conclusion would drive a coach and horses through the Act. Clause 7 to be void.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 17
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Re HH Realisations Ltd; ChD 1975 - (1975) 31 P and CR 249

 
 Maridakis v Kouvaris; 1975 - (1975) 5 ALR 197

 
 Lewis v MTC Cars Ltd; CA 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 457

 
 Maunsell v Olins; HL 1975 - [1975] AC 373; [1975] 1 All ER 16

 
 Dodson Bull Carpet Co Ltd v City of London Corporation; 1975 - [1975] 2 All ER 497; [1975] 1 WLR 781

 
 Greater London Council v Jenkins; 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 155

 
 Chiswell v Griffon Land and Estates Ltd; CA 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1181
 
Sun Alliance and London Assurance Ltd v Hayman [1975] 1 WLR 177
1975


Landlord and Tenant

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 23
1 Citers



 
 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Betchworth Investments Ltd; CA 1975 - [1975] 1 EGLR 57

 
 Hagee (London) Ltd v A B Erikson and Larson (a Firm); CA 1975 - [1975] CLY 1884; [1976] 1 QB 209; [1975] 3 All ER 234
 
Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd [1975] Ch 321; [1975] 1 All ER 690
1975
ChD
Pennycuick V-C
Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the doctrine that a tenant acquiring title to land by adverse possession, did so on behalf of hs landlord. Held: The cases demonstrated that "the law … has got into something of a tangle", but the doctrine, at least as summarised by Parke B, appeared to be "in accordance with justice and common sense". If a tenant occupies land belonging to the landlord but not included in the demise, that land is presumed to be an addition to the land demised to the tenant, so that it becomes subject to the terms of the tenancy and must therefore be given up to the landlord when the tenancy ends. For there to be a surrender of an existing lease by operation of law because of the grant of a new lease,
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Dorchester Studios (Glasgow) Ltd v Stone; HL 1975 - 1975 SC (HL) 56
 
Lam Kee Ying Sdn. Bhd v Lam Shes Tong [1975] AC 247
1975
PC

Landlord and Tenant
The Board considered an alleged breach of a covenant against assignment in a lease. Held: The transfer to a newly formed company of the partnership business being conducted on the premises was a parting with possession. "A covenant which forbids a parting with possession is not broken by a lessee who in law retains the possession even though he allows another to use and occupy the premises." and "the words of the covenant must be strictly construed, since if the covenant is broken a forfeiture may result".
1 Citers



 
 Pickard v Bishop; 1975 - (1975) 31 P & CR 108
 
Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd [1975] Ch 317
2 Jan 1975
CA

Landlord and Tenant
Judgment upheld
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Agavil Investments Unreported, 3rd October 1975
3 Oct 1975
CA
Lord Justice Cairns
Landlord and Tenant
The cost of providing a caretaker's accommodation in a building was recoverable under the lease by the landlord as part of the service charge although the relevant schedule also referred to specific expenses which were also recoverable. The landlord's obligation was recover "The costs, charges and expenses incurred in employing a caretaker for the buildings whether resident on the premises or otherwise."
1 Citers


 
Morrison's Holdings Limited v Manders Limited [1976] 1 WLR 533
1976
CA
Scarman LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The tenants had to cease trading after a fire next door. They asked the landlords to reinstate and said they wished then to resume trading. Following the landlord's demolition and reconstruction of the premises the tenants sought a new tenancy. Held: They were so entitled Applying Caplan: "I would put it in my own words as follows: in order to apply for a new tenancy under the Act the tenant must show either that he is continuing in occupation of the premises for the purposes of the business carried on by him, or, if events over which he has no control have led him to absent himself from the premises, if he continues to exert and claim his right to occupancy . . the temporary absence in Caplan v Caplan which did not destroy the continuity of occupation was absence at the volition of the tenant. In the present case the absenting by the tenants of themselves from the premises after the devastating fire was not their choice but was brought about by the state of the premises created by the fire . ."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Horford Investments Ltd v Lambert [1976] Ch 39
1976
CA
Russell and Scarman LJJ and Plowman J
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord had let two houses to the same tenant. Each had been converted into flats. The tenant lived in neither house but argued from the 1889 Act, that the singular includes the plural, and that he was a protected tenant within the meaning of section 1(1) of the 1968 Act. Held: The court dismissed his appeal. In the context of the Act, and bearing in mind the policy of the Rent Acts, the singular did not include the plural; and, accordingly, that neither tenancy was within the definition of a protected tenancy as each of the two houses had been let as a house comprising several dwellings.
Russell LJ said that notwithstanding that the result contended for by the respondent landlord was in his view somewhat anomalous, the weight of authority was in favour of accepting such anomalies and holding that the Interpretation Act 1889 did not apply, and that the singular did not include the plural: "As to the first question, the point appears to me to be this: whether the phrase "a tenancy under which a dwelling-house (which may be a house or part of a house) is let as a separate dwelling" embraces a case in which the tenancy includes when created a residential building containing more than one of what might conveniently be described as units of habitation. The question appears to be ultimately whether by force of the Interpretation Act 1889 "is let as a … dwelling" is to be construed as "is let as a … dwelling or dwellings". On this point it seems to me immaterial that the houses in question are physically adapted for a great number of units of accommodation: the question really is the same as would arise for solution when on the granting of the tenancy of a house it consisted of two separate self-contained flats."
Scarman LJ: "The letting in each case was of a house comprising more dwellings than one. Was it the letting of a house as a dwelling (both parties agree that the word 'separate' is of no importance in this connection)? If [counsel for the tenant] is right that the Interpretation Act 1889 requires us to construe the subsection's phrase 'a dwelling' so that it includes 'dwellings', cadit quaestio: each tenancy is protected. But I agree with the county court judge in thinking that Parliament when it enacted section 1(1) used the singular deliberately, and in this instance did not intend the singular to include the plural. The policy of the Rent Acts was and is to protect the tenant in his home, whether the threat be to extort a premium for the grant or renewal of his tenancy, to increase his rent, or to evict him. It is not a policy for the protection of an entrepreneur such as Mr Lambert whose interest is exclusively commercial, that is to say, to obtain from his tenants a greater rental income than the rent he has contracted to pay his landlord. The Rent Acts have throughout their history constituted an interference with contract and property rights for a specific purpose – the redress of the balance of advantage enjoyed in a world of housing shortage by the landlord over those who have to rent their homes. To extend the protection of the Acts to tenancies such as these in this case would be to interfere with contract and property rights beyond the requirements of that purpose."
Interpretation Act 1889 - Rent Act 1968 1(1)

