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Crime - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 132 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Rex v Betts and Ridley (1931) 22 Cr App R 148
1931

Avory J
Crime
Betts and Ridley agreed to rob a man on thw way to the bank. Betts was to push him to the ground and snatch the bag, while Ridley waited nearby in a car. When snatching the bag, Betts struck the victim who later died. Betts and Ridley were both convicted of murder. Held: At common law, a person who commits a felony involving personal violence, does so at his own risk, and is guilty of murder if the violence results, even inadvertently, in the death of the victim. Ridley was in the circumstances a principal in the second degree to the robbery with violence which in fact took place: "and although it might be true to say that he had not agreed before-hand that Andrews should be struck upon the head in a way likely to cause his death, it is clear upon the authorities that if he was a party to this felonious act of robbery with violence - some violence - and that the other person, the principal in the first degree, in the course of carrying out that common design does an act which causes the death, then the principal in the second degree is equally responsible in law." Even if Betts did vary the manner of execution of the plan, since it was a plan to rob which involved some degree of violence, Ridley being present as a principal in the second degree was equally responsible.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Rex v Poulton; 18-May-1932 - (1832) 5 C and P 329; [1832] EngR 613; (1832) 5 Car and P 329; (1832) 172 ER 997
 
Lawrence v The King [1933] AC 699
1933
PC
Lord Atkin
Crime
Lord Atkin said: "[A]n essential principle of our criminal law that the trial for an indictable offence has to be conducted in the presence of the accused; and for this purpose trial means the whole of the proceedings, including sentence."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Manley [1933] 1 KB 529
1933

Lord Hewart CJ
Crime
The appellant had falsely alleged that she had been robbed by a man whose description she gave to the police. It was the description of an imaginary man. She had been convicted of unlawfully effecting a public mischief. Held: Lord Hewart CJ said: "In the opinion of the court the indictment aptly describes two ingredients of public mischief or prejudice to the community, one of these being that officers of the Metropolitan Police were lead to devote their time and services to the investigation of an idle charge the other being that members of the public or at any rate those of them who answered a certain description were put in peril of suspicion and arrest."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Larsonneur; 1933 - [1933] 149 LT 542; [1933] 97 JP 206; [1933] 77 Sol Jo 486; [1933] 24 Cr Ap Rep 74
 
Attorney-General v Whelan [1934] IR 518; [1933] IEHC 1
20 Dec 1933

Murnaghan J
Ireland, Crime
(Court of Criminal Appeal - Ireland) The appellant had been tried as part of a conspiracy to steal and to receive stolen good. He was acquitted of the conspiracy, but now appealed against his conviction for theft despite his assertion that he acted only under coercion. Held: He was acquitted: " It seems to us that threats of immediate death or serious personal violence so great as to overbear the ordinary power of human resistance should be accepted as a justification for acts which would otherwise be criminal. The application of this general rule must however be subject to certain limitations. The commission of murder is a crime so heinous that murder should not be committed even for the price of life and in such a case the strongest duress would not be any justification. We have not to determine what class of crime other than murder should be placed in the same category. We are, however, satisfied that any such consideration does not apply in the case of receiving. Where the excuse of duress is applicable it must further be clearly shown that the overpowering of the will was operative at time the crime was actually committed, and, if there were reasonable opportunity for the will to reassert itself, no justification can be found in antecedent threats. "
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 In re Piracy jure gentium; PC 1934 - [1934] AC 586
 
Rex v Donovan [1934] 25 Cr App R 1 CCA; [1934] 2 KB 498
1934
CCA

Crime
The defendant was convicted of indecent assault and common assault after caning a 17 year old female complainant for the purposes of sexual gratification. The complainant suffered actual bodily harm, though the defendant was not charged with an offence under s.47. His defence was consent. The judge had directed the jury that the issue was consent or no consent, without giving any guidance on the burden of proof. Held: A direction should have been given on consent, as in the circumstances of the case the jury might reasonably have found consent. The court rejected the argument that it was unnecessary for the prosecution to prove absence of consent and that therefore the failure to give the direction was immaterial: "Always supposing, therefore, that the blows which he struck were likely or intended to do bodily harm, we are of opinion that he was doing an unlawful act, no evidence having been given of facts which would bring the case within any of the exceptions to the general rule. In our view, on the evidence given at the trial, the jury should have been directed that, if they were satisfied that the blows struck by the prisoner were likely or intended to do bodily harm to the prosecutrix, they ought to convict him, and that it was only if they were not so satisfied, that it became necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. For this purpose we think that "bodily harm" has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Maughan; CCA 1934 - (1934) 24 Cr App R 130
 
Leadbetter v Hutcheson [1934] ScotHC HCJ - 2
23 May 1934
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Sugden v Hma [1934] ScotHC HCJ - 1
12 Jul 1934
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Hma v Mcphee [1934] ScotHC HCJ - 3
18 Dec 1934
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Rex v Sandbach, ex parte Williams [1935] 2 KB 192
1935
KBD

Crime, Magistrates
The Court rejected the view that a person could not be bound over to be of good behaviour when there was no reason to apprehend a breach of the peace. As in the case of binding over to keep the peace, there had to be some reason to believe that there might be a repetition of the conduct complained of before an order to be of good behaviour could be made.
1 Citers



 
 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 23-May-1935 - [1935] AC 462; [1935] UKHL 1
 
Paton v HMA [1935] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
20 Dec 1935
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Cafferata v Wilson; KBD 1936 - [1936] 3 All ER 149
 
Rex v Rose [1937] 1 Jo Crim Law 171
1937


Crime
Attempting to pervert the course of justice by misleading the police as to the commission of a criminal offence with the result of an arrest of an innocent party.
1 Citers


 
Rex v Rule [1937] 2 KB 375
1937


Defamation, Crime
A constituent wrote to his MP asking for assistance to lodge a complaint to the appropriate MP concerning the conduct of a public official in that consituency. Held: Qualified privilege was a defence to a criminal charge of defamatory libel.

 
Mangal Singh v The King-Emperor (Lahore) [1937] UKPC 24
19 Feb 1937
PC
Alness L, Sir Shadi Lal, Sir George Rankin
Commonwealth, Crime, Criminal Sentencing
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder and against his sentence of death. Held: The appeal failed. Though the evidence was largely circumstantial, there was sufficient to allow the court to find the offence proved. It was not part of the duty of the Board to sit as a court of Criminal Appeal but only to correct a perceived miscarriage of justice.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 22-Apr-1937 - [1937] AC 576; [1937] UKHL 1
 
Ward v Robertson [1937] ScotHC HCJ - 1
10 Nov 1937
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Allenby (Benjamin) v HM Advocate; HCJ 30-Nov-1937 - [1937] ScotHC HCJAC - 2; 1938 JC 55; 1938 SLT 150
 
McCrone v Riding [1938] 1 All ER 157
1938


Crime, Road Traffic
The defendant had been acquitted of careless driving after the magistrates held that he was 'exercising oll the skill and attention to be expected from a peson with his short experience' Held: The justices were in error. The basic standard expected of a new driver was the same as that expected of any driver with the same duty as provided in the Act.
Road Traffic Act 1930 12


 
 Rex v Bourne; 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 687
 
Kirkwood v Hma [1939] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
10 Feb 1939
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Rex v Appleby (1940) 28 Cr App R 1
1940


