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Discrimination - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 44 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87; [1980] ICR 13
1980
CA
Brightman LJ, Brandon LJ, Denning LJ MR
Discrimination, Employment
The court considered the meaning of 'detriment' in discrimination law. Brightman LJ said: 'I think a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the duty was in all the circumstances to his detriment.'
Lord Justice Brandon said: "I do not regard the expression 'subjecting . . to any other detriment' as meaning anything more than 'putting under a disadvantage'."
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 4(2)(c)
1 Citers


 
Kirby v Manpower Services Commission [1980] 3 All ER 334; [1980] 1 WLR 725; [1980] ICR 420
1980
EAT
Slynn J
Discrimination, Employment
The applicant, an employee at a job centre was demoted because he had disclosed confidential information about possible contraventions of the race relations legislation. He complained of race discrimination, saying his disclosure was a protected act. Held: This was not victimisation within section 2. The relevant question was whether the employers had treated the complainant less favourably than they would have treated someone in their employment who gave away confidential information whatever its kind. The claim failed, because the Manpower Services Commission would have treated in the same way any employee who gave away confidential information whatever its nature.
Race Relations Act 1976 2
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Hitchcock v Post Office [1980] CLY 1045
1980


Discrimination

1 Citers


 
Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1981] QB 180; [1980] 3 WLR 929; [1981] 1 All ER 111; [1980] ICR 672
1980
CA

Discrimination, Employment
The employee had taken on a job substantially similar to that of a previous male employee, but had been paid less. She succeeded in a claim under the 1971 Act before the industrial tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal. The employer appealed again. The employer argued that usung the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in the Act, a former employee was not a possible comparator. Held: The CA framed four questions to be referred to the ECJ: '1. Is the principle of equal pay for equal work, contained in article 119 of the eec treaty and article 1 of the eec council directive of 10 february 1975 (75/117/eec), confined to situations in which men and women are contemporaneously doing equal work for their employer? 2. If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, does the said principle apply where a worker can show that she receives less pay in respect of her employment from her employer: (a) than she would have received if she were a man doing equal work for the employer ; or (b) than had been received by a male worker who had been employed prior to her period of employment and who had been doing equal work for the employer? 3. If the answer to question 2(a) or (b) is in the affirmative, is that answer dependent upon the provisions of article 1 of the said directive? 4. If the answer to question 3 is in the affirmative, is article 1 of the said directive directly applicable in member states?'
Council Directive 75/117/EEC
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
O'Brien v Sim-Chem Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 307; [1980] 1 WLR 734; [1980] ICR 429
1980
CA

Discrimination

1 Citers


 
Regina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Kassam [1980] 1 WLR 1037
1980
CA
Stephenson LJ
Immigration, Discrimination
Discrimination was alleged against the immigration authorities. Held: In dealing with people coming in under the immigration rules, the immigration authorities were not providing "services" within the meaning of the Act. The words the 'circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act' are the circumstances in which discrimination is prohibited by the Act.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
1 Citers



 
 Del Monte Foods Ltd v Mundon; EAT 1980 - [1980] IRLR 224; [1980] ICR 694
 
Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427
1980


Employment, Discrimination
The claimant had been moved to a different department to escape anti-Semitic harassment. He fell out (for non-racial reasons) with his colleagues in his new department and was disciplined. Held: The fact that but for the earlier harassment he would not have been in the department where the problem arose did not mean that the action of which he complained was taken on racial grounds. Discrimination against a Jew might be directed at his religion rather than his race.
1 Citers


