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Defamation - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 46 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd [1930] 1 KB 467
1930
CA
Greer LJ
Defamation, Media
The plaintiff, a famous amateur golfer, had been shown in an advert by the defendants with a bar of their chocolate in his pocket. He claimed that this suggested that he had taken money for the advert for the endorsement, and that this was defamatory. He brought evidence to show that this is what people had thought. The defendants were shown to have been made aware that this interpretation might apply. Held: Greer LJ said: "Words are not defamatory, however much they may damage a man in the eyes of a section of the community unless they also amount to disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of right thinking men generally. To write or say of a man something that would disparage him in the eyes of a particular section of the community but will not affect his reputation in the eyes of the average right thinking man is not actionable within the law of defamation."
1 Citers


 
Judd v Sun Newspapers [1930] 30 State Reports New South Wales
1930

Harvey C.J, Halse Rogers J
Commonwealth, Defamation
(Australia) The plaintiff was put in the box as a witness but not asked any questions by his counsel, nor did he give any evidence in chief; he was, however, cross-examined by counsel for the defendants, at great length, not only in regard to matters material to the facts alleged in the article complained of, but also as to his use of violent, abusive, and insulting language in regard to other persons entirely distinct from matters at issue between the parties. Held: Harvey C.J. "Damages which a jury may award a plaintiff may possibly be increased by the outrageous nature of the language in which the libel is couched, or lessened by the provocative conduct or language of the plaintiff, just as damages may be aggravated by the way in which the defendant has conducted his case in the Court. In my humble judgment, those elements of damage are hard to justify on principle, but have been sanctioned by usage, and as an indulgence to what is called the practical common sense of juries." and (Halse Rogers J) "Where the language complained of in the action has been provoked by the language of the plaintiff, and relates to the same subject matter, there is sound reason for admitting evidence of all the circumstances in which the libel was published, and for inviting the jury to consider the conduct of the plaintiff on the question of damages"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Gollan v Thompson Wyles Company 1930 SC 599
1930


Scotland, Defamation
Lord President Clyde discussed the order of consideration of the elements of defamation: "The question of the admissibility of an innuendo necessarily arises in Scotland at the relevancy stage. If - as here - the statement complained of is not defamatory in its own terms, it is for the pursuer to aver on record what he says it really means, and to set out in his pleadings any circumstances (leading up to or surrounding the utterance of the statement, or affecting the minds of those to whom it was uttered) which may throw light on its true meaning. What then is the test which the Court must apply in determining the admissibility of an innuendo. It is, I think, necessary to look behind the generality of the question - Can the statement bear the meaning which the pursuer puts upon it? - for there is no end to the ambiguity of words, written and spoken, even when construed in the light of the circumstances in which they were used." and "The test of admissibility is therefore not whether the statement is capable of construction as an attack upon the pursuer's character, for that leaves the answer open to a wide range of conjecture. It is whether the statement itself, and the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been made, provide grounds for a reasonable inference that an attack upon the pursuer's character was intended."
1 Citers


 
Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130
1930


Defamation

1 Citers


 
Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd [1931] AC 333; [1931] All ER 131; [1931] 100 LJKB 328; [1931] 145 LT 1; [1931] 47 TLR 351; [1931] 75 Sol Jo 220; [1931] UKHL 1
1931
HL

Defamation
The plaintiff was an amateur golfer. The defendant, without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent, published adverts showing the plaintiff and his caddy each with bars of the defendant's chocolate protruding from their back pockets. The plaintiff said that this carried an implied defamatory message that he had been paid for the advertisement, and had 'prostituted his reputation' as an amateur golf player. Evidence showed that the defendant had considered this result before issuing the adverts, and that people had made just that inference. The plaintiff might have been barred from several golf clubs. Held: The picture was capable of bearing the meanings suggested. The matter should be reheard, but as to the quantum of damages only.
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]

 
 Gibbons v Duffell; 1932 - (1932) 47 CLR 520

 
 Cookson v Harewood; CA 1932 - [1932] 2 KB 478

 
 Bottomley v F W Woolworth; 1932 - [1932] 48 TLR 530

 
 Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures; CA 1934 - (1934) 50 TLR 581