 
Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] QB 319
1976
CA
Lord Denning MR, Roskill and Ormrod LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
The court considered the nature and extent of the obligations of landlords of a building in multiple occupation to repair essential means of access. Held: Lord Denning MR (dissenting) suggested that the court had power to imply a term if it was reasonable so to do, and held that the landlords were under an implied obligation to repair accordingly. Roskill and Ormrod LJJ held to the contrary. Roskill LJ said: "But I am afraid, with profound respect, I cannot agree with his view that it is open to us in this court at the present day to imply a term because subjectively or objectively we as individual judges think it will be reasonable so to do. It must be necessary, in order to make the contract work as well as reasonable so to do, before the court can write into a contract, as a matter of implication, some term which the parties have themselves, assumedly deliberately, omitted to do."
1 Citers



 
 Carradine Properties Ltd v Aslam; ChD 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 442; [1976] 1 All ER 573

 
 Regina v A Circuit Judge (sitting at Norwich County Court) ex parte Wathen; QBD 1976 - (1976) 33 P & CR 423

 
 Liverpool City Council v Irwin; HL 31-Mar-1976 - [1976] UKHL 1; [1977] AC 239; [1976] 2 All ER 39

 
 Norfolk v Trinity College, Cambridge; 1-Apr-1976 - [1976] 1 EGLR 215; [1976] 238 EG 421; (1976) 32 P and CR 147
 
Champtaloup v Thomas [1977] 2 NSWLR 264
1977

Mahoney JA, Street CJ
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
New South Wales - an election to terminate must generally occur within a reasonable time of the discovery of the circumstances giving rise to the right. If the lessee of a flat, on learning of the lessor's breach, communicated to the lessor that he or she desired to consider his or her position, and in the meantime continued to occupy the flat and ride up and down in the lift, the lessee may not be found to have affirmed the contract (at least until a reasonable time had passed) even though the right to occupy and ride arose only by virtue of the lease.
Glass JA said: 'To impose the further requirement that the donee [of a legal right] must be actuated by a legitimate purpose, thus forcing a judicial trek through the quagmire of mixed motives would be, in my opinion, a dangerous and needless innovation.'
1 Citers


 
Tegerdine v Brooks (1977) 36 P&CR 261
1977
CA
Roskill LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The court was asked as to the validity of a section 24 notice. In his notice the landlord had stated that he would not oppose the grant of a new tenancy. The tenant failed to serve a counter-notice but then contended that the section 24 notice was invalid because it omitted some of the notes on the prescribed form. The relevant regulations permitted that notice to be as prescribed or "substantially to the same effect". Held: The omissions were immaterial because the notes in question were made irrelevant by the landlord's stated willingness to accept the grant of a new tenancy.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 24
1 Citers


 
Townsends Carriers Ltd v Pfizer Ltd [1977] 33 P&CR 361
1977

Sir Robert Megarry VC
Landlord and Tenant, Agency
A break notice had been served not by the tenant company but by an associated company, the service not being on the landlord company but an associated company. Held: Because the tenant and the landlord had allowed their respective associated companies to deal with the property as if they were landlord and tenant respectively in respect of matters such as an increase in the rent and variations of the lease, the break notice had been validly served.
1 Citers