 
O'Brien v Sim-Chem Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 132; [1980] 1 WLR 1011; [1980] ICR 573; [1980] IRLR 373
2 Jan 1980
HL
Lord Russell of Killowen
Employment, Discrimination
The Respondent had carried out a job evaluation exercise in co-operation with the trade unions. The plaintiff and comparators had been rated as equivalent in the course of this exercise but the employer had failed to implement the scheme because of Government pay policy. The House was asked whether the claimant could regard herself for the purposes of the Act as rated as equivalent with her comparator when the scheme had not been implemented. Held: She could. once the job evaluation study had been agreed so that it was possible to use it as a basis for comparing jobs, then it could be relied upon even although it had not in fact been implemented. A job evaluation study may not be enforced until it has been completed: "It is not the stage of implementing the study by using it as the basis of the payment of remuneration which makes the study complete: it is the stage at which it is accepted as a study. It is perfectly possible to accept the validity of a study at a stage substantially before it is implemented."
Lord Russell stated: "In summary, therefore, I am of the opinion that the words in dispute cannot have the result extended for by the employers. We are offered a number of dictionary substitutes for 'determine' none of which appeal to me. The best that I can do is to take the phrase as an indication that the very outcome of the equivalent job rating is to show the term to be less favourable. The next best I can do is to echo the words of Lord Bramwell in Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1981] AC 107 at 139: “This beats me”, and jettison the words in dispute as making no contribution to the manifest intention of Parliament."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Macarthys Ltd v Smith C-129/79; [1981] QB 180; [1980] 3 WLR 929; [1980] ICR 672; [1981] 1 All ER 111; R-129/79; [1980] EUECJ R-129/79
27 Mar 1980
ECJ

European, Discrimination, Employment
The first paragraph of article 119 of the EEC Treaty applies directly, and without the need for more detailed implementing measures on the part of the community or the member states, to all forms of direct and overt discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of the criteria of equal work and equal pay referred to by the article in question. Cases where men and women receive unequal pay for equal work carried out in the same establishment or service are among the forms of discrimination which may be thus judicially identified. In such a situation the decisive test lies in establishing whether there is a difference in treatment between a man and a woman performing 'equal work' within the meaning of article 119. That concept is entirely qualitative in character in that it is exclusively concerned with the nature of the services in question. Its scope may not therefore be restricted by its being confined to situations in which men and women are contemporaneously doing equal work for the same employer. It cannot, however, be ruled out that a difference in pay between two workers occupying the same post but at different periods in time may be explained by the operation of factors which are unconnected with any discrimination on grounds of sex. That is a question of fact which it is for the court or tribunal to decide. In cases of actual discrimination falling within the scope of the direct application of article 119 comparisons are confined to parallels which may be drawn on the basis of concrete appraisals of the work actually performed by employees of different sex within the same establishment or service. The principle of equal pay enshrined in article 119 therefore applies to the case where it is established that, having regard to the nature of her services, a woman has received less pay than a man who was employed prior to the woman ' s period of employment and who did equal work for the employer.
Council Directive 75/117/EEC
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Khanna v Ministry of Defence [1981] IRLR 331; [1981] ICR 653
1981
EAT
Browne-Wilkinson P
Discrimination
EAT Browne-Wilkinson P said: "If the primary facts indicate that there has been discrimination for some kind, the employer is called on to give an explanation and, failing clear and specific explanation being given by the employer to the satisfaction of the industrial tribunal, an inference of unlawful discrimination from the primary facts will mean the complaint succeeds . . These propositions are, we think, most easily understood if concepts of shifting evidential burdens are avoided."
1 Citers


 
Chattopadhyay v Headmaster of Holloway School [1981] IRLR 487; [1982] ICR 132
1981
EAT
Browne-Wilkinson P
Discrimination, Employment
The appellant, an Indian teacher had applied unsuccessfully for the post of head of history at Holloway School. He complained of race discrimination. Held: Browne-Wilkinson P said: "As has been pointed out many times, a person complaining that he has been unlawfully discriminated against faces great difficulties. There is normally not available to him any evidence of overtly racial discriminatory words or actions used by the respondent. All that the applicant can do is to point to certain facts which, if unexplained, are consistent with his having been treated less favourably than others on racial grounds. In the majority of cases it is only the respondents and their witnesses who are able to say whether in fact the allegedly discriminatory act was motivated by racial discrimination or by other, perfectly innocent, motivations. It is for this reason that the law has been established that if an applicant [claimant] shows that he has been treated less favourably than others in circumstances which are consistent with that treatment being based on racial grounds the industrial tribunal [ET] should draw an inference that such treatment was on racial grounds, unless the respondent can satisfy the industrial tribunal that there is an innocent explanation" and
"we are very conscious of the great dangers of opening too widely the ambit of an inquiry under the Race Relations Act 1976. If this is done and not controlled, industrial tribunals will be faced with numerous issues on matters only indirectly relevant to the main issue. This in turn would lead to long and complicated hearings and great expense and inconvenience to the respondents. It is not in the best interests of those who are being racially discriminated against that the protection of their rights before tribunals should become a matter of great expense and complication. The end result of so doing would be to render the legal redress they have difficult and expensive to obtain. In the circumstances there is a very heavy burden on legal advisers, the Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission to ensure that matters of the kind that we have had to consider in this case are not introduced into a case, except where they are satisfied that there is a real probability that they will affect the outcome. This judgment should not be treated as a charter for wholesale allegation of subsequent events."
Race Relations Act 1976
1 Citers



