Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Defamation - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 29 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Webb v Times Publishing Co Ltd [1960] 2 QB 535
1960

Pearson J
Defamation
The Times newspaper published a report of the criminal trial in Switzerland of a British subject. When sued in defamation they sought to rely upon the defence of fair reporting of judicial proceedings. Held: A blanket protection for reporting of foreign judicial proceedings was rejected, but in this case the defence did succeed. A plea of a fair and accurate report of foreign judicial proceedings was not demurrable.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway; PC 1960 - [1960] 1 WLR 997

 
 Plato Films v Speidel; HL 1961 - [1961] AC 1090; [1961] All ER 876
 
Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237; [1961] 3 WLR 866; [1961] 3 All ER 740; (1961) 105 Sol Jo 647
1961
CA
Devlin LJ, Sellers LJ
Defamation, Litigation Practice
The defendant claimed absolute immunity in respect of communications sent by him to the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct by the plaintiff, a Queen's Counsel. Held: Initial communications sent to the secretary of the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct by a barrister did not attract absolute privilege, since they were not yet a step in an inquiry before an Inn of Court.
Matters submitted to proceedings before an inquiry conducted by the Inn would attract the same privilege as they would in proceedings before a court.
Devlin LJ said: "On such a point form is of the first importance; it is by form rather than by the substance of the complaint that a writ is to be distinguished from a letter before action."
and "the privilege that covers proceedings in a court of justice ought not to be extended to matters outside those proceedings except where it is strictly necessary to do so in order to protect those who are to participate in the proceedings from a flank attack. It is true that it is not absolutely necessary for a witness to give a proof, but it is practically necessary for him to do so, as it is practically necessary for a litigant to engage a solicitor." and
"It is not at all easy to determine the scope and extent of the principle in Watson v M'Ewan. I have come to the conclusion that the privilege that covers proceedings in a court of justice ought not to be extended to matters outside those proceedings except where it is strictly necessary to do in order to protect those who are to participate in the proceedings from a flank attack. It is true that it is not absolutely necessary for a witness to give a proof, but it is practically necessary for him to do so, as it is practically necessary for a litigant to engage a solicitor. The sense of Lord Halsbury's speech is that the extension of the privilege to proofs and pre-cognition is practically necessary for the administration of justice; without it, in his view, no witness could be called. I do not think that the same degree of necessity can be said to attach to the functions of the Bar Council in relation to the Inns of Court."
Devlin LJ explained the rationale for the distinction between domestic tribunals and those recognised by law: "A private institution, such as a club, may set up a body to determine questions of admission and expulsion and it may be composed entirely of lawyers and may follow with exactitude the procedure of a court of law. But absolute privilege is granted only as a matter of public policy and must therefore on principle be confined to matters in which the public is interested and where therefore it is of importance that the whole truth should be elicited even at the risk that an injury inflicted maliciously may go unredressed. The public is not interested in the membership of a private club. The significance of . . the . . requirement . . that the Court or tribunal should be recognised by law . . is that it shows that the public is interested in the matter to be determined by the court. Parliament would not, for example, regulate the disciplining of solicitors if there were not a public interest in the sort of men who practise as solicitors. The same consideration applies to the Bar."
Devlin LJ considered that absolute privilege fell into three categories: "The absolute privilege which covers proceedings in or before a court of justice can be divided into three categories. The first category covers all matters that are done coram judice. This extends to everything that is said in the course of proceedings by judges, parties, counsel and witnesses, and includes the contents of documents put in as evidence. The second covers everything that is done from the inception of the proceedings onwards and extends to all pleadings and other documents brought into existence for the purpose of the proceedings and starting with the writ or other document which institutes the proceedings. The third category is the most difficult of the three to define. It is based on the authority of Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480 in which the House of Lords held that the privilege attaching to evidence which a witness gave coram judice extended to the precognition or proof of that evidence taken by a solicitor. It is immaterial whether the proof is or is not taken in the course of proceedings. In Beresford v. White (1914) 30 TLR 591 the privilege was held to attach to what was said in the course of an interview by a solicitor with a person who might or might not be in a position to be a witness on behalf of his client in contemplated proceedings."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Addis v Crocker; CA 1961 - [1961] 1 QB 11
 