 
 Sun Life Assurance -v W H Smith; 1934 - (1934) 150 LT 211
 
Lee v Wilson and Mackinnon (1934) 51 CLR 276; [1934] HCA 60
19 Dec 1934

Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ
Commonwealth, Defamation
(High Court of Australia)
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
O'Connor v Waldron [1935] AC 76
1935
HL
Atkins L
Defamation
The kind of tribunal to which absolute privilege attaches is one which "has similar attributes to a court of justice or acts in a manner similar to that in which such courts act." It is a question "not capable of very precise limitation".
1 Citers


 
Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384
1935
HL
Lord Atkin
Damages, Defamation
The House approved awards of punitive or exemplary damages. Lord Atkin said: said that damages awards for defamation were not arrived at "by determining the 'real' damage and adding to that a sum by way of vindictive or punitive damages. It is precisely because the ' real' damage cannot be ascertained and established that the damages are at large. It is impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the poison may reach; it is impossible to weigh at all closely the compensation which will recompense a man or a woman for the insult offered or the pain of a false accusation. No doubt in newspaper libels juries take into account the vast circulations which are justly claimed in present times. The 'punitive' element is not something which is or can be added to some known factor which is non-punitive ".
1 Citers



 
 Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd; CA 1936 - [1936] 1 KB 697

 
 Sim v Stretch; HL 1936 - [1936] 2 All ER 1237; 80 Sol Jo 703; (1936) 52 TLR 669
 
South Suburban Co-operative Society Ltd v Orum [1937] 3 All ER 133; [1937] 2 KB 690
1937


Defamation
Newspaper - privilege against disclosure of source
1 Citers


 
Kroch v Rossell [1937] 1 All ER 725
1937
CA
Scott LJ, Slesser LJ
Defamation
The plaintiff brought libel proceedings against the publishers of French and Belgian newspapers. He obtained permission to serve each defendant out of the jurisdiction on the ground that a small number of copies of each newspaper had been published in England. The vast bulk of the publications had been in France and Germany. Held: The order giving permission to serve out of the jurisdiction was set aside. Slesser LJ: "in no sense can it be said that there is any substantial importation of these papers in England, or that the libel which is said to affect the plaintiff in England is anything but a very minor incident of the substantial publication in France." Scott LJ: "I think that it would be ridiculous and fundamentally wrong to have these two cases tried in this country, on a very small and technical publication, when the real grievance of the plaintiff is a grievance against the widespread publication of the two papers in the respective countries where they are published."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Rule [1937] 2 KB 375
1937


Defamation, Crime
A constituent wrote to his MP asking for assistance to lodge a complaint to the appropriate MP concerning the conduct of a public official in that consituency. Held: Qualified privilege was a defence to a criminal charge of defamatory libel.


 
 Byrne v Deane; CA 1937 - [1937] 1 KB 818
 
Davidson v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 316
1940

Hilbery J
Banking, Defamation, Damages
The Plaintiff, a credit bookmaker successfully sued the Bank in libel. The libel proved was writing the words 'not sufficient' on a cheque issued by the Plaintiff when they dishonoured it. He would have had sufficient funds ad the bank followed his instructions to stop an earlier cheque. As applied to cheques, s 49(12) of the 1882 Act required notice of dishonour to be given by the bank within a reasonable time thereafter. Held: Though there was only one cheque Hilbery J thought the effect would have been significant because of the nature of the Plaintiff's business and the speed with which news of dishonour would travel. Hilbery J said damages had to be "a proper sum to be given as a reasonable compensation for the injury which has been done to the plaintiff, and of course it must be sufficient to mark beyond a shadow of doubt the complete lack of justification for making the aspersion which was made by this means on the Plaintiff's credit". He awarded £250.
The bank could not rely on mistake as an occasion of privilege: "you cannot, by making a mistake, create the occasion for making the communication, and what the bank seek to do here is to create an occasion of qualified privilege by making a mistake which called for a communication on their part." No general need was identified which required the engagement of principles of qualified privilege in respect of communication of a notice of dishonour.
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 49(12)
1 Citers