 
 Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman; CA 1981 - [1981] ICR 864; [1981] IRLR 398

 
 Hurley v Mustoe; EAT 1981 - [1981] ICR 490

 
 Tanna v Post Office; EAT 1981 - [1981] ICR 374

 
 Owen and Briggs v James; EAT 1981 - [1981] ICR 377; [1981] IRLR 133

 
 Owen and Briggs v James; CA 1981 - [1982] ICR 618; [1982] IRLR 502

 
 Khanna v Ministry of Defence; EAT 1981 - [1981] ICR 653

 
 Savjani v Inland Revenue Commissioners; CA 1981 - [1981] QB 458

 
 Page v Freight Hire (Tank Haulage) Ltd; EAT 1981 - [1981] ICR 299
 
Ahmad v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126
1981
ECHR

Human Rights, Discrimination
(Commision) The applicant was a devout Muslim. His religious duty was to offer prayers on Fridays and to attend a mosque if possible. He was employed as a full time primary school teacher. He complained that he was forced to resign because he was refused permission to attend a mosque for the purposes of worship during hours of employment. Held: There had been no interference with his freedom of religion under Article 9(1) of the Convention: "the freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9, is not absolute, but subject to the limitations set out in Article 9(2). Moreover, it may, as regards the modality of a particular religious manifestation, be influenced by the situation of the person claiming that freedom. "it may as regards the modality of a particular religious manifestation, be influenced by the situation of the person claiming that freedom". That had been recognised in the case of a person with special contractual obligations. The case was one of a coincidence of teaching obligations and religious duties rather than of religious manifestations in the course of the performance of professional functions, and the local education authority was entitled to rely on its contract with the applicant. "Throughout his employment the applicant remained free to resign if and when he found that his teaching obligations conflicted with his religious duties. It notes that, in 1975, the applicant did in fact resign from his five-day employment and that he subsequently accepted four-and-a-half day employment enabling him to comply with his duties as a Muslim on Fridays."
European Convention on Human Rights 9(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd; HL 19-Jan-1981 - [1983] 2 AC 751; [1982] 2 WLR 918; [1982] ICR 420; [1982] 2 All ER 402
 
Susan Jane Worringham and Margaret Humphreys v Lloyds Bank Limited C-69/80; [1981] 1 WLR 950; [1981] ICR 558; [1981] 2 All ER 434; R-69/80; [1981] EUECJ R-69/80
11 Mar 1981
ECJ

