Civil Procedure Rules - 2000

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This page lists 22 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Clark -v- Perkes [2000] All ER 1
2000	Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court gave guidance on the practice and procedure on second appeals.
	Civil Procedure Rules 52.2(3) 52.4.8

James Gilbert Ltd -v- MGN Ltd [2000] EMLR 681
2000 Early J	Defamation, Civil Procedure Rules	1 Citers
	The test to be applied to the question of summary disposal under s.8 of the 1996 Act is the same as that under CPR Part 24.
	Defamation Act 1996 8 - Civil Procedure Rules 24

Deg-Deutsche Investitions Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft Mbh -v- Koshy and Others
13 Jan 2000 ChD	Legal Aid, Costs, Civil Procedure Rules
	Once a legal aid certificate is revoked the party is deemed by statute never to have had the benefit of a legal aid certificate. The rules relating to assessment of costs which applied when a party had legal aid did not therefore apply. An order however which has once been made cannot be varied subsequently by reference to those rules, even if the order was made in the light of them.
	Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989 130 - Civil Procedure Rules Part 3.1(7)

Taylor -v- Bolton Heath Health Authority Unreported, 14-Jan-2000
14 Jan 2000 QBD Moreland J	Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court construed narrowly the term 'instructions' within the rules where they exempted document forming part of the instructions to an expert to prepare a report for the litigation from disclosure. The word meant 'what an expert was told to do'.
	Civil Procedure Rules 35.10

Commissioners of Customs and Excise -v- Eastwood Care Homes
17 Feb 2000 CA	Civil Procedure Rules
	The rules on applications for appeals out of time have changed fundamentally. The court can no longer look at these by applying strict rules, but each case had to be looked at from the point of view of how justice could be achieved, allowing for the length of any delay, the merits of the appeal, the effect of the delay on public administration, the resources of the parties, and prejudice to the parties from any delay.

The Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens Of The City Of London -v- Reeve and Company Ltd, G Lawrence Wholesale Meat Company Ltd, Citigen (London) Ltd
25 Feb 2000 TCC	Civil Procedure Rules
	Court Service CPR 24.2(a)(i) - Summary judgment against Part 20 Claimant - Whether no real prospect of success Indemnity - Indemnity against loss etc suffered by reason of indemnifier's breach of contract - Date of accrual of cause of action - Breaches giving rise to claims by third parties - Whether cause of action accrues when liability to third parties arises or is satisfied Construction of documents - Settlement agreement - Recital of agreement to "resolve all outstanding matters" - Waiver of "all claims or causes of action .... [arising] prior to the date of this Agreement" - Whether claims under indemnity included if cause of action had not accrued.

Mark Smith -v- David Probyn, PGA European Tour Ltd [2000] EWHC QB 136
25 Feb 2000 QBD The Hon Mr Justice Morland	Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The claimant had served proceedings on a representative without first checking that they had authority to accept service. This was discovered too late, and applied for an extension of time for service. The application was refused. The requirement to ensure that the person served had such authority was now clear, and the claim form must be served within four months of issue.
	Civil Procedure Rules 6.4 (2) 7.6(3)(b)
	Link[s] omitted

Dermot Gerard Richard Walsh -v- Andre Martin Misseldine [2000] EWCA Civ 61
29 Feb 2000 CA Lord Justice Brooke, Stuart-Smith LJ	Civil Procedure Rules, Personal Injury	Casemap 1 Citers
	The claimant sought damages for injuries from 1989. His claim was pursued effectively, but a four-year delay ensued after 1994. He then sought to enlarge his claim greatly by introducing a lot of new issues of which the defendant's insurers had no notice when they calculated the value of the claim in the early 1990s for the purposes of a payment into court CPR 3.1(2)(a) and 3.1(3)(a) give the court power to extend time for compliance with a rule subject to conditions. The court declined to strike out his claim despite the considerable delay on condition that the claimant was limited to prosecuting his claim on the basis of his case as it stood before the long period of delay commenced. "Although CPR 3.1(a) expressly preserves the courts' inherent jurisdiction to protect its process from abuse, this is a residual long-stop jurisdiction. The main tools the courts have now been given to exterminate unnecessary delays are to be found in the rules and practice directions and in the orders they may make from time to time."
	Civil Procedure Rules 3.1(2)(a) 3.1(3)(a)
	Link[s] omitted

