Housing and Council Tax BenefitsCourt: UTAA
References:  UKUT 242 (AAC),
Housing and Council Tax BenefitsCourt: UTAA
‘This appeal against sentence in a murder case, brought by leave of the single judge, raises once again the issue of when a weapon is to be treated as having been ‘taken to the scene’ for the purposes of paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.’Court: CACD
The applicants, relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, alleged that the forceful and disproportionate intervention of State agents had put their lives in danger and subjected them to ill-treatment, and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the events in question. They further alleged that the events complained of had been the result of discriminatory attitudes towards people of Roma origin and entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention.Court: ECHR
The applicants alleged in particular that their conviction of defamation of the prison commander has infringed their right to freedom of expression.Court: ECHR
The applicants are victims or dependents of victims of armed repression of demonstrations against the Communist dictatorship that began Dec. 21, 1989 in Bucharest and in other cities.Court: ECHR
This appeal is struck out under rule 8(2)(a) as the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.Court: FTTGRC
Creditors in a liquidation have only a right to have the assets administered by the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. The trust applies only to the company’s property. It does not affect the proprietary interests of others.Date: 01-Jan-1975
‘This fire insurance claim by the Claimant is resisted by the Defendant on the grounds that the assured had no insurable interest and that there was misrepresentation and non disclosure. The Defendant also claims that if the Claimant does have a valid claim it should not have a Declaration that it is entitled to be indemnified for the cost of reinstatement. ‘Court: QBD
Consequential judgment after principle findings in litigation as to issues of liability and quantification arising from the alleged or established invalidity under EU law of various aspects of the UK legislation which governed the taxation of ‘portfolio dividends’ (i.e. dividends derived from holdings of less than 10% of the shares in the companies concerned) paid by companies resident either in the EU, or elsewhere in the world (‘third countries’), to corporate shareholders resident in the UK.Court: ChD
The court had struck out the defendant’s plea of justification. The parties now disuoted the costs to be paid for that element of the action, the defendant arguing that the claimant had failed too comply with the requirements to comply with costs budgets.
Held: The court now gave its reasons for allowing the costs in part.
The claimant renewed his application for leave to appeal against dismissal of his claim in negligence in respct of three property valuations by the respondent.Court: CA
The applicants allege in particular that the refusal to transcribe their child’s birth certificate in the records of the Italian civil status and remoteness of the minor are incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention.Court: ECHR
ECHR The applicant alleged, in particular,that his detention in a security cell amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.Court: ECHR
The claimants complained that as campaigning journalists, investigating security matter, their communications had been intercepted by the security services. Their concerns ahd been triggered by disclosures made by Snowden. The court now set our questions for the parties.Court: ECHR
The claimants alleged unlawful interception of their voicemail messages by the defendant. The defendant now applied for the strike out of the claims, saying that they were an abuse of process, earlier claims by the same claimants having been settled. The claimanst said that the terms of the settlement did not cover additional occasions of interception discovered only later.
Held: The additional claims were covered and were struck out. The claimants had made their settlements knowing that they had not yet fully investigated the hacking activities of the defendants.
The defendant had been convicted of murdering his schoolteacher. The court now gave reasons, at the end of the case for discontinuing the order restricting his being named. Orders protecting the identities of children witnesses were continued.Court: QBD
ECHR The applicants alleged that they had suffered a discriminatory breach of their right to respect for their correspondence (Articles 8 and 14). Several of them also complained that the national authorities had lacked independence and impartiality, that the disciplinary proceedings had not been public, and that the national courts had failed to give reasons for their decisions (Article 6 – 1). Some also alleged that the proceedings had been unfair (Article 6 – 3 (a), (b) and (c)) and that they had not had access to an effective remedy (Article 13). Lastly, certain applicants relied on Articles 9, 10, 17 and 18 of the Convention.Court: ECHR
VDT VAT Default surcharge – VAT paid late by CHAPS but return received within 7 days at end of month – regulation 25(4L) VAT Regulations 1995 – no default in respect of return – reasonable excuse for late payment of VAT – taxpayer acting reasonably in confidently expecting a large payment – payment not received on time – appeal allowed.Court: VDT
Successor governments were bound by a frontier treaty as defined by the Treaty of Friendship of 1955.Court: ICJ
Two bungalows were to be built in the grounds of a house subject to a restrictive covenant. The tribunal considered the degree of disturbance which would be suffered by the objector neighbours.
