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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Agency - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Gaspet Ltd v Ellis (Inspector of Taxes); 1985 - [1985] 1 WLR 1214
 
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA ('The Ocean Frost') [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1
1985
CA
Goff LJ, Staughton J
Evidence, Torts - Other, Agency
In establishing that money was paid as an improper inducement or bribe, proof of corruptness or a corrupt motive was unnecessary.
When a court looks at a decision of a judge at first instance, the court stressed the need to look at the objective facts and the overall probabilities.
Goff LJ said: "Speaking from my own experience I have found it essential in cases of fraud when considering the credibility of witnesses always to test their veracity by reference to objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case and also to pay a particular regard to their motives and to the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence . . Furthermore it is implicit in the statement of Lord MacMillan in Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home at p. 256 that the probabilities and possibilities of the case may be such as to impel an appellate Court to depart from the opinion of the trial Judge formed upon his assessment of witnesses whom he has seen and heard in the witness box. Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents, to the witnesses' motives and to the overall probabilities can be of very great assistance to a judge in ascertaining the truth. I have been driven to the conclusion that the Judge did not pay sufficient regard to these matters in making his findings of fact in the present case."
On the facts as found and "the effect of the judge's conclusion was that, although Mr. Magelssen did not have ostensible authority to enter into the contract, he did have ostensible authority to tell Mr. Jensen and Mr. Dannesboe that he had obtained actual authority to do so. This is, on its face, a most surprising conclusion. It results in an extraordinary distinction between (1) a case where an agent, having no ostensible authority to enter into a relevant contract, wrongly asserts that he is invested with actual authority to do so, in which event the principal is not bound; and (2) a case where an agent, having no ostensible authority, wrongly asserts after negotiations that he has gone back to his principal and obtained actual authority, in which event the principal is bound. As a matter of common sense, this is most unlikely to be the law."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Robinson Scammel v Ansell [1985] 2 EGLR 41
1985


Agency

1 Citers



 
 American Express International Banking Corporation v Hurley; ChD 1985 - [1985] 3 All ER 564; [1986] BCLC 52

 
 Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA ('The Ocean Frost'); HL 22-May-1985 - [1986] AC 717; [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1; [1985] UKHL 11; [1986] 2 All ER 385; [1986] 2 WLR 1063

 
 Ratford v Northavon District Council; CA 1986 - [1987] QB 357

 
 Gomba Holdings v Homan; 1986 - [1986] 1 WLR 1301

 
 Gaspet Ltd v Ellis (Inspector of Taxes); CA 1987 - [1987] 1 WLR 769
 
Daly v Lime Street Underwriting Agencies [1987] 2 FTLR 277
1987


Insurance, Agency
A name at Lloyds confers an irrevocable power of attorney on his managing agent to underwrite business.
1 Citers


 
Wood (John D) and Co v Dantata; Beauchamp Estates v Dantata [1987] 2 EGLR 23
1987
CA
Nourse LJ
Agency, Contract
The purchaser liked inspecting houses and the vendor had appointed ten firms to act for him as estate agents. Each of the estate agents was approached by this purchaser and each of the estate agents took the would be purchaser over the property of the vendor. An estate agency's clients resisted payment of his fees. Two agents were saying they were entitled to commission. The result depended upon whether the agent had introduced the purchaser. The parties had accepted that “in order to succeed one or other of the two firms had to show that they introduced the ultimate purchaser and that such introduction was the (my emphasis) effective cause of the purchase.” Held: The familiar meaning of the word introduction was the bringing together of two people who have not previously met, and the phrase "introduction of a purchaser" could only mean the "introduction of the person who ultimately purchases, not to the property, but to the purchase, or, if you look at it from the vendors angle, to the sale; in either case to the transaction that takes place". The fact that one agent introduces a person who ultimately purchases after a later introduction by another agent will not necessarily entitle the first agent to commission. In such a case the court must determine which of the two agents was the effective cause of the transaction taking place.
Nourse LJ: "As I have said, the learned judge recorded an acceptance by all three counsel that in order to succeed one or other of the two firms had to show that they introduced the ultimate purchaser and that such introduction was the effective cause of the purchase. That would seem to suggest that there are two questions to be answered, and it would certainly explain the importance which the learned judge attached to the chief’s retention of a lively interest in the property when he went there again on September 9. In truth I think that there is but a single question to be answered: which of the two firms introduced the chief to the sale? Both language and authority establish that that question must be answered by answering this further question: which of the two firms was the effective cause of the sale? Here I would gratefully adopt the following statement of the law in Bowstead on Agency , 15th ed, at p230, to which the learned judge referred:
... the fact that one agent introduces a person who ultimately purchases after a later introduction by another agent will not necessarily entitle the first agent to commission. In such a case the court must determine which of the two agents was the effective cause of the transaction taking place.
The difficulties in clarifying the mind on this question are, I think, caused by the familiar meaning of the word “introduction” as the bringing together of two people who have not previously met. Thus it is natural, when looking at the word in its present context, to attach significance to the first bringing together of the property and the person who ultimately purchases it. But the full phrase is “the introduction of a purchaser” and I think that that can only mean the introduction of the person who ultimately purchases, not to the property, but to the purchase or, if you look at it from the vendor’s angle, to the sale: in either case to the transaction which ultimately takes place. And if you then apply the primary dictionary meaning of “introduction”, you find that what you are looking for is the leading or bringing in of the purchaser to that transaction. That makes it clear that first acquaintance is not paramount and it explains why the test is expressed by reference to the effective cause of the transaction.
Which of the two firms was the effective cause of the sale to the chief?"
1 Citers


