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Landlord and Tenant - 1900- 1929

Landlord and Tenant Law. Mostly Commercial Landlord and Tenant law but also private residential law. See also housing law.

These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.  

This page lists 87 cases, and was prepared on 21 October 2013. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.
Ellis -v- Rowbotham; CA 1900
In re Joll Gathercole -v- Norfolk (1900) 16 the Times LR 521; [1900] 2 Ch 616
1900

Collins LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
"At the end of the 12 years the possession of a tenant who has paid no rent becomes adverse during the whole time the adverse possession is validated by the statute, and it is not competent for the landlord to say that he still retains the right to recover rent which was not payable to him. I think that is emphasized by the position of a tenant under a lease for years as compared with that of a tenent under a lease from year to year. In the former case the non-payment of rent does not render the possession of th etenant adverse unless he pays rent to some person other than the lessor. But in the latter case the Legislature has treated the mere non-payment of rent by a tenant from year to year as a payment to some person other than the landlord."
Gentle -v- Faulkner [1900] 2 QB 267
1900
CA
AL Smith and Romer LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
A declaration of trust of a lease had been executed by the tenant. The landlord complained that this was a breach of the covenant against assignment. Held. In the absence of any context showing that the covenant is to have an extended meaning, a covenant in a lease against assigning the demised premises covers only a legal assignment.
Romer LJ said: "It seems to me to be clear that a covenant in a lease against assigning the demised premises, in the absence of any context showing that the covenant is to have an extended meaning, covers only a legal assignment. The covenant against assignment is, therefore, not broken by anything short of a legal assignment. In my opinion such a covenant is not broken by the lessee executing a declaration of trust of the demised premises."
Fenner -v- Blake [1900] 1 QB 426
1900

Landlord and Tenant

Oral surrender of lease.
In Re Jolly [1900] 2 Ch 616
1900
CA
Lord Alverstone MR, Rigby LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation Casemap
1 Citers
Mrs Jolly let a farm to her son who paid rent until 1881, but not thereafter, and her title to the farm was extinguished in 1893. She died in 1898. The question which arose was whether at her death any rent arrears remained due. Held: The extinction of the title also determined her entitlement to arrears of rent.
Lord Alverstone MR said: "In the year 1893 R. T. Jolly obtained, by virtue of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874, s. 1, an absolute title to the property. It is, I think, inconsistent with his right so acquired that the rent which he ought to have paid should be deemed to be still owing. The effect of the Limitation Acts of 1833 and 1874 is, in my opinion, that, after the expiration of the statutory period of 20 and 12 years respectively, all rights which the reversioner would have had in respect of the land have come to an end; and I do not think that it would be consistent with that position that rent, the non-payment of which has given the occupier a title to the land, should still be deemed to be owing."
Rigby LJ said: "It seems to me to be plain that on the expiration of the twelve years all the rights of the owner of the land are determined."
Ewart -v- Fryer; 1901
Stacey -v- Hill [1901] 1 KB 660
1901
CA
Landlord and Tenant

The surety for performance of the tenant's covenants under the lease which was "to remain in force concurrently with the lease for a period of five years" was discharged by the disclaimer of the lease by the insolvent tenant's liquidator. The lease was determined from the date of the disclaimer. The surety liability was also determined and that the action on the guarantee was not maintainable.
Budd-Scott -v- Daniell; 1902
Stein -v- Pope [1902] 1 KB 595 CA
1902
CA
Romer LJ, Sir Richard Henn Collins MR
Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
1 Cites

A lessee assigned the lease by an assignment which constituted an act of bankruptcy. He was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt and his trustee disclaimed the lease. During the interval between the assignment of the lease and the date of the adjudication two quarters' rent had fallen due, the lessors had sued the assignee and had recovered judgment for the first quarter's rent, and had commenced proceedings for the second quarter's rent. The action did not come on for trial until after the adjudication. Was the assignee of the lease liable for the rents notwithstanding the relation back of the trustee's title? Held: He was. The bankruptcy provisions, including the relation back of the trustee's title, were not provisions for the benefit of the bankrupt. As a general rule bankruptcy did not affect the rights and liabilities of persons not parties to the bankruptcy, except so far as might be necessary in the interests of the trustee and creditors and the administration of the bankrupt's estate in bankruptcy. It was not necessary in those interests to hold that the bankruptcy had freed the assignee from his liability to the lessor. The court reserved its opinion on what would have been the outcome if bankruptcy had supervened before any action had been take by the lessor against the assignee.
Walter -v- Yalden [1902] 2 KB 304
1902
QBD
Landlord and Tenant

