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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Constitutional - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 32 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Regina v Big M Drug Mart (1985) 1 RCS 295
1985

Dickson J
Constitutional
Supreme Court of Canada - A company was charged with unlawfully carrying on the sale of goods on a Sunday contrary to the Lord's Day Act. It challenged the legislation. The freedom affected was that of persons prevented by the Act from working on a Sunday. Held: This was a relevant restriction on the company.
Dickson J said: "Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to others."
1 Citers


 
Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica [1985] 2 All ER 585; [1985] AC 937
1985
PC
Templeman L
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice, Constitutional
The appellant had been sentenced to life for firearms offences. After a successfully appeal, a retrial was ordered. More than two years had passed, after a previous attempt failed for absent witnesses. Held: Referred to the US decision in Barker and Wingo (1972) 407 US 514, invoking the sixth amendment - "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....") which identified four factors in assessing whether a defendant had been deprived of his constitutional rights: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay; (3) the responsibility of the accused for asserting his rights; and (4) prejudice to the accused. "Their Lordships acknowledge the relevance and importance of the four factors lucidly expanded and comprehensively discussed in Barker v Wingo. Their Lordships also acknowledge the desirability of applying the same or similar criteria to any constitution, written or unwritten, which protects an accused from oppression by delay in criminal proceedings. The weight to be attached to each factor must, however, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case." and "It was argued on behalf of the respondents, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-General, that the applicant was able to obtain redress by waiting until his retrial, ordered for 11 May 1982, and then submitting to the Gun Court at the commencement of the retrial that the proceeding should be dismissed on the grounds that in the events which had happened a retrial would be an abuse of the process of the court. Their Lordships cannot accept this submission. If the constitutional rights of the applicant had been infringed by failing to try him within a reasonable time, he should not be obliged to prepare for a retrial which must necessarily be convened to take place after an unreasonable time."
"Their Lordships accept the submission of the respondents that, in giving effect to the rights granted by sections 13 and 20 of the Constitution of Jamaica, the courts of Jamaica must balance the fundamental right of the individual to a fair trial within a reasonable time against the public interest in the attainment of justice in the context of the prevailing system of legal administration and the prevailing economic, social and cultural conditions to be found in Jamaica. The administration of justice in Jamaica is faced with a problem, not unknown in other countries, of disparity between the demand for legal services and the supply of legal services. Delays are inevitable. The solution is not necessarily to be found in an increase in the supply of legal services by the appointment of additional judges, the creation of new courts and the qualification of additional lawyers. Expansion of legal services necessarily depends on the financial resources available for that purpose. Moreover an injudicious attempt to expand an existing system of courts, judges and practitioners, could lead to deterioration in the quality of the justice administered and to the conviction of the innocent and the acquittal of the guilty. The task of considering these problems falls on the legislature of Jamaica, mindful of the provisions of the Constitution and mindful of the advice tendered from time to time by the judiciary, the prosecution service and the legal profession of Jamaica. The task of deciding whether and what periods of delay explicable by the burdens imposed on the courts by the weight of criminal causes suffice to contravene the rights of a particular accused to a fair hearing within a reasonable time falls upon the courts of Jamaica and in particular on the members of the Court of Appeal who have extensive knowledge and experience of conditions in Jamaica. In the present case the Full Court stated that a delay of two years in the Gun Court is a current average period of delay in cases in which there are no problems for witnesses. The Court of Appeal did not demur. Their Lordships accept the accuracy of the statement and the conclusion, implicit in the statement, that in present circumstances in Jamaica, such delay does not by itself infringe the rights of an accused to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. No doubt the courts and the prosecution authorities recognise the need to take all reasonable steps to reduce the period of delay wherever possible."
1 Citers