Dingle v Associated Newspapers [1961] 2 QB 162
1961
CA
Devlin LJ
Defamation, Damages
A defamation of the claimant had been published and then repeated by others. Held: The court discussed the logical impossibility of apportioning damage between different tortfeasors: "Where injury has been done to the plaintiff and the injury is indivisible, any tortfeasor whose act has been a proximate cause of the injury must compensate for the whole of it. As between the plaintiff and the defendant it is immaterial that there are others whose acts also have been a cause of the injury and it does not matter whether those others have or have not a good defence. These factors would be relevant in a claim between tortfeasors for contribution, but the plaintiff is not concerned with that; he can obtain judgment for total compensation from anyone whose act has been a cause of his injury. If there are more than one of such persons, it is immaterial to the plaintiff whether they are joint tortfeasors or not. If four men, acting severally and not in concert, strike the plaintiff one after another and as a result of his injuries he suffers shock and is detained in hospital and loses a month's wages, each wrongdoer is liable to compensate for the whole loss of earnings. If there were four distinct physical injuries, each man would be liable only for the consequences peculiar to the injury he inflicted, but in the example I have given the loss of earnings is one injury caused in part by all four defendants. It is essential for this purpose that the loss should be one and indivisible; whether it is so or not is a matter of fact and not a matter of law."
1 Citers


 
Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 967; [1961] 2 All ER 758
1961
CA
Willmer LJ, Danckwerts LJ
Defamation
The defendants published an article describing the plaintiff estate agent as "a notorious dodgy operator of London slum properties". The article quoted statements by Lord Goddard CJ 8 years before describing the plaintiff's estate agency as "a fraudulent business from beginning to end". The defendants put forward a plea of justification stating that in the course of proceedings in the Court of Criminal Appeal where the plaintiff's conviction had been quashed Lord Goddard CJ had made the observation above quoted, and also relying on judicial statements to a similar effect in two previous civil cases in which the plaintiff had been involved. The plaintiff sought a strike out of the defence. Held: The request was refused. Willmer LJ cited Cadam's case and said that it was impossible to say that the particulars of justification could be no answer to any conceivable meaning which the jury might find, and that it was therefore not possible to strike out the particulars which set out the effect of what was said in the various previous judicial proceedings. Danckwerts LJ agreed.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Plummer v Charman [1962] 1 WLR 1469
1962

Diplock LJ
Defamation
The court discussed the defence of fair comment in political cases: "I need hardly say that there is no privilege known to the law which entitles persons engaged in politics to misstate a fact about their opponent provided that they say it honestly even though untruthfully. They can comment upon the conduct of persons in public life, provided they do so honestly and without malice."
1 Citers


 
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528; [1962] 3 All ER 380
2 Jan 1962
CA
Sellers LJ, Diplock LJ
Defamation, Police
Two police officers gave evidence in a criminal prosecution of others, that the plaintiff, a barrister, had behaved improperly by obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty and subsequently gave similar evidence at an inquiry before the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn into the conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against the police officers alleging that they, together with another person, had conspired to injure him by making false and defamatory statements about him. Held: The decision of Salmon J was upheld. The immunity given to police extends to allegations of conspiracy to give false evidence.
Sellers LJ said: "Whatever form of action is sought to be derived from what was said or done in the course of judicial proceedings must suffer the same fate of being barred by the rule which protects witnesses in their evidence before the court and in the preparation of the evidence which is to be so given", and "This immunity exists for the benefit of the public, since the administration of justice would be greatly impeded if witnesses were to be in fear that any disgruntled and possibly impecunious persons against whom they gave evidence might subsequently involve them in costly litigation."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Marrinan v Vibert [1963] 1 QB 234
1963
QBD
Salmon J
Torts - Other, Defamation
The plaintiff brought an action claiming damages for conspiracy against two police officers alleging they had conspired together to make false statements defamatory of him as a barrister. Held: The claim was struck out. Even a conspiracy to make false statements in court will be protected, not for the sake of the witnesses, but "for the benefit of the public, since the administration of justice would be greatly impeded if witnesses were to be in fear that any disgruntled and possibly impecunious persons against whom they gave evidence might subsequently involve them in costly litigation".
The gist of the tort of conspiracy was not the conspiratorial agreement alone, but that agreement plus the overt act of causing damage and the evidence given was an act done in pursuance of the agreement.
Salmon J said: "It is true that in nearly all the reported cases in which the principles to which I have alluded were laid down, the form of action was for damages for libel or slander, but in my judgment these principles in no way depend upon the form of action. In Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 Q.B. 45, an unsuccessful attempt was made to evade the immunity to which I have referred by suing for damages for perjury. Counsel for the plaintiff attempted to distinguish that case on the ground that an action for damages for perjury is unknown to the law, whereas an action for damages for conspiracy is of respectable lineage. As far as it goes, the distinction is a sound one. It does not, however, affect the point that Hargreaves v Bretherton demonstrates that the immunity to which I have referred is not only an immunity to be sued for damages in libel or slander. The immunity, in my judgment, is an immunity from any form of civil action."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd; CA 1963 - [1963] 1 QB 340
 
