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Housing - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 48 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Skinner v Geary [1931] 2 KB 546
1931
CA
Scrutton LJ
Housing
Scrutton LJ said that the Rent Acts did not protect a tenant who was not in occupation of a house in the sense that the house was his home.
1 Citers



 
 Briddon v George; CA 1936 - [1936] 1 All ER 609

 
 Markozoff v Craig; 1939 - (1949) 93 Sol Jo 693

 
 Cumming v Danson; CA 1942 - [1942] 2 All ER 653; [1942] 112 LJKB 145; [1942] 59 TLR 70; [1942] 87 Sol Jo 21
 
Lavender v Betts [1942] 2 All ER 72
1942

Atkinson J
Housing
The landlord, served a notice to quit, and obtained entry to the property without force and removed the doors and windows so that it could no longer be used as a dwelling. The plaintiff brought an action for trespass. Held: After referring to the landlord’s right, at common law, to retake possession of the demised premises peaceably after the determination of the tenancy, the court pointed out that, following the enactment of the 1920 Act, the position was regulated by section 15(1). The provisions are “quite clear”, and “A statutory tenancy is created, and the terms of the statutory tenancy are to be the same as those which have prevailed during the contractual tenancy. At the expiration of the notice the plaintiffs were in possession. They retained possession, and they were there on the terms of their original tenancy. They were under a legal obligation to carry out the obligations which had rested on them, and the landlord was under the same obligation; and the plaintiffs had the benefit of any terms and conditions which formed part of the contract of tenancy. No one disputes that one of the obligations resting on the landlord, of which the plaintiffs had the benefit, was an undertaking for quiet enjoyment. It is perfectly clear from the two cases which have been cited to me - Remon v City of London Real Property Co Ltd and Cruise v Terrell - that the effect of the section is that a statutory tenancy is created on the terms which I have stated. The statutory tenant has the same rights and is subject to the same obligations as prevailed during the tenancy. Therefore the landlord has no conceivable right to interfere with their possession or to trespass on the premises occupied by them, unless he obtains an order giving him possession of the premises.”
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 815(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Carter v SU Carburetter Co [1942] 2 KB 288
1942
CA
Lord Greene MR
Housing
A statutory tenancy is not an estate in land but a mere "personal right of occupation" and is unassignable.
1 Citers


 
Summers v Salford Corporation [1943] AC 283
1943
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Wright, Lord Romer
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
The tenant had given notice to the landlord's agent that a sash-cord in the only window of a bedroom had broken. No repair was effected and about two months later the second sash-cord broke injuring the tenant. The House was asked whether there was a breach by the landlords of the implied undertaking in the Act, that the house would be kept by the landlord during the tenancy in all respects fit for human habitation. Held: Lord Atkin said: "In the present case the point on which the Court of Appeal in Morgans case decided for the defendant does not arise, namely, that notice of the lack of repair complained of must be given to the landlord before his statutory obligation arises. I can see that different considerations may arise in the case of an obligation to repair imposed in the public interest, and I think that this question must be left open, and I reserve to myself the right to reconsider my former decision if the necessity arises."
Housing Act 1936 2(1)
1 Citers