Crime
Appleby and Osler, while committing an offence of warehouse-breaking, were surprised by police officers. They attempted to escape, but were pursued by the officers and a shot was fired by Osler which killed one of the officers. The expression "Let him have it" was used by one of two professional criminals who were found guilty of murdering a police officer. "a much less degree of violence may be sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty of murder in the case of a police officer who is killed in the execution of his duty, in arresting a person or detaining a person in custody, so long as the arrest is lawful, than would suffice in the case of another person. If that proposition is good law today, as in the opinion of this Court it is, it seems to follow that two persons engaged in committing a felony with a common design to resist by violence arrest by an officer, have a common design to do that which, if it results in death, would amount to murder."
1 Citers



 
 Thornton v Mitchell; 1940 - [1940] 1 All ER 339

 
 Regina v Whitehouse; 1941 - [1941] 1 WWR 112; [1941] 1 DLR 683
 
Regina v Barker [1941] 2 KB 381; [1941] 3 All ER 33
1941
CCA
Tucker J
Crime, Taxes Management
In the course of investigating the defendant for tax faud, he was interviewed by the Inland Revenue. Relying upon a standard statement by the revenue, the appellant produced two ledgers which had been fraudulently prepared in order to induce the Revenue to believe that the irregularities amounted to only £7,000. Held: The statement by the Revenue, which reflected a statement in Parliament, was partly a promise or an inducement and that it was not admissible on a charge of conspiring to cheat the Revenue by producing false statements of account. It was held, that "those documents stand on precisely the same footing as an oral or written confession which is brought into existence as the result of such a promise, inducement or threat."
1 Citers


 
Hma v Hill [1941] ScotHC HCJ - 1
16 Apr 1941
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Duguid v Fraser [1941] ScotHC HCJAC - 2
17 Sep 1941
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Trim [1943] VR 109
1943

Macfarlan, Martin and O’Bryan JJ
Commonwealth, Crime
(Supreme Court of Victoria) Section 62 of the Crimes Act 1928 made it an offence to do certain acts “with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman”, specifically in the context of an argument (rejected by the court) that it was a defence if the defendant believed that the child in the womb was already dead. Held: Martin J, with whom O’Bryan J agreed (Macfarlan J dissented), treated “miscarriage” as synonymous with “abortion” and as referring variously to the expulsion or removal of “the contents of a gravid uterus”, the “untimely emptying of a uterus which contains the products of a conception” and “the emptying of the contents of the womb”. It was accordingly neither here nor there that the child was already dead.
1 Citers


 
Wiles v Maddison [1943] 1 All ER 315
1943

Viscount Caldecote CJ
Crime
It was proved that the defendant had the intention to commit an offence. Viscount Caldecote CJ said "A person might, for instance, be convicted of making an offer of an article at too high a price by putting it in his shop window to be sold at an excessive price, although there would be no evidence of anybody having passed the shop window or having seen the offer or the exposure of the article for sale at that price."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Larkin [1943] 29 Cr App R 18
1943
CCA
Humphreys J
Crime
There may be involuntary manslaughter, if the accused intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act inadvertently caused death. Humphreys J said: 'Where the act which a person is engaged in performing is unlawful, then if at the same time it is a dangerous act, that is, an act which is likely to injure another person, and quite inadvertently the doer of the act causes the death of that other person by that act, then he is guilty of manslaughter.'
1 Citers


 
Regina v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551; [1944] 1 All ER 691
1944
KBD

Company, Crime
A company can be guilty of conspiracy, in this case to defraud. Both the managing director and, through him, the haulage company were convicted of conspiracy to defraud. His acts 'were the acts of the company and the fraud of that person was the fraud of the company'.
"Where the only punishment which the court can impose is death, for this purpose the basis of this exception is being that the court will not stultify itself by embarking on a trial in which, if the verdict of guilt is returned, no effective order by way of sentence can be made."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Croft; CCA 1944 - [1944] 1 KB 295
 
Knott v Blackburn [1944] KB 77
1944


Crime

Vagrancy Act 1824
1 Citers


 
Rex v Goodwin [1944] 1 All ER 506
1944

Humphreys J
Crime
Humphreys J held that: "While it is not necessary that a person should be arrested at the place where it is alleged that he was found about to commit an offence, there is no doubt from the language of the section that it is necessary that he should be found - even if 'found' means no more than discovered or seen - in such circumstances as to satisfy the court that he was then and there about to commit an offence."
Prevention of Crimes Act 1871
1 Citers


 
Dewar v Her Majesty's Advocate [1944] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
17 Nov 1944
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Hornbuckle (1945) VLR 281
1945

Lowe J
Commonwealth, Crime
The defendant answered the charge of rape by saying that he had been drunk. Held: Lowe J said: "To hold that knowledge that the act of intercourse was occurring sufficiently establishes the intent, [to have intercourse without consent] because the man who knows he is committing the act must intend it, even if prima facie warranted, seems to us to fail to distinguish 'intent to have intercourse' from 'intent to have intercourse without 'consent of the female'."
1 Citers


 
Re Sandrock and Others (1945) 13 ILR 297
1945


International, Crime
(British Military Court in Holland ) It was submitted that this military court was a court constituted under an Order in Council and was accordingly a domestic court applying English Law.
1 Citers