 
Societe United Docks v Government of Mauritius; Marine Workers Union v Mauritius Marine Authority [1985] AC 585
1985
PC
Lord Templeman
Constitutional
(Mauritius) Dockworkers and the Ports Authority, submitted their wage dispute to binding arbitration. The award granted a substantial wage increase which the workers then sought to have enforced. The government, brought in legislation allowing the Attorney General to object to the award's enforcement. Held: Section 3 of the constitution of Mauritius is an enacting section, not a mere preamble or introduction. The more detailed later sections (section 8) did not curtail the ambit of section 3, and the Board held that: “A Constitution concerned to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual should not be narrowly construed in a manner which produces anomalies and inexplicable inconsistencies.”
Lord Templeman: "Prior to the Amendment Act the appellants were entitled to an order of the court making the award executory and enforceable and each relevant employee was entitled to sue the MMA for, and to recover, the difference between the salary and allowances in fact paid to him and the salary and allowances to which he was entitled pursuant to the award during the duration of the award. The Amendment Act has thus deprived and was intended to deprive each worker of a chose in action, namely the right to sue for and recover damages for breach by the MMA of its contract of employment.
Section 3 of the Constitution of Mauritius recognises and declares inter alia the right of the individual to protection from deprivation of property without compensation. The Board have already determined in connection with the contemporaneous case of Société United Docks v Government of Mauritius that the protection afforded by section 3 is not confined to property which has been compulsorily taken possession of or compulsorily acquired within the meaning of section 8. The appellants rightly complained on behalf of the workers employed by the MMA that the workers had been deprived of property, namely their right to sue for and recover damages for breach by the MMA of its contract of employment, contrary to section 3 of the Constitution." and "It suffices that the Amendment Act was a coercive Act of the government which alone deprived and was intended to deprive the appellants of property without compensation and thus infringed the Constitution."
1 Citers


 
Robinson v The Queen [1985] AC 956; [1985] 2 All ER 594
1985
PC

Commonwealth, Criminal Practice, Constitutional
Where a defendant found himself unrepresented on the day of trial, an adjournment should be granted. The constitutional right to representation was not a guarantee of representation but a right for the defendant to arrange representation at his own or public expense. The trial had proceeded when the defendant, having failed to put his counsel in funds, appeared unrepresented: "... the important word used in section 20(6)(c) is 'permitted'. He must not be prevented by the State in any of its manifestations, whether judicial or executive, from exercising the right accorded by the subsection. He must be permitted to exercise those rights."
Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962 SCh 2 s20(6)(c)
1 Citers



 
 Williams v Fawcett; CA 1985 - [1986] QB 604; [1985] 1 All ER 787
 
Reference re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act 1870 (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 1
1985


Commonwealth, Constitutional
(Supreme Court of Canada) The court declined to give retroactive effect to its decision on the constitutional invalidity of all statutes and regulations of the Province of Manitoba not printed and published in both English and French. A declaration that the unilingual laws of Manitoba were of no effect would have created a legal vacuum with consequent legal chaos. Refusing to take a narrow and literal approach to constitutional interpretation, the court held it could have regard to unwritten postulates such as the principle of the rule of law. Faced with the task of recognising the unconstitutionality of Manitoba's unilingual laws while avoiding a legal vacuum and ensuring the continuity of the rule of law, the court made a ruling which gave deemed temporary validity to all laws rendered invalid by reason of their unilingual defect.
1 Citers