 
Minister of Health v Bellotti [1944] 1 KB 298; [1944] 1 All ER 238
1944
CA
Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
298 blocks of flats had been requisitioned to provide accommodation for persons evacuated from Gibraltar during the war. The evacuees occupied the various flats as licensees. They were given only one week's notice terminating their licences. Held: Where the relevant period has not been specified by the licence itself, a licensee is entitled, following revocation of the licence, to whatever in all the circumstances is a reasonable time to remove himself and his possessions. It was an unreasonably short period, although possession proceedings were not in fact begun until after the lapse of a reasonable time.
Had the licences been validly terminated? A licensor can terminate a licence at any time as long as reasonable time is given within which the determination is to take effect. However, the question of what the licensee is entitled to expect and the matter of determination of his licence is one that is impossible to answer by reference to other cases in different circumstances.
Mackinnon LJ said: "I think the rule of law is that the licensor can revoke his licence at any time, but the licensee has thereafter a reasonable time, having regard to all the circumstances, to comply with the revocation."
Lord Greene rejected the proposition that the only notice to terminate a licence which the law required was a period sufficient to enable the licensee to remove himself and his property from the premises comprised in the licence: "I refer to that because it appears to me that where a question arises as to the lawful method of terminating a licence, the circumstances in which the licence came to be granted are most relevant to consider. Where a licence is granted under a contract, it may very well be that the contract will make express provision for those matters which must be observed, but what is to happen where the contract is silent in that regard? I cannot take the view that there is some cast-iron principle of law which lays down for every type of contract, whatever the circumstances and whatever the purposes for which it was entered into, some rule which is always to operate. In my opinion, the true rule is that the implications of the contract are to be determined by regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. Thus, in the judgment of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. The King, the following paragraph appears: "Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, their Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case." That is the only proposition of general application which I find it possible to extract from that authority; and although the case is not binding on this court, the law there is, in my opinion, laid down with complete accuracy.
The notice given by each letter operates as a clear determination of the licence at the expiration of one week. It conveys to the mind of the recipient as clearly as anything can notice that the licence is determined. It goes on, however, to indicate that the recipient of the letter, together with his possessions, is to be removed from the premises within one week. So far as the letter gives that instruction, it was, in my opinion, quite inoperative. The true view is that where a licence is revoked, the licensee has, in spite of the revocation, whatever in the circumstances is a reasonable time to enable him to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence. I have already said that in the circumstances of this case such a reasonable time must extend to whatever is a reasonable time to find alternative accommodation, and, if the day after this notice expired, proceedings had been taken by the minister to eject the defendants, those proceedings would have failed because the defendants were entitled to a reasonable time, and a week was not a reasonable time, to enable them to find alternative accommodation. The circumstance that the threat to remove them before the expiration of what would have been a reasonable time was inserted in the letter does not prevent the letter from being a good notice to determine the licence. That being the position, the county court judge decided that the interval which elapsed between the expiration of the week mentioned in that document and the commencement of these proceedings was a sufficient time to enable alternative accommodation to be found. In view of that finding of fact, the defendants could not complain at the time these proceedings were instituted that they had not been allowed sufficient time in the circumstances to remove themselves and their possessions and find alternative accommodation."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Winchester Court Ltd v Miller; CA 1944 - [1944] KB 734

 
 Neale v Del Soto; CA 1945 - [1945] KB 144; [1945] 1 All ER 191
 
Tendler v Sproule [1947] 1 All ER 193
1947
CA
Morton LJ
Housing
The tenant appealed against a decision on whether alternatve accommodation offered by the landlord was adequate saying that the judge had not expressly found it to be reasonable. Held: Morton LJ said that when a judge gives a decision giving possession to the landlord, the appeal court should always assume that he has applied his mind to the question of reasonableness before giving his decision.
1 Citers


 
Warren v Austen [1947] 2 All ER 185
1947
CA

Housing
When looking at the reasonableness of ordering possession against a tenant, the court must take into account the surrounding circumstances in a broad commonsense way as a man of the world. In this case the tenant wanted any alternative to include a facility for taking in lodgers.

 
Wright v Howell (1947) 92 Sol Jo 26
1947
CA

Housing
To be counted as a separate dwelling, the accomodation provided, must be enough to allow the tennt to carry out the major activities of life, including sleeping, cooking and eating.

 
Stewart v Mackay 1947 SC 287
1947


Housing
In relation to the phrase "the needs of the tenant and his family" it was considered that domestic servants and even lodgers might fall within the description if they had a sufficient degree of permanence and the general relationship.
1 Citers


 
Bird v Hildage [1947] 2 All ER 7; [1948] 1 KB 91; [1948] 177 LT 97; [1948] 63 TLR 405; [1948] 91 Sol Jo 559
1947
CA
Cohen LJ
Housing
A landlord of a rent-controlled property sought possession from the statutory tenant saying he was in arrears with his rent. Held: Cohen LJ said: "Section 3 and Schedule l (of the 1933 Act) lay down the circumstances in which the court may make an order or give a judgment for recovery of possession, and we think that, in reaching a conclusion whether any rent is lawfully due and has not been paid, the court must look at the date of institution of the proceedings by which the landlord is seeking to recover possession. The rights of the parties crystallised at that date, and nothing happening thereafter could, in our opinion, deprive the court of jurisdiction to make an order for recovery of possession, if the court thought it reasonable so to do . . Before the court can have jurisdiction the landlord must prove two things, namely, (1) that some rent was lawfully due from the tenant at the date of institution of the proceedings, and (2) that such rent was unpaid."
Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act l933 3 Sch 1