 
 Kay v Butterworth; KBD 1945 - (1945) 61 TLR 452

 
 Docherty v H M Advocate; 1945 - 1945 J C 89

 
 Rex v Sullivan; CCA 1945 - (1945) 30 Cr App R 132
 
Sherwood v Cox [1945] 1 KB 549
1945
CA
Atkinson, Wrottesley, Tucker JJ
Consumer, Crime
The respondent had been accused of selling milk not of the nature, substance and quality demanded, in that it was deficient in milk fat. The justices found facts proved as admitted: "When the summons was served on the respondent on August 14, 1944, there was also served on him a copy of the certificate of the public analyst (numbered 7582) of his analysis of the sample, the subject of the information, taken on July 17, in accordance with s80, subs3, of the Food and Drugs Act, 1938. The sample had duly been divided into three parts as required by the statute, and certificate No 7582 related to that sample. On July 19, 1944, two days after the aforesaid sample was taken, the appellant, in order to meet a possible defence that the contravention was due to the act or default of another person under s83, subs1, took a further sample of the respondent's milk, in accordance with s70, subs 2. A copy of the certificate of the public analyst relating thereto (numbered 386) was not served on the respondent with the summons, but was sent to him by registered post on August 21, 1944, by the appellant's solicitor with a covering letter, saying that he proposed to adduce the certificate in evidence at the hearing. "At the hearing the prosecuting solicitor having stated that he proposed to adduce in evidence both certificates 7582 and 386, the solicitor for the respondent objected that the respondent had not been served with a copy of certificate 386 with the summons and that consequently the information was bad." The justices agreed with that submission and dismissed the information. Held:
Atkinson J said, at 551-2: "Prima facie, the sample under s70, subs2, taken on July 19, 1944, is one which does not affect the respondent, but is more concerned with the original supplier. Both samples were sent to the public analyst, and on July 25 he issued two certificates. The certificate relating to the milk in respect of which Cox was prosecuted was certificate No 7582, and it certifies that there was only 2.85 percentage of fat. The certificate of the sample taken on July 19 was No 386. I do not know that anything really turns upon what precisely happened at the hearing, but the solicitor for the prosecution opened the case, and stated that he proposed to adduce in evidence both the certificates. At once the respondent objected that he had not received a copy of the second certificate numbered 386. with the summons, and the justices took the view that he was entitled to, and ought to have been served with a copy of that certificate along with the summons, and on that ground dismissed the information.
The contention of the respondent is that 'any' in s80, subs 3, means 'every' certificate of analysis. There the submission ends. Analysis of what, and within what limitation, I know not. The appellant says that the obvious meaning of that word is: 'any certificate of analysis of the article sampled, of that which you are speaking about, the subject-matter of the information." And in my view the argument of the appellant is unanswerable. It seems to me that some limitation must be put upon the words 'any certificate of analysis'. If it is not limited in that way, where is the line to be drawn? Is it any certificate of analysis of any milk at any time purchased, however irrelevant to the article sold and sampled? If it had been meant to go beyond the analysis relating to the article sampled, surely there would have been some words indicating the class or the limits within which the certificates to be served must come."
Wrottesley J said: "I agree that what is meant by the words 'any certificate of analysis' is any certificate of analysis of the article sampled, and therefore to that extent of the article which is the subject of the information."
Tucker J said: "I agree, although I do not think the point is perhaps quite so clear as do the other members of the court, for this reason, that, in my opinion, some words have to be read into s 80, subs 3, whatever interpretation is placed on the sub-section. I think it would suffice Mr. Quass's argument if one read in the words 'any certificate of analysis obtained on behalf of the prosecutor for the purposes of such proceedings.' On the other hand, if Mr Hutton is right, I think the words which have to be read in are 'in respect of the article which is the subject matter of the prosecution.' And the question to my mind, is which of those alternative sentences should be read in. On the whole, I have come to the conclusion that the words which should be read in are 'in respect of the article which is the subject-matter of the prosecution.' When one reads the whole of s 80, I think that is what is envisaged. Generally speaking, what is envisaged is the taking of one sample, no doubt for the purpose of the prosecution, although there may conceivably be cases in which two samples might be taken in respect of the article which is the subject-matter of the prosecution. If that were so, then, no doubt, service of both analyses would have to be made on the seller."
. . And "It seems to me, therefore, to follow that if a prosecutor has an analysis made and obtains a certificate afterwards which he intends to use at the proceedings, he does so at his peril if he has not served a copy on the defendant in sufficient time to enable the defendant to comply with the requirements of subs3. If he does not, the court will no doubt grant an adjournment and the prosecution very likely will be penalised in costs."
Food and Drugs Act 1938
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146; [1944] 1 All ER 119
1945

Lord Caldecote
Company, Crime
The court considered the liability of a company under provisions being, "with intent to deceive, made use . . of a document which was false in a material particular" Held: The General Manager was capable of acting or speaking as the company;
1 Citers


 
Rex v Jarmain [1946] 1 KB 74
1946
CCA
Wrottesley J
Crime
The defendant, in robbing him, pointed his cocked pistol at the cashier. He claimed that he was thinking what to do but had no intention of pressing the trigger, but the gun went off and killed her. Held: Pointing a loaded pistol at a person with your finger on the trigger, in the course of committing a felony, was clearly an act of violence. The trial judge had directed the jury that if they accepted the facts deposed to by the accused they should find him guilty of murder. The jury convicted the accused of murder and the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal: "The judge was no more under a duty to direct the jury that if the pressing of the trigger was inadvertent the killing was manslaughter, than was the judge in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard [1920] AC 479 under a duty to direct the jury that if the pressure exerted by the appellant in that case voluntarily was only so much as necessary to silence the child and the extra pressure which throttled her was inadvertent and accidental, that the accused there was guilty of manslaughter. We think that the object and scope of this branch of the law is at least this, that he who uses violent measures in the commission of a felony involving personal violence does so at his own risk, and is guilty of murder if those violent measures result even inadvertently in the death of the victim. For this purpose the use of a loaded firearm, in order to frighten the person victimised into submission is a violent measure."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Brend v Wood [1946] 175 LT 306; (1946) 62 TLR 462
1946

Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
The court discussed the need to assume that conviction for an offence required proof of mens rea.
Lord Goddard CJ said: "It should first be observed that at common law there must always be mens rea to constitute a crime; if a person can show that he acted without mens rea that is a defence to a criminal prosecution. There are statutes and regulations in which Parliament has seen fit to create offences and make people responsible before criminal Courts although there is an absence of mens rea, but it is certainly not the Court's duty to be acute to find that mens rea is not a constituent part of the crime. It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind that unless a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the Court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind."
1 Citers


 
Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 588; (1946) 31 Cr App R 123
1946
HL
Viscount Simon LC
Crime
Viscount Simon LC said: "as society advances, it ought to call for a higher measure of self-control in a defendant. And with regard to the defence of provocation to a charge of murder: "Consequently, where the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill . . or to inflict grievous bodily harm, the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to manslaughter seldom applies. Only one very special exception has been recognised, viz, the actual finding of a spouse in the act of adultery."
1 Citers


 
Owens v HM Advocate [1946] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
22 Mar 1946
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Buries (1947) VLR 392
1947

Gavan Duffy J
Crime, Commonwealth
The defendant said in answer to a charge of rape that he knew he had the woman's consent because both by word and by deed she plainly told him so. The jury clearly disbelieved him. On appeal he asked the court whether the jury should have been directed as to the legal position arising if the accused mistakenly believed that the woman was consenting, a version which he never advanced at the trial. Held: The appeal failed. The court surveyed the authorities and said: "when once there is some evidence of belief and reasonable ground for it, the jury should be told that a guilty mind is a necessary constituent of the crime and that unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on a consideration of all the evidence, that that constituent along with the others has been proved, they should acquit." and "the jury should only consider the possibility of the accused having acted on a wrong belief as to the facts when there is some evidence that he did honestly believe at least that the necessary facts existed."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Steane [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813
1947

Lord Goddard
Crime
The defendant was charged with an offence requiring an 'ulterior intent', which he denied having. Held: Lord Goddard discussed the direction to the jury: "if on the totality of the evidence there is room for more than one view as to the intent of the prisoner, the jury should be directed that it is for the prosecution to prove the intent to the jury's satisfaction, and if, on review of the whole evidence, they either think the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted."
1 Citers


 
King v Lees (1948) 65 TLR 21
1948


Crime
A passenger who urinated in a taxi cab "injured" it, notwithstanding that the taxi could have been readily restored to its original condition with no residual effect. The essence of the Court’s decision was that the taxi was injured because it was temporarily rendered unusable.