The surrender of a lease by a lessee whose right and title to possession had been extinguished by effluxion of time gave the leaseholder no right of re-entry during the remainder of the term.
Davis -v- Town Properties Investment Corpn Ltd; CA 1903
Serjeant -v- Nash Field & Co [1903] 2 KB 304
1903

Landlord and Tenant Casemap

Wordsley Brewery -v- Halford (1903) 90 LT 89
1903

Landlord and Tenant Casemap

A notice to quit was invalid when it was served by the original lessor who had, prior to the service of the notice, granted a concurrent lease.
Glenwood Lumber Co Ltd -v- Phillips [1904] AC 405
1904
PC
Lord Davey MR
Landlord and Tenant, Torts - Other Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
The Crown had granted licenses to cut timber from an area over a period of years: "The appellants contended that this instrument conferred only a license to cut timber and carry it away, and did not give the respondent any right of occupation or interest in the land itself. Having regard to the provisions of the Act under the powers of which it was executed and to the language of the document itself, their Lordships cannot adopt this view of the construction or effect of it. In the so-called licence itself it is calld indifferently a licence and a demise, but in the Act it is spoken of as a lease, and the holder of it is called a lessee.It is not, however, a question of words but of substance." and "it is not open to the Defendant, being a wrong-doer to enquire into the nature or limitation of the possessor's right, and unless it is competent for him to do so the question of his relation to, or liability towards, the true owner cannot come into the discussion at all, and therefore, as between those two parties, full damages have to be paid without any further enquiry.' "
Harris -v- Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1904] 2 Ch 376
1904

Warrington J
Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
The case concerned the question whether an original lessee could enforce by injunction against a successor in title to the term, a provision in a lease precluding alteration without consent. The ground on which he sought to do so was a covenant by the successor in title in the usual form to observe and perform the covenants etc. contained in the lease. "There is nothing in the structure or language of the usual covenant which suggests that whilst the term is vested in the assignee the obligation to the assignor is one of indemnity, but on a subsequent assignment by him it changes into an obligation of guarantee. The single promise that the assignee and those deriving title under him would perform the covenants in the lease does not suggest that two separate obligations, different in nature, are being undertaken. The actual language used is that of indemnity: and the common understanding of conveyancers is that there exists a chain of indemnities. This established understanding of the nature of the assignee’s obligation mirrors the established understanding of the original tenant’s obligation. The original tenant’s obligation to pay rent does not become a contract of guarantee when he assigns the term."
Bree -v- Scott (1904) 29 VLR 692
1904