 
 Curl v Angelo; CA 1948 - [1948] 2 All ER 189
 
Palser v Grinling [1948] AC 291
1948
HL
Viscount Simon
Housing
The House considered the meaning of the word in the phrase "substantial proportion of the whole rent". Held: In accordance with "one of its primary meanings"; it was to be read as "equivalent to considerable, solid or big". The concept was imprecise: "Aristotle long ago pointed out that the degree of precision that is attainable depends on the subject matter."
1 Citers


 
Shelley v London County Council [1948] 1 KB 274
1948
CA
Lord Greene MR
Housing, Local Government
Taking into account the scope and policy of the Housing Acts, local authorities' powers of management of housing accommodation should be construed "in the widest possible sense."
1 Citers



 
 Brown v Nash and Ambrose; CA 1948 - [1948] 2 KB 247
 
Winters v Dance [1949] LJR 165
1949


Housing
Whether a single room in house had been let as a separate dwelling.
1 Citers


 
Langford Property Co Ltd v Goldrich [1949] 1 KB 511; [1949] All ER 402
1949
CA
Somervell LJ
Housing
The premises consisted of two flats in a single block, which had previously been separately let. They were on the same floor but not next to each other. The tenant had taken these two flats "as a home for himself and some relatives . . his father, mother and a married sister". He had made no structural alterations The court was asked whether the two self-contained flats let together could constitute "a separate dwelling-house". Held: Two apartments in a building may constitute one dwelling-house if they are let as one and occupied as one.
Somervell LJ said: "In my opinion if the facts justify such a finding, two flats or, indeed, so far as I can see, two houses, could be let as a separate dwelling-house within the meaning of the definition. What happened here was that the tenant wished to accommodate in his home these relatives to whom I have referred, and he wanted more accommodation than could be found or conveniently found in one flat. He therefore took the two flats and made those two flats his home. [Counsel] suggested at one time that there might be some absurdity, if, say, a man took under a single lease (which does not seem very probable) two flats in widely separated districts; but that case can be dealt with when it arises."
1 Citers



 
 De Marzokoff v Craig; CA 1949 - (1949) 93 Sol Jo 693

 
 Brock v Wollams; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 388
 
Wimbush v Cibulia, Wimbush v Levinski [1949] 2 All ER 432; [1949] 2 KB 564
1949


Housing
Where a tenant carries out his living activities in two properties, but exercises one function one property and another in the other, neiter tenancy will be a separate dwelling so as to provide protection.

 
Standingford v Probert [1950] 1 KB 377
1950


Housing

1 Citers


 
Baker v Turner [1950] AC 401
1950
HL
Lord Porter
Housing
The House set out the conditions for deciding whether rooms within a house were let as a separate dwelling. The time at which it has to be judged whether premises are entitled to protection is when the action is brought.
Lord Porter said that: "the rules of formal logic must not be applied . . with too great strictness" to legislation conferring security of tenure on residential tenants.
1 Citers


 
Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328
1950
CA
Lord Evershed MR, Asquith LJ
Housing
The plaintiff had lived with a woman tenant for over 20 years and they had been regarded in the neighbourhood as man and wife. Held: He could not thereby be deemed a member of her family for the Act of 1920. If their relationship was sexual "it seems to me anomalous that a person can acquire a 'status of irremovability' by living or having lived in sin, even if the liaison has not been a mere casual encounter but protracted in time and conclusive in character." and membership of the same family as limited to three relationships: that of children, that constituted by way of legitimate marriage and, thirdly, relationships whereby one person becomes in loco parentis to another. (Asquith LJ) and
Lord Evershed: "It may not be a bad thing that by this decision it is shown that, in the Christian society in which we live, one, at any rate, of the privileges which may be derived from marriage is not equally enjoyed by those living together as man and wife but who are not married."
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920
1 Citers



 
 Jones v Whitehill; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 KB 204

 
 American Economic Laundry Ltd v Little; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 All ER 1186; [1951] 1 KB 400
 