 
Tai Hing Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank [1985] 2 All ER 947; [1985] 2 Lloyds Rep 313; [1985] 3 WLR 317; [1986] AC 80; [1985] UKPC 22
1985
PC
Lord Scarman
Constitutional, Banking
(Hong Kong) The relationship between banker and customer is principally a contractual one between debtor and creditor. As between the banker and his customer, the risk of loss through forgery of the customer's signature falls on the banker unless negligence or other disentitling conduct of the customer precludes the customer's claim. No wider duty should be imposed on the customer beyond a duty not to act in a way that facilitates forgery and to make the bank aware of any known forgeries occurred: "The business of banking is the business not of the customer but of the bank. They offer a service, which is to honour their customer's cheques when drawn upon an account in credit or within an agreed overdraft limit. If they pay out upon cheques which are not his, they are acting outside their mandate and cannot plead his authority in justification of their debit to his account. This is a risk of the service which it is their business to offer."
The Board considered the need for the Board to follow earlier decisions of the House of Lords: "It was suggested, though only faintly, that even if English courts are bound to follow the decision in Macmillan's case the Judicial Committee is not so constrained. This is a misapprehension. Once it is accepted, as in this case it is, that the applicable law is English, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee will follow a House of Lords' decision which covers the point in issue. The Judicial Committee is not the final judicial authority for the determination of English law. That is the responsibility of the House of Lords in its judicial capacity. Though the Judicial Committee enjoys a greater freedom from the binding effect of precedent than does the House of Lords, it is in no position on a question of English law to invoke the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 of July 1966 pursuant to which the House has assumed the power to depart in certain circumstances from a previous decision of the House. And their Lordships note, in passing, the Statement's warning against the danger from a House of Lords' decision in a case where, by reason of custom, statute, or for other reasons peculiar to the jurisdiction where the matter in dispute arose, the Judicial Committee is required to determine whether English law should or should not apply. Only if it be decided or accepted (as in this case) that English law is the law to be applied will the Judicial Committee consider itself bound to follow a House of Lords' decision."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Winfat Enterprise (Hong Kong) Co Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 733
1985
PC

Constitutional
The power to make laws for "peace, order and good government" was widely recognised. Section 15 of New Territories Land Court Ordinance 1900 provided: "All land in the New Territories is hereby declared to be the property of the Crown …". It deemed the occupiers to be trespassers unless their occupation was authorised by the Crown. This replaced Chinese customary tenure, which was assignable and heritable. One of the issues in the case was whether that customary interest survived so that a developer whose land was being acquired for a price below its market value, could rely on it. It was held that the land vested in the Crown under that wide declaratory power.
1 Citers


 
Celestri and Co Spa v Ministry of Finance. R-172/84; [1985] EUECJ R-172/84
21 Mar 1985
ECJ

European, Constitutional
ECJ Although article 41 of the EEC Treaty, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, does not permit the court either to assess the facts of the case or to review the grounds on which the question submitted for a preliminary ruling is based, it is none the less for the court to set the measure whose validity is contested in context in community law and to examine the criteria for interpretation established by community law in order to be able to give the national court an appropriate answer for the purpose of resolving the main dispute.
Where that examination reveals that the provision of community law on which the court has been requested to give a ruling is not relevant to the solution of the main dispute, the court will declare that it is unnecessary for it to give a decision on the point at issue.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations; 1986 - (1986) 7 NSWLR 372

 
 Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions of Grenada; PC 1986 - [1986] AC 73; [1985] 3 WLR 72
 
Bell v Secretary of State for Defence [1986] QB 322; [1985] 3 All ER 661
1986
CA

Negligence, Constitutional, Armed Forces
The deceased was injured serving in the forces in Germany. His injury was worstened after negligent communications between army doctors. The defendant relied upon State Immunity to defend a claim, saying he had issued a certificate that he had died on active duty. Held: The Secretary was entitled to issue the certificate of entitlement even though at the time no-one was entitled to receive an award, and the only effect was to achieve immunity from suit. However the action which caused the injury was the failure to communicate the deceased's condition, which happened at the civilian hospital and not on Crown Land, and therefore the section did not give immunity.
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 10(1)(a)(b)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC); 53 OR (2d) 719; 24 CCC (3d) 321; 50 CR (3d) 1; 65 NR 87; [1986] CarswellOnt 95; EYB 1986-67556; [1986] SCJ No 7 (QL); 14 OAC 335; 16 WCB 73; [1986] ACS no 7; 19 CRR 308
28 Feb 1986