 
Campden Hill Towers v Gardner [1977] 2 WLR 159; [1977] QB 823
1977
CA

Housing, Landlord and Tenant
A flat was let by an underlease for seven years. The lease excluded the outside walls of the flat, but the tenant covenanted to pay for repairs to the building through a service charge. The tenant refused to pay the service charge which included the costs of repairing a neighbouring block also (included within the definition of the premises by the underlease). Held: The court will ask whether, in the ordinary use of words, the part of the house at issue would be regarded as structure and exterior. In this case that included the outside walls, the outside of interior party walls, the outer sides of the horizontal divisions between the flat and the flats above and below, and the structural framework and beams directly supporting the floors, ceilings and walls. The landlord could only recover for those items which it was obliged to repair, namely the external parts of the flat within the underlease, and could not recover the cost of repairing those parts it was obliged to repair in any event under the section.
Housing Act 1961 32(1)(a) 32(1)(b)
1 Citers


 
Bickel v Duke of Westminster [1977] QB 517
1977
CA
Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
The freeholder had refused consent to an assignment of the head lease of a house to a lady who, if she had become tenant under the head lease for five years, would have been entitled to buy the freehold from the Estate. The existing tenant was a company who would achieve no such right. Held: The refusal was proper. The reason for refusal was related to the personality of the assignee, and in particular the fact that she was a natural person, not a corporation.
Lord Denning MR considered earlier cases and continued: "If those cases can properly be regarded as laying down propositions of law, I would agree that we ought to hold the landlords' refusal to be unreasonable. But I do not think they do lay down any propositions of law, and for this reason. The words of the contract are perfectly clear English words: 'such licence shall not be unreasonably withheld.' When those words come to be applied in any particular case, I do not think the court can, or should, determine by strict rules the grounds on which a landlord may, or may not, reasonably refuse his consent. He is not limited by the contract to any particular grounds. Nor should the courts limit him. Not even under the guise of construing the words. The landlord has to exercise his judgment in all sorts of circumstances. It is impossible for him, or for the courts, to envisage them all. When this lease was granted in 1947 no one could have foreseen that 20 years later Parliament would give a tenant a right to buy up the freehold. Seeing that the circumstances are infinitely various, it is impossible to formulate strict rules as to how a landlord should exercise his power of refusal. The utmost that the courts can do is to give guidance to those who have to consider the problem. As one decision follows another, people will get to know the likely result in any given set of circumstances. But no one decision will be a binding precedent as a strict rule of law. The reasons given by the judges are to be treated as propositions of good sense - in relation to the particular case - rather than propositions of law applicable to all cases. It is rather like the cases where a statute gives the court a discretion. It has always been held that this discretion is not to be fettered by strict rules: and that all that can be properly done is to indicate the chief considerations which help to arrive at a just conclusion: see Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517; Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273."
1 Citers


 
Clyde and Co v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 WLR 926
1977
CA
Sir David Cairns
Landlord and Tenant, Planning
Planning permission had been granted for an office block, together with 8 flats as part of the same building. The building was largely erected, with the residential part incomplete. There was an application to change the existing permitted use of the residential part of the block to office use. That application was refused. The resulting appeal was dismissed by the Secretary of State. At first instance Willis J. quashed the decision, following Granada on the basis that the desirability of retaining the existing housing use was an immaterial consideration. Held: This approach was wrong, Sir David Cairns: "The fact that the refusal of planning permission for a change of use cannot ensure that a current use which is a permitted use will continue was as already indicated the ground of the refusal of planning permission in the case of the Dartford cinema. It is equally true that whereas in the present case the permitted use has not been started, the refusal of an application to change of use cannot ensure that permitted use will ever be started. This was a point strongly relied on. I do not find it a compelling argument. The need for housing is certainly a planning consideration. If permission is given for office use, the permission will almost certainly be implemented and the building will be unavailable for housing. If permission for office use is refused, there is at least a fair chance that the building will be used for housing rather than being allowed to stand empty".
1 Citers



 
 Marchant v Charters; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 1181
 
Packwood Transport Ltd v Beauchamp Place Limited (1977) 3 P&CR 112
1977


Landlord and Tenant
A tenant may apply to the court for relief immediately he receives the landlord's section 146 notice.
Law of Property Act 1925 146

 
Lovely and Orchard Services v Daejan Investments (Grove Hall) Ltd (1977) 246 EG 651; (1977) 121 SJ 711; [1978] 1 EGLR 44
1977
QBD

Landlord and Tenant
When a court sets a new rent on an application for a new lease under the 1954 Act, the valuation date is, in practice, the date upon which it sets the new rent, taking effect from the date when the new lease is to be executed, although striclty according to the words of the section, it was the date upon which the new lease term would commence. A court might therefore take into account any properly forseeable changes which might take place between the date of the hearing and the commencement date for the new term.
The defendant had here argued that the proposals set out in the pleadings constituted an offer capable of acceptance by the defendant tenant.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 34


 
 Ezekiel v Orakpo; CA 1977 - [1977] QB 260
 
Turner and Bell v Searles (Stanford-le-Hope) Limited [1977] 33 P & CR 208
1977


Landlord and Tenant
The landlord opposed the grant of a new tenancy. The business tenancy was an oral one, and he opposed renewal on the ground that the tenant was operating in breach of planning controls. Held: An illegal use is a reason connected with the tenant's use and management of the holding and is a clear reason why the tenant "ought not" to be granted a new tenancy under the 1954 Act..
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)
1 Citers



