Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Insurance - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 15 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
Australia & New Zealand Bank Limited -v- Colonial & Eagle Wharves Limited [1960] 2 Lloyds Rep 241
1960

McNair J
Insurance
A claim was made under an all risks insurance policy on goods taken out by a firm of wharfingers. There was an excess of £100 each and every claim. During the currency of the policy the wharfingers misdelivered a total of 246 bales on 30 separate occasions. Held: The word "claim" in the excess clause meant "the occurrence of a state of facts which justifies a claim on underwriters. It did not refer to the assertion of a claim on underwriters" "It seems to me quite absurd that the wharfingers' right of recovery should be determined either by the form of the Bank's letter of claim against the wharfingers or the form of the wharfingers' claim against the underwriters. In other words, in my judgment, the operation of the Excess Clause is determined by the facts which give rise to the claim and not by the form in which the claim is asserted." There were 30 separate claims covering 30 separate misdeliveries, and that the deductible of £100 applied to each claim.
1 Citers


 
Pocock -v- Century Insurance Co Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyd's List Rep 150
1960


Insurance

1 Citers



 
 John Martin -v- Russell; 1961 - [1960] Lloyd's Rep 554
 
Slattery -v- Mance [1962] 1 QB 676
1962


Insurance
Where the insured property is damaged in a fire, unless the insurers allege that it had been started deliberately with the connivance of the insured, acceptance that a fire had occurred amounted to admission of the operation of an insured peril.
1 Citers


 
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd -v- Nisbet Shipping Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 330
1962
QBD
Diplock J
Insurance
The assured alone can give a valid receipt and discharge to a third party against whom a judgment has been given following a successful subrogated claim.
1 Citers


 
Chandris -v- Argo Insurance Ltd [1963] 2 LLoyds Rep 64
1963

Megaw J
Transport, Insurance
Terms of an insurance policy for the very nature of the loss may require a particular method of computation or process of quantification of loss before payment is due. Ordinarily, the right to the indemnity accrues as soon as the loss has been suffered.
1 Citers


 
Hardy -v- Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745; [1964] 2 All ER 742
1964
CA
Diplock LJ, Lord Denning MR
Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract
The court was asked whether insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1960 would provide valid cover for the benefit of a third party injured by deliberately criminal conduct on the part of the driver. Held: Diplock LJ said: "The rule of law on which the major premise is based - ex turpi causa non oritur actio - is concerned not specifically with the lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the courts, whether or not such rights arise under contract. All that the rule means is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right (or by someone who is regarded in law as his successor) which is regarded by the court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that right."
Diplock LJ said: "It is well settled that if a man commits murder or committed felo de se in the days when suicide was still a crime, neither he nor his personal representatives could be entitled to reap any financial benefit from such an act: In the Estate of Crippen [1911] P. 108; Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd . [1938] A.C. 586. This was because the law recognised that, in the public interest, such acts should be deterred and moreover that it would shock the public conscience if a man could use the courts to enforce a money claim either under a contract or a will by reason of his having committed such acts...The court has to weigh the gravity of the anti-social act and the extent to which it will be encouraged by enforcing the right sought to be asserted against the social harm which will be caused if the right is not enforced." As to proposition that all contracts to indemnify a person against a liability which he may incur by committing an intentional crime are unlawful:- "The rule of law . . - ex turpi causa non oritur actio - is concerned not specifically with the lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the courts, whether or not such rights arise under the contract. All that the rule means is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right ... which is regarded by the court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that right."
Lord Denning MR said: "no person can claim indemnity or reparation for his own wilful and culpable crime. He is under a disability precluding him from imposing a claim."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Compania Colombiana de Seguros -v- Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101
1965

Roskill J
Insurance
The court considered the situation arising where an insurer took an sssignment of the right of action from the insured. Held: Once there has been an effective assignment of a chose in action, the assignor has no continuing interest in the right in action. The underwriters may however recover more than 100 per cent. of their loss, whereas by subrogation they could only have recovered up to 100 per cent. of their loss.
1 Citers