 
 Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1948 - [1946] AC 347; [1946] 1 All ER 186

 
 Harding v Price; KBD 1948 - [1948] 1 KB 695
 
Brannan v Peek [1948] 1 KB 68
1948


Crime

1 Citers


 
Davey v Shawcroft [1948] 1 All ER 827
1948

Lord Goddard CJ
Crime, Company
The court was asked whether an agent of the committee of an unincorporated association, who was personally responsible for a breach of the licence terms, was properly convicted. Held. Lord Goddard CJ said that section 19 meant that an unincorporated committee could be a licensed person for regulatory purposes under the Coal Distribution Order.
Interpretation Act 1889 19
1 Citers



 
 Regina v County Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner; 1948 - [1948] 1 KB 260
 
Fox v Paterson [1948] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
4 Jun 1948
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Rex v Clarke; 1949 - [1949] 2 All ER 448; 33 Cr App Rep 216
 
Wylson v Skeock [1949] 113 JP 294
1949


Crime

1 Citers


 
Burns v Ransley [1949] 79 CLR 101
1949

Latham CJ, Rich J
Commonwealth, Crime
(High Court of Australia) An Australian citizen, was convicted of uttering seditious words, contrary to Section 24 of the Crimes Act 1914-1946. Under S24B seditious words were words expressive of a seditious intention, and a seditious intention, by virtue of Section 24A included, amongst other things, an intention to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of the Commonwealth [of Australia]. Held: The court was divided as to whether the necessary intention was present on the facts. Rich J: "Disaffection connotes enmity and hostility, estranged allegiance, disloyalty, hostility to constituted authority or to a particular form of political government". reflecting the dictionary definition of disaffection. Latham CJ stated that "'disaffection' in the context in which it is used means more … than political opposition."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd; CCA 1949 - [1949] 33 Cr App R 102 CCA
 
Jenkins v Howells [1949] 2 KB 218
1949
KBD

Education, Crime
A pupil had been continuously away from school because her mother was a chronic invalid and it was necessary for the girl to assist with housework. When the mother was prosecuted pursuant to the Act, she contended that her daughter’s absence was the result of "any unavoidable cause" by reference to the Act. The Divisional Court rejected that contention and held that "unavoidable cause", like sickness, must be in relation to the child and not the parent.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Duffy; CCA 1949 - [1949] 1 All ER 932
 
Tumahole Bereng and Others v The King [1949] UKPC 4; [1949] LJR 1603; [1949] AC 253
13 Jan 1949
PC

Commonwealth, Crime
Basutoland - the seven defendants appealed against their conviction for murder.
[ Bailii ]
 
Raffaelli v Heatly [1949] ScotHC HCJ - 1
9 Feb 1949
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Johnson v Youden; KBD 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 544; [1950] 1 All ER 301; 114 JP 136

 
 Flockhart v Robinson; 1950 - [1950] 2 KB 498
 
Corkery v Carpenter [1950] 2 All ER 745; [1951] 1 KB 102
1950
KBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Hilbery, Byrne JJ
Road Traffic, Crime
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be "drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine". Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a bicycle.
Lord Goddard CJ said: "for this purpose there cannot be any distinction between a section in a highway statute passed for the protection of the public and a section in a licensing statute passed for the same purpose, both of them concerning the conduct of a person on the highway and the preservation of public order." and "a bicycle is a carriage . . It is a carriage in my opinion because it carries."
Licensing Act 1872 12
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Crawford (Arthur) v HM Advocate [1950] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
22 Jun 1950
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Walters v Lunt and another; 1951 - [1951] 2 All ER 645
 
Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834 DC
1951
CCA

Crime
The defendant was charged with indecent assault on a girl aged nine. At the man's invitation the girl had committed an indecent act on the man. Held: An invitation to another person to touch the invitor could not amount to an assault on the invitee. As the man had done nothing to the girl which, if done against her will, would have amounted to an assault on her, the man's conduct did not constitute an indecent assault on the girl.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Windle; CCA 1952 - [1952] 2 All ER 1; [1952] 2 QB 826
 
Regina v George [1952] Crim LR 52
1952
CCA

Crime

1 Citers



 
 John Lewis v Tims; HL 1952 - [1952] AC 676
 
Bird v H.M. Advocate [1952] ScotHC HCJ - 1
15 Jan 1952
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Williams [1953] 1 QB 660; [1953] 1 All ER 1068; (1953) 37 Cr App R 71; [1953] 2 WLR 937; (1953) 117 JP 251
1953

Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
The defendant, a sup-post office mistress, appealed against her conviction for larceny by the use of of 'false pretences'. Held: When considering the word 'fraudulently' from the phrase 'fraudulently and without claim of right made in good faith' , it is for the judge to define whether a state of mind, once ascertained as a matter of fact, was or was not fraudulent.
Lord Goddard CJ said: "the court thinks that the word "fraudulently" does add and is intended to add something to the words "without claim of right" and we think it means this (though I am not saying that the words I am about to use will fit every case, but they certainly will fit this particular case) that the taking must be intentional and deliberate, that is to say, without mistake. You must know when you take the property that is the property of another person and that you are taking it deliberately, not by mistake and with an intention to deprive the person of the property in it. A very simple illustration which sometimes arises is where a person picks up a suitcase at a railway station believing that it is his. There may be a suitcase on the flat form when the luggage van is emptied which may so resemble his own that he may pick it up, believing it is his. There, the taking is under a mistake and he is not taking it fraudulently; of course, if he knows it is not his own, as the persons who haunt rail way stations for the purpose of stealing suitcases do, then it is larceny; but if a person, although he is not there setting up a claim of right against someone else, is taking away a suitcase in the mistaken belief that it is his own, he is not acting fraudulently. We think that the word "fraudulently" in the section must mean that it is done intentionally and under no mistake, with the knowledge that it is the property of another person."
Larceny Act 1916 1(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v McCoy 1953 (2) SA 4
1953


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Rogers; 1953 - [1953] 1 WLR 1017; [1953] 2 All ER 644

 
 Gregory v Fearn; CA 1953 - [1953] 2 All ER 559; [1953] 1 WLR 974

 
 Attorney General for Ceylon v Kumarasinhege; PC 1953 - [1953] AC 200
 
Browning v Watson [1953] 2 All ER 775
1953


Crime

1 Citers


 
Hma v Doherty [1953] ScotHC HCJ - 1
3 Sep 1953
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Page; CMAC 1954 - [1954] 1 QB 170

 
 Regina v Sheer Metalcraft Ltd; 1954 - [1954] QB 586; [1954] 1 All ER 542; [1954] 1 QB 586; [1954] 2 WLR 777; (1954) 118 JP 190; (1954) 98 Sol Jo 253
 
Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] CLY 700; [1954] 1 All ER 507; [1954] AC 378; (1854) 38 Cr App R 11; [1954] 2 WLR 343
1954
HL
Lord Simonds LC
Crime
Half a dozen youths engaged in a fist fight with another group, but one of their number suddenly produced a knife and stabbed one of their opponents to death. One of the prosecution witnesses was a youth named Lawson. He gave evidence of an oral admission by the appellant after the event. One of the grounds of appeal was that the judge ought to have given the jury a warning that Lawson could be regarded as an accomplice, and therefore was someone whose evidence required to be treated with special caution. Lawson admitted being involved in the fight at some stage, but he denied all knowledge of a knife and there was no evidence that he was present when it was produced. He was initially charged with murder, but no evidence was offered against him. Held: The others on his side who did not know that he had the knife, were not parties to its use and were not guilty of murder or manslaughter.
The House rejected the argument that an accomplice warning was required.
Lord Simonds defined what was meant by 'accomplice': "There is in the authorities no formal definition of the term 'accomplice'; and your Lordships are forced to deduce a meaning for the word from cases in which X,Y and Z have been held to be, or held liable to be treated as accomplices. On the case it would appear that the following persons, if called as witnesses for the prosecution, have been treated as falling within the category:-
(1) On any view, persons who are participes criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, whether as principals or accessories before or after the fact (in felonies) or persons committing procuring or aiding and abetting (in the case of misdemeanours). This is surely the natural and primary meaning of the term 'accomplice'. But in two cases, persons falling strictly outside the ambit of this category have, in particular decisions, been held to be accomplices for the purpose of the rule: viz:
(2) Receivers have been held to be accomplices of the thieves from whom they receive goods on a trial of the latter for larceny (Rex v Jennings (1912) 7 Cr App R 242; Rex v Dixon (1925) 19 Cr App R. 36)
(3) When X has been charged with a specific offence on a particular occasion, and evidence is admissible, and has been admitted, of having been committed crimes of this identical type on another occasion, as proving system and intent and negativing accidents; in such cases the court has held that in relation to such other similar offences, if evidence of them were given by parties to them, the evidence of such other parties should not be left to the jury without a warning that it is dangerous to accept it without corroboration. (Rex v Farid 91945) 30 Cr. App. R. 168)
In both of these cases (2) and (3) a person not a party or not necessarily a party to the substantive crime charged was treated as an accomplice for the purpose of the requirement of warning. (I say 'not necessarily' to cover the case of receivers. A receiver may on the facts of a particular case have procured the theft, or aided and abetted it, or may have helped to shield the thief from justice. But he can be a receiver without doing any of these things.) The primary meaning of the term 'accomplice,' then, has been extended to embrace these two anomalous cases. In each case there are special circumstances to justify or at least excuse the extension. A receiver is not only committing a crime intimately allied in character with that of theft: he could not commit the crime of receiving at all without the crime of theft having preceded it. The two crimes are in a relationship of 'one-sided dependence.' In the case of 'system,' the requirement of warning within the special field of similar crimes committed is a logical application within that collateral field of the general principle, though it involves a warning as to the evidence of persons not accomplices to the substantive crime charged".
Lord Simonds continued: “My Lords, I have tried to define the term ‘accomplice.’ The branch of the definition relevant to this case is that which covers ‘participes criminis’ in respect of the actual crime charged, ‘whether as principals or accessories before or after the fact.’ But, it may reasonably be asked, who is to decide, or how is it to be decided, whether a particular witness was a ‘particeps criminis’ in the case in hand? In many or most cases this question answers itself, or, to be more exact, is answered by the witness in question himself, by confessing to participation, by pleading guilty to it, or by being convicted of it. But it is indisputable that there are witnesses outside these straightforward categories, in respect of whom the answer has to be sought elsewhere. The witnesses concerned may never have confessed, or may never have been arraigned or put on trial, in respect of the crime involved. Such cases fall into two classes. In the first, the judge can properly rule that there is no evidence that the witness was, what I will, for short, call a participant. The present case, in my view, happens to fall within this class, and can be decided on that narrow ground. But there are other cases within this field in which there is evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that a witness was a ‘participant.’ In such a case the issue of ‘accomplice vel non’ is for the jury's decision: and a judge should direct them that if they consider on the evidence that the witness was an accomplice, it is dangerous for them to act on his evidence unless corroborated: though it is competent for them to do so if, after that warning, they still think fit to do so.”
1 Citers



 
 Calvert v Mayes; CCA 1954 - [1954] 1 QB 342
 
Bedder v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 1 WLR 1119; [1954] 2 All ER 801
1954
HL
Lord Simonds
Crime
B appealed against his conviction for murder. The victim, a prostitute, had taunted the accused, then 18, for his impotence. The accused was in fact impotent. Held: The jury had properly been directed to consider whether a reasonable man who was not impotent would have reacted in the same way. The House refused to accept that physical or mental infirmity could be regarded as material in considering whether a man had been provoked to homicide, and whether a reasonable man could have lost his self control in the circumstances. The "reasonable man" is a wholly impersonal fiction to which no special characteristic of the accused should be attributed.
Though the characteristics of the accused should be taken into account by the jury in considering the gravity of the provocation, the Court should still judge the accused’s conduct by the standard of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused.
Lord Simonds expressed the view that no distinction could be drawn between susceptibility because of temper and susceptibility because of a physical defect which conditions a person’s temper.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Miller; Assz 1954 - [1954] 2 All ER 529; [1954] 2 WLR 138; [1954] 2 QB 282; [1954] 38 Cr App R 1
 
Thabo Meli and Others v The Queen [1954] UKPC 2; [1954] 1 All ER 373; [1954] 1 WLR 228
13 Jan 1954
PC

Crime
(Basutoland) Four appeals against convictions for murder.
[ Bailii ]
 
Nkau Majara v The Queen [1954] UKPC 3; [1954] 2 WLR 771; [1954] AC 235
14 Jan 1954
PC
Lord Goddard
Crime
(Basutoland) Appeal against conviction for being an accessory after the fact to a murder
[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Charlson; 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 317
 
Regina v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 2 WLR 273; (1955) 39 Cr App R 1
1955

Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, where no body had been found. Held: The court approved the direction given by the judge (Oliver J): "If he did not die by natural causes, he was killed. Members of the jury, if he was killed his body was concealed or destroyed and has not been found. It he is dead and was killed and the body was destroyed or concealed, he was murdered, was he not? That is the point. I want you to apply your minds to that set of circumstances, and decide for yourselves whether in the light of those facts, and many more to which I shall have to draw your attention, you can say that you are satisfied that no rational hypothesis except that he is dead, dead by violence, is open. If you are driven to that conclusion, that would be a verdict of murder; but if you think that that would be going too far, and that you could not safely say that no rational explanation of his death except murder could be conceived, why then it will mean that you have a doubt about it, and you will acquit him."
Lord Goddard CJ said: "it is equally clear that the fact of death, like any other fact, can be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is to say, evidence of facts which lead to one conclusion, provided that the jury are satisfied and are warned that it must lead to one conclusion only." and "here there are facts which point inevitably, as it is said irresistibly, towards the appellant being the person who knows what happened to the missing man and who disposed of that man in one way or another. It may be that it would have been desirable to emphasise to the jury that the first thing to which they must apply their minds was whether a murder had been committed; but, speaking for myself, I think that the way the judge put it in the two passages which I have read did sufficiently direct the attention of the jury to the fact that they had to be satisfied of that, and that if they were satisfied of the death, the violent death, of this man they need not go any further."