 
 F R Evans (Leeds) Ltd v English Electric Co Ltd; 1977 - (1977) 36 P and C R 185
 
Middlegate Properties Limited v Gidlow-Jackson [1977] 34 P&CR 4
1977
CA

Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Herbert Berry Associates Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners; re Herbert Berry [1977] 1 WLR 1437; [1977] 1 All ER 161; [1977] UKHL TC_52_113; [1980] AC 562; 53 TC 241; [1979] STC 735; [1979] TR 335
1977
HL
Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Russell
Litigation Practice, Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
The principle to the effect that the court should exercise its discretion to restrain a distress levied by a landlord before the commencement of a winding-up only where there were special circumstances rendering it inequitable that he should be permitted to do so, applies also to a distress levied by the Crown under a statutory duty.
Lord Russell said: "Finally section 325 cannot avail the liquidator: . . It was suggested that distraint was a form of execution; but Parliament has quite clearly distinguished distress and execution: see section 228 of the 1948 Act" and "So far as concerns section 325 I cannot conceive a more deliberate restriction to two only of methods of proceeding - I use the word in a non-technical sense - against the property of a company." S61 TMA 1970 and s319 CA 1948 could quite easily sit together. Section 61 imposes on the collector a statutory duty to distrain. Under section 319(7), a distraint (even if completed by sale) within 3 months of the winding-up order charges the distrained goods or their proceeds of sale with the preferential debts. Subject to that, and the discretion of the court to restrain completion of an uncompleted distress, the distrainor keeps the good distrained. Accordingly, in a voluntary winding-up, the distraint, even if incomplete, was permitted to disturb the pari passu distribution of preferential debts. The distrained assets are not assets of the company available for distribution within sections 302 or 319(5). There was a need for a lis to support an application for an asset freezing injunction. "The primary sense of action as a term of legal act is the invocation of the jurisdiction of the court by writ."
Companies Act 1948 325 - Taxes Management Act 1970 61
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd and others v Associated Electrical Industries Ltd (Summary) [1977] 2 All ER 293; 34 P and CR 329; [1977] 2 WLR 726; 242 EG 955; [1977] EWCA Civ 1; [1977] QB 580
2 Feb 1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Roskill, Lawton LJJ
Landlord and Tenant

[ Bailii ]

 
 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment; HL 2-Mar-1977 - [1978] AC 359; [1977] UKHL 2; [1977] 34 P & CR 48; [1977] 2 WLR 450; [1977] 1 All ER 813
 
Theodorus Engelbertus Sanders v Ronald van der Putte C-73/77
14 Dec 1977
ECJ

European, Landlord and Tenant
Europa Convention of 27 September 1968 - exclusive jurisdiction - matters relating to tenancies of immovable property - strict interpretation - business carried on in immovable property rented from a third party by the lessor -agreement to run the business - application of article 16 excluded - dispute as to the existence of such an agreement
The assignment, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one contracting state in accordance with article 16 of the convention results in depriving the parties of the choice of the forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of the domicile of any of them. Having regard to that consideration the provisions of article 16 must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by their objective. Therefore, the concept of ' matters relating to... Tenancies of immovable property ' within the context of article 16 of the convention must not be interpreted as including an agreement to rent under a usufructuary lease a retail business (verpachting van een winkelbedrijf) carried on in immovable property rented from a third person by the lessor. The fact that there is a dispute as to the existence of such an agreement does not affect the reply given as regards the applicability of article 16 of the convention.

 
Jessamine Investment Co v Schwartz [1978] QB 264
1978
CA
Sir John Pennycuick, Stephenson LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
The tenants Mr and Mrs Levy did not know their landlord Mrs David's address and had no means of paying the rent. Held: They had acquired the title by adverse possession against their mesne landlord (Mrs David) - but that nevertheless their statutory tenancy had continued against the freeholder.
Sir John Pennycuick said that: "I should be very reluctant to introduce a substantive distinction in the application of a provision of the Limitation Act to registered and unregistered land respectively, based upon what is plainly a conveyancing device designed to adapt that provision to the former class of land."
Stephenson LJ said: "Decisions of this court prevent us from deciding that Mrs Schwartz was not, from the receipt of the last payment of rent by Mrs David, 'a person in whose favour the period of limitation can run,' and so not 'in adverse possession' within section 10 (1) of the Act of 1939 . . "

 
Newham London Borough v Patel (1978) 13 HLR 77
1978


Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Section 189 of the Housing Act, which compels a local authority to serve a repair notice wherever they are satisfied that a house is unfit within the meaning of section 604, unless the house is beyond repair, may result in the lawful service of notices in relation to defects which fall short of breaches of the section 11 covenant.
Housing Act 1985 189 604(1) - Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 11
1 Citers



 
 Methuen-Campbell v Walters; CA 1978 - [1978] 2 EGLR 58; [1979] 1 All ER 606; [1979] QB 525
 
