swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases. Â
Criminal Evidence - From: 1930 To: 1959
This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.
ÂRex v Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43
1941
Criminal Evidence
1 Citers
Â
Hollington v F Hewthorne and Co Limited [1943] KB 587
1943
CA
Criminal Evidence
The defendant had been involved in a road accident in which the plaintiff's son had died, and had been convicted of careless driving. The plaintiff as the personal representative of his son sued for damages for negligence, seeking to rely on the conviction as prima facie evidence that the defendant was driving carelessly at the time. The judge rejected the conviction as evidence but found for the plaintiff on other grounds. Held: On the defendant's appeal the plaintiff claimed that the judge had been wrong to reject the conviction as such prima facie evidence. Relevance is the main consideration determining whether or not evidence is admissible. The conviction was inadmissible on two grounds; first, that the opinion of the court exercising the criminal jurisdiction as evidenced by the certificate of conviction was not relevant; second, as hearsay evidence it did not comply with the best evidence rule.
As to the first ground: "In truth, the conviction is only proof that another court considered that the defendant was guilty of careless driving. Even were it proved that it was the accident that led to the prosecution, the conviction proves no more than what has just been stated. The court which has to try the claim for damages knows nothing of the evidence that was before the criminal court. It cannot know what arguments were addressed to it, or what influenced the court in arriving at its decision. Moreover, the issue in the criminal proceedings is not identical with that raised in the claim for damages. Assume that evidence is called to prove that the defendant did collide with the plaintiff, that has only an evidential value on the issue whether the defendant, by driving carelessly, caused damage to the plaintiff. To link up or identify the careless driving with the accident, it would be necessary in most cases, probably in all, to call substantially the same evidence before the court trying the claim for personal injuries, and so proof of the conviction by itself would amount to no more than proof that the criminal court came to the conclusion that the defendant was guilty. It is admitted that the conviction is in no sense an estoppel, but only evidence to which the Court or a jury can attach such weight as they think proper, but it is obvious that once the defendant challenges the propriety of the conviction the court, on the subsequent trial, would have to retry the criminal case to find out what weight ought to be attached to the result. It frequently happens that a bystander has a complete and full view of an accident. It is beyond question that, while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but, in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not. The well recognised exception in the case of scientific or expert witnesses depends on considerations which, for present purposes, are immaterial. So, on the trial of the issue in the civil court, the opinion of the criminal court is equally irrelevant." Evidence of a prior conviction was not admissible in separate proceedings to establish the truth of the underlying allegation.
1 Citers
Â
Rex v Oliver [1944] KB 68
1944
Criminal Evidence
When an Act of Parliament provides that a person shall not do a certain thing unless he has a licence, the onus is always on the defendant to prove that he has a licence because it is a fact peculiarly within his own knowledge
1 Citers
Â
Rex v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4
1948
Criminal Evidence
If a defendant put his character in issue by attacking the character of the prosecution witnesses, but did not himself give evidence, he would escape the consequences of having his convictions put in evidence.
1 Citers
Â
Lawrie v Muir [1949] ScotHC HCJAC - 2; 1950 JC 19; 1950 SLT 37
23 Nov 1949
HCJ
Lord Justice General Cooper
Scotland, Criminal Evidence
The prosecution case was said to have been based on evidence acquired during an unlawful search of the defendant's premises. Held: An irregularity in the method by which evidence has been obtained does not necessarily make that evidence inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
Lord Justice General Cooper explained the basis for the approach: "From the standpoint of principle it seems to me that the law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are liable to come into conflict – (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from Courts of law on any merely formal or technical ground. Neither of these objects can be insisted upon to the uttermost."
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Â
Harris v Director of Public Prosecutions [1952] 1 The Times LR 1075
1952
HL
Lord Simon
Criminal Evidence
The House discussed the principle laid down in Makin's case as to the admission of similar fact evidence. Held: After approving the case, Lord Simon said: 'It is, I think, an error to attempt to draw up a closed list of the sort of cases in which the principle operates: such a list only provides instances of its general application, whereas what really matters is the principle itself and its proper application to the particular circumstances of te charge being tried. It is the application that may sometimes be difficult, and the particular case now before the House illustrates that difficulty.'