 
 Regina v Silver; CCC 1955 - [1955] 40 Cr App R 32
 
Hinchcliffe v Sheldon [1955] NZ Police Law Rp 18; [1955] 1 WLR 1207; [1955] 3 All ER 406; (1955) 120 JP 13
20 Jan 1955
QBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Cassels, Streatfield JJ
Police, Crime
The appellant was the son of the licensee of an inn. On returning to the inn one night at about 11.17, he found that police officers wished to enter the premises as they suspected that the licensee was committing an offence under the Licensing Act 1953. He shouted warnings to the licensee, who did not open the door to the police officers until 11.25 p.m. The licensee was not found to be committing any offence. The police had the right to enter licensed premises, whether an offence was being committed or not. The appellant was convicted under section 2 of the 1885 Act which prescribes the punishment for an assault on a constable in the execution of his duty, "shall apply to all cases of resisting or wilfully obstructing any constable or peace officer in the execution of his duty." On appeal, he submitted that he could not be convicted of obstructing a constable when in the execution of his duty unless it was shown that the licensee had committed an offence. Held: "obstructing", within the meaning of s. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act 1885 meant making it more difficult for the police to carry out their duties; under s. 151 (1) of the Licensing Act 1953 it was the duty of the police to enter licensed premises if they thought it likely tbat an offence might be committed, and, therefore, the appellant, in making it difficult for the police to enter the inn, was guilty of wilfully obstructing a constable when in the execution of his duty, and was rightly convicted under s. 2 of the Act of 1885.
Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act 1885 2 - Licensing Act 1953 151
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ NZLII ]
 
Quinn v Cunningham [1955] ScotHC HCJ - 1; 1956 JC 22; 1956 SLT 55
2 Dec 1955
HCJ

Crime
The defender was accused of riding his pedal cycle in a reckless manner, causing injury.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Bailey (1956) NI 15
1956
CANI
Lord MacDermott LCJ
Northern Ireland, Crime
Lord MacDermott LCJ said that the administration of public justice: "comprehends functions that nowadays belong, in practice almost exclusively, to the police, such as the investigation of offences and the arrest of suspected persons."
1 Citers


 
Williams v Phillips (1956) 121 JP 163; [1957] 41 Crim App Rep 5
1956
CCA
Goddard LCJ
Crime
Dustbinmen appealed against their convictions for the larceny of refuse as they removed it from commercial premises. Their employers had posted notices which provided that any proceeds from selling refuse had to be shared with the corporation, and warned of criminal prosecutions. The defendants had collected and sold on sacks of rags and wool they had carried on the dustcarts. In one case the sack was shown to have been corporation property. Held: The appeals failed. The original owner had not abandoned the refuse by placing it outside his premises for collection. It remained there for the purpose of awaiting collection by the corporation. On collection it passed into the constructive possession of the local authority. Given the defendants' knowlege of the notices and of the agreements made, they had sufficient animus furandi.
Goddard LCJ said: "The first point that is taken here, that the property was abandoned, is on the face of it untenable. Of course, that is not so. If I put refuse in my dustbin outside my house, I am not abandoning it in the sense that I am leaving it for anybody to take away. I am putting it out so that it may be collected and taken away by the local authority, and until it has been taken away by the local authority it is my property. It is my property and I can take it back and prevent anybody else from taking it away. It is simply put there for the Corporation [the employer of the dustmen] or the local authority, as the case may be, to come and clear it away. Once the Corporation come and clear it away, it seems to me that because I intended it to pass from myself to them, it becomes their property. Therefore, there is no ground for saying that this is abandoned property. As long as the property remains on the owner’s premises, it cannot be abandoned property. It is a wholly untenable proposition to say that refuse which a householder puts out to taken away is abandoned. Very likely he does not want it himself and that is why he puts it in the dustbin. He puts it in the dustbin, not so that anybody can come along and take it, but so that the Corporation can come along and take it."


 
 Regina v Carr; CCA 1956 - [1956] 40 Cr AR 188; [1956] 3 All ER 979; [1957] 1 WLR 165; [1956] 101 Sol Jo 112
 
Regina v Hudson [1956] 2 QB 252
1956

Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
To avoid the payment of tax by positive false representations constitutes a fraud on the Crown and a fraud on the public. It is a common law offence and is indictable as such.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Papadimitropolus v Regina [1956] CLR 249
1956

Sir Owen Dixon CJ, McTiernan J, Webb J, Kitto J and Taylor J
Crime
High Court of Australia. The rape complainant wrongly believed that she had gone through a marriage with the appellant. Held: "Rape is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. Carnal knowledge is the physical act of penetration. It is the consent to such physical act of penetration which is in question upon an indictment for rape. Such a consent demands a perception as to what is about to take place, as to the identity of the man and the character of what he is doing. Once the consent is comprehending and actual, the inducing causes cannot destroy its reality and leave the man guilty of rape."
"It must be noted that in considering whether an apparent consent is unreal it is the mistake or misapprehension that makes it so. It is not the fraud producing the mistake which is material so much as the mistake itself. But if the mistake or misapprehension is not produced by the fraud of a man, there is logically room for the possibility that he was unaware of the woman's mistake so that a question of his mens rea may arise. So in R. v. Lambert Cussen J says: 'It is plain that, though in these cases the question of consent or non consent is primarily referable to the mind of the woman, if she has really a mind, yet the mind of the man is also affected by the facts which indicate want of consent or possible want of capacity to consent'. For that reason it is easy to understand why the stress has been on the fraud. But that stress tends to distract the attention from the essential inquiry, namely, whether the consent is no consent because it is not directed to the nature and character of the act. The identity of the man and character of the physical act that is done or proposed seem now clearly to be regarded as forming part of the nature and character of the act to which the woman's consent is directed. That accords with the principles governing mistake vitiating apparent manifestations of will in other chapters of the law.
In the present case the decision of the majority of the Full Court extends this conception beyond the identity of the physical act and the immediate conditions affecting its nature to an antecedent inducing cause the existence of a valid marriage. In the history of bigamy that has never been done. The most heartless bigamist has not been considered guilty of rape. Mock marriages are no new thing. Before the Hardwicke Marriage Act it was a fraud easily devised and readily carried out. But there is no reported instance of an indictment for rape based on the fraudulent character of the ceremony. No indictment of rape was founded on such a fraud. Rape, as a capital felony, was defined with exactness, and although there has been some extension over the centuries in the ambit of the crime, it is quite wrong to bring within its operation forms of evil conduct because they wear some analogy to aspects of the crime and deserve punishment. The judgment of the majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court goes upon the moral differences between marital intercourse and sexual relations without marriage. The difference is indeed so radical that it is apt to draw the mind away from the real question which is carnal knowledge without consent. It may well be true that the woman in the present case never intended to consent to the latter relationship. But, as was said before, the key to such a case as the present lies in remembering that it is the penetration of the woman's body without her consent to such penetration that makes the felony. The capital felony was not directed to fraudulent conduct inducing her consent. Frauds of that kind must be punished under other heads of the criminal law or not at all: they are not rape. To say that in the present case the facts which the jury must be taken to have found amount to wicked and heartless conduct on the part of the applicant is not enough to establish that he committed rape. To say that in having intercourse with him she supposed that she was concerned in a perfectly moral act is not to say that the intercourse was without her consent. To return to the central point; rape is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent: carnal knowledge is the physical fact of penetration; it is the consent to that which is in question; such a consent demands a perception as to what is about to take place, as to the identity of the man and the character of what he was doing. But once the consent is comprehending and actual the inducing causes cannot destroy its reality and leave the man guilty of rape."
1 Citers



 
 Moynes v Cooper; 1956 - [1956] 1 QB 439
 
Subramaniam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1956] 1 WLR 965
1956
PC

