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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Constitutional - From: 1999 To: 1999

This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Lonrho Exports Ltd v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1999] Ch 158
1999

Lightman J
Constitutional
A court must follow the interpretation of the Crown and cannot venture its own interpretation of international treaties, nor could it seek to see whether the Crown had implemented its provisions in good faith as required
1 Citers


 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6
1999

Sachs J, Ackermann J
Human Rights, Constitutional
(South African Constitutional Court) Application was made to have declared constitutionally invalid laws against homosexuality. Sachs J held: " There is no good reason why the concept of privacy should, as was suggested, be restricted simply to sealing off from State control what happens in the bedroom, with the doleful subtext that you may behave as bizarrely and shamefully as you like, on the understanding that you do so in private. It has become a judicial cliché to say that privacy protects people, not places. Blackmun J in Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia v Hardwick et al 478 US 186 (1986) made it clear that the much quoted 'right to be left alone' should not be seen simply as a negative right to occupy a private space free from government intrusion, but as a right to get on with your life, express your personality and make fundamental decisions abut your intimate relationships without penalisation. Just as 'liberty must be viewed not merely "negatively or selfishly as a mere absence of restraint but positively and socially as an adjustment of restraints to the end of freedom of opportunity"', so must privacy be regarded as suggesting at least some responsibility on the State to promote conditions in which personal self-realisation can take place."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Secretary of State for The Home Department Ex Parte Simms; HL 11-Feb-1999 - Times, 09 July 1999; Gazette, 28 July 1999; [1999] UKHL 33; [2000] 2 AC 115; [1999] 3 All ER 400; [1999] 3 WLR 328; [1999] EMLR 689; (1999) 7 BHRC 411; (1999) 2 CHRLD 359

 
 Regina v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Bancoult; Admn 3-Mar-1999 - [1999] EWHC Admin 192

 
 Chief Adjudication Officer and Another v Maguire; CA 23-Mar-1999 - Times, 29 March 1999; Gazette, 26 May 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 1060; [1999] 1 WLR 1778

 
 Hamilton v Mohammed Al Fayed; CA 26-Mar-1999 - Times, 30 March 1999; Gazette, 12 May 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 1111; [1999] 1 WLR 1569; [1999] EMLR 501
 
Regina v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene etc Times, 31 March 1999; [1999] EWHC Admin 277; [1999] 3 WLR 175
30 Mar 1999
Admn
Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ, Laws LJ, Sullivan J
Evidence, Human Rights, Constitutional
The applicants sought, by means of the Human Rights Act to challenge the way in which the decision had been made that they should be prosecuted under the 1989 Act, arguing that section 6(2) was inconsistent with the new Act. Held: The Act contravened the Convention insofar as it made evidential presumptions which were incompatible with the presumption of innocence. An English court is able to apply the Convention anticipating the coming into force of the Act in the UK.
Lord Bingham CJ stated: "Statements by ministers concerning the future conduct of themselves and their officials can found no legitimate expectation concerning the future decisions of the Director since he, like the law officers, acts wholly independently of the executive when making decisions on the conduct of criminal proceedings. It is his public duty and responsibility to exercise his own independent judgement. He cannot be bound by any statement made on behalf of the executive, and no reasonable person alert to his constitutional role could expect him to be so bound."
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 6(2) - European Convention on Human Rights - Human Rights Act 1998
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2651; C-311/97; [1999] EUECJ C-311/97
29 Apr 1999
ECJ

Constitutional
(Judgment) Freedom of establishment - Tax legislation - Tax on company profits
[ Bailii ]
 
The Attorney General v Jones [1999] EWHC 837 (Admin); [1999] 3 All ER 436; [1999] 3 WLR 444; (1999) 11 Admin LR 557; [2000] QB 66
30 Apr 1999
Admn
Kennedy LJ, Mitchell J
Elections, Constitutional
Mrs Jones had been elected as an MP, but suspended after conviction for making a false declaration as to her election expenses. Her appeal was allowed, and no writ having been moved for another election, the AG asked whether she was entitled to resume her seat. Held: She was: " justice requires that when a conviction is set aside on appeal, all penalties imposed at the time of conviction should also, so far as possible, be set aside. It would require very clear statutory language to suggest otherwise and that is not to be found in section 160(4) or elsewhere in the 1983 Act. Where there is a conviction of the type with which we are concerned in this case, there is not only a need to do justice to the individual, but also to the electors she represents, and a need if possible to avoid the trauma and expense of a fresh election if there is no justification for that course."
Representation of the People Act 1983
[ Bailii ]
 
Browne v The Queen Times, 11 May 1999; [1999] UKPC 21; [2000] 1 AC 45
6 May 1999
PC
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Clyde, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Sir Patrick Russell
Constitutional, Commonwealth, Criminal Sentencing
(St Christopher and Nevis) The appellant had been convicted of murder whilst still a youth. He had accordingly been sentenced to be detained 'during [the Governor-General’s] pleasure; and if so sentenced he shall be liable to be detained in such place and under such conditions as the Administrator in Council may direct and, while so detained, be deemed to be in legal custody.' Held: It was inconsistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers, that a person sentenced to be detained during the Governor General's pleasure, should have the length of sentence decided by the Governor, who is part of the executive not the judiciary. The term "during pleasure" is to be "not a once and for all assessment that is made at the time that the defendant is first before the court after his conviction." The unconstitutionality could be repaired by ensuring that the decision was made by a court.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Quinn Gazette, 26 May 1999
26 May 1999
QBD

Constitutional, Prisons
A prisoner charged with a prison mutiny was moved to a prison, where one of the officers now worked. He feared reprisals, and that his trial would be unfair. The right to a fair trial is constitutional, but no real danger was shown here.