European, Discrimination, Employment
Europa A contribution to a retirement benefits scheme which is paid by an employer on behalf of employees by means of an addition to the gross salary and which therefore helps to determine the amount of that salary constitutes 'pay' within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 119 of the EEC treaty. Directive 75/117/EEC is based on the concept of 'pay' as defined in the second paragraph of article 119 of the EEC Treaty. Although article 1 of the directive explains that the concept of 'same work' contained in the first paragraph of article 119 of the treaty includes cases of 'work to which equal value is attributed', it in no way affects the concept of 'pay' contained in the second paragraph of article 119 but refers by implication to that concept. Article 119 of the EEC treaty applies directly to all forms of discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of the criteria of equal work and equal pay referred to by the article in question, without national or community measures being required to define them with greater precision in order to permit of their application. The forms of discrimination which may be thus judicially identified include cases where men and women receive unequal pay for equal work carried out in the same establishment or service, public or private. This is the case where the requirement to pay contributions to a retirement benefits scheme applies only to men and not to women and the contributions payable by men are paid by the employer on their behalf by means of an addition to the gross salary the effect of which is to give men higher pay within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 119 than that received by women engaged in the same work or work of equal value.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
J P Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd C-96/80; [1981] 1 WLR 972; [1981] ICR 592; R-96/80; [1981] EUECJ R-96/80; [1981] IRLR 228 (ECJ); [1981] ECR 911
31 Mar 1981
ECJ
Advocate-General Warner
European, Employment, Discrimination
ECJ The fact that work paid at time rates is remunerated at an hourly rate which varies according to the number of hours worked per week does not offend against the principle of equal pay laid down in article 119 of the Treaty in so far as the difference in pay between part-time work and full-time work is attributable to factors which are objectively justified and are in no way related to any discrimination based on sex. It is for the national courts to decide in each individual case whether, regard being had to the facts of the case, its history and the employer's intention, a pay policy represented as a difference based on weekly working hours is or is not in reality discrimination based on the sex of the worker. Therefore a difference in pay between full-time workers and part-time workers does not amount to discrimination prohibited by article 119 of the Treaty unless it is in reality merely an indirect way of reducing the level of pay of part-time workers on the ground that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of women. Article 119 of the treaty applies directly to all forms of discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of criteria of equal work and equal pay referred to by the article in question, without national or community measures being required to define them with greater precision in order to permit of their application. The forms of discrimination which may be thus judicially identified include cases where men and women receive unequal pay for equal work carried out in the same establishment or service, public or private. Where the national court is able, using the criteria of equal work and equal pay, without the operation of community or national measures, to establish that the payment of lower hourly rates of remuneration for part-time work than for full-time work represents discrimination based on difference of sex the provisions of article 119 of the treaty apply directly to such a situation. Article 1 of Council Directive 75/117/EEC which is principally designed to facilitate the practical application of the principle of equal pay outlined in article 119 of the treaty in no way alters the content or scope of that principle as defined in the Treaty.
Council Directive 75/117/EEC
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 J P Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd; EAT 19-Jun-1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 1485; [1981] ICR 715; [1981] UKEAT 145_79_1906; [1981] 2 CMLR 24; [1981] IRLR 228; [1981] ECR 911

 
 Din v Carrington Viyella Ltd; EAT 1982 - [1982] IRLR 281; [1982] ICR 256
 
Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2) [1982] ICR 350
1982
EAT

Discrimination
The tribunal considered the method of selection of the pool on a claim for indirect discrimination. In this case the claimant alleged that an age test applied on his application would effectively limit the proportion of coloured who would meet the tests. Held: The Commission's appeal was allowed in part. The proportion of late immigrants was irrelevant.
Race Relations Act 1974 1(1)(b)
1 Citers


 
Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd C-12/81; [1983] 2 AC 751; [1982] 2 WLR 918; [1982] ICR 420; [1982] 2 All ER 402; R-12/81
9 Feb 1982
ECJ