Dickson C.J. and Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ.
Constitutional, Human Rights, Crime
Supreme Court of Canada - Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Presumption of innocence (s. 11(d)) -- Reverse onus clause -- Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug -- Onus on accused to rebut presumption -- Whether or not reverse onus in violation of s. 11(d) of the Charter -- Whether or not reverse onus a reasonable limit to s. 11(d) and justified in a free and democratic society -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 11(d) -- Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 3(1), (2), 4(1), (2), (3), 8.
Criminal law -- Presumption of innocence -- Reverse onus -- Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug -- Onus on accused to rebut presumption -- Whether or not constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence (s. 11(d) of the Charter) violated.
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]

 
 Re Edward and Edward; 1987 - (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 654
 
Regina v Home Department ex parte Herbage [1987] QB 872
1987

Hodgson J
Constitutional
An injunction could be pronounced against ministers of the Crown acting in their official capacity.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parte Camden London Borough Council [1987] 1 WLR 819
1987
CA
Slade, Parker and Mustill LJJ
Benefits, Constitutional
A directory referred to in a statutory instrument setting a level of benefits had not itself been passed by Parliament. Held: There was no legal flaw in a statutory instrument which fixed the amount of benefits by reference to a directory separately published by the Secretary of State. The directory had not been laid before Parliament with the draft instrument but was already in existence and able to be referred to.
Slade LJ referred with approval to Macpherson J's observations in the court below about the technique of reference to outside documents in a statutory instrument. The judge said that, provided the reference was to an existing document and there was no question of sub-delegation, there was no objection to this practice in the eyes of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and that there had been an increasing tendency to resort to this technique. The court's task was to look to see whether the reference offended against the provisions of the enabling statute and was in truth simply part of the regulations by which the Secretary of State purported to exercise his powers. If that inquiry is negative, then all is well. Any control of the extended use of references which are permissible in their own statutory context was a matter for Parliament and its practices.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Rajinder Kaur [1987] Imm AR 278
1987
CA
Glidewell LJ, Schiemann J
Immigration, Constitutional
The court considered a provision requiring refusal of leave to enter if there was no entry clearance. Held: Such a mandatory rule was intra vires, the Secretary of State retaining a discretion outside the 1971 Act. Glidewell LJ said: "immigration was formerly covered by the royal prerogative and it was a matter which lay entirely within the exercise of that prerogative. Much of the prerogative powers vested in the Crown in this field have now been superseded by a statute but there remains—and this is what the royal prerogative is—a residual power in the Crown, through Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Home Affairs, to exercise such residual power as is necessary for the proper control of immigration.
In my view, the exercise of discretion in relation to leave to enter outside the rules is an exercise of the remaining part of that prerogative power"
Immigration Act 1971
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock; QBD 1987 - [1987] 1 WLR 1482; [1987] 2 All ER 518
 