 
President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union [1999] ZACC 9; [1999] 4 SA 147
4 Jun 1999


Commonwealth, Human Rights, Constitutional
Constitutional Court of South Africa - The court considered an allegation of bias in the judge, it being said that they should have recused themselves: "The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training ad experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. They must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At the same time it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial."
1 Citers

[ SAFLii ]
 
Practice Direction (Supreme Court: Devolution) Times, 05 July 1999
5 Jul 1999
LCJ

Constitutional
Directions were given for how matters arising from the constitutional changes arising from the devolution of powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were given. Such issues included, in general, whether a body had exceeded its powers, and whether or not it infringed the Human Rights Act. The Direction included forms and detailed notes and notices.

 
Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited [2000] 1 ILRM 426; [1999] 4 IR 485; [1999] IESC 5
30 Jul 1999

Hamilton CJ, Barrington J, Murphy J, Lynch J, Barron J
Constitutional, Crime
(Supreme Court of Ireland)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Lightfoot Times, 18 August 1999; Gazette, 11 August 1999
18 Aug 1999
CA

Insolvency, Constitutional
A debtor does not have a right, under the constitution to participate in any scheme for the relief of debt. Accordingly it was not ultra vires for the Lord Chancellor to provide no discretion on the payment of court fees by an intending applicant for bankruptcy. Such fees were used toward the administration of the applicant's affairs.
Insolvency Fees Order 1986 (1986 No 2030) 8(1) 9(b)

 
Starrs v Ruxton [1999] ScotHC HCJ - 259; [2000] UKHRR 78; 2000 SLT 42; [2000] HRLR 191; 8 BHRC 1; 1999 GWD 37-1793; 1999 SCCR 1052; 2000 JC 208; 1999 SCCR 1052
11 Nov 1999
HCJ
Lord Reed, Lord Justice-Clerk Cullen
Legal Professions, Human Rights, Constitutional
The court was asked "whether the Lord Advocate has acted in a way which was incompatible with the rights of the accused under art 6(1) of the Convention to fair trial by 'an independent and impartial tribunal' within the meaning of that article." Under consideration was the office of Temporary Sheriff. Such temporary trial judges were appointed by the Secretary of State on the advice of the Lord Advocate, himself also a member of the Executive. They were appointed for one year at a time. There was a power to terminate ("recall") the appointment during its currency, but this power was scarcely used. The occasion for it did not arise because the temporary sheriffs depended on annual renewal. Although the appointment was renewable, and generally was renewed, there was no certainty that it would be. Held: The arrangements were held to be inconsistent with the security of tenure necessary to guarantee the independence of the judges in question. The objective observer would see a real risk that the judge might be affected, consciously or unconsciously, by the control maintained by the Executive. The judge would be dependent upon the good regard of the Executive not only for renewal but also for the permanent appointment to which he might well aspire. The brevity of the term of appointment was therefore a critical part of the flaw in the system. The court set aside a conviction because the trial court was not an independent and impartial tribunal, having been presided over by a temporary judge.
Lord Reed said: "Conceptions of constitutional principles such as the independence of the judiciary, and of how those principles should be given effect in practice, change over time. Although the principle of judicial independence has found expression in similar language in Scotland and England since at least the late seventeenth century, conceptions of what it requires in substance - of what is necessary, or desirable, or feasible - have changed greatly since that time."
Lord Justice-Clerk Cullen said that any temporal limit upon a judicial appointment raises a question about independence.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Lord Gray's Motion; HL 12-Nov-1999 - Times, 12 November 1999; Times, 12 November 1999; [1999] UKHL 53; 2000 SC (HL) 46; [2000] 2 WLR 664; [2002] 1 AC 124; 2000 SLT 1337

 
 Higgs and Mitchell v The Minister of National Security and others; PC 14-Dec-1999 - Times, 23 December 1999; [1999] UKPC 55; [2000] 2 AC 228; [1999] 1 WLR 1679
 
Smith and Miller and Mcmorrine and Robbie the Pict v Procurator Fiscal, Dingwall [1999] ScotHC 251
16 Dec 1999
HCJ
Lord Sutherland and Lord Marnoch and Lord Cowie
Scotland, Constitutional
The appellants challenged convictions under regulations imposing toll charges. They challenged the validity of the charges. Held: The first challenge was that the people collecting the charges had not been properly appointed, being private contractors. The regulations had been complied with. Second the orders themselves were said not to have been published as required, having been incorrectly classified as local instruments. They were properly classified as local and did not have to be printed by the Queen's printer and made available for sale.
New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 38 - Assignation Statement (Prescribed Information)(Scotland) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991/2152) - Assignation Statement (Prescribed Information)(Scotland) Regulations 1991 - Statutory Instruments Act 1946 - Statutory Instruments Regulations 1947 (S.I. 1948/1)
[ Bailii ] - [ ScotC ]
 
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