 
Hough v London Express Newspapers [1940] 2 KB 507
1940


Defamation
Otherwise innocent words can acquire a defamatory meaning from surrounding circumstances.
1 Citers


 
Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB 507
1940
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Defamation
The court looked at whether it was necessary to show actual damage to a reputation in a defamation case: "If words are used which impute discreditable conduct to my friend, he has been defamed to me, although I do not believe the imputation and may even know it is untrue"
1 Citers


 
Simons Proprietary Ltd v Riddle [1941] NZLR 913
1941

Blair J
Defamation, Commonwealth
(New Zealand) Blair J said: "On the authorities - see Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers 1929] 2KB 331 and Tolley v. JS Fry and Sons Ltd. [1930] 1 KB 467 - innocent matter may be given a defamatory meaning by readers with knowledge of facts not known to the writer. But these cases do not lay down that a writer of innocent matter can by reason of certain facts coming into existence subsequent to publication of his innocent matter become liable in damages for libel because persons learning of that subsequent material are able to read into the innocent matter a defamatory meaning."
1 Citers


 
Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artide Plastics Ltd [1941] 2 All ER 393
1941

Hallett J
Contract, Defamation, Damages
There is no justification for artificially excising from the damages recoverable for breach of contract that part of the financial loss which might or might not be the subject of a successful claim in defamation. A claim for mere loss of reputation is properly for an action for defamation, and cannot ordinarily be sustained by means of any other form of action, but if pecuniary loss can be established, the mere fact that the pecuniary loss is brought about by the loss of reputation caused by a breach of contract is not sufficient to preclude the plaintiffs from recovering in respect of that pecuniary loss.
1 Citers


 
Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171
1942

Jordan CJ
Defamation
Complaint was made that the plaintiff had been libelled in the defendant's book review. Held: A publication is defamatory in nature if it "is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of [the plaintiff]".
A critic is "entitled to dip his pen in gall for the purposes of legitimate criticism."
The court equated malice with a commentator's failure to express his 'real opinion': "To establish malice, it is necessary to produce evidence that the comment was designed to serve some other purpose than that of expressing the commentator's real opinion, for example, that of satisfying a private grudge against the person attacked."
1 Citers



 
 de Buse v McCarthy; CA 1942 - [1942] 1 KB 156
 
Lyon v The Daily Telegraph Ltd [1943] KB 746
1943
CA
Scott LJ
Defamation
Scott LJ said: "The reason why, once a plea of fair comment is established, there is no libel, is that it is in the public interest to have free discussion of matters of public interest." and "It [the right of fair comment] is one of the fundamental rights of free speech and writing which are so dear to the British nation, and it is of vital importance to the rule of law on which we depend for our personal freedom that the courts should preserve the right of 'fair comment' undiminished and unimpaired."
1 Citers


 
Garbett v Hazel Watson and Viney [1943] 2 All ER 359
1943
CA
Scott LJ
Defamation
The defendants had published in a magazine a picture of the plaintiff carrying on his business as an out door photographer, and talking to a lady. On the opposite page they published a picture of a naked woman. The caption running under both pictures was that "For another shilling Madam you can have something like this". The defendant appealed, arguing against the meaning attributed to the publication by the plaintiff and found by the Judge. The plaintiff gave evidence that after the publication complained of he was shunned by those who knew him, and that instead of calling him by his Christian name (Sydney), as they had before, they called him "Smutty". Counsel for the defendant argued in the Court of Appeal that the evidence that the plaintiff was addressed as "Smutty" was inadmissible, that is inadmissible as to meaning. Held: The defendant's argument was rejected. Scott LJ saying: "It was admissible because it was evidence of the measure of damage done". The juxtaposition raised an innuendo which lowered the plaintiff’s reputation and was therefore libellous.
1 Citers