Adams v Green [1978] 247 EG 46; [1978] 2 EGLR 46
1978

Stamp LJ
Landlord and Tenant
"It was no part of the policy … of the 1954 Act to give security of tenure to a business tenant at the expense of preventing redevelopment."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Citers


 
Halliard Property Co Ltd v Jack Segal Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 377; [1978] 1 All ER 1219
1978

Goulding J
Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency
The court considered a proviso for re-entry that: "forfeiture on the bankruptcy of the lessee is considered as a case of breach of condition." Held: It was clearly a condition rather than a mere covenant of the original protected tenancy that the tenant should not become a bankrupt and this condition had been broken by the tenant. The court declined an application to amend to rely upon a fresh ground of forfeiture (namely bankruptcy) when no notice under section 146 Law of Property Act 1925 had been served before the commencement of the proceedings.
1 Citers


 
Beevor v Mason (1978) 37 P & CR 452
1978


Landlord and Tenant, Banking, Agriculture
Under the 1948 Act, effect must be given to a notice to quit served after failure to comply with a notice requiring the tenant to pay any rent due within two months of the notice. The evidence showed that the landlord had previously accepted payment of the rent by cheque posted on the date it was due. The court held that a cheque posted in this way on the last day of the two month notice period was payment of the rent on that day if the cheque was honoured. The cheque was not received by the landlord until after the notice had expired. Nevertheless, as a result of the previous course of dealing, the court held that the tenant was entitled to pay by cheque and treated the post office as the landlord’s agent for the purpose of deciding when the cheque was delivered.
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948
1 Citers


 
Aldrington Garages Ltd v Fielder [1978] 37 P & CR 461
1978


Landlord and Tenant, Housing
Mr Fielder and Miss Maxwell together applied to take a self-contained flat. Each signed an agreement to pay £54.17 per month to share the use of the flat with one other person. The couple moved into the flat and enjoyed exclusive occupation. In terms if the couple parted and Mr Fielder moved out or his agreement was terminated was, the owner could require Miss Maxwell to share her living and sleeping quarters with a stranger or move out herself. They had exclusive occupation unless and until one of their agreements was terminated. Held: The right resreved by the landlord was contrary to the Rent Acts and was, in the circumstances, a pretence intended only to get round them.
Rent Act 1977
1 Citers


 
Re Ravenseft Properties Ltd's Application [1978] 1 QB 52
1978

Mocatta P
Landlord and Tenant, Commercial
A restriction in terms of the 1976 Act was not accepted merely by the agreement with the landlord. The tenant, in taking the lease, did not restrict a pre-existing freedom to trade on the demised premises, but rather obtained a new, but limited, freedom to trade there.
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976
1 Citers


 
Federal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc; (The "Nanfri") [1978] QB 927
1978
CA
Goff LJ, Lord Denning MR
Contract, Landlord and Tenant, Equity
The court considered whether claim as against a shipowner could be set off against sums due under a time charter hire. Held: Save for any contractual provision to the contrary a tenant is entitled to deduct from the rent payable, so as to extinguish or reduce an instalment of rent due, any cross claim arising out of the provisions of the lease and the operation of the lease. Equitable set-off is ultimately based on considerations of justice.
Lord Denning MR said: "It is now far too late to search through the old books and dig them out. Over 100 years have passed since the Judicature Act 1873. During that time the streams of common law and equity have flown together and combined so as to be indistinguishable the one from the other. We have no longer to ask ourselves what would the courts of common law or courts of equity have done before the Judicature Act? We have to ask ourselves: what should we do now so as to ensure fair dealing between the parties? See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A.C. 904 per Lord Diplock. This question must be asked in each case as it arises for decision: and then, from case to case, we shall build up a series of precedents to guide those who come after us. But one thing is clear: it is not every cross-claim which can be deducted. It is only cross-claims that arise out of the same transaction or are closely connected with it. And it is only cross-claims which go directly to impeach the plaintiff's demands, that is, so closely connected with his demands that it would be manifestly unjust to allow him to enforce payment without taking into account the cross-claim. Such was . . Hanak v. Green."
Judicature Act 1873
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Germax Securities Ltd v Spiegel [1978] 37 P & CR 204
1978
CA
Buckley L.J
Landlord and Tenant
A notice was deemed valid despite an error since the error was not in the operative party of the notice.
1 Citers