European, Discrimination
The fact that an employer (although not bound to do so by contract) provides special travel facilities for former male employees to enjoy after their retirement constitutes discrimination within the meaning of article 119 against former female employees who do not receive the same facilities. Where a national court is able, using the criteria of equal work and equal pay, without the operation of community or national measures, to establish that the grant by an employer of special travel facilities solely to retired male employees represents discrimination based on difference of sex, the provisions of article 119 of the Treaty apply directly to such a situation.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Mandla (Sewa Singh) v Dowell Lee [1982] UKHL 7; [1983] IRLR 209; [1983] 2 WLR 620; [1983] 2 AC 548; [1983] ICR 385; [1983] 1 All ER 1062; Times, 25 March 1983
24 Mar 1982
HL
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Discrimination, Education
A private school had refused to admit the claimant, a sikh, because he would be unable to wear the school uniform. He claimed racial discrimination. The school denied that being a Sikh was a membership of a racial or ethnic group. Held. Sikhs were a racial group defined by ethnic origins for the purpose of the Race Relations Act. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton said: "My Lords, I recognise that "ethnic" conveys a flavour of race but it cannot, in my opinion, have been used in the Act of 1976 in a strictly racial or biological sense. For one thing, it would be absurd to suppose that Parliament can have intended that membership of a particular racial group should depend upon scientific proof that a person possessed the relevant distinctive biological characteristics (assuming that such characteristics exist)."
Race Relations Act 1976 1(1A)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd (No 2) [1982] UKHL 2; [1982] 2 WLR 918; [1981] 2 CMLR; [1983] 2 AC 751; [1982] ICR 420
22 Apr 1982
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Scarman
Employment, Discrimination
Under English law and under Community law, the national court should construe a regulation adopted to give effect to a Directive as intended to carry out the obligations of the Directive and as not being inconsistent with it if it is reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning.
Lord Diplock said that: "it is a principle of construction of United Kingdom statutes . . that the words of a statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject matter of the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation, and not to be inconsistent with it."
EEC Treaty 177 - Sex Discrimination Act 1975
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission [1982] EWCA Civ 3; [1982] IRLR 418
26 May 1982
CA

Discrimination

Employment & Training Act 1973
[ Bailii ]
 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland C-61/81; [1982] ICR 578; [1982] EUECJ C-61/81
6 Jul 1982
ECJ

European, Discrimination
The general scheme and content of Directive 75/117, whose essential purpose is to implement the principle of equal pay for men and women, indicate that it is the responsibility of the member states to guarantee the right to receive equal pay for work of equal value even in the absence of a system of job classification. To that end they must make use of appropriate laws, regulations and administrative provisions in such a way that all employees in the community may be protected in these matters. It follows that where there is disagreement as to the application of the concept of 'work to which equal value is attributed' within the meaning of the first paragraph of article 1 of the directive, the worker must be entitled to claim before an appropriate authority that his work has the same value as other work and, if that is found to be the case, to have his rights under the treaty and the directive acknowledged by a binding decision. Each member state must therefore endow an authority with the requisite jurisdiction to decide whether work has the same value as other work.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, Ex parte Amin; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 All ER 864; [1983] 3 WLR 258; [1983] 2 AC 818

 
 Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2); CA 1983 - [1983] ICR 428

 
 BL Cars Ltd v Brown; EAT 1983 - [1983] ICR 143
 
Gill v El Vino Co Ltd [1983] 1 QB 423 I
1983
CA
Griffiths LJ, Sir Roger Ormrod
Discrimination
The plaintiffs, who were both women, wanted to stand and drink at the bar in the defendants' wine bar but the barman refused to serve them and said that, if they sat at a table, the drinks would be brought to them. That was because only men were permitted to stand and drink at the bar. Held: The plaintiffs were the victims of unlawful discrimination contrary to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Griffiths LJ said: "But if a woman wishes to go to El Vino's, she is not allowed to join the throng before the bar. She must drink either at one of the two tables on the right of the entrance, or she must pass through the throng and drink in the smoking room at the back. There is no doubt whatever that she is refused facilities that are accorded to men, and the only question that remains is: is she being treated less favourably than men? I think that permits of only one answer: of course she is. She is not being allowed to drink where she may want to drink, namely standing up among the many people gathered in front of the bar. There are many reasons why she may want to do so. Her friends may be there. She may not want to break them up and force them to move to some other part of the premises where she is permitted to drink. Or she may wish, if she is a journalist, to join a group in the hope of picking up the gossip of the day. If male journalists are permitted to do it, why shouldn't she? If she is denied it she is being treated less favourably than her male colleagues."
Sir Roger Ormrod said: "The question posed by section 29(1)(a) of the Act of 1975 is unusually simple compared with most questions posed by statutes. We are enjoined simply to ask whether on this evidence the plaintiffs in this case were "treated less favourably" than a man or men would have been. To my mind, the fact that men have the three options which Griffiths LJ has mentioned makes only one answer to that question possible. Men have these options and the options are valuable to them, and I find it impossible to say, where one sex has an option and the other has not, that there is not a differentiation between them and, prima facie, a differentiation which results in less favourable treatment."
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
1 Citers