 
Knuppfer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] UKHL 1; [1944] AC 196; [1944] AC 116
3 Apr 1944
HL
Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, Atkin, Thankerton, Russell of Killowen, Porter LL
Defamation
The plaintiff complained that the defendant's article was defamatory in implying that he was an agent of Hitler. He was representative in Great Britain of a political party of Russian emigres known as Mlado Russ or Young Russia. The total membership was about 2000 and the membership of the British branch was twenty four. The article gave no names, but the plaintiff relied on his own prominence or representative character in the movement as establishing that the words referred to himself. Held: The plaintiff's appeal failed.
Viscount Simon LC said: "where the plaintiff is not named, the test which decides whether the words used refer to him is the question whether the words such as would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to" and "In the present case the statement complained of is not made concerning a particular individual, whether named or unnamed, but concerning a group of people spread over several countries and including considerable numbers. No facts were proved in evidence which could identify the plaintiff as the person individually referred to. Witnesses called for the Appellant were asked the carefully framed question, "To whom did your" mind go when you read that article?", and they not unnaturally replied by pointing to the Appellant himself. But that is because they happened to know the Appellant as the leading member of the Society in this country, and not because there is anything in the article itself which ought to suggest even to his friends that he is referred to as an individual."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 D and L Caterers Ltd v D'Ajou; 1945 - [1945] KB 364
 
National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian [1946] KB 81
1946


Defamation
A non-trading corporation (a trade union) which had been assimilated to a trading corporation sought damages for defamation.
1 Citers



 
 Bata v Bata; CA 1948 - [1948] WN 366; (1948) 92 Sol Jo 574
 
Gregoire v GP Putnam's Sons (1948) 81 NE2d 45
1948


International, Defamation, Limitation
(New York Court of Appeals) A book had been placed on sale in 1941, but was still being reprinted and sold in 1946. Held. The rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer was formulated "in an era which long antedated the modern process of mass publication" and was therefore not suited to modern conditions. The limitation period started to run in 1941, when the book was first put on sale. The court pointed out that "Under [the rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer] the Statute of Limitation would never expire so long as a copy of such book remained in stock and is made by the publisher the subject of a sale or inspection by the public. Such a rule would thwart the purpose of the legislature."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Braddock v Bevins [1948] 1 KB 580
1948
CA
Lord Greene MR
Defamation
Mr. Bevins' election address at a local election was the subject of qualified privilege in a defamation action. Held: The court applied the classic requirements necessary to confer qualified privilege.
Lord Greene MR said: 'A defamatory statement published by or on behalf of a candidate in any election to a local government authority or to Parliament shall not be deemed to be published on a privileged occasion on the ground that it is material to a question in issue in the election, whether or not the person by whom it is published is qualified to vote at the election.' It was necessary for the welfare of society that there should be a frank exchange of information and opinions on matters relating to the exercise of the franchise by the electorate
1 Citers



 
 Perera v Peiris; PC 1949 - [1949] AC 1

 
 Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (MGM); HL 1950 - [1950] 1 All ER 449

 
 Hackenschmidt v Odhams Press; 23-Oct-1950 - Times, 23 October 1950
 
Adams v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd and Champion [1951] 1 KB 354
1951
CA
Denning LJ
Defamation
The court was asked whether interrogatories should be ordered in relation to the question of whether a defendant who was relying on the defence of fair comment had been activated by malice. Held: Lord Justice Denning said: "The truth is that the burden on the defendant who pleads fair comment is already heavy enough. If he proves that the facts were true and that the comments, objectively considered, were fair, that is, if they were fair when considered without regard to the state of mind of the writer, I should not have thought that the plaintiff had much to complain about; nevertheless it has been held that the plaintiff can still succeed if he can prove that the comments, subjectively considered, were unfair because the writer was actuated by malice."
1 Citers



 
 Kemsley v Foot; CA 1951 - [1951] 2 KB 34

 
 Kemsley v Foot; HL 1952 - [1952] AC 345
 
Wilts United Dairies Ltd v Thomas Robinson Sons and Co [1957] RPC 220
1957
QBD
Stable J
Defamation
Stable J, noted that the case concerned a sweetened condensed milk very similar to the product that his Honour remembered consuming in large quantities at preparatory school, and said: “As I understand the law it is this, that if you publish a defamatory statement about a man’s goods which is injurious to him, honestly believing that it is true, your object being your own advantage and no detriment to him, you obviously are not liable. If you publish a statement that turns out to be false but which you honestly believe to be true, but you publish that statement not for the purpose of protecting your own interests and achieving some advantage to yourself but for the purpose of doing him harm, and it transpires, contrary to your belief, that the statement that you believed to be true has turned out to be false, notwithstanding the bona fides of your belief because the object that you had in mind was to injure him and not to advantage yourself, you would be liable for an injurious falsehood.”
1 Citers