Held: The neighbours would ‘suffer considerably from the noise of builder’s vehicles, from the construction of the driveway and by the general disturbance associated with building works’. This would be a considerable disadvantage for up to a year and ‘One of the questions, perhaps the most important question I have to decide, is what weight I should give to this intensive inconvenience and noise generated by builders’ traffic for this very limited period. Clearly for that period the restrictive covenant does secure practical benefits of substantial value or advantage to (the objector). On the other hand, I cannot think that such a literal construction of the section is intended, but rather one should look at the matter in a broader context and regard this as a short term, albeit intensive interference but small and not so substantial in relation to the overall long term enjoyment of the property.’
In principle, protection from short term disturbance arising from construction, although providing a ‘substantial’ benefit during the construction period, had to be looked at in a broader context for the purposes of section 84.
The principle of abuse of process is capable of applying where the relevant earlier proceedings have taken place before a foreign court (Ireland). In this case the defendants argued that the judgment obtained in Ireland had been obtained fraudulently. The defendant was estopped from mounting what was in effect a collateral challenge to the decision of Egan J. It was an abuse of process.
Stuart Smith LJ said: ‘The question is whether it would be in the interests of justice and public policy to allow the issue of fraud to be litigated again in this court, it having been tried and determined by Egan J. in Ireland. In my judgment it would not; indeed, I think it would be a travesty of justice. Not only would the plaintiffs be required to re-litigate matters which have twice been extensively investigated and decided in their favour in the natural forum, but it would run the risk of inconsistent verdicts being reached, not only as between the English and Irish courts, but as between the defendants themselves. The Waites have not appealed Sir Peter Pain’s judgment, and they were quite right not to do so. The plaintiffs will no doubt proceed to execute their judgment against them. What could be a greater source of injustice, if in years to come, when the issue is finally decided, a different decision is in Mr. McLeod’s case reached? Public policy requires that there should be an end of litigation and that a litigant should not be vexed more than once in the same cause.’
Husband and wife disputed provision under 1973 Act, and a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act. The wife had offered to transfer a house occupied by his mother, worth about £12,000, in return for him leaving the matrimonial home. He refused the offer as inadequate. Mrs. Justice Heilbron granted a declaration for the wife and ordered £10,000 for the husband out of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. He had got rather less than he had been offered. They then disputed costs on appeal.
Lord Justice Cairns said: ‘Before Heilbron J the wife’s application for costs was based upon a letter which had been written by the wife’s solicitors to the husband’s solicitors offering something substantially more than £10,000. Heilbron J, despite that letter being drawn to her attention, made no order as to costs. Immediately after the hearing before her it was discovered that that was a ‘without prejudice’ letter and very properly at the opening of this part of the appeal Mr. Hordern asked for the court’s guidance as to whether in those circumstances he was entitled to rely upon that letter. We formed the opinion that he was not. The letter was written without prejudice. The ‘without prejudice’ bar had not been withdrawn and therefore we took the view that it was a letter which could not be relied upon either before the judge at first instance or before this court. Mr. Hordern then indicated the difficulty that a party might be in proceedings of this kind when he or she was willing to accede to some extent to an application that was made and desired to obtain the advantages that could be obtained in an ordinary action for debt or damages by a payment into court, that not being a course which would be appropriate in proceedings of this kind.’
Cairns LJ suggested a formula for future cases to ensure that negotiations could be conducted without prejudice to the issue at the trial, but yet nevertheless be referred to after judgment when the question of costs came to be considered. He said: ‘There are various other types of proceedings well known to the court where protection has been able to be afforded to a party who wants to make a compromise of that kind and where payment in is not an appropriate method. One is in proceedings before the Lands Tribunal where the amount of compensation is in issue and where the method that is adopted is that of a sealed offer which is not made without prejudice but which remains concealed from the tribunal until the decision on the substantive issue has been made and the offer is then opened when the discussion as to costs takes place. Another example is in the Admiralty Division where there is commonly a dispute between the owners of two vessels that have been in collision as to the apportionment of blame between them. It is common practice for an offer to be made by one party to another of a certain apportionment. If that is not accepted no reference is made to that offer in the course of the hearing until it comes to costs, and then if the court’s apportionment is as favourable to the party who made the offer as what, was offered, or more favourable to him, then costs will be awarded on the same basis as if there had been a payment in.