Bansal -v- Cheema Unreported, 2 March 2000; CCRTI 99/1245/B1
2 Mar 2000 CA Lord Justice Brooke	Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the application of CPR 3.9(1) to a decision relating to the relief of a sanction. Held: Lord Justice Brooke said: "It is essential for courts, exercising their discretion on an occasion like this, to consider each matter listed under CPR 3.9(1) systematically in the same way as it is now well known that courts go systematically through the matters listed when an application is made for the exercise of the court's discretion under s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980."
	Civil Procedure Rules 3.9(1) - Limitation Act 1980

Bank of Credit and Commerce International Sa (In Liquidation) -v- Ali and Others (No 4) [2000] ICR 1410
2 Mar 2000 CA Chadwick and Buxton LJJ,	Civil Procedure Rules, Costs	1 Citers
	The claimant and his former employers had compromised the employee's claim for damages, but the claimant then sought to sue for stigma damages after these were awarded elsewhere. The general language of the release was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the claims which Mr Naeem sought to pursue. Held: Since all the claims known to the parties were identified and met in full, the broad language of the release must be taken to refer to other claims, not at that stage known or identified. However, the claimant's appeal was allowed since it would have been inconscionable to allow the company to rely on the release. The overriding principle now to be applied was for the judge to attempt to do justice between the parties. Though costs might ordinarily be awarded to a successful party, the court could make a different order if justice so required in the particular facts of any case.

Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (In Receivership) -v- Koshy and Others (No 2)
30 Mar 2000 ChD	Costs, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The new Civil Procedure Rules had not substantially affected the rules on costs following the event of a trial. The discretion in a judge as to the order for costs had been correctly stated in Elgindata, and approved in Phonographic Performance Ltd v AEI Rediffusion Music Ltd.

Tanfern Ltd -v- Cameron-MacDonald, Cameron-MacDonald [2000] 1 WLR 1311; [2000] EWCA Civ 152; [2000] 2 All ER 801; [2000] EWCA Civ 3023
12 May 2000 CA Brooke LJ	Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court gave detailed guidance on the application of the new procedures on civil appeals in private law cases introduced on May 2. Appeals from a County Court District Judge's final decision in a multi-track case could now go straight to the Court of Appeal. Appeals will generally be subject to leave being obtained. An appeal should only be allowed where the decision of the lower court was "wrong" or where it was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings. It is only in an "exceptional" case that a second appeal may be sanctioned. The general rule is that the decision of the appeal court on the first appeal will be the final decision. It is no longer possible to pursue a second appeal merely because the appeal is properly arguable or has a real prospect of success. "A final decision includes the assessment of damages or any other final decision where it is “made at the conclusion of part of a hearing or trial which has been split up into parts and would, if made at the conclusion of that hearing or trial, be a final decision:” article 1(3) of the Order of 2000; it does not include a decision only on costs. This means that if a judge makes a final decision on any aspect of a claim, such as limitation, or on part of a claim which has been directed to be heard separately, this is a final decision within the meaning of this provision."
	Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004 - Civil Procedure Rules
	Link[s] omitted

Petrograde Inc -v- Texaco Ltd Unreported, 23 May 2000
23 May 2000 CA Lord Woolf MR	Costs, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The award of costs under Rule 36.21 on an indemnity basis is not intended to be penal, and the court must look at what was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Lord Woolf said: "However, it would be wrong to regard the rule [36.21] as producing penal consequences. An order for indemnity costs does not enable a claimant to receive more costs than he has incurred. Its practical effect is to avoid his costs being assessed at a lesser figure. When assessing costs on the standard basis the court will only allow costs `which are proportionate to the matters in issue' and `resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonably proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party'. On the other hand, where the costs are assessed on an indemnity basis, the issue of proportionality does not have to be considered. The court only considers whether the costs were unreasonably incurred or for an unreasonable amount. The court will then resolve any doubt in favour of the receiving party. Even on an indemnity basis, however, the receiving party is restricted to recovering only the amount of costs which have been incurred (see Part 44.3 and Part 44.5). The ability of the court to award costs on an indemnity basis and interest at an enhanced rate should not be regarded as penal because orders for costs, even when made on an indemnity basis, never actually compensate a claimant for having to come to court to bring proceedings. . . The power to order indemnity costs or higher rate interest is a means of achieving a fairer result for a claimant. If a defendant involves a claimant in proceedings after an offer has been made, and in the event, the result is no more favourable to the defendant than that which would have been achieved if the claimant's offer had been accepted without the need for those proceedings, the message of Part 36.21 is that, prima facie, it is just to make an indemnity order for costs and for interest at an enhanced rate to be awarded. However, the indemnity order need not be for the entire proceedings nor, as I have already indicated, need the award of interest be for a particular period or at a particular rate. It must not however exceed the figure of 10 per cent referred to in Part 36."
	Civil Procedure Rules 36.21