Evidence, Crime, Commonwealth
(Malaysia) The defendant sought to advance a defence of duress under a section of the Penal Code of the Federated Malay States which provided that, with certain exceptions, "nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence." He sought to have admitted evidence of threats made. Held: What was said to the defendant was admissible to show that the defendant had good reason to fear death or personal injury. Hearsay evidence was admissible as to the state of the defendant's mind. The appeal was allowed because evidence relied on by the appellant to show that he had had a reasonable apprehension of instant death was wrongly excluded.
The Board recognised the distinction between adducing a statement as evidence of something expressly or impliedly asserted in the statement and simply as evidence that the statement was made: 'Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.'
1 Citers


 
Clark v Syme [1956] ScotHC HCJ - 1
3 Oct 1956
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Laila Jhina Mawji and Another v The Queen [1956] UKPC 40; (1957) 41 Cr App R 69; [1957] 2 WLR 277; [1957] AC 126; [1957] 1 All ER 385
4 Dec 1956
PC
Oaksey, Tucker, Cohen, Keith of Avonholm, Somervell of Harrow LL
Commonwealth, Crime
Eastern Africa - The two defendants, parties to a valid polygamous marriage, appealed against a conviction of conspiracy to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice by hiding a wall clock they knew was required for the purpose of an inquiry into a criminal offence. Held: The rule that a husband and wife cannot conspire together "is an example of the fiction that husband and wife are regarded for certain purposes, of which this is one, as in law one person". The words "conspires" and "conspiracy" in English criminal law were not applicable to a husband and wife alone, and the words "other person" in s 110(a) of the penal code of Tanganyika, if English criminal law were to be applied to their "interpretation" or "meaning", could not, in that context, include a spouse.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Hopkins; Regina v Collins; CCA 1957 - (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 231

 
 Regina v Rossi Blythe and Dennis; CCA 1957 - [1957] Crim LR 258

 
 Regina v Vickers; CCA 1957 - [1957] 2 QB 664

 
 Regina v Kemp; 1957 - [1957] I QB 399
 
Regina v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396
1957
CCA
Byrne J
Crime
(Court of Criminal Appeal) The defendant wrenched a gas meter from the wall to steal it. Gas escaped. He was charged with unlawfully and maliciously causing a noxious thing, namely coal gas, to be taken by the victim. Held: Byrne J said: "We have considered those cases R v Faulkner, and we have also considered, in the light of those cases, the following principle which was propounded by the late Professor C S Kenny in the first edition of his Outlines of Criminal Law published in 1902 and repeated at p.186 of the 16th edition edited by Mr. J. W. Cecil Turner and published in 1952: 'In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ie, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to nor does it indeed require any ill will towards 'the person injured''. The same principle is repeated by Mr. Turner in his 10th edition of Russell on Crime at p. 1592."
Offences against the Person Act 1861 23
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Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602
1957
HL
Lord Tucker
Crime
The defendants appealed their convictions under common law for a conspiracy to defraud. The conspiracy was within the jurisdiction but the intended fraudulent acts would happen in Germany. The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions for conspiracy. Held: The House rejected the prosecutor's appeal on the basis that a conspiracy to commit a crime abroad is not indictable in England unless the contemplated crime is one for which an indictment would lie here. The offence of conspiracy is an attempt to anticipate the substantive offence before even an attempt, and so is essential to keeping the peace. Lord Tucker approved a passage from the Court of Appeal considering section 4 of the 1861 Act: "Referring to section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, which makes a conspiracy in this country to murder any person abroad whether within the Queen's domains or not, and whether the person is or is not a subject of the Queen, a misdemeanour punishable with a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment, the court observed that as at any rate since 33 Henry 8, c.23, a British subject had been indictable in this country for murder committed abroad and the Offences Against the Person Act, 1828, expressly provided for the trial of any of His Majesty's subjects charged in England with murder committed on land out of the United Kingdom, whether within the King's dominions or without, it followed that being an accessory to murder abroad or conspiracy to murder abroad was triable here. They were accordingly of opinion that section 4 of the Act of 1861 did not alter the common law but provided a special penalty and made it clear that such a conspiracy by anyone in this country was indictable. This reasoning was not contested before your Lordships by either side and is clearly right." Lord Tucker: "I have reached the conclusion that the decision of the Court of Appeal that a conspiracy to commit a crime abroad is not indictable in this country unless the contemplated crime is one for which an indictment would lie here is correct."
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 Regina v Lobell; 1957 - [1957] 1 QB 547

 
 Regina v Thomas; CCA 1957 - [1956] 41 Cr App R 117
 
Regina v Sharp; Regina v Johnson [1957] 1 QB 552; (1957) 41 Cr App R 86; [1957] 1 All ER 577
1957
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
There had been a fight between the two defendants in a public place in the presence of a large number of spectators. They were jointly indicted on a charge of affray and convicted. They appealed. Held: The court considered the offence of affray, noting that it was an ancient offence for which there had been no recent reported prosecution. and cited the historical cases: "If two men are found fighting in a street one must be able to say that the other attacked him and that he was only defending himself. If he was only defending himself and not attacking that is not a fight and consequently not an affray." and
"The author who devotes most attention to the matter is Hawkins, in Pleas of the Crown (1824), 8th ed, vol 1, chap 28, p 488. He lays down that there may be an affray when there is no actual violence, as when a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons in such a manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people. This, he says, was always an offence at common law and dealt with by many statutes. He then quotes in particular the Assize of Northampton, 2 Edw 3, c 3. Dealing with that statute he says that no wearing of arms is within the meaning of this statute unless it be accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the people. The wearing of unusual or dangerous weapons in public is only one species of affray and in our opinion it is open to a jury to find that the circumstances amount to an affray although no person is actually called to say he was put in terror. Just as the mere wearing of a sword in the days when this was a common accoutrement of the nobility and gentry would be no evidence of an affray while the carrying in public of a studded mace or battle axe might be . ."
An indictment for affray is one which alleges that: "the circumstances involve a breach of the Sovereign's peace, that it was a real disturbance of the peace by two persons fighting each other in public instead of settling their differences in the royal courts, or endeavouring by a display of force, though without necessarily using actual violence, to overawe the public, which was what was aimed at by the Assize of Northampton."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Adams (Unreported), 8 April 1957
8 Apr 1957

Devlin J
Crime

1 Citers


 
Marshall v Clark [1957] ScotHC HCJ - 1
11 Jun 1957
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Spriggs [1958] 1 QB 270
1958
CCA

Crime
The court considered the then conventional formulations employed in Scotland in relation to the level of impairment, which included (but were not confined to) references to the borderline of insanity
Homicide Act 1957
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H M Advocate v Graham 1958 SLT 167
1958

Lord Sorn
Crime, Scotland
The accused was said to have stabbed the deceased while in the act of breaking into a public house with intent to steal from it. There was evidence that he was attempting to break in and steal when the fatal struggle took place. Held: There were two separate offences and a separate criminal purpose to which the killing was ancillary: the housebreaking with intent to steal, and the killing which was said to have been done in the course or furtherance of the stealing.The directions to the jury concentrated on the need for them to be satisfied that the accused was in the course of the theft when he did the killing.
1 Citers


