Category Archives: Jurisdiction

Gomez and others -v- Encarnacion Gomez-Monche Vives and others; ChD 18-Feb-2008

The court had no jurisdiction in a claim by the three claimants against their mother, the first defendant, arising out of a trust created by their father. The family was Spanish and the trust was expressed to be governed by English law. The defendants said that the income subject to the claim was subject to Spanish law.

Court: ChD
Date: 18-Feb-2008
Statutes: Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 5(6), Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
Links: Bailii,
References: [2008] EWHC 259 (Ch), [2008] 3 WLR 309
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Republic of India and Another -v- India Steamship Co Ltd (Indian Endurance and Indian Grace) (No 2); HL 23-Oct-1997

When a action in rem against a ship was in fact parallel to an action in personam begun in India and awaiting a decision; an action was not to be allowed here.
Lord Steyn: ‘It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. . . .It is not enough that each of the parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention.’

Court: HL
Date: 23-Oct-1997
Judges: Lord Steyn
Statutes: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
Links: Gazette, Times, House of Lords, Bailii,
References: [1997] UKHL 40, [1997] 4 All ER 380, [1997] 3 WLR 818, [1998] AC 878
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Filed under Estoppel, Jurisdiction, Transport

Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart NV -v- Slatford; 1953

A Dutch bank deposited a quantity of gold in London before the start of the 1939-1945 war. In May 1940 the Netherlands were invaded and they became an enemy territory for the purposes of the 1939 Act. The Royal Netherlands Government, with the approval of the UK Government, exercised their powers from London and in May 1940 they issued a decree which purported to have the effect of transferring property, including the gold, to the Netherlands Government (the A.1 decree). In July 1940, the Board of Trade made a vesting order transferring the gold to the Custodian of Enemy Property. He sold it for £2 million. In May 1950 the Netherlands Government made an order returning the property in the gold to the Bank. The Bank then claimed against the Custodian in conversion for the present value of the gold. Devlin J held that the A.1 decree was ineffective to transfer moveable property in this country.
Held: ‘I think it is convenient to begin by considering what is the general principle of our law with regard to foreign legislation affecting property within our territory. There is little doubt that it is the lex situs which as a general rule governs the transfer of movables when effected contractually. The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is the exception rather than the rule, and is probably to be confined to certain special classes of general assignments such as marriage settlements and devolutions on death and bankruptcy. Upon this basis the A.1 decree, not being a part of English law, would not transfer the property in this case. But decrees of this character have received in the authorities rather different treatment. Although there is not, as far as I am aware, any authority which distinguishes general legislation, such as part of a civil code, from ad hoc decrees, the effectiveness of such decrees does not appear on the authorities to be determined exclusively by the application of the lex situs. Apart from two recent cases on which the plaintiffs greatly rely, there has been no case in which such a decree has been enforced in this country, but the grounds for refusing effect to them have been variously put. Sometimes it is said that the decree is confiscatory. In the textbooks it is said sometimes that as a matter of public international law no State ought to seek to exercise sovereignty over property outside its own territory, and therefore the principle of comity is against enforcement; and sometimes it is said that the principle of effectiveness is against enforcement, since no State can expect to make its laws effective in the territory of another State. Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 6th ed., p. 13, states: ‘A State’s authority, in the eyes of other States and the courts that represent them, is, speaking very generally, coincident with, and limited by, its power. It is territorial. It may legislate for, and give judgments affecting, things and persons within its territory. It has no authority to legislate for, or adjudicate upon, things or persons not within its territory.’

Date: 01-Jan-1953
Judges: Devlin J
Statutes: Trading With The Enemy Act 1939
References: [1953] 1 QB 248,
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Brac Rent-A-Car International Inc; ChD 7-Feb-2003

The company was incorporated in Delaware. Its main centre of business was within the UK. The company resisted an attempt to wind the company up here.
Held: The English courts had jurisdiction. The company’s contracts were subject to English law, their employees were here, and their contracts also were under UK law. Whilst article 3 did not expressly extend its ambit to companies incorporated outside the EU, it should be read to do so, because its scope was defined primarily by reference to the area of operations of the company, and such an application was not excluded.

Court: ChD
Date: 07-Feb-2003
Judges: The Hon Mr Justice Lloyd
Statutes: Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 3, Insolvency Act 1986 8(7)
Links: Bailii,
References: Times, 24-Feb-2003, [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch), Gazette, 01-Apr-2003, [2003] 2 All ER 201
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Filed under Company, European, Insolvency, Jurisdiction

Hyman -v- Hyman; HL 1929

The husband had left the wife for another woman. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of £20 for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this.
Held: The parties cannot lawfully covenant or make an agreement either not to invoke the jurisdiction or to control the powers of the court where jurisdiction in invoked. In partiicular, a wife cannot contract out of her matrimonial maintenance entitlements in a deed of separation.
Lord Atkin gave a short history of such contracts and commented on their effect: ‘We have to deal with a separation deed, a class of document which has had a chequered career at law. Not recognized by the Ecclesiastical Courts, such contracts were enforced by the common law. Equity at first frowned. Lord Eldon doubted but enforced them: cf. St. John v. St. John (1803) Ves. 525, 529 and Bateman v. Countess of Ross (1813) 1 Dow 235; and see the arguments of Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr Turner and of Mr Bethell in Wilson v. Wilson (1848) 1 H. L. C. 538, 550-553, 564, 565. Finally they were fully recognized in equity by Lord Westbury’s leading judgment in Hunt v. Hunt (1861) 4 D. F. & J. 221, in which he followed Lord Cottenham’s decision in Wilson v. Wilson (1846-1848) 1 HLCas 538, 550-553, 564, 565, where his argument for the respondent had prevailed. Full effect has therefore to be given in all courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreement, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy.’