Beckett J, Madden C.J
Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant, Limitation Casemap
1 Citers
(Supreme Court of Victoria) The defendant squatted from 1878 upon land allotted to her mother as Crown licensee. A Crown licensee was entitled to acquire the fee upon performance of obligations in the licence. In 1885 a Crown grant was duly issued to the mother in consideration of a payment then made. A mortgagee sought to eject the defendant. The question which arose was whether the 15-year limitation period had run its course by 1899. If the period ran from 1878 the claim was barred. If the period ran only from 1885, being the date of the grant of the legal estate through which the mortgagee claimed title, the claim was not barred. Held: Time ran from the earlier date. The licence under the Land Act 1869 was the seed of which the subsequent grant was the fruition of title. "Stated generally, the policy of the [limitation legislation] was to require a person having a right to land to exercise it as against a person illegally occupying at the peril of losing the land if the illegal occupation continued undisturbed for fifteen years. Here we have an occupation such as the Statute contemplated continuing undisturbed, and when it commenced, and up to the time of the issue of the grant, a person having legal title from the Crown who could have recovered the land against the occupant ... This inactive licensee and lessee afterwards acquired a legal estate in the fee, not by virtue of any new right unconnected with her prior interest, but by the maturing of a right which had its inception in the licence. No doubt, up to the issue of the grant, there was no certainty that the fee would be acquired: the right to the land was inchoate, and might have been lost, but it was in fact perfected, and we have to say whether the nature of this new title is such as to wipe out all the consequences of past inaction, and to give a new term of fifteen years within which inaction must continue before the illegal occupant could acquire title ... I should say that since the Judicature Act, if not before, the mere difference between legal and equitable estates would be insufficient. Take the case of omission to proceed against an illegal occupant by a purchaser under a contract of sale ... there is no reason for saying that a conveyance by the vendor ... would give this new start in the owner's favour ... The changes in the legal interest of the person who might have brought the action against the defendant in the present case made no changes in her rights as against the defendant; the right to turn her out was as good in the licensee as in the grantee."
Hargroves, Aronson & Co -v- Hartopp [1905] 1 KB 472
1905
CA
Lord Alverstone
Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The tenants of a building of which the defendants were landlords sought damages after a rainwater gutter became stopped up and the defendants failed to clear it out for a few days after receiving notice of the stoppage. Held: The landlords were in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiffs and were liable for the damage done. If a building owner retains common parts which have to be maintained to protect the safe use of the demised properties, he has an obligation to take reasonable care that the parts he retains are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant or to the premises demised.
Lord Alverstone said: "A person who maintains an artificial thing like a gutter used for the very purpose of carrying off the rainwater from the roof in an improper condition after notice may be said, in my opinion to be guilty of an act of commission, and he is, in my opinion, under a duty to take care that as a result of that act no damage happens to the occupants of the house."
Lyttelton Times Company Ltd -v- Warners Ltd; PC 1906
Fear -v- Morgan [1906] 2 Ch 406
1906
CA
Landlord and Tenant
1 Cites
1 Citers
Cavalier -v- Pope [1906] AC 428; [1906] UKHL 1
22 Jun 1906
HL
Lord Loreburn LC
Negligence, Landlord and Tenant, Personal Injury


The wife of the tenant of a house let unfurnished sought to recover from the landlord damages for personal injuries arising from the non-repair of the house, on the ground that the landlord had contracted with her husband to repair the house. Held: The wife was not a party to the contract, and the absence of any duty in respect of the letting an unfurnished house prevented her from relying on any cause of action for negligence. As to Langridge -v- Levy and George v Skivington: "In both these latter cases the defendant represented that the article sold was fit and proper for the purposes for which it was contemplated that it should be used and the party injured was ignorant of its unfitness for these purposes"
Link[s] omitted
Morgan -v- William Harrison Limited (1907) 2 Ch 137
1907

Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
In some cases the relation of tenant at will may be expressly created by contract.
Morgan -v- Fear; HL 1907
More -v- Ullcoats Mining Co Ltd; 1908
Cable -v- Bryant [1908] 1 Ch 259
1908

Neville J
Land, Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
A tenant sought a right to ventilation enjoyed by land let to a tenant. It was argued that there could be no implied easement over adjoining property of a lessor where the adjoining property was already let out. It would be an easement in reversion. Held: The court avoided a decision on the point by resort to the doctrine of non-derogation from grant, which prevented the lessor and his successors from interfering with the lessee's use of the dominant land after the lease of the servient land had fallen in.
Markham -v- Paget [1908] 98 LT 605; [1908] 24 LTR 426; [1908] 1 Ch 697; [1908] 77 LJ Ch 451
1908

Landlord and Tenant, Contract
Parties had entered an agreement, with a draft lease attached to lease a coal seam. If the company anticipated damage, the lease allowed the company to leave sections unmined as support. The final lease allowed the miners to let down the surface, but now asked the miners to request obtain consent before leaving any coal un-mined. The surface was then also let to the plaintiff on a yearly tenancy. The miners sought consent as agreed, but the consent was withheld, and they proceeded. The surface property was damaged, and the tenant sought damages. Held: There was an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment in the lease of the house, but the owner of the land who was liable under that covenant could not seek an indemnity from the miner without joining in the trustees who had actually executed the lease.
Chalmer's Trustee -v- Dick's Trustee 1909 SC 761
1909

Scotland, Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The enforcement of an irritancy clause in an agricultural lease had deprived the tenants of all property in the crops growing at the time when the leases were terminated.
Gray -v- Owen [1910] 1 KB 622
1910

