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Jaggard -v- Sawyer; CC 1993

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

(Weymouth County Court) The court refused an injunction to a land owner who complained that a neighbour had erected a building over a right of way. The court awarded damages of £694.44, being a proportionate part of the the sum … Continue reading →

Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd -v- Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Limited; HL 1992

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

Lord Wilberforce considering whether certain assignment of book debts were in substance absolute assignments by way of sale or assignments by way of charge and would be void against a liquidator for non-registration under the Companies Act. He said: ‘My Lords, the fact that the transaction consisted essentially in the provision of finance and the similarity in result between a loan and a sale, to all of which I have drawn attention, gives to the appellants’ arguments an undoubted force. It is only possible, in fact, to decide whether they are correct by paying close regard to what the precise contractual arrangements between them and the respondents were.’ and ‘it has to be appreciated that block discounting is essentially a method of providing finance. Commercially and in its economic result, it may not differ from lending money at interest: the ‘discounting charge’, which represents the finance house’s profit, is stated in term of so much per cent per annum, which percentage is no doubt based upon current interest rates. Legally, however, there is no doubt that discounting is not treated as the lending of money and that the asset discounted is not considered as the subject of a charge.’

Heath and Hampstead Society, Regina (on the Application of) -v- Camden; Admn 3-Apr-2007

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

The claimant sought the quashing of a planning permission for the demolition of property adjacent to Hampstead Heath pond.
Held: The planning authority’s decision that the replacement dwelling was not ‘materially larger’ than its predecessor, within the meaning of a policy, was vitiated by its failure to understand the policy correctly. In its context, the phrase ‘materially larger’ referred to the size of the new building compared with its predecessor, rather than requiring a broader comparison of their relative impact, as the planning authority had supposed.

Pearson -v- HM Coroner for Inner London North; Admn 9-Mar-2005

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Relatives of the deceased said that the inquest carried out by the coroner was inadequate in Jamieson terms and had not satisfied the human rights issues. Maurice Kay LJ rejected the argument saying: ‘One does not reach the stage of resort to section 3 as a tool for interpretation unless and until it is established that the Human Rights Act applies. In Middleton and Sacker it was simply assumed, without demur, that it applied on a retrospective basis but with the point expressly left open. However, the point was very clearly decided in McKerr. It comes to this. When article 2 provides that ‘everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’, it embraces both a positive obligation on the state to protect everyone’s life and a procedural requirement that there should be some form of effective official investigation when an individual has been killed. The present case is concerned with that procedural obligation. It is not the primary obligation imposed by article 2 but, in the words of Lord Nicholls, ‘a consequential obligation’. . The logic of McKerr is inexorable. If the positive obligation did not arise in domestic law prior to 2 October 2000, the consequential, secondary, ancillary or adjectival obligation cannot now give rise to a domestic obligation because it is consequential upon and secondary, ancillary and adjectival to the substantive obligation to protect life. I am driven to the conclusion that if the Appellate Committee in Middleton and Sacker had been required to address this question, it would have yielded to the same inexorable logic.’

Allan -v- Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd; CA 1900

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

The company had altered its articles so as to give itself a lien on paid up shares in respect of the failure of the shareholder to pay calls on other shares which had not been fully paid up. The effect of the amendment was to alter the contractual rights of the shareholder.
Held: The amendment to the articles was within the power of the company under s.50 of the 1862 Act.
Lord Lindley MR said: ‘The power thus conferred on companies to alter the regulations contained in their articles is limited only by the provisions contained in the statute and the conditions contained in the company’s memorandum of association. Wide, however, as the language of section 50 is, the power conferred by it must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded. These conditions are always implied and are seldom if ever expressed but if they are complied with I can see no ground for judicially putting any other restrictions on the power conferred by the section and those contained in it . . Speaking therefore generally and without reference to any particular case, the section clearly authorises a limited company, formed with articles which confer no lien on fully paid up shares, and which allow them to be transferred without any fetter, to alter those articles by special resolution, and to impose a lien and restrictions on the registry of transfers of those shares by members indebted to the company . . But then comes the question whether this can be done so as to impose a lien or restriction in respect of a debt contracted before and existing at the time when the articles are altered. Again speaking generally, I am of opinion that the articles can be so altered and that, if they are altered bona fide for the benefit of the company, they will be valid and binding as altered on the existing holders of paid up shares whether such holders are indebted or not indebted to the company when the alteration is made.’
Romer LJ said: ‘certainly a shareholder could not say as against the company that he was entitled to special rights because he did not pay his debts’

Pearson and Another -v- Secretary of State for Home Department and Another; CA 18-Jun-2001

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

The claimants sought leave to appeal against rejection of their complaint that as serving prisoners they were unable to vote.

Seldon -v- Clarkson Wright & Jakes (A Partnership); CA 28-Jul-2010

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The claimant solicitor said that the compulsory retirement from his partnership on age grounds was discriminatory, and that the UK Regulations had not implemented the Directive fully.
Held: The appeal failed. The purpose of the provision as to allow the progression of younger members of the practice. This aim was recognised by the legislation, and ‘There is a margin of appreciation available to a national government which is not available to an employer or to parties entering into a partnership deed. But where a partnership is acting consistently with the social aim which has justified the legislative provision . . it would be to contradict that aim to render such a provision unlawful if the clause was a proportionate means of achieving the aim.’

Wieland -v- Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd; 1969

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

The plaintiff suffered injury from the admitted negligence of the defendant. After attending the hospital she felt shaken and the movement of her head was constricted by a collar which had been fitted to her neck. In consequence she was unable to use her bi-focal spectacles with her usual skill and she fell while descending stairs, sustaining further injury.
Held: Eveleigh J gave an account of the meaning in law of forseeability, saying: ‘In the present case I am concerned with the extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of actionable injury. In my view the injury and damage suffered because of the second fall are attributable to the original negligence of the defendant so as to attract compensation. If necessary I think the plaintiff’s case can also be put against the defendant in another way. If it can be said that it is foreseeable that one injury may affect a person’s ability to cope with the vicissitudes of life and thereby be a cause of another injury and if foreseeability is required, that is to say, if foreseeability is the right word in this context, foreseeability of the general nature will, in my view, suffice.’

British Waterways Board -v- London Power Networks Plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; ChD 15-Nov-2002

dls — Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000

The landowner objected to the proposal of the second respondent to grant, in favour of the first respondent, a wayleave to lay cables through tunnels owned by the claimant landowner.
Held: The tunnel structure was properly seen as land within the Act, and the way-leaves were properly granted. The argument that the meaning of the word ‘land’ must be restricted so as to avoid bizarre conclusions did not work. The right granted applied to all the subsections, or to none of them. Wayleaves through structures on or under land did not differ.

British Waterways Board -v- Norman; QBD 11-Nov-1993

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A solicitor cannot claim payment from the other party of costs he would not ask his own client to pay. An implied contingency agreement with his client could defeat a claim for payment of costs from the other party. There was never any intention on the part of the solicitors to create any liability for their own costs if the proceedings failed. It therefore followed that they sought to conduct the case on a contingency basis, such basis being contrary to public policy in any criminal trial such as this.