Petrotrade Inc -v- Texaco Ltd [2001] 4 All ER 853; [2002] 1 WLR 947
23 May 2000 CA Lord Woolf MR	Costs, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	Where a defendant failed to beat a claimant's part 36 offer to settle, but judgment was given summarily the rule did not mean that the defendant was necessarily to be ordered to pay costs on an indemnity basis, and to pay interest. Summary judgment did not involve a trial as required by the rule, and the early and relatively cheap settlement indicated the absence of need for such a rule. Nevertheless a court retained a discretion to make such an award.
	Civil Procedure Rules Part 36.21

Ropac Ltd -v- Inntrepreneur Pub Co and Another [2001] L&TR 10
7 Jun 2000 ChD Neuberger J	Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	There had been a consent order in the terms of an unless order giving the landlord an order for possession unless the tenant paid sums by a certain date, time being of the essence. The order was not complied with and the tenant applied for a retrospective extension of time to comply with the order. Held: The court retained the power to grant an order for extension of time even though the parties had previously agreed the terms of an 'unless' consent order and it had expressed time to be of the essence. The court's case management powers had to be read in the light of the overriding objective as expressed in the Rules. Under the RSC the order in the case before him was in sufficiently clear terms to be a binding consent order with which the court would only have interfered in circumstances which would justify interference with a contract. Under the CPR however, the court had jurisdiction to extend time: "To my mind, the CPR therefore gives the Court rather more wide- ranging, more flexible powers than the RSC. In my judgment, those powers are to be exercised not merely to do justice between the parties, but in the wider public interest. Further, the objective to deal with a case justly must, as I see it, sometimes (albeit rarely) require the court to override an agreement made between the parties in the course of, and in connection with, the litigation. I consider that this means that the court has greater power to interfere than before. Having said that, I should add this. Where the parties have agreed in clear terms on a certain course, then, while that does not take away its power to extend time, the court should, when considering an application to extend time, place very great weight on what the parties have agreed and should be slow, save in unusual circumstances, to depart from what the parties have agreed." Neuberger J set out the process he had to apply to to extend time in respect of a consent order. He said at: "First, at least in general, if the order was a genuine consent order, that is representing a contractual agreement between the parties, and stated that, if a party did not do something within a specified time, then his claim or defence would be struck out or that there would be some other sanction, that represented a contract with which the court had no power to interfere, save in circumstances in which the court has power to interfere with a contract. That seems to me to be the effect of the judgments in Purcell v FC Trigell Limited [1971] 1 QB 359 - see at 365G per Winn LJ and 366D per Buckley LJ ."
	Civil Procedure Rules 81