Frankland and Another v Regina [1987] UKPC 3; [1987] UKPC 6
3 Mar 1987
PC
Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Goff of Chieveley
Crime, Commonwealth, Constitutional
Isle of Man - the defendants appealed against their conviction for murder. The Board was asked whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the offence, including the fact of intoxication, the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt a murderous intent. Held: The Board considered the status of decisions of English courts in the Isle of Man.
"Decisions of English Courts, particularly decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in England, are not binding on Manx Courts, but they are of high persuasive authority, as was correctly pointed out by Sir Iain Glidewell in giving the judgment of the Staff of Government Division, Criminal Jurisdiction. Such decisions should generally be followed unless either there is some provision to the contrary in a Manx statute or there is some clear decision of a Manx Court to the contrary, or, exceptionally, there is some local condition which would give good reason for not following the particular English decision. The persuasive effect of a judgment of the House of Lords, which has largely the same composition as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the final Court of Appeal from a Manx Court, is bound to be very high."
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Arnold v Central Electricity Generating Board [1988] AC 228; Gazette, 25 November 1987; [1987] 3 All ER 694; [1987] 3 WLR 1009
22 Oct 1987
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Brightman, Lord Ackner and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton
Constitutional, Limitation
The plaintiff was widow and administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. He had worked from April 1938 to April 1943 for a predecessor to the CEGB. He had been exposed to asbestos dust as a result of his employer's negligence and breach of duty. In 1981 he began to suffer mesothelioma, a long-delayed result of his exposure, and he died in May 1982. Proceedings were issued in April 1984. It was agreed that any cause of action the deceased may have had was barred by section 21 of the 1939 Act one year after his employment had ceased, namely in April 1944. The issue was whether the 1963 Act or the 1975 Act revived the deceased's cause of action. Held: Any action time-barred before 4 June 1954 remained time-barred.
Lord Bridge thought it "beyond question that the Act of 1963 operated retrospectively, when the appropriate conditions were satisfied, to deprive a defendant of an accrued time bar in respect of a claim for damages for personal injuries in which the cause of action had accrued since 4 June 1954 and which had, therefore, been subject to the three year period of limitation introduced by the Act of 1954. This is the combined effect of the relevant provisions of sections 1, 6 and 15."
Lord Bridge accepted that: "Consistently with the presumption that a statute affecting substantive rights is not to be construed as having retrospective operation unless it clearly appears to have been so intended, it seems to me entirely proper, in a case where some retrospective operation was clearly intended, equally to presume that the retrospective operation of the statute extends no further than is necessary to give effect either to its clear language or to its manifest purpose. Construing sections 2A to 2D of the Act of 1939 in the light of section 3 of the Act of 1975, I think that full effect is given both to the language and to the purposes of the legislation if it is held retrospectively applicable to all personal injury actions previously governed by the three year limitation period under the Act of 1954, whether as then enacted or as amended by the Act of 1963. Conversely, I can find nothing in the language or discernible purposes of the statute which leads clearly, let alone avoidably, to the conclusion that defendants previously entitled to rely on the accrued six year and one year time bars under the original Act of 1939 which the Act of 1963 left intact were intended to be deprived of those accrued rights by the Act of 1975."
Limitation Act 1939 2A(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd; CA 1988 - [1988] 1 WLR 64

 
 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport ex-parte Factortame and Others; CA 1988 - [1989] 2 CMLR 353
 
Morgentaler v Regina [1988] 1 SCR 30; 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC)
28 Jan 1988

Dickson CJ and Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson and La Forest JJ
Constitutional, Human Rights, Crime, Health Professions
Supreme Court of Canada - Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Life, liberty and security of the person -- Fundamental justice -- Abortion -- Criminal Code prohibiting abortion except where life or health of woman endangered -- Whether or not abortion provisions infringe right to life, liberty and security of the person -- If so, whether or not such infringement in accord with fundamental justice -- Whether or not impugned legislation reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 -- Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251.
Constitutional law -- Jurisdiction -- Superior court powers and inter-delegation -- Whether or not therapeutic abortion committees exercising s. 96 court functions -- Whether or not abortion provisions improperly delegate criminal law powers -- Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(27), 96.
Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Whether or not Attorney General's right of appeal constitutional -- Costs -- Whether or not prohibition on costs constitutional -- Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 605, 610(3).
Criminal law -- Abortion -- Criminal Code prohibiting abortion and procuring of abortion except where life or health of woman endangered -- Whether or not abortion provisions ultra vires Parliament -- Whether or not abortion provisions infringe right to life, liberty and security of the person -- If so, whether or not such infringement in accord with fundamental justice -- Whether or not impugned legislation reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Criminal law -- Juries -- Address to jury advising them to ignore law as stated by judge -- Counsel wrong.
[ Canlii ]
 
Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41; (1988) 80 ALR 362; (1988) 62 ALJR 447; (1988) 7 MVR 289
18 Aug 1988

Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ
Commonwealth, Damages, Constitutional
Austlii (High Court of Australia) - Private International Law - Tort - Negligence - Act committed in Territory - Personal injury - Territory statute imposing limit on amount of damages - Action in State court - No limit on amount of damages under State law - Choice of law - Whether law of place of tortious act or of forum - The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 118, 122 - Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (N.T.), ss. 4,5 - State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth), s. 18.
Federal Jurisdiction - Conflict of laws - Full faith and credit - Whether State court required to give full faith and credit to Territory statute - Whether law of Territory a law of the Commonwealth - Inconsistency - The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 109, 118 - State and Territorial Laws and Recognition Act 1901 (Cth), s. 18.
Federal Jurisdiction - Action in State court against Commonwealth - Submission to jurisdiction - Whether federal jurisdiction - Whether State choice of law rules apply - The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 75(iii), 78 - Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss. 39(2), 56, 64, 79.
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1; [1988] HCA 55
26 Oct 1988

Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ
Commonwealth, Constitutional
Austlii (High Court of Australia) Constitutional Law (Cth) - Inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws - Compensation of seamen - Laws expressly contemplating coexistence of laws - Whether Commonwealth law covers field - The Constitution (63 & 64 Vict c. 12), s.109 - Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 (Cth), ss.5(2)(e), 10A - Australia Act 1986 (Cth), s.2(1) - Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), ss.7,46.
Constitutional Law - State Parliament - Powers - To make laws for peace, order and good government - Connexion of operation of law with State - Remote or general connexion sufficient - Workers' compensation claimed by crew member of State-registered ship - Whether eligible to claim only under Commonwealth legislation - Registration of ship sufficient connexion with State - Extraterritorial operation.
Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.) - Entitlement - Territorial limits of jurisdiction - Compensation under State law unavailable under Commonwealth law - Claim under State law - Whether maintainable - Crew member of State-registered ship.
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]

 
 Regina v Foreign Secretary ex parte Everett; CA 1989 - [1989] 1 QB 811; [1988] EWCA Civ 7; [1989] QB 811; [1989] 2 WLR 224

 
 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry; HL 1989 - [1990] 2 AC 418; [1989] 3 WLR 969; [1989] Ch 72; [1989] 3 All ER 523
 
McMonagle v Westminster City Council [1990] 2 AC 716; [1990] 1 All ER 993
1989
HL
Lord Bridge
Constitutional
The House treated words as surplusage in a statute which contained criminal sanctions in order to avoid the substantial frustration of the object of the Act. Words in an Act are not to be rendered "insensible, absurd or ineffective to achieve its evident purpose."
Lord Bridge said: "It is a canon of construction that, if it be possible, effect must be given to every word of an Act of Parliament or other document; but that, if there be a word or a phrase therein to which no sensible meaning can be given, it must be eliminated."
and "I recognise that this is a strong course to take in construing a statute and one which imputes an unusual degree of ineptitude to the draftsman . . the presumption that every word in a statute must be given some effective meaning is a strong one, but the courts have on occasion been driven to disregard particular words or phrases when, by giving effect to them, the operation of the statute would be rendered insensible, absurd or ineffective to achieve its evident purpose."
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 Sch 3
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd; HL 18-May-1989 - [1990] 2 AC 85; [1989] 2 WLR 997; [1989] UKHL 1; [1989] 3 CMLR 1; [1989] COD 531; [1989] 2 All ER 692

 
 Wachauf v Bundesamt Fur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft; ECJ 13-Jul-1989 - C-5/88; [1991] 1 CMLR 328; [1989] ECR 2609; R-5/88; [1989] EUECJ R-5/88

 
 Abbassy v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis; CA 28-Jul-1989 - [1990] 1 WLR 385; [1989] EWCA Civ 7; [1990] 1 All ER 193; (1989) 90 Cr App R 250
 
McKiernon v Secretary of State for Social Security Guardian, 31 October 1989; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 1017 of 1989
26 Oct 1989
CA
Lord Donaldson MR
Constitutional
A statute granting a power to be amended by a subordinate instrument can only do so by an express power: "Whether subject to the negative or affirmative resolution procedure, [subordinate legislation] is subject to much briefer, if any, examination by Parliament and cannot be amended. The duty of the courts being to give effect to the will of Parliament, it is, in my judgment, legitimate to take into account of the fact that a delegation to the Executive of power to modify primary legislation must be an exceptional course and that, if there is any doubt about the scope of the power conferred upon the Executive or upon whether it has been exercised, it should be resolved by a restrictive approach."
1 Citers


 
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