Grubb v Bristol United Press Ltd [1963] 1 QB 309
1963
CA
Pearce LJ
Defamation
Pearce LJ discussed the importance of the use of extrinsic facts in determining meaning in defamation cases, saying: "any innuendo (that is, any allegation that the words were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning) cannot rely on a mere interpretation of the words of the libel itself but must be supported by extrinsic facts or matters. Thus, there is one cause of action for the libel itself, based on whatever imputations or implications can reasonably be derived from the words themselves, and there is another different cause of action, namely, the innuendo, based not merely on the libel itself but on an extended meaning created by a conjunction of the words with something outside them. The latter cause of action cannot come into existence unless there is some extrinsic fact to create the extended meaning."
1 Citers


 
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234
1963
QBD
Salmon J
Torts - Other, Defamation
The plaintiff sought to sue police officers who had prepared a report for the Director of Public Prosecutions and appeared as witnesses against him at his criminal trial. Held: The claim failed. Salmon J considered the principle of the privilege given to those making witness statements to the police: "It has been well settled law for generations - certainly since Lord Mansfield’s time - that witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from actions brought against them in respect of any evidence they may give in a court of justice. This immunity exists for the benefit of the public, since the administration of justice would be greatly impeded if witnesses were to be in fear that any disgruntled or possibly impecunious persons against whom they gave evidence might subsequently involve them in costly litigation. "
1 Citers


 
Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362; [1963] 3 All ER 952; [1963] UKPC 29
1963
PC
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscont Radcliffe, Lord Jenkins, Lord Gest, Sir kenneth Gresson
Defamation, Commonwealth
(New South Wales) Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest discussed how words subject to a claim in defamation should be read: "In deciding whether words are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning the court will reject those meanings which can only emerge as the product of some strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation."
As to the width of the concept of 'natural and ordinary meaning', he said: "The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words. See Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd . . The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction would draw from the words."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Marrinan v Vibert [1963] 1 QB 528
2 Jan 1963
CA
Sellers LJ
Torts - Other, Defamation
A tortious conspiracy was alleged in the conduct of a civil action. The plaintiff appealed against rejection of his claim. Held: The appeal failed as an attempt to circumvent the immunity of a wirness in defamation by framing a claim in conspiracy. Sellers LJ considered whether a complaint was privileged: "Whatever form of action is sought to be derived from what was said or done in the course of judicial proceedings must suffer the same fate of being barred by the rule which protects witnesses in their evidence given before the court and in the preparation of the evidence which is to be so given."
Sellers LJ said: "It has been sought in this case to draw a difference between the action of libel and slander, the action of defamation, and that which is set up in this case, one of conspiracy. I can see no difference in the principles of the matter at all. Whatever form of action is sought to be derived from what was said or done in the course of judicial proceedings must suffer the same fate of being barred by the rule which protects witnesses in their evidence before the court and in the preparation of the evidence which is to be so given."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Dingle v Associated Newspapers; HL 1964 - [1964] AC 371; [1972] UKHL 2

 
 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd; HL 1964 - [1964] AC 234; [1963] 1 QB 340; [1964] AC 235; [1963] 2 All ER 151; [1963] 2 WLR 1063