Clarkson -v- Gilbert and others [2000] EWCA Civ 3018; [2000] CP Rep 58; [2000] 3 FCR 10; [2000] 2 FLR 839; [2000] Fam Law 808
14 Jun 2000 CA Lord Woolf CJ, Aldous and Waller LJJ	Civil Procedure Rules, Legal Professions, Litigation Practice	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the restrictions on lay representatives appearing in court as the related to relatives of the party. Held. The same objections to granting rights of audience did not apply to a husband who merely wished to assist his wife by representing her in court. Where a close relative was seeking to represent a party the question was whether there was good reason on the facts to grant it, such as ill health or lack of means. Lord Woolf CJ said: "The overriding objective is that the courts should do justice. Now that legal aid is not available as readily as it was in the past means that there are going to be situations where litigants are forced to bring proceedings in person when they will need assistance. However, if they are litigants in person they must, in my judgment, establish why they need some other person who is not qualified to appear as an advocate on their behalf. In the ordinary way it will be for them to satisfy the court that that is appropriate. If somebody's health does not, or may not, enable them to conduct proceedings themselves, and if they lack means, those are the sort of circumstances that can justify a court saying that they should have somebody who can act as an advocate on their behalf." He qualified the decision in D v S saying: "what I indicated in that case was intended for a situation which was of the sort there described and did not deal with a situation where a husband wished to appear for his wife. It does not matter whether it is said that the position is different in that case or whether it is said that the fact that a husband wishes to appear for somebody who is part of the same family makes it an exceptional situation. It is clear that the objections to someone setting themselves up as an unqualified advocate do not exist in a matter where a husband is merely seeking to assist his wife." In this case: "I am satisfied that there would be a danger of Professor Clarkson being deprived of her right to have the case conducted before the courts in a way which would enable her claims to be investigated if she did not have the assistance of her husband as an advocate." Waller LJ said: "I agree with my Lord on the proper principles to be applied to an application for a close relative to represent a litigant in person in order to have that right of audience. I also associate myself with my Lord's remarks in relation to his judgment in D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724; I was a party to that judgment on that occasion. The position of a close relative seeking to exercise a right of audience is very different from the circumstances with which that case was concerned and it is unfortunate that the judge was possibly misled into applying a wrong test, as he did." Clarke LJ said: "I agree with both judgments. The judge directed himself that the question which he should answer was whether there were exceptional circumstances which justified granting Mr Keter rights of audience under s 27(2)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. I agree with my Lords that that is not the relevant question in a case of this kind. As I see it, the question is simply whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the court should exercise its discretion under s 27(2)(c). The section does not in any way fetter the exercise of the court's discretion, although the discretion must be exercised in the light of the objective of Part II of the Act set out in s 17(1) and of the general principle set out in s 17(3). In exercising the discretion in any particular case, I agree that the court must have in mind the general principles referred to by Lord Woolf. There is a spectrum of different circumstances which may arise so that it is difficult to lay down precise guidelines. Cases will vary greatly. For example, in a case where the proposed advocate is holding himself out as providing advocacy services, whether for reward or not, the court will only make an order under s 27(2)(c) in exceptional circumstances: D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724. On the other hand, where the proposed advocate is a member of the litigant's family, the position is likely to be very different, although, as this case shows, even in such cases the circumstances may vary widely. There is, in my judgment, no warrant for holding that in such cases an order should only be made in exceptional circumstances. To my mind there is nothing in any of the decisions to which we were referred, including D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724, which requires us so to hold. All will depend upon the circumstances. It follows that the judge did not ask the correct question and that it is for this court to exercise its own discretion. That discretion should only be exercised for good reason. The question is whether, having regard to the general principles set out by Lord Woolf, there is good reason on the facts of this case to permit Mr Keter to speak on behalf of the claimant at the forthcoming interlocutory applications and at any trial. To put it another way: is it just to permit him to do so?"
	Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 27(2)(c)
	Link[s] omitted

Banks and Another -v- Cox and Another Transcript No. 1476 of 2000
17 Jul 2000 CA Morritt LJ	Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court considered the principles of admitting new evidence on appeal after the introduction of the new rules. Moritt LJ: "In my view the principles reflecting in the rules in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 remain relevant to any application for permission to rely on further evidence, not as rules, but as matters which must necessarily be considered in an exercise of the discretion whether or not to permit an appellant to rely on evidence not before the court below."

Regency Rolls Ltd and Another -v- Carnall [2000] EWCA Civ 379
16 Oct 2000 CA Simon Brown LJ	Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered what was meant by 'act promptly' in the Rule. Held: Dictionary definitions were considered by both Arden LJ and Simon Brown LJ – "with alacrity" or "all reasonable celerity in the circumstances". The court no longer has a broad discretion whether to grant such an application: all three of the conditions listed in CPR r 39.3(5) must be satisfied before it can be invoked to enable the court to set aside an order. In all the circumstances, 4 weeks was held to be too long a delay by Simon Brown LJ and Rix LJ. Arden LJ expressed grave doubt but found it unnecessary to decide the point.
	Civil Procedure Rules 39.3
	Link[s] omitted