I see no reason why some similar practice should not be adopted in relation to such matrimonial proceedings in relation to finances as we have been concerned with.
Mr. Millar drew our attention to a provision in the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1968 with reference to damages which were then payable by a co-respondent, provision to the effect that an offer might be made in the form that it was without prejudice to the issue as to damages but reserving the right of the co-respondent to refer to it on the issue of costs. It appears to me that it would be equally appropriate that it should be permissible to make an offer of that kind in such proceedings as we have been dealing with and I think that that would be an appropriate way in which a party who was willing to make a compromise could put it forward. I do not consider that any amendment of the Rules of the Supreme Court is necessary to enable this to be done.’
The owner of land was held entitled to erect a house against his neighbour’s windows even though they had enjoyed light for over 30 years. ‘And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water as hath been said, but of aire, and all other things even up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, as it is holden.’ (Coke)Date: 01-Jan-1587
The driver of a car left it momentarily, during which time the defendant went and sat in the driver’s seat. When the driver returned, he attempted to remove the defendant and, in the ensuing struggle, the defendant’s foot accidentally depressed the accelerator causing the car to move off suddenly, the defendant not having intended to drive. Nevertheless, the driver was thrown to the ground and the car ran over his legs.
Held: Widgery LCJ said: ‘I think that this is quite a different case from almost any of the other cases that have come before this court in recent years dealing with driving; they have all been cases where the person was consciously seeking some movement of the car in some way, and was thus driving. Here one has a man sitting in the driving seat, not intending to drive, and as far as I can see not intending to exercise any control over the vehicle, and accidentally his foot touches the accelerator and off goes the car. I content myself by saying I do not think that in any ordinary use of the word ‘driving’ that conduct would be included.’
The defendant, a prostitute wearing revealing clothing sat silent and motionless behind a bay window, illuminated by a red light, to advertise her services as a prostitute.
Held: She was soliciting, in the sense of tempting or alluring prospective customers to visit her for the purposes of prostitution. No movement, signal or words were required. ‘In my judgment the facts here are conclusive against the defendant, and, as I see them, in the light of the law which is to be applied to them, there is but one answer. This young woman, sitting on a stool scantily clad, in a window bathed in red light and in an area where prostitutes were sought, might just as well have had at her feet an advertisement saying ‘I am a prostitute. I am ready and willing to give the service of a prostitute and my premises are now available for that purpose.’ It is clear, in my judgment, that she was soliciting in the sense of tempting or alluring prospective customers to come in for the purpose of prostitution and projecting her solicitation to passers-by.’
Application by the claimants for an order that the first defendant attend for cross-examination upon his affidavits as to assets and as to his answers to questions posed.Court: QBD
The court was asked whether statutory changes made to the ability of acquitted defendants in the Crown Court to recover their costs from central funds are compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights.
Held: The inability of acquitted defendants in the Crown Court to recover (a) any of their privately incurred costs after 1 October 2012, or (b) only to recover their costs at legal aid rates from 27 January 2014, by virtue of section 16A of the 1985 Act is not incompatible with their Convention rights. There is no independent power at common law to order such costs to be paid from central funds.
Meaning of dishonesty under the 1968 Act.Court: CACD
The liquidator of a company ceased to be liable to pay the rent under the company’s lease in full from the time it gave notice to the landlord that it was seeking authority to disclaim the lease, even though it remained in occupation for nearly two months longer.Court: ChD
The defendant wrongly used and asserted a right of way over a private road to a house which he had built.
Held: To restrain the defendant from using the road would render the new house uninhabitable. The court refused an injunction on the grounds of the plaintiff’s delay in commencing proceedings. The defendant was ‘liable to pay an amount of damages which so far as it can be estimated is equivalent to a proper and fair price which would be payable for the acquisition of the right of way in question.’