Landlord and Tenant

Even if one of the parties to a tenancy is acting under a mistake, there can be a surrender of a tenancy by law, provided that the mistake is not induced by the fraud of the other.
Matthews -v- Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777
1910

Parker J
Landlord and Tenant
A landlord cannot prevent accepting a payment of rent from operating as a waiver of breach merely by stating at the time of payment that he accepts it without prejudice to his right to forfeit.
Parker J said: "It is also, I think, reasonably clear upon the cases that whether the act, coupled with the knowledge, constitutes a waiver is a question which the law decides, and therefore, it is not open to a lessor who has knowledge of the breach to say 'I will treat the tenancy as existing, and I will receive the rent, or I will take advantage of my power as landlord to distrain; but I tell you that all I will do will be without prejudice to my right to re-enter, which I intend to reserve'. That is a position which he is not entitled to take up. If, knowing of the breach, he does distrain, or does receive the rent, then by law he waives the breach, and nothing which he can say by way of protest against the law will avail him anything."
Phipos -v- G & B Callegari (1910) 54 SJ 635
1910

Warrington J
Landlord and Tenant Casemap

(Obiter) The service of an upwards notice to quit on a head landlord by a head tenant had the same effect on a sub-tenancy as a surrender.
West -v- Gwynne [1911] 2 Ch 1
1911
CA
Cozens-Hardy MR, Buckley LJ
Landlord and Tenant
1 Cites

The plaintiffs were assignees of a lease dating from 1874. The lease contained a covenant by the lessees against underletting the premises or any part thereof without the consent in writing of the landlord. Under the Act, landlords could no longer seek any fine for consent to an assignment. The lease predated the Act. Held: It was wrong to describe the Act as retrospective. It applied to events taking place after it came into effect. Section 3 does not annul or make void any existing contract; it only provides that in the future, unless there is found an express provision authorizing it, there shall be no right to exact a fine. The power to refuse consent to an assignment except upon the terms of paying a fine cannot fairly be called a vested right or interest.
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1892 3
Green -v- Rheinberg (1911) 104 LT 149
1911
CA
Vaughan Williams LJ, Farwell and Kennedy LJJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap

1 Citers
Lurcott -v- Wakely & Wheeler; CA 1911
Browne -v- Flower [1911] 1 Ch 219
1911

Parker J
Landlord and Tenant
With regard to the landlord's covenant for quiet enjoyment, Parker J said: "to constitute a breach of such a covenant there must be some physical interference with the enjoyment of the demised premises, and that a mere interference with the comfort of persons using the demised premises by the creation of a personal annoyance such as might arise from noise, invasion of privacy, or otherwise is not enough."
Ind, Coope & Co [1911] 2 Ch 223
1911

Landlord and Tenant Casemap

Stait -v- Fenner [1912] 2 Ch 504
1912

Neville J
Trusts, Agency, Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
The beneficiary under a bare trust is not thereby constituted the agent of the trustee. A break clause was operable by the tenant if he gave notice and if he should pay all the rent and perform all the covenants up to the determination of the lease. The question for the court was whether that condition for payment and performance was a condition precedent to be performed before the expiration of the term: "it must have been intended, in construing a covenant of this kind, that the question whether the lease does or does not exist after the expiration of the seven or fourteen years should be capable of being decided there and then and not left to future contingency leaving both the lessor and the lessee in uncertainty as to whether they are bound by the lease or whether they are not." In this case the condition was a condition precedent.
Ayers -v- Hanson, Stanley & Prince [1912] 56 SJ 735
1912

Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
1 Citers
Corea -v- Appuhamy [1912] AC 230
1912

Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
Shanly -v- Ward; CA 1913
Rickards -v- Lothian; PC 11-Feb-1913
Reeves -v- Pope [1914] 2 KB 284
1914
CA
Lord Reading CJ, Buckley LJ, Phillimore LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The potential landlord agreed with the proposed tenant to build a hotel by a date, and the tenant agreed to take a lease when it was ready. The building was late in completion. The tenant took the lease but without prejudice to his claim for damages. The landlord then mortgaged its interest to the claimant. The tenant sought to set its damages claim off against the rent due to the mortgagee for periods since the date of the mortgage. The mortgage took effect under the common law as a conveyance, subject to the mortgagee's obligation to reconvey once the mortgage debt was paid off. The mortgagee had the legal title to the land. Held: The tenant's claim for a set-off failed. A transferee of the reversion is entitled to recover the rent in his own right, and therefore an equitable right of set-off which could have been raised in the case of a normal equitable assignment of a chose in action (including one which would now be recognised as a legal assignment by virtue of section 136) cannot be invoked.
Lord Reading CJ said: "It is perfectly plain that we are not dealing here with the right to set-off against the assignment of a chose in action, in which event quite different principles apply. . . "But that is not the real question in this case. The whole point depends upon whether or not Mr Crawford is right in saying that his client would be entitled to set off this claim, notwithstanding that it is not an interest in land. That is the whole matter in dispute. If what his client had was an interest in land which he desired to set off against the mortgagees in possession, no doubt the cases which he has quoted are in point as authorities for that proposition; but the moment it is ascertained that in this case the claim is not an interest in land, but if established is merely a right to damages against the mortgagor for breach of an agreement made in respect of, or in connection with, the land".
Buckley LJ said that the tenant's argument that the right to future rent which had been transferred was a chose in action was "wholly misconceived" and that the mortgagees were not assignees of the rent: "The mortgagees were entitled, as mortgagees, to the reversion expectant on the determination of the lease under which the defendant held, and as such mortgagees they were entitled in their own right to enforce payment of the arrears of rent. They were not assignees of the rent; they were persons claiming to enforce payment of rent as entitled thereto as mortgagees; they could have distrained for the rent."
"Then it was said that there was a right of set-off by reason of the fact that the damages in question were damages arising from a breach of contract to do something upon the land within a time.
"Now that, I conceive, is wholly a misconception. The doctrine is this – that whether there be a purchaser or mortgagee (it does not matter which) and the purchaser or mortgagee finds a tenant in possession, he is bound to assume that the tenant in possession has some interest in the land … [The damages gained under the building agreement] were not any incumbrance on the land, and the right to them was no estate or interest in any way in the land. The damages in question, therefore, are not within the principle which is to be found in and perfectly indisputably established by the cases which have been cited to us".
Dooner -v- Odlum [1914] 2 Ir R 411
1914

Dodd J
Landlord and Tenant

(Kings Bench Division - Ireland) Dodd J said: "The rent, according to the authorities I have cited, is divisible. There is absolutely no evidence and no presumption upon which to found an inference that she holds an undivided share in the lands jointly or as tenant in common, in the ordinary sense of the term, with others. In one sense, of course, it may be contended that a number of tenants, each holding a divided portion and each contributing to the entire rent, are tenants in common . . But the authorities recognize a divided share, and the inference here is overwhelming that it is a divided share that the defendant holds."
Wheeler -v Keeble [1920] 1 Ch 57
1914

Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
Jolly -v- Brown [1914] 2 KB 109
1914
CA
Buckley LJ Kennedy LJ (majority) Vaughan Williams LJ (dissenting)
Landlord and Tenant
1 Cites
1 Citers
"The Act of Parliament provides that a right of re-entry or forfeiture for breach of covenant in a lease shall not be enforceable unless the lessor serves on the lessee a notice specifying the particular breach complained of, and if the breach is capable of remedy requiring the lessee to remedy the breach. In that sentence 'breach complained of' means (see the earlier words of the section) breach of a covenant in the lease of which the lessor complains. He must specify the particular breach of the covenant in question. What he has to do is to give a notice specifying the particular breach of a covenant in the lease of which he makes complaint. If the breach complained of be breach of a covenant to repair, the obvious intention of the legislature is that the attention of the tenant shall be particularly called to the particular condition of the premises which the tenant is required to remedy, so that he may remedy it if he be so minded. The right of re-entry or forfeiture arises upon neglect on the part of the tenant to remedy the condition of the premises to which his attention is thus called. It is not, for instance, sufficient that the lessor should give the tenant notice that he has broken the covenant to repair. The tenant is entitled to know how he is said to have broken it. For instance, that he has broken it by not reglazing broken windows, or by not rebuilding a demolished party wall, or by not keeping the roof in proper repair. But the lessor is not bound to go on and say the broken windows are situate at such and such places or the repair which the roof requires is to replace so many tiles or slates found in such and such positions. The notice must be one which calls the tenant's attention to the particular condition of the premises which is alleged to be defective. It need not identify every defect in the conditions to which attention is called. The breach of covenant must arise by either doing or neglecting to do some act. The particular breach complained of is specified when the act which the tenant has done or which the tenant has neglected to do is specifically pointed out. This is done when the lessor says you have not repaired the roof or you have not glazed the windows. The argument has largely proceeded in my opinion upon a confusion between two things which are distinct, namely, specifying the particular breach complained of and giving particulars of the breaches complained of. The lessor is bound to do the former, he is not bound to do the latter."
Dooner -v- Odlum; 02-Jan-1914
Goldstein -v- Sanders [1915] 1 ChD 549
1915