 
Hughes v Architects' Registration Council of the UK [1957] 2 QB 550
1957

Devlin J
Defamation
The plaintiff appealed against a finding of the defendant disciplinary body. Devlin J said: "There is something more important than the standing of a profession about which the council is naturally and properly concerned. There is the right of every man to earn his living in whatever way he chooses unless by the law or by his own voluntary submission his way is taken from him." and "It is not of itself disgraceful to disagree with a majority view and to act accordingly. It is only if a man has bound himself in honour to accept that view and to act according to the code that a deliberate breach of the code for his own profit can be called disgraceful."
1 Citers


 
Ideal General Supply Co Ltd v Louis Edelson and Edelson (t/a Ideal Clothing Co) [1957] RPC 252
1957

Diplock J
Jurisdiction, Estoppel, Defamation, Damages
The plaintiff had started an action for passing off and slander in the county court. The county court judge declined jurisdiction on the basis he thought they were equity proceedings and the claimant withdrew the proceedings and started again in the High Court. The question was whether this created an estoppel Held: It did not. Diplock J expressed no opinion on the view of the county court judge that he had no jurisdiction. Diplock J refused to award any damages because the plaintiff managed to put an end to the defendant’s passing-off by an injunction after 4 advertisements in a local evening newspaper and the plaintiff had suffered no damage at all. He was prepared to grant injunctive relief in respect of probable damage which would occur if the defendants continued their conduct.

 
Wilts United Dairies Ltd v Thomas Robinson and Co [1958] RPC 94
1958
CA

Defamation
Malice may exist without an actual intention to injure.
1 Cites


 
Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 1 WLR 743; [1958] 2 All ER 516
1958
QBD
Diplock J
Defamation
The test of whether a comment amounted to fair comment, is whether the opinion, however exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, was honestly held by the person expressing it. Diplock J said: "Let us look a little more closely at the way in which the law balances the rights of the public man, on the one hand, and the rights of the public, on the other, in matters of freedom of speech. In the first place, every man, whether he is in public life or not, is entitled not to have lies told about him and by that is meant one is not entitled to make statements of fact about a person which are untrue and which redound to his discredit, that is to say, tend to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking men.
What are the limits of the right of comment? Quite rightly they are very wide. First of all, who is entitled to comment? The answer to that is 'everyone.' A newspaper reporter or a newspaper editor has exactly the same rights, neither more nor less, than every other citizen, and the test is no different whether the comment appears in a Sunday newspaper with an enormous circulation, or in a letter from a private person to a friend or, subject to some technical difficulties with which you need not be concerned, is said to an acquaintance in a train or in a public house. So in deciding whether this was fair comment or not, you dismiss from your minds the fact that it was published in a newspaper, and you will not, I am sure, be influenced in any way by any prejudice you may have for or against newspapers any more than you will be influenced in any way by any prejudice which you may have for or against Lord Silkin's politics . .
I have been referring and Counsel in their speech to you have been referring to fair comment, because that is the technical name which is given to this defence, or, as I would prefer to say, which is given to the right of every citizen to comment on matters of public interest. But the expression 'fair comment' is a little misleading. It may give you the impression that you, the jury, have to decide whether you agree with the comment, whether you think it is fair. If that were the question you had to decide, you realise that the limits of freedom which the law allows would be greatly curtailed. People are entitled to hold and to express freely on matters of public interest strong views, views which some of you, or indeed all of you, may think are exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, provided - and this is the important thing - that they are views which they honestly hold. The basis of our public life is that the crank, the enthusiast, may say what he honestly thinks just as much as the reasonable man or woman who sits on a jury, and it would be a sad day for freedom of speech in this country if a jury were to apply the test of whether it agrees with the comment instead of applying the true test: was this an opinion, however exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, which was honestly held by the writer?"
1 Citers



 
 Cadam v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd; CA 1959 - [1959] 1 QB 413
 
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