 
Armagh District Council v Fair Employment Agency [1983] NI 346
1983
CANI
Lowry LJ
Northern Ireland, Discrimination
The court considered an allegation of discrimination made as to the appointment of a wages clerk by a district council. Held: Lord Lowry said: "It must not be forgotten that when the Act uses the word 'discrimination or 'discriminate' it is referring to an employer who makes a choice between one candidate and another on the ground of religious belief or political opinion; it is not speaking of an incidental disadvantage which is due to a difference between the religion of the employer and of the candidate but of a deliberate, intentional action on the part of the appointing body or individual.
Here I must dispose of a misleading argument which was raised before the learned county court judge but not seriously pursued in this court. An action may be deliberate without being malicious. Most acts of discrimination are both, but the only essential quality is deliberation. If a Protestant employer does not engage a Roman Catholic applicant because he genuinely believes that the applicant will not be able to get on with Protestant fellow workmen, he is discriminating against the applicant on the ground of his religious belief, although that employer's motives may be above reproach. If women are allowed to stop work five minutes early in order to avoid being endangered when the day's work ends, it has been decided that the men in the workforce are discriminated against on the ground that they are men. The employer's decision to keep the men at work longer, though reached in good faith, was deliberately based on the fact that they were men.
Accordingly, it can be stated that, although malice (while often present) is not essential, deliberate intention to differentiate on the ground of religion, politics, sex, colour or nationality (whatever is aimed at by the legislation) is an indispensable element in the concept of discrimination. The distinction is sometimes expressed as one between motive and intention. In Peake v. Automotive Products Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 780, the case about releasing women early from their work, Phillips J. stated, at p. 787: 'it seems to us that [counsel] is confusing the motive or the purpose of the act complained of with the factual nature of the act itself. Section 1(1)(a) requires one to look to see what in fact is done amounting to less favourable treatment and whether it is done to the man or the woman because he, is, a man or a woman. If so, it is of no relevance that it is done with no discriminatory motive.' This idea runs through all the cases."
Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 16(2)

 
Showboat Entertainment Centre v Owens [1984] IRLR 7; [1983] UKEAT 29_83_2810; [1984] ICR 65
28 Oct 1983
EAT
Browne-Wilkinson P
Employment, Discrimination
The employer had dismissed an employee who had refused to comply with a discriminatory instruction by the employer to exclude blacks from the employer’s amusement centre. The tribunal at first instance had found that that was a dismissal "on racial grounds", notwithstanding that the dismissed employee was white. Held: The employer's appeal failed. The Appeal Tribunal considered the meaning of the phrase 'on racial grounds.' Browne-Wilkinson P: “Therefore the only question is whether Mr Owens was treated less favourably ‘on racial grounds’. Certainly the main thrust of the legislation is to give protection to those discriminated against on the grounds of their own racial characteristics. But the words ‘on racial grounds’ are perfectly capable in their ordinary sense of covering any reason for an action based on race, whether it be the race of the person affected by the action or of others.” and “We can, therefore see nothing in the wording of the Act which makes it clear that the words ‘on racial grounds’ cover only the race of the complainant.”
Race Relations Act 1976
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Van Der Mussele v Belgium; ECHR 23-Nov-1983 - 8919/80; (1983) 6 EHRR 163; [1983] ECHR 13
 
Quinnen v Hovells [1984] ICR 525
1984

Waite J
Employment, Discrimination
Waite J said: "The concept of a contract for the engagement of personal work or labour lying outside the scope of a master-servant relationship is a wide and flexible one, intended by Parliament in our judgment to be interpreted as such." The concept could include somebody who was self-employed providing personal services.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 - Equal Pay Act 1970
1 Citers