 
Crows Transport Ltd -v- Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 383
1965


Insurance, Transport
The insured goods were stolen from temporary storage whilst awaiting being loading. Held They were 'in transit' under the insurance policy, everything done thereafter was incidental to and part of that transit.
1 Citers


 
Barrett Bros (Taxis) Ltd -v- Davies Lickiss and Milestone Motor Policies at Lloyd's, Third Parties [1966] 1 WLR 1334
1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon, Dankwerts LJ
Insurance
The court was asked whether notice had in substance been properly given by an insured so as to allow a claim to be made under an insurance policy. The County Court judge held that there had been a breach of condition and that the insurers were therefore entitled to decline liability. Held: The appeal succeeded. The insurers had all relevant information from another source, so notice was irrelevant. The notification condition had been inserted in the policy so as to afford a protection to the insurers so they should know in good time about the accident and any proceedings consequent on it. If they obtain all the material knowledge from another source so that they are not prejudiced at all by the failure of the insured himself to tell him, then they cannot rely on the condition to defeat the claim.
Lord Denning MR said: ""Seeing that they had received the information from the police, it would be a futile thing to require the motor-cyclist himself to give them the self-same information. The law never compels a person to do that which is useless and unnecessary."
Salmon LJ held that in principle the insurers were entitled to avoid liability on the grounds of the insured's failure to send them the notice of intended prosecution and summons, but agreed that in the circumstances of the case they had waived their right to do so.
1 Citers


 
Fraser -v- B N Furman (Productions) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 898
1967
CA
Diplock LJ
Insurance
The employer’s liability policy contained a condition precedent that the insured should take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents and disease. The company sought to rely upon the clause to avoid liability. Held: "'Reasonable' does not mean reasonable as between the employer and the employee. It means reasonable as between the insured and the insurer having regard to the commercial purpose of the contract, which is inter alia to indemnify the insured against liability for his (the insured's) personal negligence. That, too, is established by the case which I have cited. Obviously, the condition cannot mean that the insured must take measures to avert dangers which he does not himself foresee, although the hypothetical reasonably careful employer would foresee them. That would be repugnant to the commercial purpose of the contract, for failure to foresee dangers is one of the commonest grounds of liability in negligence. That, too, is established by the case which I have cited. Obviously, the condition cannot mean that the insured must take measures to avert dangers which he does not himself foresee, although the hypothetical reasonably careful employer would foresee them. That would be repugnant to the commercial purpose of the contract, for failure to foresee dangers is one of the commonest grounds of liability in negligence. What, in my view, is "reasonable" as between the insured and the insurer, without being repugnant to the commercial object of the contract, is that the insured should not deliberately court a danger, the existence of which he recognises, by refraining from taking any measures to avert it."
1 Citers



 
 Post Office -v- Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd; CA 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 363; [1967] 1 Lloyds Rep 216
 
Charnock -v- Liverpool Corporation [1968] 1 WLR 1498
1968

Salmon LJ
Insurance



 
 Gurtner -v- Circuit; CA 1968 - [1968] 2 QB 587
 
Jason -v- Batten (1930) Ltd [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 281
1969

Fisher J
Insurance, Damages
The plaintiff suffered a coronary thrombosis partly as the result of an accident caused by the defendant’s negligence and partly as a result of a pre-existing medical condition. He was a market trader, the one man in a one-man business, a limited company. But he did not have the beneficial ownership of all the shares in that company. Fifty per cent of those shares were held in trust for his children. "The form in which he took the profits was by way of director's fees which were voted to him annually, but the amount so voted was decided by him, in consultation with his accountant, and was quite properly influenced by tax considerations" Held: The true measure of his loss was the reduction in the net profit of the company caused by his injuries, and was not restricted to 50% of those profits. The insured
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.