Shreeve v Hallam [1950] WN 140
1950
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Sir Raymond Evershed MR considered what a judge had to look at when making a possession order: 'In such matters the judge was not to consider whether it was reasonable for the landlord to claim possession, but whether it was reasonable to make an order.'
1 Citers


 
Clarke v Grant [1950] 1 KB 104
1950
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Lord Goddard CJ said: "if a notice to quit has been given in respect of a periodic tenancy such as a yearly tenancy, the result is to bring the tenancy to an end just as effectually as if there had been a term which had expired."
1 Citers



 
 Langdon v Horton; 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 666
 
Cresswell v Hodgson [1951] 1 All ER 710; [1951] 2 KB 92
1951
CA
Somervell LJ, Denning LJ, and Singleton LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The landlord sought possession. The tenant had a controlled tenancy. L offered the tenant another house (one he had built) as alternative accommodation. The rent was higher. The landlord was under pressure from his bank and wanted capital to pay off his overdraft. He wanted to sell the tenanted house with vacant possession at an unrestricted price, whereas the maximum price at which he could sell the house he had built was restricted. Held: The landlord's appeal was dismissed, the court holding that the judge had taken into account the factors he should have done. The judge had properly considered both sides – the positions of both the landlord and the tenant, and found the offered alternative accommodation suitable but that it would not be reasonable to make the order: its making would represent nothing but loss to the tenant and nothing but very substantial gain to the landlord. As to the reasonableness of making an order for possession, Parliament had given the judge in the county court a very wide discretion, and that the Court of Appeal should not say anything that restricted the circumstances he should take into consideration. Denning LJ thought that the word "reasonable" meant "reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned and also reasonable having regard to the interests of the public".
Somervell LJ said: 'I think the words of the section themselves indicate that the county court judge must look at the effect of the order on each party to it. I do not see how it is possible to consider whether it is reasonable to make an order unless you consider its effect on landlord and tenant, firstly, if you make it, and secondly, if you do not. I do not think we should say anything which restricts the circumstances which the county court judge should take into consideration. I think he is entitled to take into consideration that this is a case where the landlord is making a pecuniary gain. That might in other cases be a fact in the landlord's favour, and it might be thought reasonable that he should be given the chance of making pecuniary gain.'
Singleton LJ said: "It seems to me that if a county court judge, in a case of this kind, found that the landlord was in dire financial straits – and landlords sometimes are – whereas the tenant was well-to-do, that would be a matter which the county court judge could consider. Equally, if he found that the tenant would be put into grave difficulty by the making of the order whereas the landlord would not be in any difficulty, because he had more means, again I think that is a matter for consideration." Because the tenant's employment gave him a rent allowance that would cover the increased rent at the alternative accommodation, he was in a much better position than most tenants and that 'it may well be that many persons might not have come to the conclusion at which the county court judge arrived.' But as the question of fact was for the judge, and he had not erred in principle or made a mistake in law, his decision must be upheld.
1 Citers


 
Dellenty v Pellow [1951] 2 KB 858; [1951] 2 All ER 716
1951


Litigation Practice, Housing
The payment off of arrears of rent will not necessarily prevent an order for possession being made where there is a history of arrears and poor payment.
1 Citers


 
Murray Bull and Co v Murray [1952] CLY 1969
21 Nov 1951
QBD
McNair J
Housing
The defendant was appointed manager of the company and granted a seven year lease whixh would terminate also on the earlier end of his appointment. He continued to hold after the term expired. His employment finished and he held over on a licence under which he agreed to leave when asked or as soon as he found alternative premises. He was asked to leave but did not. Held: The proper inference from the correspondence was that he held over eventualy as a mere licensee, and without protection as a tenant.
1 Citers


 
Hayward v Marshall [1952] 2 QB 89
1952


Housing
Whether rooms were let as a separate dwelling.
1 Citers


 
Feyereisel v Turnidge [1952] 2 QB 29
1952
CA
Denning LJ, Romer LJ, Somervell LJ
Housing
The court considered what premises were protected under the Rent Acts. A bungalow had been let with a campsite. Held: The dominant purpose was for business use, and the tenancy of the bungalow was not protected.
Denning LJ: "The guiding light through the darkness of the Rent Acts is to remember that they confer personal security on a tenant in respect of his home. The Acts apply to dwelling-houses, not to business premises. This is shown by the opening words of section 12(2) of the Act of 1920 which applied the Acts to houses ‘let as a separate dwelling’ and section 3 of the Act of 1939 which applies the Acts to ‘dwelling-houses’. Those are the governing words. The remaining words of those sections are concerned with marginal cases, such as a house where the front rooms are used as a shop; and a house let with a field, and so on."
Somervell LJ: "There was a time when business premises were included, but it is common ground that it is now dealing with dwelling-houses."