Graham J said: ‘I think that for the purposes of estimating damages [the plaintiffs] and the other servient owners in Hill Road, albeit reluctant, must be treated as being willing to accept a fair price for the right of way in question and must not be treated as if they were in the extremely powerful bargaining position which an interlocutory injunction would have given them if it had been obtained before the defendant started operations and incurred expense. Such is to my mind the penalty of standing by until the house is built.
On the evidence here the probable figure of notional profit which the defendant has made, being the difference between the overall cost of the new house and its present-day value seems to be somewhere between £4,000 and £6,000 and I think it is fair to take £5,000 as about as accurate a figure as one can get. The circumstances here are very different from those in the Wrotham Park case and I think that the proper approach is to endeavour to arrive at a fair figure which, on the assumption made, the parties would have arrived at as one which the plaintiffs would accept as compensating them for loss of amenity and increased user [of the private road], and which at the same time, whilst making the blue land a viable building plot, would not be so high as to deter the defendant from building at all. . . . I think he would have been prepared to pay what is relatively to his notional profit quite a large sum for the right of way in question and to achieve the building of his new home. This was a time of rising property values and I think he would have been prepared to pay £2,000 to get his right of way and if he had made such an offer, I think the other five owners in Hill Road ought also to have been prepared to accept it.. . . ‘
The plaintiff had been injured when, as a passenger in his employer’s security van, it turned over as it left the motorway. Liability was not disputed but the defendants alleged that the plaintiff was malingering and said that they had video evidence to support this claim. The defendants now now appealed against an order for the disclosure of the film.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The ‘cards on the table’ approach which now operates in my view requires that it should be very rare indeed in a personal injury case for an order for non-disclosure of a video film to be made. ‘
Sales of alcohol had taken place at a bar within the meaning of section 76(5).
Held: Widgery LCJ said: ‘I think it must be remembered that the consumption of liquor in the special hours period, for want of a better phrase, is liquor which is to be ancillary to dancing, music, refreshment or all of those things. It is an ancillary service, and one has to regard Parliament I think as expecting that the provision of liquor shall be suitable for service as an ancillary and no more. It is I think a matter of common sense and general experience that anybody who is taking advantage of section 77 facilities, who goes for music, dancing and refreshment, with liquor incidental, can perfectly well be served in his requirements without there being a bar counter at all. If he is having dinner or pretty substantial refreshment, what more simple than that his drink be brought to his table with his meal. If he is dancing, what more simple than that his drink be brought to the table at which he sits out when not dancing. If, as may well happen, he is contemplating all those pleasures, again he has, as it were, a base or table to which his drinks can be bought, and the facility of what may be properly called a cocktail bar or a bar counter of the kind which I have described is not a necessary feature of providing the service for which there is a special hours certificate. On the other hand, it must be plain to anyone that the presence of a bar counter with someone serving behind it, and stools and service, is likely to attract into the premises people who come to drink only. . . ‘
The plaintiffs were the owners and occupiers of two adjoining properties. They claimed damages for nuisance by smell. The judge awarded over £6,000. to each of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal reduced the sum to £1,000.
Held: the right to sue in private nuisance is linked to the correct measure of damages. Damages were awarded on a lump sum basis for loss of amenity over twelve years, there being no evidence of any diminution in market value of either of the two adjoining properties. There might be an analogy with loss of amenity in personal injuries cases. But this was only for the purpose of showing that the sum awarded by the judge was much too high. The damages were assessed per stirpes and not per capita. Pill LJ ‘I regard satisfying the test of occupation of property as a home provides a sufficient link with the property to enable the occupier to sue in private nuisance. It is an application in present-day conditions of the essential character of the test as contemplated by Lord Wright. It appears to me, as it did to Dillon L.J., to be right in principle and to avoid inconsistencies, for example between members of a family, which in this context cannot now be justified.’