 
Ponsford v HMS Aerosols [1978] CLY 1813
1978


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Griffiths v Williams [1978] 2 EGLR 121
1978
CA
Goff LJ
Estoppel, Landlord and Tenant
The claimant had been told she could live in a house for her life. On that assurance she improved the house. Held: She had raised an equity, but how could it be satisfied? The court declined to order the grant of a life interest because it would have created a settlement, under which the claimant would have had the powers of a tenant for life. It suggested a long lease, determinable on her death at a nominal rent. Though the payment of a nominal rent was not contemplated when the representations were made, "perfect equity is seldom possible." The court ordered the grant of a long lease at a rent of £30 per annum, determinable on the death of the tenant. The lease was to be non-assignable, and the other terms of the lease were to be agreed between the parties or, in default of agreement, determined by the county court.
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Charles Clements (London) Ltd v Rank City Wall [1978] 1 EGLR 47; [1978] 246 EG 739
1978
Chd
Goulding J
Landlord and Tenant
When setting a rent on a lease renewal, taking into account other potential uses involves ignoring terms in the lease providing for only one use. Restrictions on use should not be relaxed solely to increase the rent, and conversely, the restrictions on use should not be tightened merely to reduce that rent.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
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Lloyd v Sadler [1978] 1 QB 774
1978
CA
Megaw LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
One of two joint tenants under a tenancy protected under the Act, had left the property to get married and did not intend to return. The remaining tenant stayed until the end of the tenancy. The landlord claimed possession, arguing that the remaining tenant was not a statutory tenant protected by the statute because she was not "the tenant". Held: Megaw LJ said that whilst it was a "remarkable fact" that "the Rent Acts throughout their long history have never made any relevant express provision relating to joint tenants or joint tenancies", "the ordinary law as to joint tenancy does not have to be, and ought not to be, applied in all its strictness . . it is permissible for the court to hold, if so to do makes better sense of the relevant statutory provision in its particular context, that one of those persons, by himself, may for certain purposes be treated as being 'the tenant'."
Rent Act 1968 3(1)(a)
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 United Scientific Holdings v Burnley Borough Council; HL 1978 - [1978] AC 904
 
Cheryl Investments v Saldanha [1978] 1 WLR 1329
1978
CA
Geoffrey Lane LJ, Lord Denning MR, Eveleigh LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
Protection was sought under the 1954 Act for premises where the relevant occupation was partly residential and partly for the purposes of a business. Held: The Act will apply so long as the business activity is a significant purpose of occupation. It must be more than incidental. The business occupation must exist both at the time when the contractual tenancy comes to an end and the date of service of the notice of determination of the tenancy: "If the tenant continues the 'business occupation' (if it may be called that) thereafter, no further difficulty arises. What is the situation, however, if between the end of the contractual tenancy and the service of notice of determination by the landlord the business occupation ceases? Section 25(1) provides that the landlord 'may terminate a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies by a notice given to the tenant in the prescribed form specifying the date at which the tenancy is to come to an end...' If at the time the notice is served the business occupation has ceased, there is no 'tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies,' and nothing on which a section 25 notice by the landlord can bite. It seems therefore that the business occupation must exist both at the time, the contractual tenancy comes to an end and at the date of service of the notice of determination. It is necessary to point out, however, that in neither of the two cases with which we are concerned was there any change of purpose between the term date and the service of notice of determination. In each case the question is, was there or was there not a section 23(1) business occupation at the time the contractual tenancy ended?"
Lord Denning MR: "There was much discussion before us as to the meaning of the Business Tenancy Act (I use those words because I think 'Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, Part II' is a little confusing), especially the word 'purposes' in section 23(1); and the time or times at which those 'purposes' had to exist; and the effect of a change by the tenant in the use to which he put the property. Could he take himself in or out of the Act at his option? I found all these matters so confusing that I do not propose to attempt a solution today. I am only going to take four simple illustrations to show how the statute works; for they will suffice for our present cases.
First, take the case where a professional man is the tenant of two premises: one his office where he works; the other his flat, conveniently near, where he has his home. He has then a 'business tenancy' of his office; and a 'regulated tenancy' of his home. This remains the situation even though he takes papers home and works on them at evenings or weekends and occasionally sees a client at home. He cannot in such a case be said to be occupying his flat 'for the purposes of' his profession. He is occupying it for the purpose of his home, even though he incidentally does some work there: see Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 155 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest.
Second, take the case where a professional man takes a tenancy of one house for the very purpose of carrying on his profession in one room and of residing in the rest of the house with his family, like the doctor who has a consulting room in his house. He has not then a 'regulated tenancy' at all. His tenancy is a 'business tenancy' and nothing else. He is clearly occupying part of the house 'for the purposes of' his profession, as one purpose; and the other part for the purpose of his dwelling as another purpose. Each purpose is significant. Neither is merely incidental to the other.
Third, suppose now that the first man decides to give up his office and to do all his work from his home, there being nothing in the tenancy of his home to prevent him doing it. In that case he becomes in the same position as the second man. He ceases to have a 'regulated tenancy' of his home. He has only a 'business tenancy' of it.
Fourth, suppose now that the second man decides to give up his office at home and to take a tenancy of an office elsewhere so as to carry on his profession elsewhere. He then has a 'business tenancy' of his new premises. But he does not get a 'regulated tenancy' of his original home, even though he occupies it now only as his home, because it was never let to him as a separate dwelling, unless the landlord agrees to the change."
Geoffrey Lane LJ discussed the ddifference between premises occupied for carrying on a business and premises occupied for the purpose of a business: "It is obviously a very fine distinction, but the words in section 23 seem to have been used in an attempt to make it absolutely clear that activities on the premises which are merely incidental to residential occupation do not bring the premises within the section although they may properly be described as using them for carrying on a trade or business. The businessman, for example, who takes work home in the evening which he does in a study set aside for the purpose may very well be using the premises partly for carrying on thereat a business, but he could scarcely be said to be occupying the premises for the purposes of a business, any more than the person who watches the television regularly every evening can be said to be occupying his house for the purpose of watching television. It is only if the activity is part of the reason for, part of his aim and object in occupying the house that the section will apply. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest expressed the concept clearly when dealing with the meaning of the words of section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132: 'It seems to me, therefore, that the words "premises … used for the purpose of smoking cannabis" are not happily chosen if they were intended to denote premises in which at any time cannabis is smoked. In my opinion, the words "premises used for any such purpose …" denote a purpose which is other than quite incidental or casual or fortuitous; they denote a purpose which is or has become either a significant one or a recognised one though certainly not necessarily an only one.'
As is so often the case in matters of this kind it will in the end come down to a question of degree, and borderline cases will produce their usual difficulties."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
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Ravenseft Properties Ltd v Davstone (Holdings) Ltd [1978] EWHC QB 1; [1979] 1 All ER 929; 249 EG 51; [1979] 2 WLR 897; [1980] QB 12
30 Oct 1978
QBD
Forbes J
Landlord and Tenant
It was a question of degree whether the work carried out on a building was a repair or work that so changed the character of the building as to involve giving back to the landlord a wholly different building to that demised.
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 Quennell v Maltby; CA 15-Nov-1978 - [1979] 1 WLR 318; [1979] 1 All ER 568; [1978] EWCA Civ 1