Court: HL
Date: 01-Jan-1929
Judges: Lord Hailsham, Lord Atkin
References: [1929] AC 601, [1929] All ER 245, [1929] P 1
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Filed under Family, Jurisdiction

Ideal General Supply Co Ltd -v- Louis Edelson and Edelson (t/a Ideal Clothing Co); 1957

The plaintiff had started an action for passing off and slander in the county court. The county court judge declined jurisdiction on the basis he thought they were equity proceedings and the claimant withdrew the proceedings and started again in the High Court. The question was whether this created an estoppel
Held: It did not. Diplock J expressed no opinion on the view of the county court judge that he had no jurisdiction. Diplock J refused to award any damages because the plaintiff managed to put an end to the defendant’s passing-off by an injunction after 4 advertisements in a local evening newspaper and the plaintiff had suffered no damage at all. He was prepared to grant injunctive relief in respect of probable damage which would occur if the defendants continued their conduct.

Date: 01-Jan-1957
Judges: Diplock J
References: [1957] RPC 252,

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Filed under Damages, Defamation, Estoppel, Jurisdiction

Sengupta -v- Republic of India; 1983

India did not appear at court to take a point on jurisdiction under the 1978 Act. The Court asked for the appointment of an amicus to assist it.
Held: The court has a duty under statute to give the effect to the immunity conferred, even though the state does not appear to claim it. As to the issue of state immunity: ‘If we have asked ourselves the right questions, then in our judgment the necessary result must be that there is no jurisdiction to entertain the applicant’s claim. It is true that any private individual can employ another, i.e. can enter into a contract of employment. Therefore in that sense the entry into a contract of employment is a private act. But when one looks to see what is involved int he performance of the applicant’s contract, it is clear that the performance of the contract is part of the discharge by the foreign state of its sovereign functions in which the applicant himself, at however lowly a level, is under the terms of his contract of employment necessarily engaged. One of the classic forms of sovereign acts by a foreign state is the representation of that state in a receiving state. From the doctrine of sovereign immunity were derived the concepts that the embassy premises were part of the soil of the foreign sovereign state, and that diplomatic staff are personally immune from local jurisdiction. A contract to work at a diplomatic mission in the work of that mission is a contract to participate in the public acts of the foreign sovereign. The dismissal of the applicant was an act done in pursuance of that public function, i.e. the running of the mission. As a consequence, the fairness of any dismissal from such employment is very likely to involve an investigation by the industrial tribunal into the internal management of the diplomatic representation in the United Kingdom of the Republic of India, an investigation wholly inconsistent with the dignity of the foreign state and an interference with its sovereign functions.’ The tribunal could not hear the claim even though the employment had been at a low grade.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Justice Browne-Wilkinson
Statutes: State Immunity Act 1978 1(2)
References: [1983] ICR 221,
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Filed under Employment, Jurisdiction

Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS -v- Nomura International plc and Others; QBD 9-Dec-2002

The parties were in a substantial dispute. The respondents sought the hearing of the action in England, citing the greater experience in commercial litigation, and procedures better suited to such litigation. They also argued that the long delay likely in the Czech Republic would deny their right to a speedy trial.
Held: The Czech Republic being the more appropriate forum, and despite the fact that there might be delay, even to the point or breaching the claimant’s right to a speedy trial, that forum should still be chosen where substantial justice remained obtainable. The English action should be stayed. Other characteristics of the Czech system were consistent with Civil Law jurisdictions.

Court: QBD
Date: 09-Dec-2002
Judges: Jonathan Sumption QC
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights Art 6
References: Times, 16-Dec-2002,

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Navig8 Pte Limited -v- Al-Riyadh Co; ComC 17-Dec-2012

Court: ComC
Date: 17-Dec-2012
Judges: Popplewell J
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] EWHC 3925 (Comm),

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Filed under Jurisdiction, Transport

Metall und Rohstoff AG -v- Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc; CA 1990

There was a complicated commercial dispute involving allegations of conspiracy. A claim by the plaintiffs for inducing or procuring a breach of contract would have been statute-barred in New York.
Held: Slade LJ said: ‘The judge’s approach to the limitation point was further criticised by the defendants’ counsel on the grounds that, following the guidance given by Lord Goff in Spiliada relating to the treatment of a ‘legitimate personal or juridical advantage’ he should first have considered which was the appropriate forum without reference to the juridical advantage which M. & R. would enjoy by proceedings in England, and only if he decided that New York was prima facie the appropriate forum, should have gone on to consider whether, none the less, the limitation point rendered a trial in England necessary for the purpose of doing substantial justice between the parties. We think that the approach to this point suggested on behalf of the defendants is correct in principle and that at least on one reading of the judge’s judgment, he did not follow it, but took into account the juridical advantage point in his initial search for the appropriate forum.’
Slade LJ said: ‘Relief in tort under the principle of Grainger v Hill is not, in our judgment, available against a party who, however dishonestly, presents a false case for the purpose of advancing or sustaining his claim or defence in civil proceedings. This may well cause hardship to an injured party who cannot be sufficiently compensated by an appropriate order for costs. However, if there is a gap in the law it rests on sound considerations of public policy, as does the rule of law which gives immunity to witnesses against civil actions based on the falsity of evidence given in judicial proceedings. If the position were otherwise, honest litigants might be deterred from pursuing honest claims or defences and honest witnesses might be deterred from giving evidence.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1990
Judges: Slade LJ
References: [1990] 1 QB 391,
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Filed under Jurisdiction, Torts - Other