 
Lupetti v Wrens Old House Ltd [1984] ICR 348
1984
EAT
Balcombe LJ
Employment, Discrimination
The applicant was given notice on 3rd February 1983 terminating his employment on 28th February 1983. The question arose on appeal whether the date of the notice or the date when he left employment was the relevant date. Held: With a discriminatory dismissal, time does not run until the notice of dismissal has expired and the employment ceased: " The act complained of here is the dismissal of the applicant and the short point is: for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976, did that dismissal occur on 3 February, when notice was given, or 28 February, when the employment was terminated? We have been referred, in this context, to Dedman v. British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd. [1974] I.C.R. 53, which dealt with the effective date of termination of a contract, and we find that decision and, indeed, definitions which occur in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 of no help to us in this case, because Dedman's case is dealing with a different section, and the definitions in the Act of 1978 cover matters on which the Race Relations Act 1976 is silent. It appears to us that we have to approach the construction of the Act of 1976 by considering what was the mischief that Parliament was intending to cover by providing that it was unlawful to discriminate against an employee by dismissing him.
Putting it quite shortly, it seems to us that the mischief which Parliament was intending to cover by those provisions was that of a person finding himself out of a job because of racial or other discriminatory grounds. If that be right (and it appears to us that it is), then the act complained of is the termination of employment and accordingly the effective date for considering when time starts to run is the date when the man finds himself out of job rather than the date when he is given notice."
Balcombe LJ said: "That is sufficient to dispose of this appeal but, in case it goes elsewhere and in order to give proper respect to the able arguments which were presented to us by both counsel in this case, it is right that we should deal with the two other grounds of appeal. The second ground of appeal was that section 68(7)(b) of the Act of 1976 provides that any act extending over a period should be treated as done at the end of that period. Mr Cofie, for the applicant, argues that the act of dismissal extended over the period between the giving of notice and the date when the notice expired. Accordingly, under that subsection, it should be treated as having occurred at the end of the period.
We accept Mr Jeremy's submissions on that ground of appeal both that it is inconsistent with the earlier argument which we have accepted - although that does not of itself render the earlier argument the less effective - but secondly this was not an act done over a period. It was an act of dismissal. Either that act took place when the notice was given or, as we have held, when the employment terminated. So we reject that ground of appeal."
Race Relations Act 1976 68(1)

 
Regina v Commission for Racial Equality (ex parte Westminster City Council) [1985] ICR 827; [1984] IRLR 230
1984
QBD
Woolf J
Discrimination, Employment
The council had dismissed a black road sweeper to whose appointment the trade union objected on racial grounds. Held: The council's motive for doing so, to avert industrial action, could not avail them. Woolf J said: "In this case although the employer's motives are wholly unobjectionable, he is clearly treating the black employee less favourably on racial grounds and is clearly guilty of unlawful discrimination under the Act."
Race Relations Act 1976 1
1 Citers



 
 von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen; ECJ 10-Apr-1984 - (1986) 2 CMLR 430; C-14/83; [1984] ECR 1891; R-14/83; [1984] EUECJ R-14/83
 
Charles Lux v Court of Auditors of the European Communities C-129/82
13 Dec 1984
ECJ

European, Discrimination, Employment
Europa 1. Officials - recruitment - appointment to the starting grade - exception authorized by the staff regulations - application by means of a general decision - discretionary power of the administration - limits - no discretion allowed (staff regulations of officials, arts. 5 (3) and 31 (2) (b)) 2.Measures adopted by the institutions - internal directive - rule of conduct indicating the practice to be followed - legal force as regards the administration (staff regulations of officials, art. 5 (3))
  1. Where an exception, authorized by the staff regulations, to the general rule governing appointments is introduced in the form of a general decision adopted within an institution, the principle that there should be no discrimination between officials in any one category at the time of their recruitment, laid down by the staff regulations, would be deprived of any legal significance if in such a case the appointing authority still had the same discretion as is conferred upon it to lay down exceptions to the aforementioned general rule.
  2. The court has held on numerous occasions that the principle of equality of treatment laid down by the staff regulations is of fundamental importance in the law relating to the employment of community officials. Thus, although an internal directive does not have the character of a rule of law which the administration is bound to observe, it nevertheless lays down a rule of conduct indicating the practice to be followed, from which the administration may not depart without giving the reasons which have led it to do so, since otherwise the aforesaid principle would be infringed.


 
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