Stephenson LJ said: ‘It is difficult to find an analogy to damages for interference with the enjoyment of property. In this case, efforts to prove diminution in the value of the property as a result of this persistent smell over the years failed. The damages awarded by Walton J. were damages simply for loss of amenity from the smells as they affected the plaintiffs living on their property; and of course their enjoyment of their own property was indirectly affected by these smells inasmuch as they affected their visitors and members of their families, such as Lady Goodale. The nearest analogy would seem to be the damages which are awarded almost daily for loss of amenity in personal injury cases; it does seem to me that there is perhaps a closer analogy than at first sight appears between losing the enjoyment of your property as a result of some interference by smell or by noise caused by a next door neighbour, and losing an amenity as a result of a personal injury. Is it possible to equate loss of sense of smell as a result of the negligence of a defendant motor driver with having to put up with positive smells as a result of a nuisance created by a negligent neighbour? There is, as it seems to me, some parallel between the loss of amenity which is caused by personal injury and the loss of amenity which is caused by a nuisance of this kind.’
ECJ Order – Article 104(3), second subparagraph, of the Rules of Procedure – Community trade mark – Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Article 9(1)(a) and (2)(d) – Right of the proprietor of a registered mark to prevent the use by a third party of a sign which is identical to the mark – Concept of ‘use’ – Use of a sign which is identical to the mark by a trade intermediary in its business papers – Intermediary acting in its own name but on behalf of a vendorCourt: ECJ
The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries. The defendants had refused to disclose the evidene they wished to bring to establish that he hwas not as severely injured as he had claimed.
Held: The plaintiff’s appeal against refusal of an order for disclosure was dismissed. ‘It was necessary to keep well in mind the principle that the interests of justice were best served by the early disclosure of all relevant material.’
(Commission) The Commission looked to the admissibiliity of a complaint by Rudoph Hess who was incarcerated by the respondent state in Spandau prison. The prison was in the British sector in Berlin under the control of the four WWII Allied powers.
Held: If the agreement had been concluded after the UK acceded to the Convention, the incarceration might have been subject to Articles 3 and 8 under the SAA doctrine.
The United Kingdom acts only as a partner in the joint quadrapartite organisation of the Spandau prison and of R Hess’s detention. It does not follow from that United Kingdom participation that the admininstration and supervision of the prison are a matter ‘within the jurisdiction’ of the United Kingdom. An issue could have arisen only if an agreement concerning Spandau Prison ha been entered into when the Convention was already in force for the United Kingdom Government.
cw Inter Partes Decisions – Patents – The reference under section 8(1) concerning entitlement to the application was treated as unopposed following the failure of the applicant for the patent to provide a counter-statement. The application was due to be, but had not actually been, treated as withdrawn for failure to file an abstract and a request for preliminary examination and search. The hearing officer made a declaration of entitlement in favour of the claimants and gave them an opportunity, within 6 weeks, to request discretion under rules 110(1) and 110(4) respectively to allow late filing of the missing items, failing which the application would be treated as withdrawn.Court: IPO
AIT Country guidance is given in this case on the following issues and in the following terms:
(i) On the available evidence Sudanese draft evaders and draft deserters do not face a real risk of imprisonment as a punishment. Instead they are forced to perform military service under close supervision.
(ii) In view of the ending in January 2005 of the north-south civil war, there is no longer a real risk of conscripts or draft evaders or draft deserters being required to fight in the south.
(iii) The recent conflict in Darfur (still ongoing) has been characterised by serious violations of international humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. However, on the available evidence it is not reasonably likely that conscripts or draft evaders or draft deserters are being or would be required to fight in Darfur.
(iv) Accordingly, Sudanese who face conscription, or who are draft evaders and draft deserters do not face a real risk on return of persecution or treatment contrary to Article 3.
(v) The case of AM (Sudan Draft Evader) Sudan  UKIAT 00335 is no longer to be followed and, even read historically, was wrongly decided.
(vi) In view of the substantial political realignments in Sudan during the 2002-2005 period, none of the existing Country Guideline cases on Sudan (save for TM (Persecution- Christians – Individual – General) Sudan CG  UKIAT 04849 and AE (Relocation – Darfur – Khartoum an option) Sudan CG  UKAIT 00101) are to be considered any longer to furnish current country guidance and are accordingly to be deleted from the AIT Country Guideline list.
The defendants appealed orders requiring them to attend court and provide evidence under cross-examination. They claimed a prvilege against self-incrimination.