Reliance National Insurance Company (Europe) Limited and Another -v- Ropner Insurance Services Limited [2000] EWCA Civ 304
1 Dec 2000 CA	Civil Procedure Rules
	A court action had become stale, and was at risk of automatic striking out. One party wrote the court requesting directions or that the judge direct a case management conference if appropriate. He did not seek the approval of the defendant. It was held that the letter, and its being read by the judge, was not sufficient of itself to sound an assertion that the proceedings had come before the court on paper. The letter fell short of a notice of application and the judge's response was not an exercise of his powers under the rules. The claim was automatically struck out. The phrase 'coming before a judge … on paper' had to mean that the judge also considered the exercise of his powers under the Rules.
	Civil Procedure Rules Part 23 Rule 3.3
	Link[s] omitted

Safeway Stores Plc -v- Albert Tate [2000] EWCA Civ 335
18 Dec 2000 CA Lord Justice Otton, Lord Justice Mantell And Sir Ronald Waterhouse	Defamation, Constitutional, Civil Procedure Rules	1 Cites 1 Citers
	The respondent, a neighbour of the claimant, had fallen into dispute with the claimant, and issued a leaflet and signs alleging fraud. The claimants obtained an injunction, and in the absence of a substantive defence, judgement. He claimed that the judgement had deprived him of his right to a jury trial because the case involved an allegation of fraud. Held: The rule was ultra vires section 1(3) of the Act. It was not for a judge to pre-empt a possibly perverse jury finding. The right is a fundamental, not a procedural right, and was outside the power of the Rules Committee. The right is guaranteed by statute, and cannot be taken away by a delegated legislation. The rule which allowed summary judgment to be entered in all cases was a denial of that right. However the rule, as amended, allowed an exception in cases of some compelling reason. The right to jury trial in defamation case was such a compelling reason. The Act provided exceptions to the otherwise absolute right to elect for jury trial, and the list of exceptions in the act was complete and exclusive. There was no power in delegated legislation to repeal such a fundamental right given by primary legislation.
	Civil Procedure Rules Part 24.2(b) - Defamation Act 1981 - Supreme Court Act 1981 1(3) 69
	Link[s] omitted

A Local Authority -v- A Mother and Child [2000] EWCA Civ 339
20 Dec 2000 CA The President. Lord Justice Laws, And Lady Justice Hale	Costs, Family, Legal Aid, Constitutional, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Cites
	A solicitor claimed the sum of £59.00 for the cost of preparing his legal aid bill for assessment. The court had disallowed the costs of an in-house costs draftsman preparing the bill. The Costs Procedure Rules would generally allow something toward such a charge. The Court of Appeal had given leave to appeal although the amount at issue in this case was less than ten pounds. Held: The Act specified what sums could be paid from the legal aid fund. The rules made under the Act specified a sum of £71.75 toward the cost. Historically the preparation of a bill is seen as part of a solicitors overheads, and thus not claimable. This changed under the Civil Procedure Rules, and the solicitor argued that the Rules over-rode the Regulations so as to remove the limitation. However there is no new additional category by which changes under the rules have become vires. The Civil Procedure Rules go through no process of democratic control. The Rules have no power to override either legislation or subordinate legislation.
	Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989 No 339) 107 - Legal Aid Act 1988 6(1) - Civil Procedure Rules 2.16
	Link[s] omitted

Hubert Scammell, Dora Scammell, Donald Green -v-Margaret Kathleen Dicker [2000] EWCA Civ 352
21 Dec 2000 CA Lord Justice Aldous And Lord Justice Mance	Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules	Casemap 1 Citers
	A part 36 offer can be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted or expires. The rules can not force an offer to be left open. Clear words would have been required within the rules to impose such an obligation. The actual words referred to offers 'expressed' to be open for 21 days, but the intention was to create an 'unless' condition not a positive obligation. Such offers are subject to the general rules of contract, including offer and acceptance and the rules merely provide an advantage to the parties in dealing with each other. A court will strive to give effect to agreements, unless not intended to create legal relations, particularly when the agreement is a compromise of an existing dispute and when it has been acted on.
	Civil Procedure Rules Part 36
	Link[s] omitted