1 Citers
Â
Regina v Miller [1952] 36 Cr App R 169
1952
Devlin J
Criminal Practice, Criminal Evidence
The fact that a defendant has previous convictions is not normally relevant: "The fundamental principle, equally applicable to any question that is asked by the defence as to any question that is asked by the prosecution, is that it is not normally relevant to inquire into a prisoner's previous character, and, particularly, to ask questions which tend to show that he has previously committed some criminal offence. It is not relevant because the fact that he has committed an offence on one occasion does not in any way show that he is likely to commit an offence on any subsequent occasion. Accordingly, such questions are, in general, inadmissible, not primarily for the reason that they are prejudicial, but because they are irrelevant."
As to the possibility of separate trials for conspirators: "The cases must be rare in which fellow conspirators can properly in the interests of justice be granted a separate trial." There is a considerable risk with separate trials in such circumstances and on such a charge that the jurors would each hear a very different account of events from the defendants they were trying with a distinct possibility of a miscarriage of justice.
1 Citers
Â
 Regina v Teper; PC 1-Jul-1952 - [1952] AC 489; [1952 2] The Times LR 162
Â
 Kuruma v The Queen; PC 8-Dec-1954 - [1955] AC 197; [1954] UKPC 43; [1955] 2 WLR 223; [1955] Crim LR 339; (1955) 119 JP 157; [1955] Crim LR 69; [1955] 1 All ER 236
Â
 Chan Kau v The Queen; PC 1955 - [1955] AC 206; [1955] 1 All ER 266; [1955] 2 WLR 192
Â
Manuel v HM Advocate [1958] ScotHC HCJ - 1; 1958 SLT (Notes) 44; 1958 JC 41; 1959 SLT 23
25 Jun 1958
HCJ
Lord Justice General Clyde
Scotland, Criminal Evidence
In order to be found to be voluntarily given, a suspect's statement must have been freely given and not given in response to pressure or inducement and not elicited by questioning other than what is directed simply to elucidating what has been said. The crucial question then is whether this statement freely given? Or was it the result of some kind of pressure or inducement by the police?
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Â
Regina v Smith (1959) 43 Cr App R 121; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193
1959
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Evidence, Police, Crime
The court considered a situation where one admission was made at 10.00 pm one night under a threat or inducement, and a second statement was made the next morning before a different investigator and after the usual caution was given. The issue was whether the second statement was still under the influence of the threat or inducement of the first. Held: Even the most gentle threats or slight inducements will taint a confession, thoughh "The court thinks that the principle to be deduced from the cases is really this: that if the threat or promise under which the first statement was made still persists when the second statement is made, then it is inadmissible. Only if the time-limit between the two statements, the circumstances existing at the time and the caution are such that it can be said that the original threat or inducement has been dissipated can the second statement be admitted as a voluntary statement.
This court, however, is of the clear opinion that the second statement was admissible. No doubt, the opening reference to what it was said he had said to the regimental sergeant-major put the appellant in a difficulty. No doubt it was introduced by Sergeant Ellis in the hope that thereby he might get a continued confession; but it is quite clear that the effect of any original inducement or threat under which the first statement was made had been dissipated. Quite apart from the fact that the caution was given and given twice, some nine hours had elapsed and the whole circumstances had changed. The parade had ended. The rest of the company had gone to bed. The effect of the threat or the inducement was spent. On those grounds this court has come to the conclusion that the oral and written statements made to Sergeant Ellis were clearly admissible."
The test for causation of a death at common law is that it is a "substantial or significant cause"
Â
Regina v Rhodes (1959) 44 Cr App R 23
1959
Criminal Evidence
1 Citers
Â