Waller LJ said: ‘A witness is entitled to claim the privilege in relation to any piece of information or evidence on which the prosecution might wish to rely in establishing guilt. And, as it seems to me, it also applies to any piece of information or evidence on which the prosecutor would wish to rely in making his decision whether to prosecute or not.’ and ‘It is finally important to recognise that it is only in exceptional circumstances that cross-examination would be ordered on an affidavit sworn pursuant to a Mareva order.’
C had been recalled from parole, and complained that the procedure had been unfair in that it had been almost entirely based upon closed materials.
Held: The Commissioners’ decision was indeed based solely or decisively on the closed material. Moreover, the allegations contained in the open material were not sufficiently specific to enable the appellant to provide his lawyers and the special advocate with information to refute them. The hearing which the commissioners had conducted into the appellant’s case constituted, on that account, a breach of the appellant’s ‘right to procedural fairness’ under article 5(4) of the Convention. However the court decided to remit the matter to the Commissioners with a direction that they reconsider the case and reach a decision in accordance with his ruling. The judge also decided to admit the appellant to bail pending reconsideration of his case by the Parole Commissioners.
EAT Unfair Dismissal: Reasonableness of Dismissal – Claim of unfair dismissal for conduct reason relating to misuse of Twitter.
Application of section 98(4) Employment Rights Act 1996 and the range of reasonable responses test, Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones  IRLR 439.
Appeal on basis: (1) the Employment Judge had fallen into error of substitution mindset; and/or (2) had reached a conclusion that was perverse.
Appeal allowed: the Employment Judge had erred in substituting his view for that of the reasonable employer and/or had reached conclusions that were either inconsistent given earlier findings or failed to take into account relevant matters or were simply perverse. The EAT did not consider, however, that only one outcome was possible in this case and thus ordered that the matter should be remitted to a new ET for determination of the application of the range of reasonable responses test to the question of disciplinary sanction.
Declined to lay down fresh guidance for future unfair-dismissal cases involving alleged misuse of social media. Cases were likely to be fact-sensitive and the relevant test would continue to be that laid down in Iceland Frozen Foods.
Application challenging the dismissal by the respondent of the Claimant’s appeal against the Council’s refusal to grant outline planning permission for a ‘sustainable urban extension’ to Grantham, comprising at least 1,000 dwelling houses and other development on land to the north of GranthamCourt: Admn
Housing BenefitsCourt: UTAA
The claimants challenged rejection of five applications under section 5 of the 1981 Act for modification orders allowing the upgrade of routes to provide vehicular public rights of way. The applications had been subitted using digital mapping. The Council said that the maps did not accord with the legislation.
Held: The application failed: ‘there was no strict compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1 of Schedule 14 to the 1981 Act. The maps which accompanied the applications were not drawn to a scale of no less than 1:25,000.’ Moreover, the departures were not such as to fal within a de minimis principle: ‘a map to a scale of 1:50,000 is very different from a map to a scale of 1:25,000, in particular, in terms of the detail relevant to the routes of the claimed ways and their impact relative to surrounding features.’
The defendant appealed by case stated against conviction under section 172 of failing to provide appropriate driver details. The notices had been received at his address, but he had been unaware of them. He was at the time working regularly in the far East for week at a time.
Held: The reference to due diligence rather than reasonable practicability was an unfortunate error, but not one which made a significant difference. The questions were answered: ‘(i) The offence created by section 172(3) does not require knowledge on the defendant’s part that he is under an obligation to provide the specified information;
(ii) The notice was properly served on the defendant notwithstanding that it was not actually received by him;
(iii) The defendant does not have a defence under section 172(7)(b) merely by virtue of the fact that he has no knowledge that the Notices were sent. However, in an appropriate case a defendant may be able to show in such circumstances that it was not reasonably practicable for him to have been aware of the Notice, in which case the defence will apply.’
Application for judicial review of the decisions of Birmingham City Council, the second defendant, determining him to be over 18 years old on the material dates for the purposes of the Children Act 1989.Court: Admn
Section 46(1)(b). Appeal to the Appointed Person. Award of costs – Award of costs to the registered proprietor. See Hearing Officer’s decision dated 8 April 2008 (BL O/100/08).