 
 British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd; ChD 19-Dec-1978 - [1980] QB 137; [1978] EWHC QB 2

 
 Brikom Investments v Carr; CA 1979 - [1979] 1 QB 467; [1979] 2 All ER 753
 
Morrisons Holdings Ltd v Madners Properties (Wolverhampton) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 533
1979


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285; [1979] 1 All ER 240
1979
CA
Megaw LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Damages
The amount of damages payable by a trespasser on land is ordinarily the letting value of the premises. Megaw LJ said: "It appears to me to be clear, both as a matter of principle and of authority, that in a case of this sort the plaintiff, when he has established that the defendant has remained on as a trespasser in residential property, is entitled, without bringing evidence that he could or would have let the property to someone else in the absence of the trespassing defendant, to have as damages for the trespass the value of the property as it would fairly be calculated; and, in the absence of anything special in the particular case it would be the ordinary letting value of the property that would determine the amount of damages. In the present case, therefore, it appears to me that this appeal falls to be allowed and that the plaintiffs ought to have, not merely judgment for possession, but also damages for trespass for whatever would have been the appropriate amount . . as being the proper letting value of the property from July 5, 1976, to the date of the judgment in the West London County Court".
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Hilton v James Smith and Sons (Norwood) Ltd (1979) 251 EG 1063
1979
CA

Landlord and Tenant
A landlord may be under a positive duty to his tenants to prevent obstruction of a right of way.
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Hoggett v Hoggett and Wallis [1979] 39 P&CR 67
1979


Landlord and Tenant
An act of surrender of a lease by one of two joint tenants was ineffective where the other joint tenant remained living in the property.
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Crusabridge Investments Ltd v Casings International Limited (1979) 54 TC 246
1979

HH Judge Finlay QC
Landlord and Tenant, Corporation Tax
The landlord of light industrial premises sought damages from his tenant for breach of the user covenant in the lease. This permitted the premises to be used, inter alia, as an "industrial building or structure" as defined by the Capital Allowances Act 1968. The tenant was in business of purchasing used tyres, storing and inspecting them in the premises to see whether they were suitable for making re-moulds. Those thought to be suitable were then consigned to a re-moulder which would then select and purchase the tyres it wanted. The tenant also sold re-moulded tyres on commission and provided a re-moulding service for some of its customers. Due to the nature of its business, at any one time there would be a large number of tyres stored in the premises awaiting despatch to a re-moulder. Held: The storage of used tyre casings and re-moulds fell within s.7(1)(f)(ii) and (iii) of the 1968 Act. As to Dale -v-Johnson, the true ratio of that decision was that the storage in that case was no more than ancillary to the company's trade and that Shiel J did not decide that s.7(1)(f) was only applicable if "there is a trade which consists in storage and nothing else". The words "which consists in" in s.7(1)(f) means he said "involves" .
Capital Allowances Act 1968
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Kirkwood v Johnson (1979) P&CR 392
1979
CA
Ormrod LJ, Geoffrey Lane LJ
Landlord and Tenant

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II
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Brikom Investments v Carr [1979] QB 467
1979

Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
A reversioner can grant rights in respect of covenants in the lease which bind reversioners by way of a collateral contract. When a person makes a representation intending that another should act on it: "It is no answer for the maker to say: 'You would have gone on with the transaction anyway'. That must be mere speculation. No one can be sure what he would, or would not, have done in a hypothetical state of affairs which never took place….Once it is shown that a representation was calculated to influence the judgment of a reasonable man, the presumption is that he was so influenced."