 
Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER 193; (1958) 42 Cr App R 51; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 QB 277; 122 JP 134
1958
QBD
Goddard CJ, Devlin, Pearson JJ
Crime, Road Traffic
The Court was asked whether the accused had put forward sufficient evidence on a charge of dangerous driving to justify the justices adjudging that he should be acquitted, there having been no dispute that at the time when his car collided with another one he was at the driving wheel. At the trial the accused had contended that he became unconscious as a result of being overcome by an unidentified illness. Held: The prosecutor's appeal succeeded. The court discussed the defence of insanity.
Devlin J said: "For the purposes of the criminal law there are two categories of mental irresponsibility, one where the disorder is due to disease and the other where it is not. The distinction is not an arbitrary one. If disease is not the cause, if there is some temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But if disease is present, the same thing may happen again and therefore, since 1800, the law has provided that persons acquitted on this ground should be subject to restraint."
However: "It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the prosecution's case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleep walking or not in a trance or black out."
Goddard CJ did not equate unconsciousness due to a sudden illness, which must entail the malfunctioning of the mental processes of the sufferer, with disease of the mind. Where the driving or apparent driving is deprived of its voluntary character by, for example, automatism or unconsciousness, the offence is not committed: "I agree that there may be cases where the circumstances are such that the accused could not really be said to be driving at all. Suppose he had a stroke or an epileptic fit, both instances of what may properly be called acts of God; he might well be in the driver's seat even with his hands on the wheel, but in such a state of unconsciousness that he could not be said to be driving".
1 Cites

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Munah Binti Ali v Public Prosecutor (1958) 24 MLJ 159
1958

Thomson CJ, Whyatt CJ(S) and Good J
Commonwealth, Crime
(Court of Appeal of Malaya) Thomson CJ: “it is quite clear that the expression “causes a woman with child to miscarry” means to cause her to lose from the womb prematurely the products of conception and … therefore there can be no offence under the section unless there are products of conception”.
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Head [1959] AC 83; [1958] 1 All ER 679
1958
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid, Tucker and Somervell of Harrow, Lord Denning
Crime
The defendant had been convicted under the Act, of having carnal knowledge of "a woman . . under care or treatment in an institution or certified house or approved home, or whilst placed out on licence therefrom." She was at an institution for defectives as a "moral defective". At the time of the alleged offences, she was out on licence. The prosecution conceded that the order had first been made without proper evidence that she was a "moral defective" and that it could be successfully challenged on an application for certiorari or a writ of habeas corpus. Held: The Prosecutor's appeal failed. The issue was the construction of section 56. Did the prosecution have to prove she was lawfully detained? Whilst detention established a prima facie case that a woman was a defective and lawfully under care, that presumption could be rebutted if the defendant showed that the detention was in fact unlawful. The prosecution had itself adduced the evidence from which the invalidity of the order appeared, but the defendant could have brought such evidence. If he had so that it could be quashed, the court would have to ask whether a defence was made out. (Lord Denning, minority) The order was valid as at the date of the alleged offence. That was enough. Even though it was voidable and therefore liable to be quashed on certiorari. The majority did not think it voidable rather than void, but also doubted that, even if voidable rather than void, a defendant could not raise the matter by way of defence. (Lord Somervell of Harrow) "Is a man to be sent to prison on the basis that an order is a good order when the court knows it would be set aside if proper proceedings were taken? I doubt it." It would be a fundamental wrong for an individual to be convicted for contravening a rule which is itself liable to be set aside by a court as unlawful".
Mental Deficiency Act 1913 56(1)(a)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474
1958
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ
Crime
The defendant raised a defence of dimished responsibility under the 1957 Act to a charge of murder. Three doctors called for the defence at the trial had stated that the defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mind due to arrested or retarded development and that this abnormality of mind substantially impaired the appellant's mental responsibility for killing a 15 year old boy. The jury convicted of murder. The defendant argued now that there had been no evidence to contradict that of the doctors. Held. The appeal succeeded. A verdict of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility was substituted. Lord Goddard CJ said: "While it has often been emphasised and we would repeat that the decision in these cases as in those in which insanity is pleaded, is for the jury and not for doctors, the verdict must be founded on evidence. If there are facts which would entitle a jury to reject or differ from the opinions of the medical men, this court would not, and indeed could not, disturb their verdict, but if the doctors' evidence is unchallenged and there is no other on this issue, a verdict contrary to their opinion would not be "a true verdict according to the evidence".
Homicide Act 1957
1 Citers



 
 The Queen v Howe; 1958 - (1958) 100 CLR 448; 32 ALJR 212; [1958] ALR 753; [1958] HCA 38
 
Regina v Chapman [1958] 3 WLR 401; [1959] 1 QB 100; [1958] 3 All ER 143
1958
CCA

Crime
The court accepted that the word `unlawfully' in relation to carnal knowledge had in many early statutes not been used with any degree of precision, and he referred to a number of enactments making it a felony unlawfully and carnally to know any woman-child under the age of 10. 'One would think that all intercourse with a child under ten would be unlawful; and on that footing the word would be mere surplusage.'
Sexual Offences Act 1956 19
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Newton and Stungo; 1958 - [1958] Crim LR 469

 
 National Coal Board v Gamble; QBD 1958 - [1958] 3 All ER 203; [1959] 42 CAR 240; [1959] 1 QB 11; (1958) 42 Cr App R 240; [1958] 3 WLR 434; (1958) 122 JP 453
 
Regina v Padola [1959] 43 Cr App R 220
1959


Crime
Lord Parker CJ said: "In our judgment the direction given by Alderson B. is not intended to cover and does not cover a case where the prisoner can plead to the indictment and has the physical and mental capacity to know that he has the right of challenge and to understand the case as it proceeds."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Jones [1959] 1 QB 291
1959


Crime
There were two criminal acts and the defendant had two purposes, one ancillary to the other. His primary intention was to steal. Having stolen the money, he then killed as he left the house in order to avoid detection.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Smith (1959) 43 Cr App R 121; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193
1959

Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Evidence, Police, Crime
The court considered a situation where one admission was made at 10.00 pm one night under a threat or inducement, and a second statement was made the next morning before a different investigator and after the usual caution was given. The issue was whether the second statement was still under the influence of the threat or inducement of the first. Held: Even the most gentle threats or slight inducements will taint a confession, thoughh "The court thinks that the principle to be deduced from the cases is really this: that if the threat or promise under which the first statement was made still persists when the second statement is made, then it is inadmissible. Only if the time-limit between the two statements, the circumstances existing at the time and the caution are such that it can be said that the original threat or inducement has been dissipated can the second statement be admitted as a voluntary statement.
This court, however, is of the clear opinion that the second statement was admissible. No doubt, the opening reference to what it was said he had said to the regimental sergeant-major put the appellant in a difficulty. No doubt it was introduced by Sergeant Ellis in the hope that thereby he might get a continued confession; but it is quite clear that the effect of any original inducement or threat under which the first statement was made had been dissipated. Quite apart from the fact that the caution was given and given twice, some nine hours had elapsed and the whole circumstances had changed. The parade had ended. The rest of the company had gone to bed. The effect of the threat or the inducement was spent. On those grounds this court has come to the conclusion that the oral and written statements made to Sergeant Ellis were clearly admissible."
The test for causation of a death at common law is that it is a "substantial or significant cause"

 
Mccluskey v Her Majesty's Advocate [1959] ScotHC HCJ - 1
24 Feb 1959
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Hma v Kidd [1959] ScotHC HCJ - 2
23 Oct 1959
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
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