See Appointed Person’s decision dated 10 November 08(BL O/306/08)
In her decision dated 10 November 2008 (BL O/306/08) the Appointed Person rejected the appeal against the Hearing Officer’s decision of 8 April 2008 (BL O/100/08). She allowed the parties to make written submissions as to the award of costs.
The Appointed Person decided that an appropriate scale award would be £2,100 but she abated this sum by £500 as the applicant had had some measure of success with its appeal. The sum of £1,600 therefore, awarded to the registered proprietor, together with the sum of £2,000 awarded by the Hearing Officer.
Summary Decision – TransferCourt: Nom
The defendant appealed against his convictions for possessing a Clas B drug and for possessing criminal property.Court: CACD
The AG sought leave to appeal against a sentence of two years imprisonment suspended after the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to supply Class A drugs.
Held: In considering the appropriate length of sentence was two and a half years or more, the notion of suspending the term should not have even been considered.
Failure to respond to a request for information and requirements for review within the required timescales – This decision considers whether Shetland Islands Council (the Council) complied with the technical requirements of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA) in responding to information requests made by Mr Peterson.
The Council failed to respond to Mr Peterson’s information request in one instance and his requests for review in respect of this and another request for information. Following an investigation, the Commissioner found that the Council had failed to comply with the relevant timescales specified in sections 10(1) and 21(1) of FOISA.
Consequential opinion as to remedies.Court: SCS
‘what steps a national of an EU Member State must take in order to preserve her status as a worker for the purposes of Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC (‘the Directive’) when she has become involuntarily employed.’Court: UTAA
‘the claimant (ODD) brings a claim against the defendant (BAL) to enforce two adjudication decisions. ODD applied for summary judgment in the sum of £1,229,393.40 inclusive of VAT and interest. BAL originally challenged the appointment of the Adjudicator in the adjudications, contended that the he did not have jurisdiction to make corrections to the decision in one adjudication (Adjudication 8A) and sought a stay of execution of any summary judgment in relation to the adjudication decisions.’Court: TCC
Application to enforce arbitration award.Court: TCC
Road traffic accident – the parties disputed liability.Court: QBD
The claimant sought judicial review of a decision postponing his Parole Board review beyond a time compliant with his right to review, involving an elapse of 21 months.Court: Admn
The claimant sought judicial review of a planning permission saying that the building if erected would infringe her rights of light.Court: Admn
A company had been formed to take over the taxpayer’s business. He held the shares equally with his wife. Later the company created a class of preference shares of £200 each carrying a fixed preferential dividend, the right to vote if such dividend were in arrear for three years or more and the right in a winding up to a return of capital paid up. Some of the shares were taken up by his children on which they paid £10 per share. Dividends substantially in excess of the amounts paid up were then declared and the taxpayer, on behalf of his children claimed repayment of the tax paid in respect of the dividend to the extent of that child’s personal allowance.
Held: The claim was rejected: ‘In my opinion, it is impossible to come to any other conclusion but that this was not a bona fide commercial transaction, and it appears to me that there was a disposition within the meaning of the definition or an arrangement in the nature of a disposition within [that meaning].’
The testator had made his will and contracted not to change it.
Held: A contract not to revoke a will is subject to contingencies. Revocation by operation of law on remarriage is not a breach of such a contract results from the operation of law. The testator could not be prevented from altering his will, but the other party to the contract may be free to bring an action for breach of contract.
The plaintiff’s former employee offered the defendant information about one of the plaintiff’s secret processes which he, as an employee, had invented. The defendant knew that the employee was obliged by his contract not to reveal trade secrets but mistakenly thought that if the process was patentable, it would be the exclusive property of the employee. He took the information in the honest belief that the employee would not be in breach of contract.
Held: The former employer’s appeal failed. The defendant was not guilty, in this state of mind, of having induced a breach of contract. Mr Ferguson did not deliberately abstain from inquiry into whether disclosure of the secret process would be a breach of contract. He negligently made the wrong inquiry, but that is an altogether different state of mind.
Parliament cannot sidestep a restriction in the constitution by a colourable device.Court: PC
In the case of an insolvent company, in which the shareholders have no interest of any value, the court may sanction a scheme which leaves them with nothing.Date: 01-Jan-1939