Landlord and Tenant Casemap

John Haig & Co v Boswell-Preston 1915 SC 339
1915

Scotland, Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
A tenant may be able to retain rent where the landlord was in material breach of his duty under the lease to maintain fixed equipment.
Lord Ashburton -v- Nocton [1915] 1 Ch 274
1915
CA
Swinfen Eady LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The parties to a lease can agree that an early payment of rent will satsify the duty to pay rent due later, displacing the rule that an early payment does not satisfy a later duty to make payment.
Lovesy -v- Palmer [1916] 2 Ch 233; [1916-1917] All ER 1034
1916

Contract, Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
Solicitors for two parties corresponded and agreed for their clients about a proposed lease. The plaintiff said the agreement was to be on behalf of a company he was yet to form. The documents making up the memorandum made no mention of the company. Held: The solicitor was not intended to be bound by the alleged contract, and therefore no evidence could be given that the he was agent of the intended company. No sufficient memorandum existed.
Malzy -v- Eicholz; CA 1916
Hart -v- Rogers; 1916
Fox -v- Jolly; HL 1916
Phelps -v- City of London Corporation; 1916
Malzy -v- Eichholz; CA 1916
In re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426
1916
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
Re Boyer's Settled Estates; 1916
Cheater -v- Cater; CA 1917
Barnes -v- City of London Real Property Co Ltd [1918] 2 Ch 18
1918

Sargant J
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The landlord defendants had let various sets of rooms imposing on the tenants an obligation to pay a stated additional rent specifically for the cleaning of rooms by a house-keeper to be provided for the purpose. The agreements placed no express obligation on the landlords to provide for the cleaning of the rooms. Held: The obligation of the tenants to pay the rent for the particular service was an unqualified obligation to pay a definite periodic amount in respect of that service, the obligation to pay not being expressed so as to be conditional on the provision of the service or on the service of notice requesting payment. (Obiter) Such an obligation should be implied.
Epsom Grand Stand Association Ltd -v- Clarke [1919] WN 170
1919
CA
Bankes.Scrutton and Atkin LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
Premises on a racecourse were let to the defendants in part as a public house, and to occupy the other part themselves. The court was asked whether this was a letting of "a house or a part of a house let as a separate dwelling . . and every such house or part of a house shall be deemed to be a dwelling-house to which this Act applies" so that the 1915 Act applied. Held: The premises were "let as a separate dwelling". Bankes LJ: "The house was dwelt in by the defendants and let to them for that purpose. It is in the fullest sense a dwelling-house and none the less so because it is also a public-house. [Counsel for the landlord] contended that the Acts do not apply to houses if let for business purposes. I cannot accept that view. No doubt if the word "dwelling-house" is given its ordinary meaning the Act may seem to include cases not contemplated by the Legislature; but a restricted meaning would exclude many cases which were intended to be included. The object of the Legislature was to include all houses which are occupied as dwelling-houses provided they are of the class ascertained by their value as prescribed by the Act, notwithstanding that they are also used by the tenant for other purposes as well as those of a dwelling-house."
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915
Epsom Grandstand Association Ltd -v- Clarke; CA 1919
Ellis -v- Torrington; CA 1920
Re Lyne-Stephens and Scott-Miller's Contract; CA 1920
Matthey -v- Curling [1920] 3 KB 608
1920
CA
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
Hemmings -v- The Stoke Poges Golf Club Limited; CA 1920
Cole -v- Kelly [1920] 2 KB 10
1920
CA
Asprey J, Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap

In the absence of a contrary intention a concurrent lease passes to the concurrent lessee the concurrent lessor's accrued rights under the existing lease. The landlord has granted to the second lessee a pro tanto disposition of the reversionary estate.
Asprey J explained a holding over: "A holding over occurs where, after the expiration of the term originally granted, the tenant continues in possession with the consent of the landlord but without prior agreement as to the terms upon which the possession of the subject property is to be retained, which situation gives rise to a tenancy at will which tenancy by a subsequent payment of rent or by subsequent agreement may be converted into a tenancy of more fixed duration, e.g. weekly, monthly, etc."
Atkin LJ said that where, after the termination of any tenancy, the tenant holds over, and "the facts do not exclude an implied agreement to hold upon the terms of the old lease," then impliedly the old terms remain.
Rossdale -v- Denny [1921] 90 LJ Ch 204; [1921] 1 Ch 57; [1921] 124 LTR 294; [1921] 37 TLR 45; [1921] 65 Sol Jo 59
1921
CA
LJ Sterndale, Sargant L.J
Contract, Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
The plaintiff offered in writing to purchase a leasehold house, but the letter was to take effect 'on signing of a formal contract' and 'This offer is subject to a formal contract to embody such reasonable provisions as my solicitors may approve'. The offer was accepted, but the defendant backed out. Held: No formal contract was created. (per L Sterndale) "I am far from saying that there may not be an unconditional offer and acceptance of a binding contract although the letters may contain the words 'subject to a formal contract', but certainly those words do point in the direction of the offer or acceptance being conditional. I do not think it can be put higher than that; I think he is well founded in saying that the general trend of the decisions has been, where those words occurred, to hold that the offer or acceptance was conditional."
United Dairies Ltd -v- Public Trustee; 1922
Matthey -v- Curling; HL 1922
Brewer -v- Jacobs; 1923
Jackson -v- Simons; 1923
Re Knight and Hubbard's Underlease; 1923
Anstruther-Gough-Calthorpe -v- McOscar [1924] 1 KB 716
1924
CA
Atkin LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Tenants of new houses in 1925 agreed in their 99 year leases to yield up the premises having well and sufficiently repaired the premises with all manner of reparations. Held: Atkin LJ said that repair 'connotes the idea of making good damage so as to leave the subject so far as possible as though it had not been damaged'.
Cockburn -v- Smith [1924] 2 KB 119
1924

Scrutton LJ, Bankes LJ and Sargant LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Cites

The owner of a block of flats let one to the tenant, but kept the roof and guttering in his own possession and control. The guttering became defective and the landlord failed to remedy it after notice. Rainwater escaped and caused damage to the Claimant. Held: The landlords were liable for the damage suffered by her.
Bankes LJ referred to a "line of authorities to show that a landlord is under an obligation to take reasonable care that the premises retained in his occupation are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the parts demised to others."
Houlder Brothers & Co Ltd -v- Gibbs; CA 1925
P Phipps and Co (Northampton and Towcester Breweries) Ltd -v- Rogers [1925] 1 KB 14
1925

Atkin LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
A notice to quit a lease should be so expressed as to expire on the relevant date. "The date of determination must be the right date."
Boswell -v- Crucible Steel Co [1925] 1 KB 119
1925
CA
Atkin LJ
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The question was whether plate glass windows which formed part of the wall of a warehouse were landlord's fixtures within the meaning of a repairing covenant: ". . . I am quite satisfied that they are not landlord's fixtures, and for the simple reason that they are not fixtures at all in the sense in which that term is generally understood. A fixture, as that term is used in connection with the house, means something which has been affixed to the freehold as accessory to the house. It does not include things which were made part of the house itself in the course of its construction."
Chaplin -v- Smith; 1926
Fisher -v- Walters [1926] 2 KB 315
1926
KBD
Finlay J, Mackinnon J
Landlord and Tenant

T complained of being injured when the ceiling fell in the house. The defect was latent. Held: L was not liable without notice of te defect.
Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 15
Griffin -v- Fillet [1926] 1 KB 17
1926