 
Brian Cooper and Co v Fairview Estates (Investments) Ltd [1987] EGLR 18
13 Mar 1987
CA
Woolf LJ
Agency, Contract
A substantial property developer sought a tenant for its office block and agreed with his selling agent to pay "a full scale letting fee . . should you introduce a tenant by whom you are unable to be retained and with whom we have not been in previous communication and who subsequently completes a lease." There was an introduction but, after a number of months, a lease was completed by a company in respect of whose introduction the personnel in Fairview had no recollection, the tenant having been procured by other means. Held: The agent was not an effective cause of the tenancy but the fee was payable. The court refused to imply the usual term requiring that the agent play an effective part was that an introduction was all that Fairview wanted; they had their own employers and lawyers who could do all the subsequent work and no further work after the introduction was expected of the agent. Woolf LJ thought the implied term would avoid the possibility of the client paying commission to more than one agent each of whom might be said to have "introduced" a purchaser or lessee but only one of whom could be said to be the effective cause of the transaction, and said: "In a case where there are no express qualifications to be fulfilled other than that a purchaser should be introduced by the estate agent, then the need to imply a term as to effective cause can be readily appreciated, since otherwise if the vendor engages more than one agent there will be no way in which he can avoid being faced with an obligation to meet the claim for commission of more than one agent who each introduced the tenant. However, in this case there is virtually no danger of this happening because of the words "with whom we have not been in previous communication."
1 Citers


 
Re K (Enduring Powers of Attorney), In re F [1988] Ch 310
1988
ChD
Hoffmann J
Agency, Litigation Practice, Health
The court allowed an appeal against the decision of the Master of the Court of Protection refusing registration to an enduring power of attorney on the ground that the donor, although capable of understanding the nature of the power, was herself incapable by reason of mental disorder of managing her property and affairs at the time that she executed the power. For a juristic act to be valid, the person performing it should have the mental capacity (with the assistance of such explanation as he may have been given) to understand the nature and effect of that particular act. In the context of litigation, the test to be applied is: "whether the party to legal proceedings is capable of understanding, with the assistance of such proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which his consent or decision is likely to be necessary in the course of those proceedings." There is no logical reason why a person who understands that something needs to be done, but who does not have the requisite understanding to do it for himself, should not confer on another the power to do what needs to be done.
Hoffmann J said: "there is no logical reason why, though unable to exercise her powers, [the donor] could not confer them upon someone else by an appropriate juristic act. The validity of that act depends on whether she understood its nature and effect and not on whether she would hypothetically have been able to perform all the acts which it authorised." and
"I do not think that it would be sufficient if he realised only that it gave Cousin William power to look after his property. Mr Rawson [counsel instructed by the Official Solicitor] helpfully summarised the matters which the donor should have understood in order that he can be said to have understood the nature and effect of the power. First (if such be the terms of the power) that the attorney will be able to assume complete authority over the donor's affairs. Secondly (if such be the terms of the power) that the attorney will in general be able to do anything with the donor's property which he himself could have done. Thirdly, that the authority will continue if the donor should be or become mentally incapable. Fourthly, that if he should be or become mentally incapable, the power will be irrevocable without confirmation by the court. I do not wish to prescribe another form of words in competition with the explanatory notes prescribed by the Lord Chancellor, but I accept Mr Rawson's summary as a statement of the matters which should ordinarily be explained to the donor (whatever the precise language which may be used) and which the evidence should show he has understood."
1 Citers



 
 Chaudry v Prabhakar; CA 1988 - [1989] 1 WLR 29; [1988] 3 All ER 718
 
Brodie, Marshall and Co (Hotel Division) Ltd v Sharer [1988] 1 EGLR 21; [1988] 19 EG 129
1988

White J
Agency
The defendant resisted payment of his estate agent's charges. The agency contract gave the agent sole selling rights, but the purchaser was found on the vendor's own initiative. The terms made commission was payable if 'we introduce directly of indirectly a person who agrees to purchase the property.' Further 'if during the period of our sole selling agreement the owner deals with a person not introduced by us or by any other agent, we shall be entitled to the same commission as if we had introduced such person.' The defendant had not withdrawn the plaintiff's instructions, but the introduction was not by any person within the terms defined. Held: The agent could recover his commission. The clauses were clear and unambiguous, and had properly been brought to the attention of the defendant. The terms were neither onerous, nor unusual.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd; CA 1988 - [1988] 1 WLR 1231; [1989] 1 All ER 261; (1988) 5 BCC 27; [1989] BCLC 115
 
Re Offshore Ventilation [1989] 5 BCC 160
1989


Agency, Insolvency
The position of agency of receivers is a real one, even though it has some peculiar incidents.
1 Citers



 
 Republic of Haiti v Duvalier; CA 1989 - [1990] 1 QB 202; [1989] 2 WLR 261

 
 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry; HL 1989 - [1990] 2 AC 418; [1989] 3 WLR 969; [1989] Ch 72; [1989] 3 All ER 523
 
Chesterfield v Zahid [1989] CLY 54
1989


Agency

1 Citers


 
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