 
 Rookes v Barnard (No 1); HL 21-Jan-1964 - [1964] AC 1129; [1964] UKHL 1
 
McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1965] 2 QB 86
1965
CA
Pearson, Willmer and Diplock LJJ
Damages, Defamation
References to damages awards in personal injury actions were legitimate in directing a defamation jury on quantum.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Broadway Approvals Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd (No 2); CA 1965 - [1965] 1 WLR 805
 
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185; [1966] HCA 37
2 Jun 1966


Commonwealth, Defamation, Damages
(High Court of Australia)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Uren v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; [1966] HCA 40
2 Jun 1966

McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ
Commonwealth, Damages, Defamation
(High Court of Australia) "It seems to us that, in a case where there is no qualified privilege to report or repeat the defamatory statements of others, the whole cohesion of the law of defamation would be destroyed, if it were permissible merely to plead and prove that the defamatory statement was made by another; that this fact was stated in the matter complained of and that the defamatory imputation was not adopted or affirmed. The law as to qualified protection of the reports of certain designated matters would be largely if not wholly redundant." and 'It seems to me that, properly speaking, a man defamed does not get compensation for his damaged reputation. He gets damages because he was injured in his reputation, that is simply because he was publicly defamed. For this reason, compensation by damages operates in two ways—as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as consolation to him for a wrong done. Compensation is here a solatium rather than a monetary recompense for harm measurable in money.' (Windeyer J)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Austlii ]

 
 Richards v Naum; CA 1967 - [1967] 1QB 620
 
Fielding v Variety Incorporated [1967] 2 QB 841
1967
CA
Lord Denning M.R. and Harman and Salmon LJJ
Defamation, Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd; CA 1968 - [1968] 2 QB 157; [1968] 1 All ER 497
 
Cohen v Daily Telegraph [1968] 1 WLR 916
1968
CA
Lord Denning MR, Russell LJ, Davies LJ
Defamation
The defendant newspaper pleaded, as matters on which its publication was alleged to be fair comment, facts that had occurred some weeks after the publication. These were struck out and the defendant appealed. Held: The appeal failed. A defendant may not rely, for a plea of fair comment, upon facts post-dating publication, and a man may comment on existing facts without having them all in the forefront of his mind at the time.
Lord Denning said: "No ordinary human person can look into the future and comment on facts which have not yet happened" and "In order to make a good plea of fair comment, it must be a comment on facts existing at the time. No man can comment on facts which may happen in the future. There is a passage in Gatley on Libel and Slander, 6th ed (1967), p 723 which goes further. It says: 'The facts which the defendant seeks to prove as the basis of his comment must have been known to him when he made the comment.' I do not know that I would go quite so far as that. A man may comment on existing facts without having them all in the forefront of his mind at the time. Nevertheless it must be a comment on existing facts."
Russell LJ noted that counsel for the defendants did not dispute that "the facts on which the defence of fair comment is based can only be those known at the time of publication."
Davies LJ discussed whether a defence of fair comment could be supported by facts which occurred later. He thought not: "There is a singular absence of English authority on this point, and it may be that the reason for that is that it is so obvious that authority is not required". And "If it is necessary for the man making the comment to know the facts at the time he makes it, it follows as the night follows the day that it is impossible for him to rely on events which at that time had not happened."
1 Citers


 
London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375; [1968] 1 WLR 607; [1968] EWCA Civ 3; [1969] 2 All ER 193
10 Dec 1968
CA
Lord Denning MR
Defamation
The defence of fair comment on matters of public interest is not to be defined too closely. Lord Denning MR said: 'Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or others; then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.' The comment must be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR
Defamation, Media
The law of confidence is based on the moral principles of loyalty and fair dealing. An injunction was sought to restrain an intended publication: "The court will not restrain the publication of an article, even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That has been established for many years ever since Bonnard v. Perryman. The reason sometimes given is that the defences of justification and fair comment are for the jury, which is the constitutional tribunal, and not for a judge. But a better reason is the importance in the public interest that the truth should out. There is no wrong done if it is true, or if [the alleged libel] is fair comment on a matter of public interest. The court will not prejudice the issue by granting an injunction in advance of publication." and iniquity] is merely an instance of just cause or excuse for breaking confidence."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590
1969
PC

Commonwealth, Damages, Defamation

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.