 
Marks v Warren [1979] 1 All ER 29
1979

Browne-Wilkinson J
Landlord and Tenant
An alienation provision such as the clause "Not to charge assign equitably assign underlet or part with possession of a part of the demised premises nor to hold the whole or any part of the demised premises on trust for another nor to share possession of the whole or any part of the demised premises nor to part with possession of the whole of the demised premises (except as hereinafter permitted) all of which are expressly prohibited." is, when properly analysed, in fact a series of separate covenants wrapped up together in a single clause.
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Bristol Cars Ltd v RKH (Hotels) Ltd (In Liquidation) [1979] 38 P&CR 411
1979


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had served a s26 notice, but it was invalid in specifying a date too early. Not seeing this, the landlord at first said it would not oppose a new tenancy, and gave no counter-notice and went on to apply for an interim rent. On later seeing the error, the landlord objected. Held: The landlord's behaviour created an estoppel. By the time he objected it was too late for the tenant to correct the notice.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 26

 
Metropolitan Properties v Cordery (1980) 39 P & CR 10; (1979) 251 EG 567; (1979) 39 P&CR 10
1979
CA

Legal Professions, Agency, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant sought to impose knowledge by the landlord of the condition of the property. The landlord employed porters in the building. Held: The presence of the porters was sufficient to fix the landlord with knowledge of the breach of his covenant. The Court applied the principle of deemed knowledge in the law of agency: " When any fact or circumstance, material to any transaction, business or matter in respect of which an agent is employed, comes to his knowledge in the course of such employment, and is of such a nature that it is his duty to communicate it to his principal, the principal is deemed to have notice thereof as from the time when he would have received such notice if the agent had performed his duty, and taken such steps to communicate the fact or circumstance as he ought reasonably to have taken . . ."
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Land Reclamation Co Ltd v Basildon District Council [1979] 2 All ER 993; [1979] 1 WLR 767
1979
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had acquired from the defendant a lease of access rights to its premises. It sought a renewed tenancy under the 1954 Act. Held: A lease of an easement on its own was not a lease of premises, and the tenancy was not protected under the Act. A right of way could not be "occupied" for the purpose of section 23(1).
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 23(1)
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Longrigg, Burrough Trounson v Smith (1979) 251 EG 847; [1979] 2 EGLR 42
1979
CA
Ormrod LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The defendant dealer in antiques also lived in the property with his wife. He refused to leave after the expiry of the term, claiming a Rent Act tenancy. The lessors had accepted rent from the defendant undertenant who contended that thereby a new periodic tenancy had been created. Held: All the circumstances must be looked at in order to decide whether it was proper to infer from acceptance direct that the parties had agreed to the creation of a new tenancy. In the circumstances, there was no new tenancy as the overwhelming inference was that no agreement was ever reached or indeed ever contemplated. Any common law assumption is now largely displaced where behaviour might be attributed to statutory renewal rights.
Ormrod LJ said: "The old common law presumption of a tenancy from the payment and acceptance of a sum in the nature of rent dies very hard. But I think the authorities make it quite clear that in these days of statutory controls over the landlord's right of possession, this presumption is unsound and no longer holds. The question now is a purely open question; it is simply: is it right and proper to infer from all the circumstances of the case, including the payments, that the parties had reached an agreement for a tenancy? I think it does not now go any further than that." and "The question is whether the proper inference from all the circumstances is that the parties had agreed upon a new tenancy."
Scarman LJ held that the inference to be drawn in the circumstances was that no contractual tenancy, periodic or otherwise, was agreed, but in many cases a common and reasonable inference from the acceptance of rent is the creation of a tenancy, and: "but of course the law remains essentially this, that one must look at all the circumstances of the case and determine what is a fair inference to be drawn . . Indeed, one would have thought that today, where tenants have in one respect or another the protection of the law for possession of premises to which they would have at common law no contractual entitlement, the courts would not be as quick to infer a new tenancy as in the old days they would have been where there was nothing to explain the presence of a defendant upon the premises or upon the land other than a trespass or a contract."
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West Layton Ltd v Ford; West Layton Ltd v Joseph and Another [1979] EWCA Civ 1
12 Feb 1979
CA
Roskill, Lawton, Megaw LJ
Landlord and Tenant
When considering whether to consent to an assignment of a lease, a landlord need consider only his own interests.
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Old Grovebury Manor Farm Ltd v W Seymour Plant Sales and Hire Ltd and Another [1979] EWCA Civ 2
21 Jun 1979
CA
Lord Russell of Killowen, Browne LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiffs granted a business lease to the defendants for three years. The tenant covenanted not to assign the lease without the written consent of the landlord, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of a respectable tenant. The tenant assigned the lease without the landlord's consent. That assignment was effective. The landlord served a section 146 notice to forfeit the lease. The question was whether the notice should be served on the assignee or the original tenant. Held: If the landlord's application was granted, the notice would take effect from the day the writ was issued. The assignee was the person interested. The appeal was dismissed.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
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