 
 Hawes v Evenden; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 WLR 1169
 
Hardial Singh and Others v Malayan Theatres Limited [1953] UKPC 23; [1953] 3 WLR 491; [1953] AC 632
20 Jul 1953
PC

Housing
(Singapore) Construction of Control of Rent Ordinance
[ Bailii ]

 
 Montague v Browning; CA 1954 - [1954] 1 WLR 1039; [1954] 2 All ER 601; (1954) 98 Sol Jo 492
 
Regina v Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal Ex parte Slaughter [1954] 1 QB 446
1954


Housing

1 Citers


 
Whitmore v Lambert [1955] 1 WLR 495
1955


Housing
Provisions for transmission of secure tenancies operated only once.
1 Citers


 
Sherrin v Brand [1956] 1 QB 403
1956
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Birkett LJ, Romer LJ
Housing, Litigation Practice
The landlord had obtained a possession order against his secure tenant. The order was suspended, but the landlord then failed to enforce the order after the date and when the tenant had failed to comply with the terms of the suspension. The tenant died. There was in the meantime a statutory succession and the court had to decide whether here remained a tenancy to succeed to. Held: The court interpreted the order to mean that that the tenant was to remain on as tenant subject to the added obligation that he had to pay off the arrears by instalments "and subject also to this, that if default was made, the plaintiff could then take the appropriate steps mentioned by getting a warrant to execute the order without further or separate proceedings." Birkett LJ emphasised the wide powers given to the judge. A possession order did not terminate the statutory tenancy so as to prevent a statutory succession.
Sir Raymond Evershed MR: "It is always within the jurisdiction of the court, in my judgment (assuming that the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction have arisen) to make an order for possession, but to postpone the effectiveness of the order by making the continued occupation of the tenant conditional, for example, on his paying arrears of rent and costs in such manner as is provided by the order - such a provision being within the language which I have read from section 4 (2) - or to postpone the date of possession for such period or periods as it thinks fit, and subject to such conditions, in regard to payment by the tenant of arrears of rent and otherwise, as the court thinks fit. That indeed is, as I think, plainly the effect of the order of December 2, 1953; and, if that is the effect of the order, it certainly does not necessarily involve the result (as I read section 15 (1)) that, during the period of the postponement of possession, the so-called statutory tenancy ceases altogether, and the tenant wholly ceases to have the protection of the Act."
Birkett LJ: "[T]he widest possible discretion is given to the county court judge, and one can understand why it is done. He is told: 'You can postpone possession if the facts warrant it; you can postpone the date for possession for such time as you think proper; and, moreover, you can lay down such conditions as you think proper.' Then at the end of the section come the all-important words: 'and, if such conditions are complied with, the court may, if it thinks fit, discharge or rescind any such order or judgment.'
What the Act of Parliament was clearly intending to do was to invest the county court judge with the widest possible powers, because of the infinite variety of circumstances in which people are placed in regard to their housing, and in which they are compelled to go to the county court either as landlords or as tenants. The statute says: 'You can adjourn it if you wish when the facts are such that, if you do adjourn it, that may be an end of the whole matter. If the facts indicate that it is the proper thing to do, you may make an order for possession. If it is a reasonable thing to do, make it. It is quite true that you may suspend the order' - and, as the county court judge pointed out, during that period of suspension, there may be any number of applications to the court for a suspension of the order; that, at any rate, is in a category by itself. Then the third matter is the wide discretion vested in the court for postponing the date of possession as it thinks fit for such period as it thinks fit and on such terms as it thinks fit; and if those conditions are fulfilled, the court may also, if it thinks fit, discharge the order altogether."
Romer LJ said: "the judgment for possession was not intended to have an immediate effect, and would never indeed take effect at all provided that the conditions as to payment were fulfilled. If this be the true meaning and construction of the order, it is clear that it cannot have resulted in determining Phelps's statutory tenancy on the date upon which it was made, for the object of the order was to preserve Phelps's position (albeit conditionally) and preservation is the antithesis of destruction. At Phelps's death there was a tenancy which was subsisting, and not defunct; and I can see no valid reason why the defendant should not be entitled to it by succession."
Rent Restriction Act 1923 4(2)
1 Citers