Wright J
Landlord and Tenant Casemap

The tenant gave notice to his landlord that steps to the dwelling-house needed attention but the lessee did not know that the steps were in fact actually dangerous. Held: The landlord's liability rested upon the lessor when subsequently he, though not his lessee, did acquire knowledge that the steps were actually dangerous.
Wright J said: "the lessor in my judgment was not liable for breach of covenant until he had been able to ascertain the nature of the repairs required. This he knew by 8th April, and I think he acted at his peril if he did not at once remedy the non-repair, either by temporary measures, if the permanent repairs could not be immediately effected, or by doing the permanent repairs, if this was practicable. If he did not do this he committed a breach of covenant."
Lesley & Company -v- Cumming [1926] 2KB 417
1926
KBD
Roche J and MacKinnon J
Landlord and Tenant Casemap
1 Citers
The County Court had held that the landlords were not entitled to recover possession of a flat of which the defendant was tenant because the premises had not been taken out of the protection of the Rent Restrictions Act by the tenant twice sub-letting furnished the whole of the premises with the landlord’s permission for periods of a year, which periods had expired before the commencement by the landlord of proceedings to recover possession. Held: Roche J "I do not think that the effect of the letting of the whole premises furnished to Mr Moore and Mrs Wilcox (with it is to be noted, the consent of the plaintiffs) was that the premises both became and continued for all time premises to which the Acts of 1920 and 1923 did not apply. In my opinion, at any rate, from the termination of those sub-tenancies Robert Cumming was in possession; his tenancy was a statutory one and the premises were not let furnished." Mackinnon J: "I do not suppose that Mr Stone (counsel for the landlord) would have sought to argue that Prout -v- Hunter went as far as to apply in a case where the dwelling house had been let furnished during the currency of the original lease, say in 1919 or 1920, but he does seek to say the letting furnished for, I suppose, however short a period after the tenant became a statutory tenant took the house out of the category of a protected house and put it into the category of unprotected house. It is only necessary to consider what startling results that contention would lead to in order to see that that argument must be wrong. For instance, if there be, as well there may be, a person in occupation of a house at Henley on Thames as what is called a statutory tenant, and supposing the owner of that house discovered that the statutory tenant let the premises furnished for Regatta Week in 1922, could he now, by virtue of that use of the house for a week 4 years ago, come to the court and say: give me possession of the premises, because by virtue of that temporary sub-letting so long ago the premises cease to be protected? I am far from saying because you find that some contention under these Acts leads to an extraordinary result that therefore that cannot be the effect of the Act, because the Acts are so worded that extraordinary results of one kind and another do follow; but I think these considerations assist in leading one to the conclusion, with which I agree, that the fact that a house has been let furnished for a period which had expired before proceedings are commenced cannot be relied upon as taking the house out of the protection of the Act in the way in which is suggested."
Booth -v- Thomas [1926] Ch 397
1926
CA
Sir Ernest Pollock MR, Sargant LJ
Landlord and Tenant
1 Citers
A landlord, whose predecessor in title had enclosed a natural stream in an artificial culvert which was incapable of retaining it, was held liable to the tenant for injury suffered by the demised premises as a result of the outflow of water consequent upon the culvert falling into disrepair. Held: Without finding it necessary to decide whether liability arose on other grounds also, considered that it arose under an express covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease. A mere act of omission on the part of a landlord is capable of constituting a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, if, but only if, there is a duty to do something.
Newman -v- Slade [1926] 2 KB 328; [1926] 42 TLR 607; [1926] 70 Sol Jo 738
1926
KBD
Landlord and Tenant
A notice to quit given by reference to a calendar week (excluding the day on which it was sent, but including the day on which it is received) was effective, unless a contrary intention was shown.
Morgan -v- Liverpool Corporation; CA 1927
Hicks -v- Snook; CA 1928
Howson -v- Buxton; CA 1928
Farr -v- Gillings [1928] TLR 249
1928

Landlord and Tenant

In re Drew (A Bankrupt) [1929] IR 504
1929

Johnston J
Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency Casemap
1 Citers
(Ireland) A tenant subject to a re-entry clause in his tenancy agreement in the case of his being made bankrupt, and who had gone bankrupt had broken an obligation of his tenancy. He was not protected from an order for possession. "The tenant here has broken one of the conditions of his tenancy by allowing himself to be adjudicated a bankrupt, and therefore he is no longer entitled to possession, even as a statutory tenant."
Viscount Tredegar -v- Harwood; HL 1929

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