 
Collier v Stoneman [1957] 1 WLR 1108
1957
CA
Jenkins, Sellers LJJ
Housing
A grandchild and his wife shared a 2-bedroom flat with the grandmother tenant. There was communal living and eating and no question of a sub-tenancy. Held: The claim to succession to the tenancy was upheld.
Sellers LJ said: "The grandmother, as tenant, had control of the premises, and I find it difficult to see how, without a tenancy of their own, the plaintiff and her husband, making their home there, could be said not to be residing with the grandmother up to the date of her death."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Edmunds v Jones [1957] 1 WLR 118
1957
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Housing
Lord Evershed MR said: "I think that the words 'residing with' must be given their ordinary popular significance. They do not, I think, involve any technical import or have some meaning only to be defined by lawyers. Giving them, then, the ordinary sense of the language it is, to my mind, necessary in order that paragraph (g) may be satisfied, that the person claiming to succeed to the tenancy of the particular premises must fairly and truly be said to have been residing with the predecessor in those premises in the sense that the successor lived and shared for living purposes the whole of the premises to which he or she claims to have succeeded.
1 Citers



 
 British Land Co. Ltd v Herbert Silver (Menswear) Ltd; CA 1958 - [1958] 1 QB 530
 
Payne v Cooper [1958] 1 QB 174
1958
CA
Lord Evershed MR, Romer LJ
Housing
An absolute possession order had been made against the statutory tenant, but, on later application to suspend, vary or discharge this order under section 4 of the 1923 Act, the statutory tenant obtained a further order postponing the date for possession by 28 days on condition that the tenant pay the arrears within that period. The order further provided ("proleptically") that "on such payment the order for possession shall be discharged". The landlord challenged the court's jurisdiction to convert an absolute order into a conditional order for possession. Held. The provision in the 1923 Act could be seen as a "proleptic" exercise of the power of discharge which the statutory wording provides. A further, separate application by the tenant after compliance with the conditions was therefore unnecessary. "As a matter of English, at first sight it might be said with force that it is only when the conditions have in fact been complied with that [the] power [to discharge or rescind] arises, and may be invoked",
Lord Evershed MR said: "The last two lines of the subsection are: "and if such conditions are complied with, the court may, if it thinks fit, discharge any such order". As a matter of English, at first sight it might be said with force that it is only when the conditions have been in fact complied with that that power arises, and may be invoked. In the present case it will be recalled that the judge combined all the operations into one order".
Romer LJ explained that section 4(2) showed that the court could suspend execution or postpone the date for possession on terms "and that, if those terms are complied with, then the court may discharge or rescind the original absolute order" and "the county court judge made in the present case . . [a] compendious form of order directing that on fulfilment of conditions, the original order should be discharged, instead of making an order imposing conditions, and then waiting to see if the conditions had been performed, and, if they had been performed, then making another order. I agree with the Master of the Rolls in thinking there is nothing wrong, or beyond the power of the court, in making an order in that compendious form." and "In my opinion, the meaning and effect of this judgment [the judgment for possession], when taken as a whole, and especially in view of the concluding paragraph, is that the defendant might remain on as tenant of the premises so long as he performed the conditions as to payment of the prescribed instalments in addition to the current rent; and that, on payment of the final instalment, the operation of the judgment would automatically cease. In other words, the judgment for possession was not intended to have an immediate effect, and would never indeed take effect at all provided that the conditions as to payment were fulfilled."
Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act 1923 4(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Brown v Davies [1958] 1 QB 117
1958
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Lord Evershed MR considered an appeal against an order finding it reasonable to award possession where the landlord had provided alternative accommodation: 'the judge made it quite clear . . that he appreciated his duty was to decide whether it was reasonable to make the order and not merely whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to ask him to make the order.'
1 Citers


 
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